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ABSTRACT 
Stephen B. Riegg: Claiming the Caucasus: Russia’s Imperial Encounter with Armenians,  
1801-1894 
(Under the direction of Louise McReynolds) 
My dissertation questions the relationship between the Russian empire and the Armenian 
diaspora that populated Russia’s territorial fringes and navigated the tsarist state’s metropolitan 
centers. I argue that Russia harnessed the stateless and dispersed Armenian diaspora to build its 
empire in the Caucasus and beyond. Russia relied on the stature of the two most influential 
institutions of that diaspora, the merchantry and the clergy, to project diplomatic power from 
Constantinople to Copenhagen; to benefit economically from the transimperial trade networks of 
Armenian merchants in Russia, Persia, and Turkey; and to draw political advantage from the 
Armenian Church’s extensive authority within that nation.  
Moving away from traditional dichotomies of power and resistance, this dissertation 
examines how Russia relied on foreign-subject Armenian peasants and elites to colonize the 
South Caucasus, thereby rendering Armenians both agents and recipients of European 
imperialism. Religion represented a defining link in the Russo-Armenian encounter and therefore 
shapes the narrative of my project. Driven by a shared ecumenical identity as adherents of 
Orthodox Christianity, Armenians embraced Russian patronage in the early nineteenth century to 
escape social and political marginalization in the Persian and Ottoman empires. After the tsarist 
state wrested the headquarters of the Armenian Church from Persia in 1828, it maneuvered to 
ensure the election of an Armenian ecclesiastical leader most conducive to Russia’s geopolitical 
objective of maintaining influence over Armenians abroad.  
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Tsarist diplomats amplified the clout of the Armenian Church in European capitals and 
Russian generals relied on Armenian priests to gather intelligence in Turkey during wartime, but 
the government shuttered Armenian parish schools and imprisoned clergy when it detected links 
between the church and a rising nationalist movement. In the last quarter of the nineteenth 
century, a multifaceted Armenian nationalist sentiment that sought varied goals penetrated 
Armenian students, aristocrats, and clerics. Yet my research shows that even during this 
challenge to tsarist authority, Russian statesmen and Armenian clergy continued to pursue 
parallel aims.
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INTRODUCTION 
A large crowd in Yerevan braved the winter chill of 2 December 2013 to watch the 
unveiling of the city’s latest sculptural addition. Dignitaries at the ceremony included Serzh 
Sargsyan, the president of the Republic of Armenia, and Maksim Sokolov, the Russian Minister 
of Transportation. Towering behind the men stood the new, fifteen-foot-tall marble monument. It 
depicts two women, their veiled heads slightly bowed toward each other, bound in an intimate 
embrace. A large cross, the focal point of the sculpture, not only links the women but also finds 
shelter in their unity. While new to the Armenian capital, the monument is a larger replica of an 
older statue in central Moscow, where an inscription declares: “Blessed over centuries is the 
friendship of the Russian and Armenian peoples.”  
A relationship that stretches back into the premodern era, contemporary Russo-Armenian 
ties penetrate time and politics to base their foundation upon centuries of cultural, diplomatic, 
and economic dialogue. Tsar Nicholas I wrested Armenia from Persia in 1828, fusing it to the 
Romanov and then the Soviet empires for nearly two centuries. Since the emergence of an 
independent Armenian state in 1991, the Republic of Armenia has maintained a close political 
partnership with its former imperial overlord, relying on its diplomatic, economic, and military 
support. Indeed, in January 2015, Yerevan joined the Moscow-organized Eurasian Economic 
Union, abandoning the prospect of entering the European Union. Most Western analysts 
interpreted Armenia’s decision to side with President Vladimir Putin’s brainchild as a case of 
realpolitik, in which Armenia yielded to Russian pressure out of fear of losing Moscow’s support 
against its neighboring foe, Azerbaijan. Yet such explanations ignore the deep ties between 
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Russians and Armenians that continue to inform modern developments in the Caucasus and 
beyond. As the Russian Foreign Ministry declared on Twitter in April 2015, “Armenia is 
Russia’s reliable partner and ally. We share centuries-old relations and are bound by historical 
and spiritual ties.” The political synergy and religious kinship between Russians and Armenians 
evoked by Moscow in the twenty-first century experienced their defining moments in the 
nineteenth century. 
This dissertation explores the evolution of the Russian political encounter with 
Armenians in the nineteenth century, a period marked both by the zenith and the nadir of that 
relationship. I argue that Russia harnessed the stateless and dispersed Armenian diaspora to build 
its empire in the Caucasus and beyond. Russia relied on the stature of the two most influential 
institutions of that diaspora, the merchantry and the clergy, to project diplomatic sway from 
Constantinople to Copenhagen; to benefit economically from the transimperial trade networks of 
Armenian merchants based in Tiflis, Astrakhan, and Moscow; and to draw political advantage 
from the Armenian Church’s authority in that nation.  
Religion plays a key role in this narrative because of its centrality to the Russo-Armenian 
encounter. Driven by a shared ecumenical identity as adherents of Orthodox Christianity, 
Armenians embraced Russian patronage in the early nineteenth century to escape social and 
political marginalization in the Persian and Ottoman empires. Tsarist officials resettled Armenian 
peasants from northern Persia and eastern Anatolia into newly conquered territories in the South 
Caucasus, provided financial incentives to Armenian vendors in Constantinople to relocate to 
Crimea, and institutionalized exclusive tax breaks for the Armenian communities of Astrakhan 
and other southern Russian cities. After Petersburg conquered the headquarters of the Armenian 
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Church from Persia in 1828, it maneuvered to ensure the election of an Armenian prelate most 
open to Russia’s geopolitical objective of maintaining influence over Armenians abroad. 
Armenians make a compelling instrument for investigating Russian strategies of 
imperialism for three reasons. First, owing to their diaspora’s distribution along not only social 
and economic lines, but also across regional and imperial borders, Armenians could be found in 
numerous milieus. The exploration of Russo-Armenian ties takes us to the neighboring Persian 
and Ottoman empires, universities and printing presses from Yerevan and Tiflis to Moscow and 
St. Petersburg, and from Caucasian battlefields to Russian provincial capitals. Second, Armenia 
initially embraced tsarist patronage, unlike other territories in the Caucasus. Third, Armenians 
experienced a wide spectrum of group identities that tsarist officials ascribed to them: at first 
recognized as distant Persian vassals lauded for their economic prowess, they graduated into 
loyal Russian allies who were crucial for the administration of the South Caucasus, only to find 
themselves a half century later labeled suspect nationalists.  
A key goal of this dissertation is to contribute to the ongoing reconceptualization of 
dominant narratives of empire in general, and the Russian empire in particular. Moving away 
from traditional dichotomies of power and resistance, this work examines how the Russian 
government relied on foreign-subject Armenian peasants and elites to colonize parts of the South 
Caucasus, thus rendering Armenians concurrently the agents and the recipients of European 
imperialism. Some of the key protagonists here are ethnic Armenian officers in the tsarist 
service, who served in the Romanov bureaucracy and commanded Russian troops, often against 
their own compatriots. Before and after the Russian annexation of Georgia and Eastern Armenia, 
Armenians served as tsarist spies, settlers, and soldiers. Armenians joined Georgians and other 
Christian and Muslim natives of the Caucasus in collaborating with St. Petersburg’s imperial 
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project in the South Caucasus, which achieved tangible results in pulling the region closer to 
Russia and closer to modernity. 
Yet the Armenian encounter with modernity in the nineteenth century, much as it played 
out in other parts of Europe in that age of nationalism, yielded a complex interplay of national 
and imperial identities. This dissertation engages the interdisciplinary work of such theorists of 
empire as Ann Laura Stoler, who has emphasized that “blurred genres of rule are not empires in 
distress but imperial polities in active realignment and reformation.”1 Tsarist agents lauded 
Armenian traders’ contributions to the economic development of the imperial periphery but 
distrusted their affiliations with British and French merchants in Asia Minor. The government 
supported an Armenian family’s establishment of the Lazarev Institute of Oriental Languages in 
Moscow but prohibited the formation of smaller Armenian academies and benevolent 
organizations elsewhere. Tsarist diplomats amplified the clout of the Armenian Church in 
European capitals and Russian generals relied on Armenian priests to gather intelligence in the 
Ottoman empire during wartime, but the government shuttered Armenian parish schools and 
imprisoned clergy when it detected links between the church and a rising nationalist movement. 
In the last quarter of the nineteenth century, a multifaceted Armenian nationalist sentiment that 
sought varied goals infiltrated students, aristocrats, and clerics. Yet even during this challenge to 
tsarist authority, Russian statesmen and Armenian clergy continued to pursue parallel aims.  
Extending to the Russian empire the theoretical framework of what Stoler and Frederick 
Cooper have termed the “tensions of empire”—the contrast between what imperialism sought 
and what it did—I examine how the Armenian Church continued to collaborate with tsarist 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1Ann Laura Stoler, “On Degrees of Imperial Sovereignty,” Public Culture 18, no. 1 (2006): 138. 
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authorities during the nadir of Russo-Armenian relations in the late nineteenth century.2 The two 
sides joined forces to resist the encroachment of foreign Protestant and Catholic missionaries in 
the Caucasus and cooperated in other ways because Armenian ecclesiastical leaders recognized 
the need for Russia’s protection from neighboring Muslim states. One of the contentions here is 
that while Armenians guarded their culture from Russification, the paramount need for physical 
security overshadowed such concerns. This circumstance explains the absence of a concerted 
secessionist current within the diverse Armenian nationalist movement of the 1880s and 1890s. 
Thus this dissertation looks to explanations of empire, by Stoler, Cooper, Burbank, and 
others, that account for the complexity of relationships and identities that characterized imperial 
structures. Dominic Lieven’s exposition matches the contours of this story, but it is not enough 
to explain the Russo-Armenian encounter. Lieven’s streamlined definition of empire, and the 
Russian state of the nineteenth century in particular, describes it as “a very great power that has 
left its mark on the international relations of an era . . . a polity that rules over wide territories 
and many peoples . . . not a polity ruled with the explicit consent of its peoples.”3 To be sure, by 
its own designation, the “All-Russian Empire” (Vserossiiskaia imperiia) was a polyethnic state 
that conquered territories beyond Russia proper and controlled millions of non-Russian and non-
Slavic national groups from the Baltic and Black seas to the Pacific and Arctic oceans. Indeed, 
the very term for the Russian emperor—tsar—is a Russified derivative of that quintessential 
empire’s ruler: the Roman Caesar. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2Frederick Cooper and Ann Stoler, “Tensions of Empire: Colonial Control and Visions of Rule,” in 
American Ethnologist 16, no. 4 (1989): 609-21. 
3Dominic Lieven, Empire: The Russian Empire and Its Rivals (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000), 
xi.  
 6 
Yet the Armenian experience with Russia demands more fluid interpretations of empire, 
which highlight the blurred lines between colonizer and colonized, metropole and periphery. For 
much of the nineteenth century, Armenians derived political, economic, and even cultural 
advantage from their association with Russia. For Armenians, and some other tsarist subjects, 
imperial rule meant not only subjugation and exploitation but also protection and promotion. 
When Khachatur Abovyan, the father of modern Armenian literature, declared in 1841, “Blessed 
be the hour when the blessed Russian foot stepped upon our holy Armenian land,” he was not 
simply pandering to his imperial masters.4 Although the theme of constructive and symbiotic 
imperial relationships has gained traction in historical studies of Russia and other empires,5 last 
century’s temptation to equate “empire” with oppression remains powerful. As Michael 
Reynolds has observed, only recently have we started to move away from a climate in which 
“the very word ‘empire’ became an almost universal word of opprobrium.”6  
The circumstances of the Russian empire, including its contiguous structure that captured 
one-seventh of the planet’s landmass while contesting who qualified as Russkie and Rossiane,7 
render it akin to the “imperial formations” described by Ann Stoler and Carole McGranaham. 
Neither politically static nor socially rigid, “Imperial formations are polities of dislocation, 
processes of dispersion, appropriation, and displacement. They are dependent both on moving 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4Khachatur Abovyan, Rany Armenii [Arm: Verk Hayastani] (Yerevan: Sovetakan grokh, 1977), 102. 
5Alexei Miller, The Ukrainian Question: Russian Nationalism in the Nineteenth Century (Budapest: 
Central European University Press, 2003); Paul Werth, The Tsar’s Foreign Faiths: Toleration and the 
Fate of Religious Freedom in Imperial Russia (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014). 
6Michael Reynolds, Shattering Empires: The Clash and Collapse of the Ottoman and Russian Empires, 
1908-1918 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 9. 
7This distinction refers to the political and ethnic categories of belonging in Russia. Russkie denotes 
members of the Russian nation, while Rossiane indicates inhabitants of the Russian state, irrespective of 
their ethnic or national identity. 
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categories and populations.”8 Such polities display “[g]radations of sovereignty and sliding 
scales of differentiation,” and “are not, as we once imagined them, based on fixed forms and 
secure relations of inequity: they produce unstable relationships of colonizer and colonized, of 
citizen to subject, and unequal struggles over the forms of inclusion and the principles of 
differentiation.”9 Armenians are not a unique exemplar of this circumstance in the Russian case: 
Robert Crews and others have shown how tsarist authorities relied on non-Russians and non-
Slavs to administer and control the vast empire.10 To do so, the government coopted national 
elites and promoted the social and cultural standing of various groups, thus blurring the 
ostensibly fixed lines not only between imperial agents and subjects, but also between the 
dominant (i.e., Russian) and dominated nations. In promoting the Russian “imperium as a 
creative space,” Nicholas Breyfogle has underscored that “Russian/Soviet rule offered important 
opportunities and possibilities—not to mention resources—that could be used to push local 
agendas.”11 This dissertation extends these foci to the Caucasus and Armenia, giving us a better 
understanding of historical and, by extension, contemporary Russo-Armenian ties that continue 
to influence everyday politics in the Caucasus.  
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8Ann Stoler, Carole McGranahan, et al, eds., Imperial Formations (Santa Fe: School for Advanced 
Research Press, 2007), 8. 
9Stoler, McGranahan, et al, eds., Imperial Formations, quotes from 9 and 12. 
10Robert Crews, For Prophet and Tsar: Islam and Empire in Russia and Central Asia (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 2009). 
11Nicholas Breyfogle, “Enduring Imperium: Russia/Soviet Union/Eurasia as Multiethnic, 
Multiconfessional Space,” in Ab Imperio 1 (2008): 100. 
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Historical Context 
The Russo-Armenian encounter antedates by centuries the tsarist incorporation of Eastern 
Armenia in 1828. Divided between the Ottoman (Western) and Persian (Eastern) empires, 
Armenia lost its political independence in 1375. Since the mid-seventeenth century, Russo-
Armenian relations developed around two axes: economic and ecumenical ties. Having become 
frequent visitors in Russian bazaars and trade posts, Armenians’ real and mythologized 
economic prowess, as well as the value of the rare goods they carried from the Orient, earned 
them special status by the second half of the seventeenth century. In April 1667, Tsar Aleksei 
Mikhailovich (1645-76), eager to take advantage of Persian Armenians’ silk imports, included 
Armenians among ethnic groups permitted to trade at advantageous rates, often duty-free, in 
major Russian commercial centers, such as Astrakhan and Moscow.12  
Under Peter the Great, Russia absorbed Armenians from abroad and sympathized with 
the first manifestations of an Armenian liberation movement. In 1701, the Russian emperor 
received Israel Ori, an envoy dispatched by Persian Armenians in hopes of securing a tsarist 
alliance against the shah. Peter granted the Armenian emissary the symbolic rank of colonel in 
the Russian army and promised to “extend his hand of assistance” toward the Armenians of 
Persia.13 Although Ori failed to deliver Eastern Armenians from the grasp of the shah, he 
inspired other young Armenians to look to the Russian empire for liberation. One of Ori’s most 
ambitious successors, Joseph Emin, an Indian Armenian who had served in the British army, 
arrived in the South Caucasus decades later to rally Armenians and Georgians against Persia.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12Sobranie aktov, otnosiashchikhsia k obozreniiu istorii Armianskogo naroda, vol. 1 (Moscow: Lazarev 
Institute of Oriental Languages Press, 1833), 3-4. 
13Sobranie aktov, vol. 2, 289.  
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Russia codified its recruitment of Armenians from abroad in 1711, when the Governing 
Senate recommended that the state “increase Persian trade and court [prilaskat’] Armenians as 
much as possible and ease their lot, in order to encourage them to arrive [in Russia] in large 
numbers.”14 In 1724 Peter issued sweeping economic privileges for Armenians settled 
throughout his realm, granting them exemptions from military service and other exclusive 
rights.15 Peter’s successors continued to grant economic privileges to Armenians in Russia. In 
1746, Armenian merchants in Astrakhan, a strategically important commercial center in southern 
Russia, gained the right to trade tax-free and to establish their own court; in 1769, Astrakhan 
Armenians received the exclusive right to build seagoing vessels for trade in the Caspian Sea.16 
Catherine the Great continued these policies, absorbing new Armenian subjects in 1779 by 
resettling Ottoman Armenians from Crimea to Nor Nakhichevan, a town on the Don River.17 
Religious solidarity drove Russo-Armenian relations in the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries. From the adoption of Christianity by the two nations, in 301 by Armenians and 988 by 
Russians, the links between the Armenian Apostolic and the Russian Orthodox churches 
remained strong. These autocephalous national churches are members of Orthodox Christianity, 
with Russia part of the Eastern Orthodox branch and Armenia part of the Oriental Orthodox 
wing. Although close liturgical cousins, the two churches never entered into full communion and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14Sobranie aktov, vol. 1, 7 and 290. 
15V. B. Barkhudarian, “Armianskie kolonisty v Rossii i ikh rol’ v armiano-russkikh otnosheniiakh,” in M. 
G. Nersisian, ed., Iz istorii vekovoi druzhby (Yerevan: Izdatel'stvo Akademii nauk Armianskoi SSR, 
1983), 124-25. 
16Sobranie aktov, vol. 1, 27, and Barkhudarian, “Armianskie kolonisty v Rossii,” 126. 
17George Bournoutian, “Eastern Armenia from the Seventeenth Century to the Russian Annexation” in 
Richard Hovannisian, ed., Armenian People from Ancient to Modern Times, volume 2. (New York: St. 
Martin’s, 2004), 91.  
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developed independently after members of Oriental Orthodoxy rejected the dogmatic definitions 
of the Council of Chalcedon in 451. Thus shared religion played at once a unifying and a divisive 
role between Russians and Armenians. 
Religion acquired especially politicized implications for Russo-Ottoman relations as soon 
as the tsarist empire portrayed itself as the patron of Ottoman Christians. When Russia forced 
Turkey to sign the Treaty of Kutchuk Kainardzhi in 1774, few contemporaries could have 
imagined the later reverberations of the accord’s Article 7, which stipulated that the “Sublime 
Porte pledges to give the Christian faith and its churches firm protection and it grants the 
Ministers of the Russian Imperial Court [the right] to protect all interests” of Christians.18 As one 
of the largest Ottoman Christian subject groups, Armenians became not just an aspect of the 
nineteenth century’s Eastern Question, but also a key part of Russia’s answer to it.  
Historiography  
While Russian imperialism in the Caucasus attracted particularly wide attention among 
Anglophone historians after the collapse of the Soviet Union, several notable works emerged 
earlier in the twentieth century. The first serious English-language study, John Baddeley’s The 
Russian Conquest of the Caucasus, appeared in 1908. Baddeley focused on the military and 
political story of St. Petersburg’s expansion, using Russian newspapers, periodicals, and other 
published sources. In a passage representative of the prose, Baddeley described General Aleksei 
Ermolov: “Of gigantic stature and uncommon physical strength, with round head set on mighty 
shoulders and framed in shaggy locks, there was something leonine in his whole appearance, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18Basil Dmytryshyn, ed. Imperial Russia: A Source Book, 1700-1917 (Orlando, FL: Harcourt Publishers, 
1990), 109. 
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which, coupled with unsurpassed courage, was well calculated to excite the admiration of his 
own men and strike terror into his semi-barbarous foes.”19  
World wars and revolutions delayed new scholarship on the Caucasus until David 
Marshall Lang began publishing in 1957, producing eight monographs on Georgian and 
Armenian history over the next decades. His first book, The Last Years of the Georgian 
Monarchy, argued that Russia’s annexation of Georgia saved the tiny Christian nation from 
assured annihilation under the Persians.20 Lang’s Armenia: Cradle of Civilization, which mainly 
focused on the prehistorical and premodern eras, was the first survey of Armenian history in 
English.21 Although Ronald Grigor Suny and Richard Hovannisian, two prominent Anglophone 
scholars of Armenia, began publishing in the 1980s, their most influential works came after 
1991. In the meantime, Soviet scholars produced important histories.   
Soviet scholarship on the Caucasus and Armenia often emphasized the historic solidarity 
between the Armenian and Russian peoples. Portraying Persian and Ottoman suzerainty over 
Armenians as wholly oppressive, Soviet scholars—mainly Armenians—presented the Russian 
conquest of Eastern Armenia in 1828 as the timely deliverance of a fellow Christian people, 
echoing the Stalinist trope of “friendship of the peoples.”22 Such narratives continued into the 
post-Stalinist era, reflected particularly in the surge in publications around the 150th anniversary 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19John Baddeley, The Russian Conquest of the Caucasus (London: Longmans and Green, 1908), 94-95. 
20David Lang, The Last Years of the Georgian Monarchy, 1658-1832 (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1957).  
21David Lang, Armenia: Cradle of Civilization (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1970). 
22Z. Grigorian, Prisoedinenie Vostochnoi Armenii k Rossii v nachale XIX veka (Moscow: Izd-vo 
sotsial’no-ekonomicheskoi literatury, 1959); G. M. Kazarian, ed., Prisoedinenie Vostochnoi Armenii k 
Rossii i ego istoricheskoe znachenie: Sbornik statei (Yerevan: Erevanskii gosudarstvennyi universitet, 
1978). 
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of the 1828 annexation. For example, a commemorative volume published in Yerevan in 1978, 
Druzhba naveki (Eternal Friendship), tried to merge the “national-liberation struggle of the 
Armenian people” with the “revolutionary movement of the Russian proletariat.”23 Such texts 
sought to underscore the Marxist vision of a supranational proletarian movement that moved 
beyond bourgeois nationalisms on the path toward Communism.  
S. A. Ter-Avakimova’s history of early-modern Russo-Armenian ties emphasized the 
deep efforts of Armenian ecclesiastical leaders to secure Russian patronage, highlighting in 
particular Israel Ori’s mission to Peter the Great.24 A. M. Pogosian’s archival-based history of 
Kars province within the Russian empire underscored the correspondence of Western Armenian 
and tsarist interests.25 V. G. Gukasian described the influence of the popular press on the 
Western Armenian nationalist movement.26 Some Soviet historians infused Cold War tensions 
into their narratives, accusing Western powers of directly contributing to Russo-Muslim conflicts 
of the nineteenth century. B. P. Balaian argued that British and French diplomats pushed Persia 
and the Ottoman empire into wars with Russia to halt its advances into the Near East.27  
Glasnost’ and perestroika helped Soviet scholarship move away from ideologically 
driven histories of Russo-Armenian ties. V. G. Tunian’s history of Eastern Armenia provided a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23Druzhba naveki: materialy prazdnovaniia 150-letiia vkhozhdeniia Armenii v sostav Rossii (Yerevan: 
Hayastan, 1980). See also M. G. Nersisian, ed., Iz istorii vekovoi druzhby (Yerevan: Izdatel'stvo 
Akademii nauk Armianskoi SSR, 1983). 
24S. A. Ter-Avakimova, Armiano-russkie otnosheniia v period podgotovki persidskogo pokhoda 
(Yerevan: Izdatel'stvo Akademii nauk Armianskoi SSR, 1980).  
25A. M. Pogosian, Karsskaia oblast’ v sostave Rossii (Yerevan: Hayastan, 1983). 
26V. G. Gukasian, Konstantinopol’skie armiane i natsional’no-prosvetitel’noe dvizhenie 30-60kh godakh 
XIX veka (Yerevan: Izdatel'stvo Akademii nauk Armianskoi SSR, 1989). 
27B. P. Balaian, Diplomaticheskaia istoriia russko-iranskikh voin i prisoedineniia vostochnoi Armenii k 
Rossii (Yerevan: Izdatel'stvo Akademii nauk Armianskoi SSR, 1988). 
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sober, well-documented assessment of tsarist policies toward Armenia, even breaking with his 
predecessors by accusing tsarist Russia of suppressing Armenian dreams of independence.28 
Among late-Soviet era scholars of the Caucasus, few gained as much international recognition as 
D. I. Ismail-Zade, whose scholarship on the Russian colonization of the South Caucasus 
appeared in English translation in the early 1980s.29 Ismail-Zade combined research in Soviet 
archives with published Western documents, such as the memoirs of French diplomats, to 
produce important studies of the Russian encounter with the South Caucasus.30 Contemporary 
Russian scholarship has continued to produce well-researched narratives that utilize new archival 
sources. B. T. Ovanesov and N. D. Sudavtsov’s coauthored volume represents the only 
comprehensive overview of Armenians’ bureaucratic and military role in the Russian 
administration of the Caucasus in any language.31  
The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the subsequent opening of the archives for 
foreign researchers marked a watershed moment in Anglophone studies of the Russian empire, 
the Caucasus, and Armenia. Before Francine Hirsch identified the Soviet Union as an “Empire of 
Nations” and before Terry Martin illustrated the Bolsheviks’ pursuit of a supranational state 
devoid of fracture-inducing ethnonationalisms, the emergence of “new” nation-states awakened 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28V. G. Tunian, Vostochnaia Armeniia v sostave Rossii, 1828-1853 gg. (Yerevan: Hayastan, 1989). 
29For one example, see D. I. Ismail-Zade, “Russian Settlements in the Transcaucasus from the 1830s to 
the 1880s,” in Ethel Dunn and Stephen Dunn, eds., The Molokan Heritage Collection, vol. 1 (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1983). 
30D. I. Ismail-Zade, Naselenie gorodov Zakavkazskogo kraia v XIX-nachale XX v. Istoriko-
demograficheskii analiz (Moscow: Nauka, 1991). 
31B. T. Ovanesov, N. D. Sudavtsov, Voenno-administrativnaia deiatel’nost’ armian v rossiiskoi imperii 
na kavkaze (Stavropol: Nairi, 2008).  
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historians’ attention to the multiethnic composition of the Russian and Soviet empires.32 Andreas 
Kappeler spurred the shift in imperial narratives from a metropole-centered, Orthodox tsarist 
state to a polyethnic and polyconfessional empire with multiple poles of power.33 Kappeler 
prodded historians to consider the experiences of the diverse non-Russian subjects of the tsarist 
empire. His research traced the situational and fluid methods of Russian expansionism, from the 
acquiesced incorporation of Armenians and Georgians, to the military conquest of the North 
Caucasus, and the selective co-optation of elites in Central Asia.   
Ronald G. Suny spearheaded the post-Soviet study of Russian imperial policies on the 
periphery with case studies, published in 1993 and 1994, of Armenians and Georgians (Looking 
Toward Ararat and The Making of the Georgian Nation).34 He accented the Russian influence on 
the trajectory of Armenian and Georgian cultural and political thought, as well as their reciprocal 
effect on the metropole. He found that both nations accepted Russian absorption to escape 
Persian and Ottoman rule, and subsequently assimilated into the Russian bureaucracy and 
society, rising to prominent positions in military, cultural, academic, and economic spheres. 
Suny has focused particularly on the responses of Caucasian social classes to Russian 
imperialism, underscoring the distinct combinations of advantages and disadvantages 
experienced by various social groups. Suny’s work has been groundbreaking in many ways, 
providing some of the first surveys of Georgian and Armenian history since David Lang’s 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32Francine Hirsch, Empire of Nations: Ethnographic Knowledge and the Creation of the Soviet Union 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005), and Terry Martin, Affirmative Action Empire:Nations and 
Nationalism in the Soviet Union, 1923-1939 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001). 
33Andreas Kappeler, The Russian Empire: A Multiethnic History (New York: Routledge, 1992). 
34Ronald G. Suny, Looking Toward Ararat: Armenia in Modern History (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1993), and Suny, The Making of the Georgian Nation (Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press, 1994). 
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publications in the mid-twentieth century. Yet Looking Toward Ararat and The Making of the 
Georgian Nation were written during the turmoil of the Soviet collapse, limiting Suny’s 
fieldwork in relevant archives.  
Over the past fifteen years, American scholars have taken advantage of unfettered 
archival access to publish case studies of the Russian experience in the Caucasus, limiting their 
topics in chronology or thematic scope to produce detailed accounts. Austin Jersild studied the 
North Caucasus highlanders (gortsy) and their Georgian neighbors to the south.35 Relying on 
Edward Said’s Orientalism, Jersild argued that the imperial project in the Caucasus required the 
“othering” of the locals in the Russian imperial imagination. Not only did Jersild demonstrate 
how the state legitimized its imperial project (and itself) through the creation of “us” and “them” 
discursive categories, but he also argued that Georgia represented a “closer” center/periphery 
relationship than that between the North Caucasus and St. Petersburg. Nicholas Breyfogle 
followed up Jersild’s study by illustrating the colonization of the South Caucasus by Russian 
non-Orthodox dissenters.36 Heretics and Colonizers emphasized the evolution of imperial 
methods: while St. Petersburg was quick to expel the sectarians into the Caucasus to stave off 
their influence within Russia, the government took advantage of the dissidents’ unexpected 
success in the region and employed them to disseminate Russian cultural and political clout.  
The research of Richard Hovannisian, professor emeritus of Armenian history at UCLA, 
has done much to introduce Anglophone audiences to broad surveys of Armenian history. In 
addition to work on the Armenian Genocide, Hovannisian has written or edited multivolume 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35Austin Jersild, Orientalism and Empire: North Caucasus Mountain People and the Georgian Frontier, 
1845-1917 (Montreal and London: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2002). 
36Nicholas Breyfogle, Heretics and Colonizers: Forging Russia’s Empire in the South Caucasus (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 2005). 
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metahistories of Armenians.37 These syntheses have focused on the Armenian response to 
external political and cultural influences, highlighting the evolution of Western Armenian 
national identities. A protégé of Hovannisian’s, George Bournoutian, has complemented his 
mentor’s scholarship by producing several case studies of Eastern Armenian history. One of his 
most influential works remains his revised doctoral dissertation, Eastern Armenia in the Last 
Decades of Persian Rule, which argued that Persian rule in Yerevan in the early nineteenth 
century was not as oppressive as often assumed.38 Most recently, broad syntheses by Charles 
King and Thomas de Waal have provided surveys of Caucasian history.39 Although these works 
utilize little archival material and treat the various national groups of the Caucasus in unison, 
they provide valuable introductions to Anglophone public audiences.  
Methodology and Sources 
Historian Robert Geraci has rightly lamented that “in the many works published on the 
imperial dimension of Russian history during the past decade, it is often the mechanical or ‘nuts 
and bolts’ aspects of the empire’s administration that are least discussed.”40 In recognizing this 
neglect, this dissertation marshals archival sources to examine closely several key themes that 
shaped Russia’s approach toward Armenia, such as religion, economics, and state policy. This is 
a one-sided story of tsarist methods of rule, with the vast majority of sources Russian. I 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37The Republic of Armenia, 4 vols. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971-96); The Armenian 
Holocaust (Cambridge, MA: Armenian Heritage Press, 1980); ed., The Armenian People from Ancient to 
Modern Times, 2 vols. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997); ed., Remembrance and Denial: The Case of 
the Armenian Genocide (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1998). 
38George A. Bournoutian, Eastern Armenia in the Last Decades of Persian Rule, 1807-1828 (Malibu, CA: 
Undena Publications, 1982). 
39Charles King, The Ghost of Freedom: A History of the Caucasus (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2008); Thomas de Waal, The Caucasus: An Introduction (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010). 
40Robert Geraci, “On ‘Colonial’ Forms and Functions,” in Slavic Review 69, no. 1 (Spring 2010): 180. 
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conducted fieldwork in St. Petersburg and Moscow, Russia; Yerevan, Armenia; and Washington, 
D.C. To analyze “matters of practical functionality” and the way tsarist officialdom perceived 
and engaged with Armenians, I use state and regional correspondence, bureaucratic reports, 
decrees, petitions, popular newspapers, and other sources. 
In St. Petersburg, I worked in the Russian State Historical Archive (RGIA), and two 
branches of the Russian National Library. RGIA contains the records of the Lazarev family (f. 
880), the Caucasus Committee (f. 1268), the Interior Ministry Department of Foreign Faiths (f. 
821), and other relevant collections. The Lazarev files illustrate the extent of that family’s efforts 
to promote Armenian interests within tsarist society. From establishing churches and academies 
to petitioning government officials and mediating between the Armenian Church and the tsarist 
state, the Lazarevs played a crucial role in Russo-Armenian ties in the nineteenth century. The 
files of the Caucasus Committee reveal the parallel interests between the Russian state and the 
Armenian Church during the nadir in Russo-Armenian relations in the late nineteenth century, 
when state officials closed Armenian parish schools and imprisoned clergy. Despite such 
obstacles, the two sides continued to cooperate to stave off the encroachment of Catholic and 
Protestant missionaries in eastern Anatolia and the South Caucasus. The records of the Caucasus 
Committee also shed light on the evolution of Armenians’ economic position in several southern 
Russian cities. From negotiating their tax obligations to petitioning for the renewal of exclusive 
economic privileges, Russian Armenians sought permanent economic rights within Russian 
society. Senior tsarist officials debated and often disagreed, as Tsar Alexander I phrased it in 
1825, “whether it is fair to grant immigrants eternal advantages over native Russians.”41   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41Russian State Historical Archive (RGIA), f. 1152, op. 1, d. 77, l. 38ob. Emphasis in the original.  
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In St. Petersburg’s Russian National Library, I used the three-volume Sobranie aktov, 
otnosiashchikhsia k obozreniiu armianskogo naroda (Collection of Documents Pertaining to the 
Review of the Armenian People) to explore early Armenian immigration and settlement in such 
Russian cities as Moscow, Astrakhan, and Rostov. These communities became important hubs of 
Armenian life in Russian space, eliciting different responses from regional and state authorities. 
Additionally, the diary of Mikhail Vorontsov, the Caucasus viceroy at mid-century, provides a 
more detailed view of the local Russian administration than official documents from the 
archives. The newspaper department of the Russian National Library contains important St. 
Petersburg dailies, such as the newspaper Golos (The Voice), which in the late 1870s published 
recurring front-page articles in support of Ottoman Armenians. I use Golos to illustrate the non-
official, liberal Russian perspective upon the Eastern Question and popular Russian views of the 
transimperial Armenian diaspora. 
In Moscow, I worked in the State Archive of the Russian Federation (GARF), the 
Russian State Military History Archive (RGVIA), the Central Historical Archive of Moscow 
(TsIAM), and the Russian State Library. GARF houses the records of the Third Section of His 
Imperial Majesty's Own Chancellery, the secret imperial police active from 1826 through 1880 
(f. 109), and the files of its successor, the Department of Police of the Interior Ministry, or 
Okhranka (f. 102). These collections provide an intimate view of the state’s pursuit of Armenian 
nationalists, and also demonstrated the mechanisms of imperial nationalities policy. Letters and 
investigative reports elucidate not only Russian officials’ response to the real and imagined 
threat of Armenian nationalism, but also the diversity—in terms of social and class composition, 
as well as divergent aims—of the Armenian groups. 
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RGVIA contains the records for the two Russo-Persian wars of the early nineteenth 
century. During the first war in 1804-13, Armenians, then Persian subjects, sympathized with 
Russian expansion, seeing in their northern Christian neighbor a defender against Persian 
excesses (f. 475). I retrieved multiple reports, orders, and correspondence pertaining to Russian 
Generals Tsitsianov, Ermolov, and Paskevich, who relied on Armenians in their conquest of 
Persian territories. During the second Russo-Persian war, in 1826-28, when Russia finally 
wrested Armenian-populated Yerevan khanate from Persia, Armenians played a prominent role 
in the Russian war effort, volunteering for military service and providing intelligence (f. 476). 
This depository also houses the records for the Russo-Ottoman War of 1877-78, as well as files 
for the Russian administration of Kars province (f. 485 and f. 15322).  
TsIAM houses documents pertaining to the Lazarev Institute of Oriental Languages in 
Moscow (f. 213). Established in 1815 as the Lazarev Armenian Academy by Russian statesmen 
and entrepreneurs of Armenian heritage, this institution became an important center of Eastern 
language and culture training in imperial Russia. The institute trained many Russian specialists 
of Orientology (vostokovedenie) and related languages, including Armenian.  
The Russian State Library in Moscow and the Library of Congress in Washington, D.C. 
hold the twelve-volume Akty, sobrannye Kavkazskoiu Arkheograficheskoiu Kommissieiu 
(Documents Collected by the Caucasus Archeographical Commission). This rare published 
collection of primary sources contains thousands of official correspondence, royal decrees, 
orders, and petitions, regarding the Russian administration of its Caucasus territories. An 
academic-bureaucratic entity, the Caucasus Archeographical Commission assembled the records 
of the local administration and studied Russian-native interactions, facilitating a closer 
understanding of the relationships characterizing St. Petersburg’s project in the Caucasus.  
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In Yerevan, the National Archive of Armenia (NAA) contains the files of the Russian 
administration: Armianskaia oblast’ (f. 90) and Yerevan guberniia (f. 94). These records 
illustrate Russian efforts to relocate Armenians from the Ottoman empire and Persia into the 
newly annexed territories of the South Caucasus. Although some of this material is at RGVIA, 
NAA holds detailed files pertaining to the resettlement of Armenian refugees after the Russo-
Ottoman War of 1877-78. Some of the statistical data at NAA is more detailed than the records 
from Moscow and Petersburg, and is especially useful for illustrating tsarist policies vis-à-vis 
Armenian immigrants and local Muslims, shedding light on the political and economic 
incentives for such large-scale population transfers.  
Chapter Overview  
Claiming the Caucasus comprises five chronologically arranged chapters. I begin my 
narrative in 1801, when Russia entered the interimperial politics of the South Caucasus by 
annexing from Persia the Georgian kingdom of Kartli-Kakhetia. The dissertation concludes with 
the death of Tsar Alexander III in 1894, by which date Russian officials had made the crucial 
decision to resist the immigration of Ottoman Armenians into tsarist territory, the policy that 
dominated until the Bolshevik Revolution.  
In chapter 1, I advance several interrelated points. First, I argue that mutual distrust 
hindered early Russo-Georgian and Armeno-Georgian ties. Second, this chapter illustrates the 
systematic Armenian cooperation with Russian imperial aims during and after the Russo-Persian 
war. Third, this chapter examines the tsarist state’s approach toward the Armenian Church and 
its head, the Catholicos. Although the government prioritized the election of a pro-Russian 
Catholicos, it sought to merge its political interests with Armenian desires. Indeed, this chapter 
shows that Russians needed Armenians as much as Armenians needed Russians.  
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In chapter 2, I demonstrate how and why the Russian state recruited and distrusted 
Armenians from abroad, and also promoted and restrained their commerce in southern Russia, 
illustrating the evolution of a multifaceted project that resists traditional labels of “colonial 
expansion” or “economic exploitation.” I contrast the Armenian resettlement into Russia with the 
acrimony resulting from Armenians’ growing economic position in imperial society. 
In the third chapter, I focus on the religious and economic aspects of Russo-Armenian 
ties under Tsar Nicholas I (1825-55). This chapter examines how, and why, the state codified the 
rights and activities of the Armenian Church in 1836 and argues that in considering Armenian 
legal status in Russia, the government often prioritized geopolitical aims beyond Russia’s 
frontiers, eager to utilize the diaspora for its political goals. Officials struggled to reconcile the 
demands of a well-regulated country with the special circumstances of such imperial minorities 
as Armenians.  
 In chapter 4, I consider Russo-Armenian relations within the broader context of the 
Eastern Question. This chapter demonstrates how Armenians were key to tsarist foreign policy in 
the East in general and to the Eastern Question in particular. Because St. Petersburg ruled over 
only a portion of the Armenian diaspora, a large proportion of which resided in the Ottoman 
empire, it had to contend with a unique set of political circumstances.  
 The final chapter examines the rise of a diverse Armenian nationalist movement in the 
last quarter of the nineteenth century. It also assesses the political responses of Russian officials 
in St. Petersburg and in the Caucasus to the illicit raids of Eastern Armenians into Anatolia. 
More broadly, this analysis illuminates the tensions between the integrating forces of ecumenical 
solidarity and the alienating forces of nationalist discord, which defined Russo-Armenian 
interactions for much of the nineteenth century.   
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Terms and Dates 
Owing to the historical distribution of Armenians across Eurasia, distinguishing them 
according to their political affiliations results in multiple labels. To denote Armenian subjects of 
the Russian tsar, I use “tsarist Armenians,” “Russian Armenians,” and “Eastern Armenians.” 
Those outside Russia are described either as “foreign Armenians,” or according to their imperial 
overlord, such as “Ottoman” or “Western Armenians,” and “Persian Armenians.” I opt for the 
neutral “South Caucasus” rather than the Russian-inspired “Transcaucasus” (Zakavkaz’e). Unless 
otherwise noted, I use “Patriarch” and “Catholicos” interchangeably to refer to the leader of the 
Armenian Church based in Echmiadzin. To avoid confusion, I use the modern “Yerevan” for the 
capital of Eastern Armenia, rather than the “Erivan’” [Эривань] of pre-1936 Russian sources. 
All dates are given according to the Julian calendar used in imperial Russia. Russian and 
Armenian words are transliterated according to the modified Library of Congress system.  
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Figure 1. Monument to Russian-Armenian Friendship in Yerevan.  
Photo property of the author.
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CHAPTER 1: THE EMBRACE OF AN EMPIRE, 1801-1814 
“Better to have allies interested in an alliance than unreliable subjects.” 
                   -Tsar Paul, 1801 
“From ancient times the Armenian nation has awaited liberation from the yoke of its 
merciless rulers. At last the coveted hour has arrived under the scepter of the august northern 
monarch.” 
     -Armenians of Baku, 1809 
In the early nineteenth century, the expanding Russian empire searched for non-Russian 
allies. In the first fourteen years of that century, Tsar Alexander I (1801-25) annexed the 
Georgian kingdom of Kartli Kakhetia, defeated the shah in the First Russo-Persian War (1804-
13), and incorporated new Armenian subjects into his realm. This chapter tracks these 
developments to advance three aims. First, I argue that mutual distrust hindered early Russo-
Georgian and Armeno-Georgian ties. This strife manifested especially among Georgian elites, 
including members of the dethroned royal family, and the increasingly powerless Georgian 
nobles. Second, this chapter illustrates the systematic Armenian cooperation with Russian 
imperial goals during and after the Russo-Persian war. Armenians served not only as tsarist 
spies, messengers, and negotiators, but also became the frontiersmen of Russian expansion into 
the region, settling newly conquered territories. Third, this chapter examines the tsarist state’s 
approach toward the Armenian Church and its head, the patriarch or Catholicos, the 
ecclesiastical and often political leader of the stateless Armenians. Although the government 
prioritized the election of a pro-Russian Catholicos, it sought to merge its political interests with 
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Armenian desires. Indeed, this chapter shows that Russians needed Armenians as much as 
Armenians needed Russians. Driven by ecumenical solidarity, Armenian peasants, clergymen,  
and nobles defected from the shah’s khanates to the tsar’s provinces in search of security and 
prosperity, while Russian generals and administrators recruited Armenian spies, settlers, and 
translators to advance tsarist political objectives.  
Tsarist authorities chose Armenians as their key diplomatic and military ally because of 
their diasporic distribution along not only social and economic lines but also across imperial 
borders. While Georgians possessed a large aristocracy with sizable resources at its disposal, 
Russian statesmen sought to capitalize on Armenian commercial and religious networks that 
penetrated countries and societies inaccessible to Russian agents. Indeed, Russia’s borders with 
Persia and Turkey, effectively impenetrable to Russian and even Georgian elements, remained 
porous to Armenian merchants and priests. Beyond the Caucasus, too, the potential political 
advantages of the Armenian diaspora informed Russian foreign policy.  
Russia’s methods in annexing the South Caucasus blended the settler colonialism of an 
external intruder with the indirect rule of an indigenously administered dependent. More 
specifically, as this chapter demonstrates, Armenians at once colonized and were colonized in the 
South Caucasus during the first two decades of the tsarist absorption of the region. Armenians 
blurred the traditional colonizer/colonized binary by becoming both the agents and the subjects 
of imperial expansion. They joined the Russian bureaucracy and army, attended elite institutions 
in St. Petersburg and commanded (Russian) troops in the Caucasus. At the same time, scores of 
new Armenian refugees and immigrants from Persian khanates, such as Yerevan, gravitated 
toward life in the tsar’s dominion, not only settling recently annexed territories but also fighting 
alongside tsarist forces and supplying them with intelligence.  
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In their initial forays into the politics of the South Caucasus, tsarist imperial agents 
defined Armenians as ethnically distinct “Orientals.” Armenians’ brand of Christianity may have 
been a close dogmatic cousin of their new overlords’ religion and a co-member of Orthodox 
Christianity,42 but that did not keep it from being lumped together with Islam and Judaism as a 
“foreign confession” (innostrannoe ispovedanie).43 Russian statesmen concurrently delineated 
culturally between the Great Russian nation and Armenians, and distinguished politically 
between Armenians and the ostensibly less reliable Georgians and other regional natives.  
Thus Armenians resisted the traditional characteristics of assigned otherness by 
challenging Russian officials to redefine and maintain their difference. To be sure, St. 
Petersburg’s incorporation of the South Caucasus in the early nineteenth century produced a 
space of increasingly unclear divisions. Many prominent tsarist officials tasked with expanding 
and securing new frontiers were non-Russians, reflecting both Alexander I’s cosmopolitanism 
and the realities of empire-building. Such generals and administrators as the Baltic German Karl 
Heinrich Knorring, the Italian Philip Paulucci, the Georgian Pavel Tsitsianov (Tsitsishvili), and 
the Armenian Ivan Petrovich Lazarev (Lazarian) are but the most famous examples. Their 
superiors in the imperial metropole, too, included powerful non-Russian officials, such as 
Minister of Foreign Affairs Karl Nesselrode, a Baltic German. Thus to speak of “Russian 
imperialism” in “Eastern Armenia” in the early nineteenth century is to speak of a complex 
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dialogue that involved not only some tsarist imperialists who were not Russians at all, but also 
imperial agents and subjects who often belonged to the same ethnic and national group.   
Early Armeno-Georgian and Russo-Georgian Strife  
 To understand Russo-Armenian ties in the early nineteenth century, an analysis of 
contemporaneous South Caucasian political and social developments is necessary. Because of 
Georgians’ numerical and political importance in the region, we must examine Armeno-
Georgian and Russo-Georgian relations during and after St. Petersburg’s annexation of the 
Georgian kingdom of Kartli Kakhetia in 1801. While it is tempting to see Georgia as a precursor 
to the Armenian case, significant contrasts marked their respective encounters with the tsarist 
state. True, both of these Christian nations sought Russian refuge from imminent Persian and 
Ottoman threats. However, Georgian elites objected to the methods of tsarist annexation and 
hesitated to accept their new imperial overlord. Additionally, Armeno-Georgian social and 
cultural strife not only estranged these neighbors but also informed Russian understandings of 
the two nations. Armenians and Georgians, the two largest and most prominent representatives 
of Christianity in the Caucasus, shared deep cultural ties since the premodern era yet tensions 
between the two nations defined the nineteenth century and continue to influence contemporary 
regional politics. “To the outsider,” Thomas de Waal has observed, “one of the mysteries of the 
Caucasus is why the relationship between Armenians and the Georgians, two old Christian 
nations, is frequently fraught and suspicious.”44 
 The roots of this discord reach into antiquity. Georgian King Mirian III adopted 
Christianity around 330, just a few decades after his Armenian counterpart’s conversion in 301. 
Their faith became a sacrosanct cornerstone of Georgian and Armenian national identities, linked 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44Thomas de Waal, The Caucasus: An Introduction (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), 21.  
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by their perennial tensions with neighboring Muslims. But, as early as the fifth century, the two 
national churches chose separate paths. Because of doctrinal disagreements over the Council of 
Chalcedon in 451, the Georgian Orthodox Church looked toward Byzantium and Eastern 
Orthodoxy, while the Armenian Apostolic Church aligned itself with the Oriental Orthodox 
branch of Christianity. Consequently, as De Waal notes, “the Armenian and Georgian churches 
traded anathemas, and the Armenian catholicos forbade Armenians to communicate with, eat 
with, pray with, or marry Georgians.”45  
In the modern era, social and economic factors divided Armenians and Georgians more 
than theology. From the late Middle Ages and well into the nineteenth century, Armenians, 
Muslims, and other foreigners outnumbered Georgians in Georgian towns.46 Fleeing Seljuk 
advances and the Byzantine conquest of Ani, the short-lived Armenian city-state (961-1045) in 
1045, Armenian nobles and their peasants found asylum in Georgian towns, especially Tiflis. 
Georgian kings ascribed to them the role of urban traders, a vocation in which Armenians soon 
excelled, engaging in regional and long-distance trade. By the turn of the nineteenth century, 
outsiders and locals alike concurred that among the Georgian capital’s population, “the group 
that truly stood out in the economic and administrative life of the city was the Armenians.”47 
This reputation of Armenians as the merchants of the Caucasus endured for the rest of the 
century. By contrast, as historian Ronald G. Suny has observed, Georgians relied on an agrarian 
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46Ronald G. Suny, The Making of the Georgian Nation (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, second 
edition, 1994), 38. 
47Charles King, The Ghost of Freedom: A History of the Caucasus (New York: Oxford University Press, 
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economy in the countryside that sought to satisfy local needs without producing surplus for 
resale and trade.48   
Lopsided national proportions of the Tiflis population contributed to Armeno-Georgian 
tensions. By some estimates, the Armenian domination of Tiflis amounted to three-fourths of the 
city’s population when Russia annexed Kartli Kakhetia in 1801.49 Armenians reigned over the 
city’s bazaars and moneylending sector, accruing not only financial gain but also the attendant 
social and political leverage. Some of the first tsarist officials to arrive in Tiflis reported to St. 
Petersburg that “the Armenians control most of the trade here.”50 A decade later, one of the 
tsarist commanders of the Caucasus remarked that in Tiflis “the merchantry is comprised almost 
exclusively of Armenians.”51 Georgian nobles and peasants, more at ease with the seigniorial 
economy of the early modern era than the mercantile practices of urban retailers, disdained the 
Armenians who dominated the Georgian capital and other towns. One indignant Georgian noble, 
Prince Iese Baratashvili, derided Armenians for their lack of aristocratic pedigree and for their 
diasporic distribution, “Where do Armenians possess nobility? They have been dispersed by 
God! Is it in Man’s power to reunite them?”52     
Visitors to Georgia from Russia and the west often noted the ostensibly “indolent” work 
ethic of Georgians, although such observations often tell us more about the authors than their 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48Suny, The Making of the Georgian Nation, 77. 
49King, The Ghost of Freedom, 147-148. 
50Quoted in Ronald G. Suny, Looking Toward Ararat: Armenia in Modern History (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1993), 37. 
51Philip Paulucci, quoted in D. I. Ismail-Zade, Naselenie gorodov Zakavkazskogo kraia v XIX-nachale XX 
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subjects. To be sure, as Suny has stressed, “consistently distressed by the Georgians’ attitude 
toward work, economy, and self-employment, noble officers from the north or travelers from the 
West found their explanations in racial, climatic, or educational factors.”53 English writer and 
diplomat Robert Ker Porter, for example, upon visiting Tiflis in 1817, remarked that “the 
Armenians set a stimulating example of the ways and means of industry, and show many 
persuasive advantages, resulting from their extensive exercise,” a trend that he hoped would 
“inspire” Georgians.54 Moreover, arriving Russian agents expressed surprise at the degree to 
which Georgian elites had retreated from the economic and social life of Tiflis, Gori and other 
cities, apparently contented with age-old arrangements of enserfed labor and wanting little to do 
with trade and industry. Thus the image of Georgians as economically backward and socially 
isolated began to solidify in the political imagination of early Russian imperial agents.  
 Yet aristocratic Russian officers often found more in common with the Georgian 
noblemen of the countryside than the Armenian merchants of the towns. Based on “shared values 
of military bravery, chivalry, and a love of grace and largess,” tsarist elites welcomed the few 
Georgian nobles who joined the Russian service.55 However, at the same time as Russian 
administrators faulted Armenians for what they perceived as avarice, their eagerness to animate 
regional commerce necessitated the Russian reliance on the Armenian bourgeoisie and its 
commercial networks. Armenians, therefore, gradually earned the reputation of “diligent” 
natives, juxtaposed by Russian observers against their supposedly less-ambitious Georgian 
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55Suny, Looking Toward Ararat, 38. 
 31 
neighbors. Consequently, it is hardly surprising that tsarist officials, despite residual distrust of 
Armenian entrepreneurship, looked to Armenians as their more capable indigenous ally in the 
Caucasus. 
 Economic competition and social strife defined Armeno-Georgian relations at the turn of 
the nineteenth century. Georgians were not only in the minority in Tiflis, but also felt 
increasingly marginalized in the city’s commercial culture. The combination of theological, 
national, economic, and social differences between Armenians and Georgians fueled a 
“smoldering hostility” between the two groups and also precipitated distinct Russian 
understandings of those two nations and their roles in the tsarist expansion into the South 
Caucasus. Russia’s seizure of Tiflis in 1801 exacerbated old tensions and created new ones. 
The tsarist annexation of the Georgian kingdom of Kartli Kakhetia does not need 
retelling.56 What is important for our purposes is an overview of the Russo-Georgian discord 
caused by the manner of the Russian incorporation of Georgia. Although between 1795 and 1801 
Persia redoubled its efforts to bring Kartli Kakhetia to heel and to reestablish a vassal state 
relationship, no more attacks followed after 1795, and King Erekle II remained on the throne 
until his death in 1798. Despite the fact that in 1795, during the Persian assault of Tiflis, the 1783 
agreement with the Russian empire had proved tragically insufficient against Persian aggression, 
Georgian elites sought deeper ties to their northern neighbor. In September 1799, Erekle’s 
successor, Giorgii XII (1798-1800), personally petitioned Tsar Paul I (1796-1801) for the Kartli 
Kakheti kingdom to become part of the tsarist empire “on the same footing as the other provinces 
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of Russia.”57 Giorgii likely understood this as legal protection of his territory’s status within 
Russia concurrent with the continuation of his reign over Georgia. In return for fusing his nation 
to Russia, Giorgii asked that the Bagrationi family remain on the Georgian throne and that the 
Georgian nobility be absorbed into the Russian system of ranks.  
 Even before Giorgii’s petition, Paul looked to project his empire’s authority into Kartli 
Kahetia. In April 1799, a special “minister” in Georgia was chosen, State Councilor Petr 
Kovalenskii. Citing the 1783 Treaty of Georgievsk as legal precedent, Paul dispatched this envoy 
to the Georgian court to represent Russia’s interests, protect economic links, and to gather 
intelligence.58 A specific objective, however, concerns us here.   
 In a development that would soon become state policy, the tsarist government tasked 
Kovalenskii with enabling the arrival of Armenians from abroad in the South Caucasus. The 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (hereafter MID) instructed him to facilitate the resettlement of 
several Armenian communities, per their wishes, from such nearby Persian khanates as Karabakh 
into Kartli Kakhetia.59 Kovalenskii was to secure favorable land grants from King Giorgii for the 
use of these hereditary Armenian nobles, or meliks, and their communities. Tsar Paul, who 
wished to see “this new Christian community in Georgia prosper as much as possible,” was 
convinced that the influx of Persian Armenians would only benefit the Georgian kingdom. He 
impressed on Kovalenskii the importance of securing from Giorgii land grants for Armenians 
“on as favorable terms as possible,” and emphasized that these new Armenian communities 
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should “not be a kind of vassals” of the Georgian king, although they were expected to pay 
“moderate” tribute and do their share to protect the region from external attack. “In any case,” 
concluded the MID’s instructions to Kovalenskii, “you will have no trouble in making the 
Georgian tsar understand how beneficial for him can be the settlement of various Christian 
communities in those areas, where [they can] counteract the activity of Muslims, so harmful and 
ruinous to Christian peoples.”60  
Tsar Paul drove home the point himself by asking the Georgian king in June 1799 to 
“grant the requested land for them, give them the freedom and privileges proper for guests, and 
maintain all of the rights and advantages over their Armenian subjects [i.e., peasants] that they 
enjoyed in their former homelands, never depriving them of this rightful authority, as long as 
they stay loyal and diligent.”61 Giorgii acquiesced, presenting to one of the Armenian meliks, 
Dzhimshid Shakhnazarov, the stately Lori fortress and the territory surrounding it, with control 
over the area’s non-Armenian peasants. 
King Giorgii had every reason to accept Kovalensii’s arrival in hopes that a repeat of the 
1795 attack would be impossible with St. Petersburg’s new attention toward his kingdom.62 But 
the tsarist diplomat’s presence alone was insufficient guarantee of security for Giorgii, who 
continued to lobby for Russian troops to be stationed in his kingdom as a redoubt against Persian 
invasion. Anticipation of an impending Persian attack grew in 1800, as repetitive reports of 	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gathering Persian forces inundated Georgian and Russian officials.63 Yet the tsarist empire’s 
newfound dedication to Georgia’s security vis-à-vis Persia had to be balanced with a desire to 
expand economic ties between the two empires.  
In late 1799 Tsar Paul consented to Giorgii’s requests for military protection, dispatching 
two small forces. General Karl Heinrich Knorring, a Baltic German, led the first group, while 
General Ivan Petrovich Lazarev, an ethnic Armenian born in Russia, marched another contingent 
of soldiers into Tiflis. But the Georgian king grew increasingly frustrated by what he saw as 
Russia’s inadequate military assistance, imploring Knorring to double the size of the Russian 
contingent from 3,000 to 6,000 men.64 Indeed, the Persian threat to Kartli Kakhetia had risen to 
new levels in the summer of 1800. In July, Abbas-Mirza, son of Shah Baba Khan, encamped his 
army at Yerevan, a short distance from the Georgian capital. Abbas Mirza demanded that Giorgii 
send his eldest son to Tehran as a sign of his continued loyalty.65 As the first year of the 
nineteenth century drew to a close, these tensions in the Russo-Georgian encounter swelled.  
Giorgii was not alone in his growing frustration with the kingdom’s geopolitical 
situation. Questions of royal succession began to crescendo as it became clear that Giorgii 
intended to fuse the kingdom to Russia. The fleeing of Giorgii’s half-brother, Alexander, from 
Kartli Kakhetia evinced this anxiety. Alexander had long opposed Giorgii’s orientation toward 
Russia’s orbit and found an eager welcome from neighboring khans. Alexander represented a 
simmering Georgian elite that grew wary of Giorgii’s policies, fearing the loss of its authority 
and wealth. His protracted anti-Russian rebellion, stretching over a decade and backed not only 	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by some Persian khans but also by various North Caucasian tribes, would drive a wedge between 
Russo-Georgian ties of the early nineteenth century. Alexander’s first strike came in November 
1800, when he and Omar Khan, the ruler of Dagestani Avars, launched a unified attack. A joint 
Russian-Georgian army that enjoyed the advantage of artillery, however, repelled the assault.66  
 Alexander’s abortive attempt to expel Russians from Kartli Kakhetia not only failed, but 
also directly precipitated the final act of the tsarist empire’s annexation of Georgia. Just eight 
days after the battle, on 15 November 1800, Tsar Paul informed General Knorring that King 
Gigorii, “seeing his kingdom threatened by external foes as much as, and perhaps more, by the 
growing internecine war within his own family over succession to the throne, has ordered his 
embassy to declare to me his wish to see Georgian lands in our direct subjecthood 
[poddanstvo].”67 Paul was not exaggerating. Under Giorgii’s orders, the Georgian legation in St. 
Petersburg had declared to the Russian court: “King Giorgii of Georgia, . . . dignitaries, the 
clergy, and the people, unanimously wish to enter forever into the subjecthood of the Russian 
empire, solemnly pledging to carry out all that, which Russian subjects carry out, without 
avoiding any laws or commands.”68 In January 1801, a month after the Georgian monarch’s 
death, and just two months before his own murder at the hands of palace conspirators, the tsar 
signed a decree establishing Georgia as part of the Romanov empire. 
Paul’s successor, Alexander I, confirmed his father’s last foreign policy decision, but 
chose to dethrone the Georgian royal family, contradicting the agreement his father had reached 
with the Bagrationi family. Despite the outcry of Georgian nobles, Alexander claimed the 	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decision was not calculated to “increase my powers, secure profit, nor enlarge the boundaries of 
an already vast empire,” bur rather was intended to “establish in Georgia a government that can 
maintain justice, ensure the security of persons and of property, and give to everyone the 
protection of law.”69 Suny has argued that Alexander “decided that Russia’s interests and 
Georgia’s future could best be guaranteed by outright incorporation into the empire.”70 Few 
sources survive to illustrate more precise reasoning for Alexander’s reversal of his father’s 
agreement, but imperial events in a different corner of the world may shed light here.  
The Russian autocracy closely watched Napoleon’s invasion of Ottoman-administered 
Egypt in 1798, hostile to both empires’ expansionist ambitions.71 With the tide of war having 
turned decidedly to the Ottoman side by early 1801, Russia saw a renewed threat from the 
sultan’s empire. It is fair to interpret Alexander’s decision regarding Georgia, made almost 
concurrently with the French defeat in Egypt, as calculated to secure Russia’s borders with the 
Sublime Porte. The Bagrationi dynasty, weakened as it was by internal havoc as well as 
neighboring gortsy, khans, and the shah, was likely to become a liability in the event of a new 
Russo-Ottoman showdown. With the Georgian royal family forcefully removed to Russia, the 
ancient Bagrationi lineage—for centuries the steadfast political representative of the Georgian 
nation—ceased to exist as a political entity.  
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Capitalizing on his gains and emboldened by Persian inaction, the young tsar set his 
sights on further expansion, instructing his ministers in March 1802 that all territory north of the 
Kura and Arax rivers must be conquered.72 Responding to complaints about Knorring and 
unsatisfied with the general’s “weak” command of the Georgian situation, Alexander removed 
him from command in the fall of 1802.73 Perhaps seeking to smooth the tumultuous relationship 
with Georgian elites who continued to resist the unilateral annexation of their kingdom, 
Alexander appointed General Pavel Tsitsianov as High Commissioner (glavnoupravliaiushchii) 
of Georgia.74 A Russian-educated Georgian with an impressive military record, the general took 
up the tsar’s task with alacrity. Although his tenure at the helm of the Caucasus administration 
would last less than three and a half years—cut short by his death at the siege of Baku in 1806—
Tsitsianov’s influence on Russo-Georgian and broader Russo-Caucasian narratives cannot be 
underestimated. Tsitsianov was Russia’s first Caucasus commander to be granted both military 
and civilian jurisdiction, eventually taking over the responsibilities previously carried out by 
Knorring and Kovalenskii, respectively. The reasons for such a promotion are important. 
Knorring’s dismissal stemmed from the tsar’s general “dissatisfaction” with his 
performance, but the practically unknown story of Kovalenskii’s demotion deserves attention for 
the insight it provides into the gestation of early Russian knowledge about the South Caucasus 
and its inhabitants.75 While the roots of the problem stemmed from the envoy’s personal 	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arrogance vis-à-vis his Russian colleagues and Georgian counterparts, the wider tensions he 
caused in Russo-Georgian ties reverberated deeply. Essentially, Kovalenskii ignored the de 
rigueur observances of diplomatic protocol, seemingly trivial actions that in practice produced 
animosity between the Russian administration and the Georgian elite. From the beginning, he 
displayed insufficient deference toward the Georgian king, failing to report to him immediately 
upon arrival in Tiflis and repeatedly declined the king’s dinner invitations, citing ill health, but 
sending in his stead low-ranking representatives. He also demanded that custom-built armchairs 
be provided for his audience with the Georgian monarch, which he moved so close to the king 
during their meeting that their feet touched, a gross breach of etiquette.76 In putting an end to 
Kovalenskii’s debauchery, Tsitsianov scolded the bureaucrat that his downfall was “a 
consequence of your insensitivity toward local nobles, whom you offended by your behavior and 
thereby compelled to come to hate [our] administration to such a degree, that I have found a 
terrible wavering of minds against the Russian administration.”77  
 If the Kovalenskii affair was grounded in individual haughtiness, more consequential 
factors obstructed early Russo-Georgian ties. In one of the most salient manifestations of their 
friction, General Lazarev was murdered in April 1803, not by a disgruntled Georgian prince, 
noble, or an obscure sympathizer, but by Queen Mariam, the widow of Georgia’s last king.78 
When Tsitsianov ordered Lazarev to detain the queen and her children to prevent their imminent 
fleeing of Tiflis, Mariam stabbed Lazarev with a dagger when he approached her. Before his 	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demise, Lazarev had characterized the entire Georgian court and nobility as “filled with intrigues 
and internecine conflicts [mezhdusobiia]”79 He found that not only external threats but also 
internal “secret conspiracies of various prominent people” compromised Georgia’s security. The 
Russian general’s reports to St. Petersburg illustrated Bagrationi family schemes and 
summarized the discontent of the king’s sons, his stepmother, Dariia, and his wife, Mariam.  
Beyond the family politics of the Georgian court, tsarist officials elucidated the rift 
between their administration and the locals. Although Tsitsianov initiated several measures to 
soothe relations with the Georgian nobility, his efforts remained informed by notions of Russian 
cultural superiority. True, in his first year in command he opened doors to Georgian elites for 
daily meetings, issued orders to local officials about the primacy of egalitarian “justice” in all 
aspects of law enforcement, and even declared a two-month amnesty for all nobles who had fled 
Tiflis with Prince Alexander and other rebellious Bagratids. Tsitsianov also supported the spread 
of schools and education throughout the Caucasus, the expansion of trade, and the official 
recognition of Islam.80 At the same time, Tsitsianov remained convinced that “nature, which 
delegated Asiatic peoples to unlimited autocratic authority, has left an indelible mark here. 
Against wildness and intransigence strong and determined measures are necessary.”81 Georgian 
nobles, for whom “the word ‘law’ has no meaning,” grumbled the tsarist general, sought every 
opportunity to avoid obeying new laws and regulations, and treated Russian officials with 
contempt if their familial background did not match Georgian notions of eminence and status. 
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Tsitsianov, in essence, highlighted the early gulf between Russian officials and the Georgian 
elite. “For them everything is new; for us everything is strange,” he quipped.82 
Georgian nobles had tangible reasons for their discontent. New Russian laws had opened 
doors for peasants to file complaints against their hereditary overlords. Many landowners were 
incensed, according to a parting letter from Knorring to Tsitsianov, when provincial police and 
newly established courts demanded that nobles account for their mistreatment of their serfs and 
respond to accusations of physical abuse.83 Moreover, argued Knorring, the removal from 
political office of several aristocrats, who had achieved their positions through hereditary 
prestige rather than merit, as well as a broader “reduction of the methods, through which the 
nobles enriched themselves at the expense of the people, has given [another] reason for 
discontent to those who place their individual wellbeing ahead of that of the community.”84 
Despite his engagement with Georgian elites, Tsitsianov’s actions unnerved them as much as 
Knorring’s policies had, especially after Tsitsianov confiscated all estates and properties 
belonging to nobles who had fled Kartli Kakhetia after the annexation.85  
Finally, ordinary Georgians voiced their own grievances. “Many” Georgians protested to 
General Lazarev that locally stationed Russian troops “interfere in the internal affairs of the 
locals, willfully taking supplies and horses—less out of necessity than whim,” and refusing to 
compensate the peasants. Rank-and-file Russian soldiers also “inflicted personal harm on the 
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residents, stole their cattle, fowl, produce, wine” and filled emptied wine jugs with sand out of 
“reckless mischief” (bezrasudnaia shalost’).86    
 The discontent of the dethroned Bagratids and other Georgian nobles boiled over into 
open rebellion periodically throughout the first half of the nineteenth century. In 1810-11, Prince 
Levan, a grandson of King Giorgii, mobilized Ossetians into an anti-Russian insurrection.87 
More Georgian uprisings followed in Kakhetiia in 1812-13, in Imeretiia in 1819-20, a pan-
Georgian rebellion in 1832, and even large peasant disturbances in Guriia in 1841 and in 
Mingreliia in 1857.88 Although tsarist authorities easily quelled such resistance, the image of 
Georgians as unreliable at best and rebellious at worst took hold in the imagination of early 
Russian administrators of the South Caucasus. With few trustworthy subjects, Russia searched 
the South Caucasus for new, reliable allies.      
The Napoleonic Backdrop and Imperial Ambitions 
In the first decade and a half of the nineteenth century, the tsarist empire maintained its 
grip on Georgia despite actively feuding or battling with Persians, Ottomans, the French, 
Georgian rebels, North Caucasian highlanders, and the British. Against the efforts of these 
parties, the tsarist state fortified its position as a regional power and made preparations for 
further expansion into the shah’s domain. Russia’s goals and incentives for conquest in the South 
Caucasus, and their implications for Russo-Armenian ties, cannot be divorced from the context 
of the Napoleonic Wars and broader Russian imperial strategy. 
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The Napoleonic Wars and rapidly changing European alliances informed Russia’s 
engagement with Armenians as much, or more, as Caucasian developments. St. Petersburg’s 
imperial ambitions in northern Persia and eastern Anatolia were often defined vis-à-vis its 
European rivals’ actions: competition among Russia, France, Britain, Austria, and Prussia in the 
early nineteenth century affected the tsar’s relations with the shah and the sultan.  
With Napoleon’s ascension to power a decade after the 1789 revolution, France gained a 
leader whose military genius and expansionist resolve revitalized France’s geopolitical 
aspirations, pitting it not only against its staunch foe, Britain, but also against the other three 
major European powers: Austria, Prussia, and Russia. Although Russian elites often distrusted 
their British counterparts, at the turn of the nineteenth century Russia sided with London against 
Paris, wary of French overtures toward its traditional adversaries: Swedes, Poles, and 
Ottomans.89 By 1805, two years after it launched a major anti-French campaign, Britain recruited 
Russia into the Third Coalition. Equally concerned about Napoleon’s conquest of central Europe 
and the economic repercussions of French expansion, London and St. Petersburg had many 
reasons to cooperate.  
 Despite the broad alliance seeking Napoleon’s defeat, by 1807 the French emperor had 
routed Europe’s largest armies and forced Britain into a defensive war, protected by its superior 
navy. In July 1807, Tsar Alexander had few options but to sign the Treaty of Tilsit with 
Napoleon, which stipulated Russian assistance to France against its British and Swedish enemies. 
At the same time, as Dominic Lieven notes, Alexander “gained a peace which would be more 
than a temporary truce, without paying the vanquished side’s usual price of territorial 	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concessions and a war indemnity.”90 Yet the new accord required Russia to support Napoleon’s 
Continental System, which sought to suffocate London’s economy by restricting its commerce 
on the continent. The tsarist court’s formal declaration of a “rupture” in Russo-British relations, 
dated October 1807, presented a litany of grievances against London. From stifling Russian trade 
on the high seas to providing inadequate cooperation during the earlier anti-Napoleonic 
coalitions, Alexander enumerated the reasons for the break and accused Britain of seeking to 
“ignite a new war in northern Europe.”91 
 In the years leading up to Napoleon’s invasion of Russia in 1812, the Russian elite 
grumbled against Alexander’s treaty with France. Admiral Nikolai Mordvinov, the Anglophile 
minister and economist, was not alone in arguing that Russia’s economic and political interests 
aligned with Britain’s, and emphasized that Britain was Russia’s most prized commodities 
market.92 Foreign Minister Rumiantsev argued that the Continental System effectively punished 
Britain’s major trading partners, including Russia, more than it punished London. Additionally, 
Russian foreign policy could hardly benefit from a French victory over Britain. Numerous 
statesmen and cultural leaders, such as Nikolai Karamzin, feared Napoleon’s ability to establish 
an independent Polish state, anathema to tsarist imperial policy. Moreover, Mordvinov, General 
Levin von Bennigsen, and other eminent officials privately expressed concern that “if Napoleon 
was allowed to strangle Russia’s foreign trade [through the restrictions of the Continental 
System] then the economy would no longer be able to sustain Russia’s armed forces or the 
European culture of its elites. The country would revert to its pre-Petrine, semi-Asiatic 	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condition.”93 Such individuals advocated Russia’s withdrawal from European rivalries, 
proposing instead that the state return to its eighteenth-century foreign policy of expansion at the 
expense of the Ottoman and Persian empires.94 
 An array of factors contributed to the breakdown of the Russo-French union. Napoleon’s 
invasion of Austria, a Russian partner, in the spring of 1809 gave Alexander another reason to 
suspect French expansionist ambitions. Soon Russian spies in Paris flooded St. Petersburg with 
reports of French overtures toward Russia’s neighboring antagonists, including the Ottomans, 
Poles, and Swedes.95 By the summer of 1810 the prospect of a Russo-French war grew and 
tsarist War Minister Barclay de Tolly initiated defensive measures against a potential French 
attack. This political climate directly influenced the tsar’s calculations regarding his ties with the 
shah and the sultan, both of whom waged war against Russia at this time: in 1804-13 and 1806-
12, respectively. For example, when Ottoman forces attacked Russian troops in 1806 but were 
quickly overwhelmed in Moldavia and Wallachia, the sultan dragged out negotiations in 
anticipation of an imminent Russo-French break. General Mikhail Kutuzov forced the Turks to 
sign a treaty only in June 1812, just days before the French invasion of Russia.   
 The rivalry with European powers hardly constrained Russia’s imperial ambitions in the 
Caucasus. To the contrary, facing threats from the west, St. Petersburg looked for resources and 
allies in the south. Within a couple years of securing Kartli Kakhetia and establishing Tiflis as 
the regional seat of the Russian administration, the tsarist empire continued to expand into the 
Caucasus. The incentives for this growth were primarily political and secondarily economic. 	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First, several formidable fortress cities remained between Persia proper (to the south of the Arax 
River) and the newly annexed Russian territories. The tsar and his officials saw these citadels, 
including at Yerevan, Shusha (in Karabakh), and Baku, as potential bases for Persian incursions 
into Georgia and the rest of the Russian Caucasus domain.  
As early as April 1802, Tsar Alexander supported Knorring’s aspirations for Yerevan as 
“a measure of utmost necessity.”96 When Russians learned that the city’s sardar (prince-
governor) refused to recognize the authority of Shah Baba Khan and was in open rebellion, they 
saw an opportunity. The sardar had expressed vague interest in coming under the tsar’s aegis, 
yet during protracted negotiations he hesitated to accept the main demand of the tsarist side—
that the Yerevan fortress be garrisoned by Russian forces. Alexander was certain that rebellious 
Persian khans south of Georgia would recognize the necessity of his protection against the shah’s 
army. “These reasons are so self-evident, that he must recognize them himself and agree to our 
demands,” confidently declared Alexander about Yerevan’s overlord. Alexander remained 
convinced that by occupying the fortress cities between Georgia and the Arax River, the Russian 
empire would “not only place Georgia beyond danger, but also . . . take away from the foe his 
best means and, most importantly, will provide a much-needed confirmation to local lords 
(vladel’tsy) of Russian patronage and thus will strengthen their trust.” 
Political considerations beyond the South Caucasus also drove Russia’s pursuit of the 
Yerevan khanate. Just twenty kilometers from the Yerevan fortress stood the Echmiadzin 
monastery complex, the headquarters of the Armenian Apostolic Church, to whose authority 
submitted the entire dispersed Armenian diaspora. While control of Yerevan, the region’s second 
city after Tiflis, promised Russia full dominion over the South Caucasus, control of Echmiadzin 	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promised extensive political and economic sway into those countries, such as Turkey, Persia, and 
even India, where Russian diplomats struggled for influence while local Armenian bishops 
enjoyed social prominence. Enticed by the strategic advantage of the Yerevan fortress and the 
ecumenical-political clout of the Echmiadzin monastery, St. Petersburg viewed those historic 
Armenian centers as vital components of its broader foreign policy in the East.   
Although political incentives for Russian expansion into Persian-held territory 
overshadowed economic reasons, the latter constituted important considerations for St. 
Petersburg. Trade between Georgia and Persian khanates, such as Yerevan, rendered Georgia 
one of Russia’s most profitable imperial territories, and even during the height of the first Russo-
Persian war, cross-border commerce continued almost uninterrupted. For example, by mid-1809, 
about 1,080,000 pounds of cotton, valued at about 250,000 rubles, reached Tiflis from Yerevan, 
usually delivered by Armenians.97 Moreover, the famously lucrative vineyards and other 
agricultural industry of the Yerevan khanate, coupled with the metal ores of the eastern South 
Caucasus (today’s Azerbaijan), promised to reimburse the tsarist treasury for the costs of the 
Georgian annexation and maintenance. Alexander made this clear to Knorring’s successor, 
General Tsitsianov, to whom he complained in September 1802 that despite Knorring’s 
assurances that Georgia would be financially self-sufficient, it continued to drain the state 
treasury and inundate St. Petersburg with requests for financial assistance.98 “There is still 
nothing from [Knorring] about the profits derived [from Georgia],” carped the tsar, “meanwhile 
the costs of various issues, multiplying from day to day, have risen to a very deliberate 
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[narochitaia] sum, and while the welfare of this people has become the government’s general 
concern, I would not want the weight of its administration to fall solely upon Russia.”99  
Tsitsianov wasted no time in responding to this expansionist mandate. Through a deft 
combination of negotiation and coercion, in 1803 and 1804 he brought several Persian-held 
khanates and principalities, including Georgian Mingrelia and Imeretia, into the tsar’s realm. 
When, however, in January 1804 Tsitsianov entered Ganje khanate, ostensibly part of Georgia, 
the First Russo-Persian War (1804-13) erupted.100 The Russian army’s first and most formidable 
objective at the onset of the war was Yerevan and its large, strategically positioned fortress. 
The invitations and pleas that tsarist agents received from local Armenians made 
Yerevan’s capture more appealing. As early as April 1803, Tsitsianov reported to Tsar 
Alexander that “Armenians who populate [northern Persian provinces], owing to a single 
Christianity and to their confidence in commerce under the protection of Russian rule, for their 
own wellbeing exhibit toward us devotion [predannost’] and a desire to see the speedy and 
successful establishment in these lands of Russian overlordship [vladychestvo], [and] call to me 
every day to hasten [our] expedition on Yerevan.”101 The citation of the two nations’ ecumenical 
bond, well entrenched in Russian society and culture by this stage, provided the type of 
guarantee that tsarist agents sought in their imperial mission in the Caucasus. Even if, as 
historian George Bournoutian has argued, Armenians and other religious minorities of Persian 
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domains were not as oppressed as Russian officials imagined, their marginalization in local 
communities provided them with incentives to seek Russian annexation.102 The steady stream of 
Armenian refugees escaping from Persian to Russian territory confirmed this for Tsar Alexander, 
his ministers, and generals.  
In anticipation of the approaching Russian army, in the summer of 1804 several 
Armenian meliks fled from Yerevan to Russian territory.103 These hereditary Armenian nobles 
brought with them “over 200 families” of their peasants, likely numbering between 800 and 
1,000 individuals. While pleased to find sanctuary, they immediately urged Tsitsianov to rescue 
over 500 other Armenian families from Yerevan, who had been left, under guard, “in the hands 
of the unreliable Persians.”104 As would become a staple of Russo-Armenian engagement in the 
South Caucasus for the next several years, these Armenians also provided tactical information 
about the size and strength of the Persian contingent. Warning that the sardar had already 
executed several Armenians, seized the property of others, and threatened to expel the rest of the 
khanate’s Christians to Persia proper, the newly resettled Armenians implored Tsitsianov, “with 
tears we beg you, be the savior [spasitel’] of the Armenians left behind, who are in an extreme 
situation, have no help from anywhere, and suffer various offenses and persecutions.”105    
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In May 1804, Tsitsianov issued to Yerevan’s sardar several peremptory demands, which 
he likely knew would be unacceptable.106 The sardar had to recognize the tsar as his supreme 
ruler, yield the fortress to Russian forces, and agree to pay a large annual tribute.107 In return, 
Yerevan’s overlord would be permitted to maintain his current rights and powers, except the 
ability to decree the death penalty, and guaranteed safety and protection. When the khan 
dawdled, Tsitsianov thundered, “I do not frighten with words but act with bayonets and prove 
with deeds.”108 By June, the general wrote: “According to European custom, before launching an 
assault on the city, I must offer it to surrender, but if I do not receive by tonight a satisfactory and 
definitive answer, then God and bayonets will deliver it for me, despite a hundred Baba Khans or 
his son, who rides around in the distance like a hare avoiding a pack of lions.”109  
Memorable as they were, Tsitsianov’s threats soon proved futile, and the city’s Persian 
garrison repelled a Russian attack. Despite this setback, or perhaps due to it, the Russian general 
continued to look toward Armenians to advance tsarist borders in the South Caucasus. When, in 
1805, Persian reinforcements arrived in the region, replaced the rebellious Yerevan sardar, and 
once again threatened to remove local Armenians beyond the Arax, Tsitsianov expressed his 
hope that “if the developments of this war do not interfere and God helps us drive Baba Khan 
from Karabakh, then I will try to resettle [Armenians] in Georgia, which is what they want.”110 	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At the same time, the Russian commander sought the Armenians’ active participation in their 
“liberation” and the expansion of Romanov domains.  
In June 1805, a year after his abortive assault on Yerevan, Tsitsianov sought to recruit 
Armenians from Karabakh to fight against the shah’s army. His declaration to them lauded their 
one-time “famous bravery” and questioned whether they had lost it, becoming “womanly 
[zhenopodobnymi], like those Armenians who engage only in commerce.”111 “No,” implied 
Tsitsianov himself, “I am aware of your past bravery, which is why I call on you . . . with the 
glorious and invincible Russian army . . . to help the strong and unsurpassable Russian troops 
against the Persian forces, which are encroaching to ruin Karabakh and to steal each one of your 
properties.”112 Specifically, Tsitsianov urged Karabakh Armenians to attack retreating Persian 
forces after the main Russian assault. Few sources survive to illustrate the exact result of this 
recruitment, but by the latter half of 1805 the tsarist army firmly controlled Karabakh,113 no 
doubt in part thanks to the participation of local Armenians. Moreover, the general Russian 
satisfaction with Karabakh Armenians’ efforts suggests that Tsitsianov’s petition was heeded.114          
At the same time as he recruited these regional natives to cooperate in St. Petersburg’s 
expansion, Tsitsianov promoted ethnic hierarchies and tightened his state’s control over newly 
annexed societies and spaces. The general represented Russia’s ideas of itself as empire, where 
the participation of non-Russian groups in the state’s imperial project was welcomed as long as 
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the initiative for such actions came from the metropole. For example, when in January 1806 
Tsitsianov learned that up to 10,000 Armenian families from the Western Armenian town of 
Bayazit in Anatolia had expressed a desire to resettle in Yerevan upon its capture by the tsar’s 
army, Tsitsianov feared that the immigrants would eschew “proper obedience” and would 
maintain ties to elements in Anatolia and Persia without tsarist approval.115 Moreover, Tsitsianov 
accused Armenian merchants of the South Caucasus of raising prices during wartime, and 
consequently prohibited them from trading in mountainous villages (auly).116 In April 1804, he 
ordered regional police to monitor local commerce, seeking out “resellers who greedily raise 
prices on necessities, a practice in which, after the Yids, the Armenians are the most capable, to 
the general detriment of the population.”117 
Such sentiments were in line with Tsitsianov’s broader perception of the region’s 
residents and Russia’s new role in the South Caucasus. A committed imperialist who took pride 
not only in military glory but also in administrative efficiency, Tsitsianov set the contours of the 
tsarist imperial policy for decades to come. Such successors as Paskevich later echoed many of 
the views Tsitsianov expressed in the early 1800s. The sine qua non of successful imperial 
administration, Tsitsianov believed, lay in “sternness” (strogost’), coupled with “fairness” 
(spravedlivost’) and “selflessness” (bezkorystie).118  
“Asiatic” intransigence, argued the Russian general, could not be eradicated through 
annual tribute payments or even extended sojourns in St. Petersburg. To combat supposedly 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
115AKAK, vol. II (1868), 632. 
116AKAK, vol. II (1868), 943. 
117AKAK, vol. II (1868), 49.  
118AKAK, vol. II (1868), 1036-37. 
 52 
egocentric and corrupting tendencies of the locals, the tsarist administration had to demonstrate 
both the benefits of egalitarian justice and the consequences of straying from prescribed norms 
and laws. “In an Asiatic,” insisted Tsitsianov, “nothing is as effective as fear, as a natural 
consequence of force. Thus, in my opinion, while expecting, with God’s help, a change in 
Asiatic mores and customs over the course of several generations, for at least thirty years fear, 
sternness, fairness, justice, and selflessness must be the characteristics or rules of the local 
administration.”119       
Tsitsianov’s bravado caught up to him on 8 February 1806, when he rode up to the walls 
of besieged Baku to demand its surrender. The Persian forces inside the city shot the Russian 
general and mutilated his corpse. Tsitsianov’s body was held hostage for five years, and its 
release to Russian officials once again confirmed tsarist agents’ reliance on the region’s 
Armenians. In November 1811, Baku’s Armenians, who had kept the slain Russian 
commander’s body in the city’s main Armenian church, played the intermediary in the 
ceremonial handoff of the general’s casket to Russian officials.120 
After Tsitsianov’s death, St. Petersburg had to reorient its military, economic, and 
political resources away from the Caucasus. Facing Napoleon’s forces in 1804-07 and the 
sultan’s army in the Balkans in 1806 required a focus on the European theater. Nevertheless, 
Tsitsianov’s successor, General Ivan Vasil’evich Gudovich, continued the Russian war effort 
against Persia in the South Caucasus. A less ostentatious and more experienced commander than 
his predecessor, Gudovich was as eager to conquer Yerevan. Soon after his arrival in Tiflis, the 
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general beseeched the tsar to send him additional troops in order “not only to maintain the 
integrity of Your Majesty’s borders, but also to make incursions into enemy territory.”121 
Making the most of his available resources,122 Gudovich by October 1808 besieged 
Yerevan.123 The Russian general promised to spare life and property if the city surrendered 
voluntarily and guaranteed safe passage for the Persian garrison back to Persia proper. Should 
they refuse, however, he vowed to take the city by force and to slaughter the Persian forces. With 
Tsitsianov’s failed assault fresh in the minds of the attackers and defenders alike, Gudovich 
warned the inhabitants of Yerevan to ignore the Russian attack of 1804, when the young 
Tsitsianov, “not yet experienced in the military art,” failed to take the city.124 Now, armed with 
decades of experience and a seasoned army, Gudovich thundered that he had come with enough 
soldiers “not only to annihilate [istrebit’] the fortress, but also to march through all of Persia.”125 
Apparently unmoved by the threats, the commander of the Persian garrison sardonically offered 
Gudovich to join the shah’s army, in return for which the Russian general was promised to 
receive overlordship of the Yerevan and Tavriz khanates.126   
A two-month-siege ensued, during which Gudovich bombarded the fortress with as many 
ultimatums as artillery shells.127 But even as small groups of residents, mainly Armenians, 
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voluntarily crossed into tsarist territory during this time,128 the tsar’s army failed—for the second 
time in four years—to capture Yerevan. An assault on November 17 was repelled at a high cost 
for the Russian side, and by November 28 Gudovich ordered a retreat.129 In his report to the tsar, 
the general blamed the failure on European interference: French engineers, not Persian riflemen, 
had created the greatest obstacle to Russian victory at Yerevan. Gudovich conceded that the 
citadel had been buttressed according to “all European military standards,” and that the work of 
French advisors was evident not only in the design of the fortifications and the sophisticated 
weaponry but also in the previously unseen tactics the Persians employed.130 
Tsarist officials saw French interference in Russia’s conquest of Persian lands manifested 
beyond the supply of weapons and engineers. Gudovich complained during the siege that “the 
French mission to Persia, despite the friendly relations with us, harms my affairs with Persia now 
more than they did during the war with France. For they have empowered [vozgordili] Baba 
Khan and convinced the Persian government that it can do whatever it wishes.”131 Evidence of 
European collusion included intercepted letters from the French representative in Tehran, 
diplomat and general Claude Gardane, to the sardar of Yerevan.132 Despite the Treaty of Tilsit 
between Napoleon and Alexander, a steady stream of reports reached Gudovich and other tsarist 	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officials about the strengthening Franco-Persian alliance, in which Napoleon had assured the 
shah of his support against the tsar, promising various rewards and territorial gains.133 Gudovich 
also received personal letters from various French officials, including from Gardane in Tehran, 
urging the Russian general to withdraw from Yerevan khanate and other Persian territories.134 
Although St. Petersburg’s main military objective failed in 1808 and Persian forces 
remained stationed to the north of the Arax River, other developments heralded success for 
Russia’s imperial ambitions. First, Gudovich’s army easily overwhelmed Persian opposition in 
Nakhichevan and Karabakh, confirming for tsarist officials that only such city-fortresses as 
Yerevan helped the shah to maintain his grip on the South Caucasus. Second, several local 
communities welcomed Gudovich’s advancing army. He reported that retreating Persian forces 
had razed Armenian villages and seized their harvests, giving new incentive for the Armenians to 
turn to Russian protection.135  
When, during his march to Yerevan, Gudovich stopped at the Echmiadzin monastery, the 
senior Armenian clergy “joyfully welcomed” him.136 The Russian general’s increasingly close 
rapport with ecclesiastical and lay Armenians boded well for imperial policy, a fact that Prince 
Alexander Saltykov, a senior aide to the minister of foreign affairs, reinforced to the general after 
the abortive assault on Yerevan. Saltykov emphasized that the tsar “is particularly pleased to see 
the care with which you protect residents from the effects of war, which roots in them trust and 
attachment toward the Russian government, to which end especially helpful can be the patronage 	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that you demonstrate to the Armenian Echmiadzin monastery.”137 Tsarist agents would soon 
capitalize on this merger of interests between the Russian state and the Armenians of the South 
Caucasus to advance their goals.  
 With the Russian army’s withdrawal from Yerevan khanate, the First Russo-Persian war 
turned into a tense standoff. Between 1808 and 1813, occasional skirmishes and many failed 
negotiations yielded no progress and the dynamic remained influenced as much by European as 
Caucasian developments.138 Citing ill health but perhaps also frustrated by the lack of progress, 
Tormasov retired and in September 1811 was replaced by the joint command of generals Philip 
Paulucci and Nikolai Rtishchev.139 The former headed the administration of the South Caucasus, 
while the latter commanded the Caucasus Line and the nearby Astrakhan province. Within half a 
year, however, Paulucci was recalled to St. Petersburg and the region’s supreme power fell to 
Rtishchev, who would remain in charge until the arrival in 1816 of one of Russia’s most 
celebrated Caucasus field marshals, General Aleksei Ermolov. But while Rtishchev’s tenure 
outlasted most of his predecessors, it was frustrated by St. Petersburg’s preoccupation with 
Napoleon’s invasion and with maintaining the European balance of power. The general, in fact, 
at one point voiced frustration that such senior tsarist officials as Karl Nesselrode, the soon to be 
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foreign minister, had ceased almost all communications with him and had granted him not a 
single permission for even the most serious requests in some two years.140  
 While the core of the tsarist army struggled against the onslaught of the Grande Armée in 
Russia proper, in the Caucasus Russian forces confronted an unprecedented array of formidable 
threats. In the spring of 1812, local Russian troops not only vied for control of Dagestan in the 
North Caucasus, but also fought on three fronts in the South Caucasus: against an Ottoman 
assault on the Akhalkalaki fortress (which threatened to open an unimpeded corridor to Tiflis141), 
against Persians in Karabakh, and against a new Georgian uprising in Kakhetia. The latter threat 
particularly unnerved tsarist authorities not only because of its epicenter in the heart of the 
regional Russian administration, but also because of the furtive manner in which the conspirators 
had launched their attack by slaughtering Russian soldiers sleeping in their quarters. In his report 
to the tsar, Paulucci vented that the rebels had “carried out horrifying atrocities, examples of 
which the French Revolution presents to us.”142 In no small part thanks to the cooperation of 
local Armenians, who not only provided information but also fought alongside Russian troops, 
by early spring Paulucci and Rtishchev had quelled the Georgian uprising and captured its 
leader, Prince Giorgii, a grandson of the late King Giorgii.143   
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 Despite these conflicts, and unfazed by the two abortive attempts to capture Yerevan, 
Paulucci and Rtishchev made several incursions into Yerevan khanate to force a peace treaty.144 
By September 1812, reflecting the turn of the tide in the Russo-French and Russo-Ottoman wars, 
and also the signing of an anti-French Russo-British pact, Rtishchev succeeded in forcing Abbas 
Mirza to the negotiating table. Although Persians invited British officers to mediate,145 the shah 
had few options in the wake of Russian advances in Karabakh and the capture of the British-
fortified Lenkoran fortress.146 On 12 October 1813, the Treaty of Giulistan in Karabakh ended 
the First Russo-Persian War.147 The terms of the accord proved generous to the victor. Persia 
relinquished control of the khanates of Karabakh, Baku, Ganje, Shakki, Kuba, Shirvan, and parts 
of Talesh.148 Crucially, however, the Yerevan khanate, with its eponymous capital city and the 
Echmiadzin monastery, remained under the shah’s control. Although population statistics do not 
survive from the era, it is clear that by 1814 thousands of new Armenian subjects had joined the 
expanding tsarist empire. The turmoil of the preceding decade had pitted St. Petersburg against 
an array of enemies in the Caucasus. To fortify itself in the newly conquered territories, Russia 
searched for an ally.   
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Spies and Settlers: Armenians in the Russian Service 
Russia looked to Armenian collaboration to facilitate its expansion as soon as it entered 
the interimperial politics of the South Caucasus with the annexation of Kartli Kakhetia. From 
1801, the aims of tsarist agents and the hopes of the region’s Armenians coincided. Russia relied 
on Armenians—with their eager participation—to advance into Persian territory, secure its new 
domains, and to settle newly conquered lands in the first fifteen years of the nineteenth century.  
Just weeks before his assassination, Tsar Paul tasked General Knorring with expanding 
the Romanov realm in the South Caucasus through diplomacy. The tsar cautioned the general: 
“do not seek new [territorial] acquisitions, aside from those that voluntarily search for my 
patronage; it is better to have allies interested in an alliance than unreliable subjects.”149 Paul 
made clear which of the indigenous national groups he had in mind. “Look to attract Armenia,” 
he wrote, “into a rapprochement [sblizhenie] for, and through, trade, in order to establish avenues 
through them, and maintain [their] privileges, but institute our order.” More explicitly, the tsar 
identified Armenians as the key to expanding Russian borders and influence in the region: 
“engage now not in conquest but in acquisition through the voluntary consent of Armenia.”150 
The tsar had good reason to expect Armenians’ cooperation. In February 1801, Armenians from 
Constantinople petitioned tsarist officials to permit their immigration to Crimea, where they 
wished to become tsarist subjects.151 The Armenians pledged to advance regional commerce by 
establishing silk and paper mills on the peninsula, and they asked for no additional privileges in 
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return beyond those granted to Armenians already living in Crimea. Apparently sympathetic to 
this request, Tsar Paul forwarded it to the Senate not long before his death.152  
Paul’s successor, Alexander, shared his father’s commitment to an alliance with 
Armenians. Persian and Ottoman Armenians, as well as other regional Christian groups, were to 
be recruited to settle the newly annexed Georgian territories. In September 1801, Alexander 
emphasized to Knorring that his “particular attention must be given to the attraction 
[privlechenie] into Georgia of settlers from abroad, especially Christians.”153 These colonizers 
were to be granted fertile land, as well as various “assistance,” “benefits,” and “privileges.” For 
these relocation efforts, Russia specifically targeted Armenians from among the Christian 
communities living in Ottoman and Persian territories adjacent to Georgia. Alexander’s 
instructions to Knorring in this regard were unequivocal: 
I place under your particular attention the attraction of the Armenian nation through 
various kindnesses [oblaskaniia]. This method, owing to the large population of this 
people in regions adjacent to Georgia, is one of the most reliable ways for increasing the 
[regional] population’s strength and also for ensuring the dominance of Christians. To 
this end, I decree that you demonstrate whatever possible patronage of the Echmiadzin 
patriarchal monastery and maintain friendly relations with its head.154     
 
Foreign-subject Armenians had been enticed by economic privileges in Russia proper 
since the seventeenth century, but with the turn of the nineteenth century their economic role 
assumed a broader dimension. Armenians became, in essence, the frontiersmen of Russian 
expansion. Several closely intertwined factors coalesced to grant Armenians this status in the 
Russian political imagination. First, their real and mythologized economic prowess under 
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difficult political and social conditions was seen as a sign of Christian resilience in hostile 
environments, underscoring the Russian attraction to settling new domains with economically 
capable residents. Second, the ecumenical bond between Orthodox Russians and Apostolic 
Armenians, the majority of whom remained under the hegemony of the shah and the sultan, 
provided the kind of guarantee of loyalty that the tsar sought in recruiting colonizers. Third, 
Russian agents often exaggerated and took advantage of Persian and Ottoman Armenians’ 
minority status in Muslim empires to advocate for their resettlement into ostensibly more 
welcoming and egalitarian tsarist territories. The tsar summarized some of these perceptions to 
Tsitsianov in September 1802: “Armenians, as an industrious people that holds in its hands the 
entire trade of this part of the Orient, deserve your particular attention and protection, for, given 
their persecution in Persia, there can be no doubt that the majority of that people will settle in 
Georgia as soon as they feel themselves provided with an orderly government.”155  
 Armenians heeded the Russian calls. During the First Russo-Persian War, in particular, 
significant numbers of Persian Armenians became Russian subjects. Most frequently, Armenian 
meliks defected from Persia to Russia with their Armenian peasants. For example, in November 
1807, two Armenian meliks from Yerevan crossed into Georgia with their peasants and requested 
noble status in Russian society.156 General Gudovich reviewed their credentials and granted their 
request, admitting them into the Russian table of ranks with all of its rights and privileges. The 
Russian commander demonstrated similar flexibility and openness to Armenian migrants in 
another case, where an Armenian melik refused to settle on land picked for him by tsarist 
officials. After the Armenian’s protest, Gudovich acquiesced to his demands and granted him 	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and his peasants “however much they need” of state-owned land in the exact locale that the melik 
had specified.157 Moreover, in March 1809, during heightened tensions with the Yerevan sardar 
in the wake of the abortive Russian assault, incoming Armenians refused to settle in districts 
adjacent to Persia’s borders, fearing incursions from the shah’s forces. Once again, Gudovich 
agreed to their requests and facilitated their relocation to territory farther north, away from 
Yerevan.158 In the last stages of the war, with the Persian army on the retreat, tsarist troops freed 
captured Armenians and resettled them into Russian territory. In one such example from 
December 1812, Russian soldiers “liberated” 3,000 Armenian families that had been “captured” 
by Persians near Lenkoran and brought them to Russian-held Karabakh.159   
 Tsarist officials not only invited the Armenian colonization of the South Caucasus, but 
also took advantage of Armenian participation in the military conquest of Persian lands. Before 
his fall from grace, Petr Kovalenskii argued that Georgian kings’ ancient control over Yerevan 
and surrounding lands justified claiming those Persian domains along with the rest of Georgia.160 
To achieve these goals, Kovalenskii emphasized that local Armenians, seeing the Echmiadzin 
monastery come under tsarist protection, were sure to support Russian expansion. It is hardly 
surprising, then, that Tsitsianov and other tsarist generals recruited Armenians in Karabakh, 
Yerevan, and elsewhere to fight alongside the Russian army.  
 Active Armenian participation in the Russian war effort in 1804-13 manifested itself 
primarily in the form of intelligence gathering. Broadly speaking, these activities fell into two 	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categories: Persian Armenians sneaking out of Yerevan and other Persian territories into Russian 
camps with information, and Russian officials dispatching Armenians on specific espionage 
missions. Armenians also served as intermediaries between Russian and Persian negotiators, 
often ferrying messages between the two sides. Successive tsarist commanders relied on the 
reports and information provided by Armenians to formulate strategy, ascertain Persian and 
Ottoman actions, and communicate with entities where the Russian presence was impossible.  
 Tsarist officials capitalized on the Armenian diaspora’s transimperial links. As early as 
1802, tsarist officials dispatched Armenians from Tiflis into the neighboring states to determine 
the activities of hostile forces. In one example from June 1802, a Tiflis Armenian returned from 
Ottoman Akhaltsykh to report to Russian commanders that the Georgian rebel Prince Alexander 
had joined forces with Lezgin highlanders from Dagestan to mount an anti-Russian campaign.161 
Tsarist agents tracked Alexander’s movements in no small part thanks to the work of such 
Armenian sympathizers. One Armenian merchant from the Persian city of Ganje, upon arriving 
in Tiflis to conduct trade, reported to local Russian officials about Alexander’s arrival in that city 
with a small army and eagerly answered all Russian queries.162 When Prince Alexander set his 
sights on an outpost with a small Russian garrison in November 1802, several local Armenians 
snuck into the Russian camps to alert tsarist officials to the imminent danger.163 A month later, 
another Armenian merchant of Tiflis who had traveled to Ganje for commerce returned to report 
to Russian commanders about the composition and location of Prince Alexander and his allies.164 	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Russian commanders dispatched Armenians to Yerevan not only to spy but also to deliver 
messages to Persian forces.165 During the Russo-Ottoman conflict, too, Armenians from Kars 
made unsolicited reports to Russian officers about the movement and composition of local 
Ottoman forces.166 Gudovich and his commanders also employed trusted Armenians to gather 
intelligence in eastern Anatolia, often sending them to Armenian monasteries and churches to 
speak with the clergy and to determine local conditions.167 Despite individual instances of 
Armenian collusion with anti-Russian forces,168 Armenians cooperated with tsarist authorities by 
taking advantage of their relatively unhindered cross-border traffic.  
Of the diverse intelligence that Armenians provided to Russians before and during the 
First Russo-Persian War, perhaps none of it was as sensational as the information that Armenian 
escapees from Yerevan delivered to tsarist officers in July 1806.169 The men told General 
Nesvetaev that two French envoys, Pierre Amédée Jaubert and General Romie, had recently 
arrived at the Persian court.170 The emissaries had conveyed to the shah Napoleon’s request to 
allow the French navy access to Persian shores and to use the shah’s territory to strike the 
Russian empire through the South Caucasus. Various promises and assurances accompanied this 
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audacious scheme to assuage the shah’s fears. Nevertheless, the Armenians reported—and 
Nesvetaev verified through other sources—that the shah had declined Napoleon’s request, 
because this daring plot, no matter the result, would only further complicate the shah’s relations 
with the tsar. Disappointed, the Frenchmen returned to France through Ottoman lands. Learning 
of these developments, generals Nesvetaev and Gudovich entreated local Ottoman pashas to 
detain and hand over the French emissaries, promising lucrative rewards.171 Napoleon and Baba 
Khan did sign an accord in May 1807, the Treaty of Finkenstein, but it fell far short of the 
French emperor’s dreams of a strategic alliance.172  
The autocracy prized Armenians’ ability to reach distant elements beyond the Caucasus. 
In April 1810, Foreign Minister Nikolai Rumiantsev proposed to Caucasus commander General 
Nikolai Rtishchev that an anti-Persian partnership with Afghans could be arranged “through the 
help of Armenians.”173 Although little came of this initiative, its deliberation among senior tsarist 
statesmen reveals the Russian confidence in transregional Armenian networks. In this case, 
Armenians were seen as a means toward securing new military alliances. Coupled with 
Armenians’ active participation in the Russian war effort in the South Caucasus—from Karabakh 
Armenians’ fighting alongside Tsitsianov’s army to their espionage for Gudovich—the view of 
Armenians as St. Petersburg’s key regional ally set the stage for a partnership that would remain 
intact for several decades.  
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This Russian view of Armenians grew stronger in late 1812, when an uprising by elite 
Georgian subjects of the tsar provided a new opportunity for Armenians to demonstrate their 
loyalty to the tsarist empire. During this rebellion, unusual for the participation in it of Christian 
and long-incorporated tsarist subjects, members of the dethroned Bagrationi family and their 
allies sought to regain control of Kartli Kakhetia by expelling the Russian administration. 
General Rtishchev’s report to the tsar emphasized that nearly “all Kakhetinian nobles and 
princes” had taken part in the rebellion.174 Although thousands of ordinary Georgians remained 
devoted to the tsarist state, the protracted resistance of Georgian elites to tsarist rule eroded the 
foundations of Russo-Georgian partnership and promoted the increasingly exclusive standing of 
the South Caucasian Armenians within the imperial hierarchy.   
In May 1813, Rtishchev, the supreme commander of the Caucasus, submitted to Tsar 
Alexander an effusive report on the Armenian role in recent developments. The document’s 
implications cannot be ignored, for, indeed, it set a precedent for Russo-Armenian collaboration 
for much of the nineteenth century. “The Armenian people [narod],” wrote the tsarist general, 
“comprising a notable portion of Georgia’s population,  
continues to demonstrate exemplary zeal and unwavering loyalty to the Russian empire. 
From the establishment of the Russian administration here, the Armenian society has 
always distinguished itself by its devotion to it and during all of the often-rising 
malicious Georgian parties . . . our administration always found in Armenians 
faithfulness, unmovable by any deceits, and zealous service that they contributed to Your 
Majesty’s advantage.175     
 
This juxtaposition of Armenians with Georgians, the two main Christian national groups in the 
Caucasus, is particularly important not only because the Georgian faith represented a closer 	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dogmatic cousin of Russian Orthodoxy than the Armenian Apostolic creed, but also because 
Georgians possessed a large aristocracy with sizable resources at its disposal. Yet tsarist 
statesmen identified Armenians as their indigenous allies, eager to capitalize on their commercial 
and religious networks, which penetrated countries and societies inaccessible to Russian agents.  
To be sure, Rtishchev singled out Armenians as an example of a loyal national group. 
During the recent Georgian uprising in Kartli Kakhetia, continued the general, when “almost all” 
locals took up arms or in other ways resisted the Russian presence, Armenians “sacrificed their 
property and, indeed, their lives, in solidarity with Russian troops, arming themselves in 
Kakhetia against the rebels and . . . demonstrated through action against the conspirators the 
most excellent example of courage and their sincere loyalty to Your Imperial Majesty.”176  
Armenian volunteers provided intelligence to local Russian authorities during their 
struggle to quell the Georgian insurrection. These Armenian collaborators “readily accepted” 
Russian tasks and “repeatedly paid with their lives” for the benefit of the regional administration. 
Armenian merchants of Tiflis, additionally, sold supplies to Russian officials at discounted rates 
during a poor harvest, when food supplies to Tiflis nearly dried up. Finally, Rtishchev, having 
summarized the “great diligence, allegiance, and devotion to Your Majesty of the loyal 
Armenians” of the South Caucasus, expressed confidence that “any encouragement 
[poshchrenie] of them will deliver additional, highly significant benefits for the administration 
and the local region, increasing their diligence and sparking among Georgians competition with 
[Armenians].”177 Thus Rtishchev continued to hold up Armenians to other regional natives, such 
as Georgians, as an example of proper conduct and devotion.  	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 Tsar Alexander gratefully responded to this Armenian assistance. A month after the 
signing of the Treaty of Giulistan, he expressed to the Armenians of Georgia his “appreciation to 
this people for its exemplary loyalty to the Russian empire and for its many confirmations of its 
most zealous diligence toward the benefits of” the Russian state.178 Alexander’s proclamation 
was read, in both Russian and Armenian, to a large Armenian crowd in the city’s main square on 
22 November 1813. A jubilant ceremony in Tiflis’s main Armenian church, led by Archbishop 
Astvatsur, celebrated the community’s acceptance of this honor. Rtishchev’s summary of this 
fete to Foreign Minister Rumiantsev emphasized that the “sincere awe and tears of emotional 
tenderness, which at this event were visible on the faces of members of every Armenian estate, 
are the most genuine signs of their true feelings of gratitude and diligence [userdie] toward His 
Imperial Majesty.”  
During a citywide Armenian celebration of the tsar’s acknowledgement, wealthy Tiflis 
Armenians hosted a lavish feast, inviting not only Russian officials but also several Georgian 
princes. Over 200 people, from the city’s Armenian, Russian, and Georgian communities, 
attended the banquet. Around the city, Armenians celebrated by decorating their neighborhoods 
and vending stalls. Rtishchev stressed that the Armenians displayed “unfeigned joy that 
accompanied sincere gratitude” to Russia.179  
 Other manifestations of the Armenian embrace of the tsarist empire fortified the early 
Russo-Armenian bond. When a new port opened in Baku in August 1809, local Armenian traders 
were at the forefront of celebrating what they saw as the state’s “patronage” and “benevolence” 
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toward the Armenian nation. During the opening ceremony, one Armenian merchant, no doubt 
eager to secure personal approbation from local Russian officials, summarized the attitudes of 
the region’s Armenians: 
From ancient times the Armenian nation has awaited liberation from the yoke of its 
merciless former rulers. . . . Now behind the shield of His Imperial Majesty’s power, we 
feel complete tranquility while freely exercising our faith and [also feel] the strong sign 
of the emperor’s favor, which protects commerce with egalitarian laws and [allows us to] 
enjoy new happiness chiefly ahead of others.180 
 
Two aspects of this saccharine praise deserve examination. First, the explicit contrast 
between the socioeconomic life of Armenians under the tsar and under the shah underscored the 
Armenian preference for Russian patronage. The majority of Eastern Armenians at this time 
continued to exist under the rule of the shah, and the essential Armenian centers of Yerevan and 
Echmiadzin remained within the Persian empire. This exaltation of the ostensible benefits of 
Russian governance not only served to reinforce the feelings of Armenians already settled in 
Georgia and other Russian territories but also was intended to attract Armenians still living 
outside tsarist borders. The speech celebrated the economic freedom of local Armenians while 
praising the religious liberty they enjoyed under the aegis of the Christian tsar in order to 
juxtapose these rights with the life of Muslim-ruled Armenians in the neighboring states. Indeed, 
these not-so-subtle messages should be interpreted not just as a sign of Armenian gratitude 
toward Russians but also as an effort to recruit Armenians from the neighboring empires.  
Second, the reference to the exclusive “happiness” (commercial and, by extension, social 
rights) enjoyed by Armenians within Russian society cannot be overlooked. Living alongside the 
tsar’s Muslim subjects and also such Christians as Georgians, this reference almost certainly was 
intended to highlight the perception of Armenians as the tsar’s most “reliable” subjects in the 	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South Caucasus. Addressing the tsar directly, Baku Armenians drove home these points by 
praising the “abundance and total happiness” (izobilie i sovershenneishee schastie) that they 
enjoyed under the direction of tsarist commerce officials, as well as the “complete tranquility and 
safety from our former abusers and hostile neighbors” afforded by the command of General 
Tormasov.181 With the strengthening political and economic bond between Russian officials and 
foreign-subject Armenians, the partnership between the Armenian Church and the tsarist state 
became the last major component of the growing Russo-Armenian alliance.     
Patriarchal Patronage  
The head of the Armenian Apostolic Church, the patriarch or Catholicos, often doubled 
as the political leader of the stateless Armenians. From his See in Echmiadzin, within Persian 
territory until 1828, the Catholicos presided over Armenian ecclesiastical affairs in Russia, 
Turkey, Western Europe, and wherever else large Armenian communities established local 
eparchies. The combination of ecumenical and political influence over the Armenian diaspora 
granted the Catholicos unique leverage, rendering control over Echmiadzin essential for any 
neighboring empire that counted Armenians among its population. As early as 1800, a senior 
tsarist official in Tiflis emphasized that the Catholicos exercised authority over Armenians 
“spread across the entire face of the earth,” and that his “commitment to the faith and his flock’s 
devotion to him, which he can skillfully utilize, grant [him] a strong influence in his nation.”182  
The Echmiadzin Catholicos, representing a religious minority in Persia, had to negotiate a 
delicate balance between supporting the growth of Russia’s Armenian community and protecting 
the interests of the shah’s own Armenian subjects. Any perceived support of Russian goals, such 	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as encouraging the emigration of Persian Armenians into tsarist territory during the war, was 
certain to elicit opprobrium or worse from Persian authorities. Tsarist officials understood this. 
When Catholicos Luka died in 1799 after two decades of leading Echmiadzin, Russian officials 
reported to St. Petersburg that “the position of this monastery and of the politics of the entire 
Armenian nation demand from its church’s leader quite delicate politics, which the [previous 
Catholicoi] always employed, maintaining both their authority and their lifestyle despite all of 
the tyrannies and cruelties that surrounded them.”183 When Catholicos Iosif, a longtime Russian 
subject whose rapport with tsarist authorities was no secret, succeeded Luka, one Russian agent 
from Tiflis warned St. Petersburg that “the Persians quite dislike Patriarch Iosif, owing to his 
famous devotion and diligence toward Russia, and this case can be a point of contention in their 
relations with Russia for a long time.”184 Both concerns and hopes were allayed when Iosif died, 
in March 1801, en route to take up his post at Echmiadzin. To be sure, the Armenian Church 
played an important consideration in Russian diplomatic goals as soon as tsarist agents arrived in 
the South Caucasus. Knorring and Lazarev entered into close relations with Armenian 
ecclesiastical officials and kept a watchful eye over their treatment by Persian officials, 
beginning to portray their government as the patron of the Armenians in Persia. When reports 
reached Knorring that Persians had raided an Armenian monastery “inflicted many dishonors, 
abuses, and thefts,” the general rushed to notify the tsar.185   
Yet relations between the Armenian Church and Russian officials were often tense. 
Knorring assigned Armenian-heritage General Lazarev to facilitate ties between the newly 	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formed Russian administration and the local Armenian ecclesiastical authorities. The young 
commander worked with Archbishop Efrem, the head of the Armenian eparchy in Georgia, to 
compile detailed information about the composition, legal and financial procedures, and other 
matters pertaining to the Armenian Church’s activities in Georgia.186 However, in April 1801, 
Efrem complained to Knorring that Lazarev interfered in the patriarchal election.  
Before the selection of a new Catholicos after Iosif’s sudden death, four senior Armenian 
archbishops from Persia arrived in Tiflis to pay their respects to the late church leader. 
According to Efrem, Lazarev inexplicably detained in Tiflis these four Armenian clergymen, 
preventing them from returning to Echmiadzin, where the election of a new Catholicos was set to 
take place soon. Although Lazarev denied these accusations, this incident is valuable for the 
emphasis Lazarev’s superior, General Knorring, placed on the Russian facilitation of an 
unhindered patriarchal election. Knorring not only ordered Lazarev to release the priests and to 
provide an explanation for his actions, but also made clear that, “the selection of the patriarch 
depends upon the will of the Armenian people and its clergy, and [you] from here on must not 
engage in even the smallest interference; I prohibit this to you, for such an event can precipitate 
unpleasant consequences.”187 A patriarchal election crisis, however, was not to be avoided, and 
soon posed stark challenges for Russia.  
Catholicos Iosif’s death, while perhaps alleviating potential conflicts with Persia over his 
ostensible devotion to Russia, created a new difficulty. During the year he headed the Armenian 
Church and before his arrival in Echmiadzin, Iosif had named a successor, Archbishop David, 
the curator of the Echmiadzin monastery. Although the confirmation of a new Catholicos was 	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determined by the entire Armenian diaspora of the Russian, Persian, and Ottoman empires, as 
well as a few representatives from other states, Iosif’s endorsement of David placed much cachet 
behind his candidacy. The ensuing drama over the new Catholicos’s selection pressed Russia 
into defining its relationship with the Echmiadzin leader and helped solidify an official policy 
that remained intact for half a century.   
In the spring of 1801, candidates for the Echmiadzin patriarchy were selected. Of the 
three archbishops, only two were seen as serious contenders: David, the Persian-subject curator 
of the Echmiadzin monastery, and Daniil, an Ottoman-subject archbishop of Constantinople.188 
With the death of Iosif, the tsarist empire reluctantly conceded that the next Catholicos would not 
be a Russian subject. However, owing to the death of Tsar Paul in March and the wresting of 
Kartli Kakhetia, along with its sizable Armenian community, the 1801 election of the 
Echmiadzin patriarch acquired new significance for Russian officials. 
This affair was exacerbated when, on 28 April 1801, David, the late Catholicos’s chosen 
candidate, was secretly “confirmed” as the new Echmiadzin patriarch. This unilateral decision of 
Persian Armenians, supported by the Persian khan of Yerevan but taken without the participation 
of Armenian delegates from Turkey or Russia, caused a tri-imperial crisis. Knorring immediately 
alerted freshly crowned Tsar Alexander I to this news. Ottoman Armenians and their 
government, in a rare display of parallel aims, protested this development. The Russian envoy in 
Constantinople, Vasilii Tomara, informed Knorring that “the Armenians around here, or, more 
specifically, local Armenian bankers, are attached [prilepleny] to Daniil,” and wished to see no 
one but him confirmed Echmiadzin patriarch.189 Tomara was adamant that Daniil’s potential 	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replacement of David boded poorly for tsarist interests, cryptically labeling the Ottoman 
Armenian archbishop “devious” (khitryi).190 The Russian diplomat emphasized that David’s 
election, while unpopular in Constantinople, was legitimate because it not only obeyed late 
Catholicos Iosif’s endorsement but also corresponded to the wishes of non-Ottoman Armenians. 
Tomara urged Knorring to help him ensure the confirmation of David and to prevent 
Constantinople Armenians and the Sublime Porte from replacing him with Daniil.      
When, in June 1801, Ottoman Armenians dropped their opposition to David’s election, 
and the Porte signaled its consent, the matter appeared resolved. However, within months, Tsar 
Alexander wrote to his ambassador in Constantinople, Tomara, expressing concern at the number 
of petitions he had received from various Armenian communities that rallied for Daniil, not 
David, to be the Echmiadzin patriarch.191 The young tsar, convinced that this represented the 
wishes of the majority of Armenians, made clear that he supported Daniil.192 By April 1802, 
Knorring pressed the khan of Yerevan to allow the replacement of David with Daniil, a decision 
that he emphasized corresponded to the desires of “all” Russian and Ottoman Armenians and 
was affirmed by the respective monarchs. Knorring underscored that “according to ancient 
customs and privileges of the Armenian nation, the choice must be left to the complete and 
precise decision of this people, without the slightest external interference.”193 The Yerevan khan, 
embroiled in tensions with the new shah and expressing interest in Russian protection, had little 	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incentive to oppose this turn of events. On 19 May 1802, Constantinople Archbishop Daniil 
received the tsar’s formal recognition as Catholicos and permission to travel through Russia.194  
The active involvement—and even interference—of Russian agents in the selection of the 
Catholicos signaled their acknowledgement of that person’s geopolitical leverage. The tsar and 
his officials vacillated between supporting David and Daniil, ostensibly until the desire of the 
“majority” of Armenians was ascertained, suggesting that the individual’s subjecthood was not 
as important to St. Petersburg as his popularity with Armenians. The David-Daniil saga also 
demonstrated the delicate balance that the Russian government maintained between pursuing its 
interests, such as ensuing the confirmation of a Catholicos sympathetic to Russian ambitions, 
while taking into account the wishes of the vast Armenian diaspora, within and outside of the 
tsar’s realm. Russian officials knew little about Daniil’s political leanings, but despite the 
objections of such tsarist agents as Ambassador Tomara, the affirmation of the candidate who 
appeared most appealing to the Armenians of the South Caucasus (in Russia and Persia) dictated 
the resolution of this affair. Finally, Lazarev’s warning to the Yerevan khan about the need to 
demonstrate “due deference” and proper treatment toward the Echmiadzin monastery and its 
clergy evinced Russia’s growing position as a patron of Christian Armenians living under 
Muslim rule. For the rest of the nineteenth century, this element of Russo-Armenian ties 
impacted not only the politics of the Caucasus but also informed the Eastern Question.  
With Daniil’s appointment, St. Petersburg continued to promote itself as the protector of 
Christians in neighboring Muslim empires. When Russia forced Turkey to sign the Treaty of 
Kutchuk Kainardzhi in 1774, few contemporaries could have imagined the later implications of 
the accord’s Article 7, which stipulated that the “Sublime Porte pledges to give the Christian 	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faith and its churches firm protection and it grants the Ministers of the Russian Imperial Court 
[the right] to protect all interests” of churches and their congregations.195 By the early nineteenth 
century, this notion of Russian protection for foreign-subject Christians had spread to include 
Persia. Indeed, Tsitsianov intimated this to Daniil in February 1803, pledging to “use to your 
benefit all those resources and methods, which I have at my disposal.”196  
Russian authorities confirmed their commitment to Daniil when, in April 1803, 
Tsitsianov learned that Daniil “received harassment and offenses, inflicted on him by the hate of 
various evil people, who are driven solely by greed.”197 The offending villains were not Persian 
khans or bandits, but rather the shah’s Armenian subjects. A sizable group of Armenians in 
Yerevan, coalescing around a few wealthy patrons, mounted a vociferous campaign in support of 
David. Responding to the apparent harassment of Daniil by Persian Armenians, Tsitsianov 
vowed to uphold the tsar’s decision at all costs, if need be with the use of the “invincible and 
mighty” Russian army. The general threatened that if any more “offenses and disrespect” or 
“animal-like” abuses befell Daniil, the tsar’s “terrifying ire” would be unleashed upon the 
tormentors of the legitimate Armenian patriarch. He also appealed to the shared Christian faith of 
the Armenian and Russian peoples, and juxtaposed it to the Muslim rule of the shah and the 
Yerevan khan. “Come to your senses!” pleaded the general, “Compare the meekness [krotost’] of 
Christian rule with the ferocity [liutost’] of Muslim rule; measure the tyranny of the latter against 
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the tolerance of the former—you will see that ours reflects Christian laws inscribed in the Holy 
Gospel, while theirs [reflects] contrary laws. Think again and fear!”198      
 Tsarist patronage of the Armenian Church leadership soon bore geopolitical fruit. After 
Tsitsianov’s failed assault on Yerevan in 1804, for example, Armenian clergy organized the 
relocation of Persian Armenians into Georgia, where they were granted generous tracts of land. 
In one case, Archbishop Hovannes oversaw the migration of some 11,100 Armenian families 
from Yerevan to Georgia, an act for which Tsitsianov praised him to the tsar.199 Soon thereafter, 
in a sign of his approval of this emigration, Catholicos Daniil nominated Hovannes to oversee 
the Armenian eparchy of Georgia. In his support of this decision, Tsitsianov wrote to Tsar 
Alexander that Hovannes demonstrated “unlimited diligence toward Russian benefits and his 
loyalty to [the tsarist empire].”200 Tsar Alexander responded by confirming Hovannes as the 
archbishop of the Armenian eparchy in Georgia. The tsar also, as attestation of the Armenian 
priest’s “excellent diligence toward Russian benefits,” presented Hovannes with a “paean” to 
commemorate his contributions to Russia’s efforts in the resettlement of Persian Armenians.201  
 At the onset of the First Russo-Persian War in 1804, the shah’s authorities removed 
Catholicos Daniil from Echmiadzin and prevented him from carrying out his duties. David, loyal 
as ever to Persia, temporarily took the reins of the Armenian Church.202 In a sign that Persian 	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officials understood the degree to which many senior Armenian clergymen, and Daniil in 
particular, sympathized with Russian political aims, the Persian government imprisoned the 
Catholicos for nearly four years. Only in September 1807, after General Gudovich made Daniil’s 
release and reinstatement a core demand of negotiations with Persian Crown Prince Abbas 
Mirza, did the Armenian patriarch return to Echmiadzin.203   
Despite, or perhaps owing to, this experience, Daniil continued to correspond with senior 
tsarist officials, not only in the Caucasus but also in St. Petersburg. In 1808, not long before 
Gudovich’s renewed assault, Daniil wrote to Minister of Education Count Petr Zavadovskii, 
thanking him for Russia’s patronage of Armenians and asking Zavadovskii to continue 
cooperating with Russia’s Armenian elites, such as the Lazarev family.204 Persian authorities did 
not overlook the Armenian patriarch’s close rapport with the shah’s foe. When the tsar’s army 
reentered Yerevan khanate in October 1808, Persian officials again removed Daniil from 
Echmiadzin to Yerevan, where the patriarch died—apparently of natural causes—not long after 
the siege. With a new patriarchal election looming, the Russian empire solidified its policy 
toward this important event.  
 As Iosif had done in 1799, before his death in February 1809 Daniil endorsed a candidate 
to succeed him. The chosen priest, Archbishop Efrem, was a Russian subject who was reputed to 
sympathize with St. Petersburg’s political goals, especially with regard to relocating Persian 
Armenians into Russian territory. The tsar and his ministers did not object to Efrem’s 
confirmation, and ensured that the frail patriarch’s wishes were widely publicized throughout 
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Russia proper and the Caucasus.205 When, in January 1809, Assistant Minister of Foreign Affairs 
Saltykov asked General Gudovich to provide his assessment of Efrem’s candidacy, the state’s 
geopolitical imperatives were on full display. “It goes without saying,” emphasized Saltykov, 
“that the Russian Court must give its backing to that candidate, who, invited by the voice of the 
people, is well known for his commitment and diligence toward the benefits of the Russian 
empire.” Indeed, so crucial was the placement of a Russian-backed candidate, such as Efrem, at 
the apex of the Armenian Church, that Saltykov ordered Gudovich to do everything in his power 
to prevent the Persian government from installing its own candidate, such as David. The 
potential implications of this decision compelled Saltykov to grant Gudovich the a+uthority to 
confirm, without waiting for the tsar’s consent, any Armenian-chosen candidate whom Gudovich 
deemed to be “a person loyal to Russia and pleasant to the Armenian people.”206  
 In a display of realpolitik, the tsar’s court pursued a goal of ensuring the election of a 
Catholicos who was first and foremost sympathetic to Russian politics. Yet at the same time the 
Russian government sought to merge its interests with Armenian desires. True, so paramount 
were state interests in the patriarchal election matter, that Saltykov conceded that even in the 
unlikely event of Persian-backed David’s election—which Russia opposed—the tsarist court 
could still affirm this selection as long as David could be used to pursue Russian goals, such as 
securing a peace treaty with Persia.207 But these issues were left to Gudovich’s discretion, with 
Saltykov emphasizing that the “most important wish of the Tsar Emperor is that in the selection 
of the patriarch combine the benefits [pol’zy] for the Russian Court with the desires of the 	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Armenian people, leaving everything else to your discretion.”208 After Daniil’s death in February 
1809, several senior Armenian clergymen from Echmiadzin endorsed Efrem, as did many lay 
Armenians in Georgia and the rest of the South Caucasus. Despite the opposition of some 
Persian Armenians, the Armenians of Turkey and Russia elected Efrem to become the next 
Catholicos. Gudovich rushed to affirm this selection in the name of the Russian empire, 
expressing to St. Petersburg confidence in the new patriarch’s political reliability. Efrem’s “long 
term residence in Russia and the immense generosities displayed to him by His Imperial 
Majesty,” stressed the general, “can be firm guarantees that he, of course, will remain forever 
loyal and diligent to Russia, [which is why] I consider that his royal confirmation as the 
Armenian patriarch will both correspond to Russia’s interests and also be pleasant to the local 
Armenian people and clergy.”209 Tsar Alexander’s confirmation of Efrem’s election in 
September 1809 praised the new Catholicos for his “sincere diligence and loyalty to my imperial 
throne, as demonstrated through many exploits.”210  
Despite frequent conflict, Persian authorities at times courted Echmiadzin as actively as 
their Russian rivals. Whereas as recently as 1807 the then pro-Russian Catholicos, Daniil, was 
arrested and forcefully removed from Echmiadzin to Yerevan, the reception that the new, openly 
pro-Russian Catholicos Efrem received in 1809 illustrated important developments. General 
Tormasov, Gudovich’s successor, reported to Foreign Minister Rumiantsev that Persian Crown 
Prince Abbas Mirza had personally greeted the Catholicos upon his arrival in the Persian realm. 
But the crown prince forced Efrem and his retinue to take an oath of allegiance to the shah and 	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also forbade him from wearing the tsar’s medals without also wearing the awards that Abbas 
Mirza had presented to Efrem.211 At the same time, Abbas Mirza—to Tormasov’s surprise—
decreed for Efrem an annual payment equivalent to 4,000 rubles, a sum that exceeded the 
salaries of any preceding Armenian patriarch. These Persian overtures toward the Echmiadzin 
leader appeared at least partially successful, because soon after his arrival in Echmiadzin Efrem 
requested the venerable Armenian monastery’s treasures, which Tsitsianov had removed in 1804 
“for safekeeping” in Tiflis, to be returned to the monastery in Persian territory. Despite 
Tormasov’s resistance, the tsar approved this request in late October 1810. For the next several 
decades, this Russo-Persian rivalry for influence over the Echmiadzin Catholicos, and also the 
role of Ottoman Armenians and their government’s interests, defined the dynamics of the tri-
imperial feuding in which Russo-Armenian ties evolved.   
Conclusion 
The Russo-Armenian encounter of the early nineteenth century represented a two-way 
dynamic. Armenians invited tsarist patronage and made tangible contributions to the fortification 
of the Romanov, and then Soviet, empires as the overlord of the South Caucasus for nearly two 
centuries. During these formative years of the Russo-Armenian partnership, Armenians began to 
enter tsarist service and to achieve prominence within Russia’s social and bureaucratic hierarchy. 
To cite one example from this era, the son of Armenian-heritage tsarist General Iosif Bebutov, 
Vasilii, who had been raised in Tiflis during his father’s posting in the South Caucasus, returned 
to the region in 1810 to serve under the command of General Tormasov after becoming the first 
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Armenian to graduate from the elite Cadet Corps in St. Petersburg.212 Given the insurgency of 
North Caucasian highlanders and the passive resistance of some Georgian elites, it is no 
exaggeration to claim that, among the native peoples of the Caucasus in the first fifteen years of 
the nineteenth century, Russia had no closer ally than the Armenian nation. 
For its part, the tsarist state looked to advance its geopolitical objectives through the 
direct and indirect participation of the Armenian nation and church. To this end, it played a 
pivotal role in the election of the Echmiadzin Catholicos and strove to merge its priorities with 
the desires of the Armenian nation in this regard. Russia annexed the South Caucasus mainly out 
of political reasons, including a desire to maintain parity with the expanding French and British 
empires, but also remained eager to take advantage of the economic opportunities provided by 
interstate and international trade in the Near East.  
With all of Georgia and several Persian khanates annexed and thousands of new subjects 
absorbed into the tsar’s realm, the Romanov state between 1801 and 1816 made key 
advancements on its way to claiming the Caucasus. However, with such formidable Persian 
citadels as Yerevan—the capture of which had eluded two tsarist generals—still maintaining the 
shah’s grip on parts of the region, tsars Alexander I and Nicholas I (1825-55) set their sights on 
consolidating their imperial possessions by completing the Russian conquest of Eastern Armenia. 
New challenges and opportunities between 1816 and 1828, when St. Petersburg finally seized 
Yerevan and Echmiadzin, would shape and reshape the evolution of Russo-Armenian relations. 
The estate-based Russian social system of the early nineteenth century granted not 
individual rights characteristic of modern citizenship but collective rights and obligations that 	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allowed it to respond to the growth of the empire.213 To be sure, some ethnic or national 
communities received preferential status based on their immediate or future contributions to the 
vitality of the empire. Alexander Morrison has argued that in the 1860s, Russia “saw the creation 
of legal and administrative differences that offer some parallels to the division between 
metropole and colony seen in the British and French empires.”214 But as this and the next 
chapters demonstrate, such differences existed in the early decades of the nineteenth century, as 
St. Petersburg privileged Armenians and other groups in a manner that challenged narratives of 
European hegemony over non-Europeans. While the Russo-Armenian bond was grounded in 
religious kinship, Armeno-Georgian and Russo-Georgian ties show that the autocracy considered 
not just religious affiliation when picking its allies.  
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CHAPTER 2: ARMENIANS IN THE RUSSIAN POLITICAL IMAGINATION, 1815-1830 
  “The question will always remain: in Russia, do Armenians possess more rights than 
Russians?” 
          -Finance Minister Egor Kankrin, 1827 
 
“We rather eat Russian grass than Persian bread.” 
      -Armenian refugees, 1828 
In 1816, Admiral Count Nikolai Mordvinov, Russia’s first naval minister and one of its 
most eminent political thinkers, envisioned his empire’s future engagement with, and domination 
of, the Orient. He suggested that through adroit diplomacy and economic incentives, more than 
artillery and bayonets, Russia could ensure a peaceful and profitable future in the Caucasus and 
beyond. “Europe is antiquated [ustarela] and requires little of our surplus,” he argued, “Asia is 
young, immature, can connect with Russia more closely, and all [our] superiority in 
enlightenment and labor will serve to grow Russia’s might over this vast and most important part 
of the world.”215 Buoyed by recent triumphs over the French emperor, the Persian shah, and the 
Ottoman sultan, the tsarist political elite set its sights on claiming the still-unconquered parts of 
the Caucasus. To do so, as Mordvinov and other influential liberals proposed, required flexible 
politics that drew on the participation of Caucasus natives in the Russian imperial project.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
215Akty, sobrannye Kavkazskoiu Arkheograficheskoiu Kommissieiu (hereafter AKAK) (Tiflis: Glavnoe 
upravlenie namestnika kavkazskogo, 1873, vol. V), 951-53. Mordvinov argued that Russia and the 
natives of the Caucasus had parallel economic priorities, which had to be privileged over the tactics of 
armed conquest and military occupation. Only then could peace and prosperity characterize the Russian-
native encounter in the Caucasus.  
 85 
This Russian imperial project drives this chapter. To demonstrate that tsarist imperial 
objectives were as contingent as complex, I examine the state’s policies toward three distinct 
communities of the Armenian diaspora: impoverished immigrants from other empires, 
established merchants in southern Russia, and an elite family aspiring to social and political 
prominence in Moscow. Because they were all tsarist subjects, the government needed tailored 
responses to their needs. Through shifting but complementary Russian perceptions of Armenians 
in the 1820s, the autocracy recruited and distrusted Armenians from abroad while concurrently 
promoting and restraining the commerce of Armenians already settled in southern Russian cities. 
These circumstances illustrate the evolution of a multifaceted project that resists traditional 
labels of “colonial expansion” or “economic exploitation.” Russia’s encounter with Armenians in 
1815-1830 shows that Ann Laura Stoler and Carole McGranaham’s concept of “imperial 
formations” is a more appropriate description of the tsarist nationalities policy under Alexander I 
(1801-25) and the early reign of Nicholas I (1825-55). Unlike the imperial powers of Victorian 
Western Europe, imperial formations “are not, as we once imagined them, based on fixed forms 
and secure relations of inequity: they produce unstable relationships of colonizer and colonized, 
of citizen to subject, and unequal struggles over the forms of inclusion and the principles of 
differentiation.”216 Elsewhere Stoler has emphasized that “blurred genres of rule are not empires 
in distress but imperial polities in active realignment and reformation.”217   
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I echo these arguments by exploring the contested discourses and symbolic practices by 
which Russians attempted to reconcile their often-divergent perceptions of Armenians. To do so, 
I contrast the Armenian resettlement into Russia with the acrimony resulting from Armenians’ 
growing economic position in imperial society. This episode reveals that the state’s nationalities 
policies were less contradictory than conditional. Moreover, the emphasis on Armenian 
sociopolitical ambitions, in the form of lay and ecclesiastical community leaders’ dialogue with 
tsarist political elites, undercuts a historiographical tendency to overlook the political leverage 
exercised by the tsars’ non-Russian subjects in the Caucasus.218 At the broadest level, this 
chapter contributes to our understanding of how the Russian empire was “organized and 
structured, and how imperial rule was established and maintained.”219   
I focus on several groups within the Armenian diaspora, and the role Armenians played 
in the discourse of such statesmen as Mordvinov, to highlight the complexity of the Russo-
Armenian encounter. From starving refugees on the outskirts of Tiflis to powerful philanthropists 
in central St. Petersburg, Armenians experienced Russian nationalities policy differently. Social 
and economic status, geography, acculturation, and other factors shaped the autocracy’s 
perceptions of its Armenian subjects. The Lazarev family of Russified Armenian magnates, 
through economic success and social integration, attained the status of mediators between the 
tsarist government and the external Armenian diaspora. In establishing the Lazarev Institute of 
Oriental Languages, the Lazarevs responded to the political demands of the expansionist state. 
When the tsar battled the shah in the Second Russo-Persian War (1826-28), foreign Armenians 
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cooperated with Russians, precipitating a policy of transplanting Persian and Ottoman-subject 
Armenians into newly annexed territories in the South Caucasus. At the same time, long-settled 
Armenians in several southern Russian cities experienced a gradual waning of economic 
privileges, as senior tsarist officials debated and disagreed over the socioeconomic role that 
Armenians were playing, and should play, in Russia. To be sure, Russian politics evolved as 
rapidly as Russian policies. The rule of Tsar Nicholas I marked a departure from his brother’s 
more progressive nationalities laws, when the state granted foreigners incentives to resettle in the 
Russian empire.  
The Lazarev Dynasty  
It is difficult to overstate the impact of the Lazarev family on facilitating the Russo-
Armenian engagement in the nineteenth century. The Lazarevs were entrepreneurs, bureaucrats, 
philanthropists, generals, and educators. They allied with the Armenian Church, established a 
renowned academy, oversaw the resettlement of Persian and Ottoman Armenians into Russia, 
and acted as intermediaries between the tsarist state and the Armenian nation and church. In 
many ways, the history of their family is one of acculturation, resistance, cooptation, and 
interethnic discourse between Russian and non-Russian elites under the old regime. The Lazarev 
family contributed to this dialogue most clearly by establishing the Lazarev Institute of Oriental 
Languages. Not simply coinciding with Russia’s absorption of foreign-subject Armenians and 
other “Orientals” into the empire but a direct response to these imperial demands of the state, the 
Institute represented a broader Russian objective of understanding its new imperial possessions, 
their inhabitants, and their cultures.   
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The Lazarev genealogy in Russia began in the 1720s, when twenty-something Eleasar 
Nazar’ian Lazariants emigrated from Persia.220 The young man Russified his name to Lazar 
Nazarovich Lazarev and entered state service as a translator of Russo-Persian correspondence. In 
1758 he purchased a silk mill on the outskirts of Moscow. The factory proved a profitable 
venture for the growing Lazarev family. By the mid-eighteenth century, Lazar and his wife, 
Anna Ekimova, had three sons: Ivan, Christopher, and Ekim. The family expanded its 
commercial activities beyond the silk trade of Moscow, entering the jewelry business in St. 
Petersburg, purchasing factories and manufacturers in several towns of European Russia and 
Siberia, and maintaining trade with Persia. Reflecting the family’s economic position, in 1774 
the Lazarevs were admitted into the noble estate (dvorianskoe soslovie), receiving the right to 
own serfs and fortifying the economic foundation on which their social and political clout would 
be based in the following century. 
 The death of Ivan Lazarev, the eldest son of the clan’s original patriarch, precipitated the 
rise of what later became the Lazarev Institute of Oriental Languages. As one of Catherinian 
Russia’s wealthiest tycoons, Ivan not only benefitted from his father’s wealth but also amassed 
his own fortune. Ivan engaged in the tsarist capital’s jewelry trade and accumulated land, 
factories, and mines from other prominent industrialists and aristocrats, including the Stroganov, 
Orlov, Demidov, Golitsyn, and Shakhovskoi families.221 His purchase of the Stroganov family’s 
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Perm estate in 1778, sized at nearly 800,000 hectares with over 7,000 serfs, was one of the 
largest transactions of the era.  
Ivan Lazarev’s greatest contribution to Russo-Armenian engagement came after his death 
in October 1801, in the form of 200,000 rubles in the Moscow Trustee Council (opekunskii 
sovet) reserved for the establishment of “an academic institution for Armenians” in Moscow.222 
While Ivan left few instructions about his envisioned school’s curriculum and mission, it focused 
on the education of both poor and wealthy Armenian boys. Ivan appointed his younger brother, 
Ekim, agent and custodian of this will. Ekim shared his late brother’s vision but without a home 
for the school or permission from tsarist authorities, more than a decade passed before the 
realization of Ivan Lazarev’s dream. By 1823, Ekim Lazarev had contributed 300,000 rubles to 
his brother’s original deposit; at least a third of this amount financed the construction of a stone 
schoolhouse in central Moscow.223 
From the moment the school opened in 1815, the Lazarevs fashioned it as a vehicle for 
Armenians to attain higher social status. Initially known as the Armenian Lazarev Academy 
(ALA), its name reflected the institution’s focus on the education of the Armenian diaspora’s 
youth. By 1819, the first year for which statistical data is available, the academy enrolled thirty-
one pupils. Twenty-five of them came from penurious Armenian families and paid no tuition, 
while the remaining six, including an unspecified number of Russians, paid full tuition.224 Yet 
the academy attracted fewer pupils, wealthy or poor, than the Lazarevs had hoped. As a result, 
the family petitioned local education officials as well as Tsar Alexander I—often invoking the 	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“Christian brotherhood” between Russians and Armenians—to grant more advanced 
accreditation to the academy.225 Ekim Lazarev sought to have the Armenian Lazarev Academy 
be designated a gimnaziia, or secondary school, akin to similar privately funded lyceums, the 
graduates of which automatically entered the lowest, fourteenth, rung of the Russian table of 
ranks. The early debate over the mission of the new institution allowed the Lazarev family to 
engage with officials at a time when important changes in the system of secondary education in 
Russia transformed social, economic, and political ties of the Russian aristocracy.  
The government, keen to standardize the education of nobles by nudging them away from 
private tutors and into universities, supported the formation of several lyceums in the early 
nineteenth century. These privately conceived but state backed institutions became intermediate 
points for elites who aspired to continue their education at universities, or to join the civil 
service. After the formation of the preparatory academy (pansion) alongside Moscow University 
in 1779, several more lyceums arose between 1803 and 1820, including the Demidov uchilishche 
in Yaroslavl (1803), the Imperial Tsarskoe Selo Lycée near St. Petersburg (1811), the Richelieu 
lyceum in Odessa (1817), the Volynskii lyceum in Kremenets (1819), and the Bezborodko 
lyceum in Nezhin (1820). These academies recruited both Russians and non-Russians, and all 
but Tsarskoe Selo admitted limited numbers of non-nobles.226 Although regulations fluctuated 
throughout the first quarter of the century, the graduates of some of these elite institutions were 
often admitted into higher rungs of the Table of Ranks than university graduates. The Lazarev 
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family wished to create an analogous institution for Armenians and non-Armenians in Moscow, 
distinguishing their academy by a broad curriculum that included Oriental studies.  
The Lazarevs imagined that their lyceum would fill an important niche in the Russian 
educational system. It would become only the second preparatory academy in Moscow, and only 
the eighth such institution in the empire, and also would reflect a growing interest and demand 
for Oriental studies in Russia, anticipating the rise of professional Orientology in the empire’s 
universities and at the Academy of Sciences. As David Schimmelpenninck van der Oye has 
emphasized, orientology in this era attracted Russian elites not only because of its potential 
political benefits, but also because Russians, “conscious of their own Asian heritage,” sought to 
understand their hybrid East-West identity through the study of the Near East and Asia.227 
Although emperors Peter and Catherine had promoted the study of the Orient in the eighteenth 
century, the first serious steps toward the professionalization of this endeavor occurred with the 
formation of chairs of Eastern languages and literatures at three Russian universities in 1804.228 
In 1810, Sergei Uvarov, who would later become the longest-serving minister of education and 
president of the Academy of Sciences, urged the government to establish a scholarly Asian 
Academy in St. Petersburg, where diplomats, teachers, translators, and administrators could be 
trained in thirty-one languages, including Chinese, Arabic, Persian, Turkic, Hebrew, and, in the 
future, Armenian and Georgian.229 Although distinct motives and goals drove Uvarov and 
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Lazarev, they were part of a growing Russian elite that stressed the political, social, and cultural 
value of orientology.  
The government had its own ideas for the Lazarev institution. In response to Ekim 
Lazarev’s petitions, the Glavnoe pravlenie uchilishch (GPU) formulated several suggestions for 
reimagining the fledgling academy. In June 1819, the GPU discouraged Lazarev from turning the 
Armenian Lazarev Academy into a general-purpose lyceum, warning him of the stiff competition 
for students and faculty that it was likely to face from its more established and prestigious 
counterparts. Instead, the GPU proposed a narrow curriculum focused on the vocational training 
of future businessmen, “since they [Armenians] mostly engage in trading, and various 
industry.”230 The GPU argued that such an institution would “have its own purposeful goal, 
distinct from others, making it quite commendable and useful in this regard.”231 To attain this 
vision, the GPU suggested converting the ALA to an exclusively Armenian institution with only 
Armenian-heritage pupils.  
An incensed Ekim Lazarev resisted the state’s meddling in his vision. The philanthropist 
insisted that his family’s academy must admit non-Armenian students alongside Armenians in 
order to increase its “general benefit” to the Russian state as well as the Armenian nation, and 
thereby attain the prestige enjoyed by comparable institutions.232 Ekim believed that the school’s 
reputation would suffer if it became an exclusively Armenian establishment, rejecting the GPU’s 
recommendation for a vocational curriculum based on commercial training. He envisioned the 
graduates of his academy advancing not only to bazaars and trade posts, but also to universities 	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and bureaucratic offices. For these goals to succeed, Armenian pupils had to be trained in a 
diverse environment that fostered Armenian and non-Armenian interaction. At the same time, 
Ekim worked within the system, citing the government’s interests in his appeal and emphasizing 
the state benefits of agents versed in Armenian and other Oriental languages, cadres “in whom, it 
is known, the Department of Foreign Affairs has a need.”233  
Although Ekim rejected the GPU’s recommendations, and state officials rejected Ekim’s 
petitions for granting his institution the status of a gimnaziia, the two sides compromised and the 
academy grew rapidly. By the fall of 1821, the ALA’s 70 students enjoyed a wide range of 
classes: Armenian Apostolic and Russian Orthodox doctrines; Armenian, Russian, Persian, 
Latin, French, and German grammar and literature; rhetoric and ethics; physics and natural 
history; macroeconomics; “general commercial science”; “general and particularly Russian 
history”; law; geography and statistics; and calligraphy, drawing, and dancing.234  
This curriculum mirrored the “encyclopedic” programs of other prestigious lyceums,235 
but only the Lazarev academy offered training in Armenian, Persian, and other Eastern cultures. 
Yet at least one other analogous institution in the Russian empire—the Volynskii lyceum in 
Kremenets—emphasized the national education of a non-Russian group. The Volynskii lyceum, 
in modern Ukraine, catered to the Polish nobility, used Polish as the language of instruction, 
employed almost exclusively Polish faculty, and had just one Russian teacher, responsible for 
language, literature, and history courses.236 The Lazarev academy differed from this model not 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
233TsIAM, f. 213, op. 1, d. 1, l. 8. 
234TsIAM, f. 213, op. 1, d. 1, l. 31. 
235Disson, “Privileged Noble High Schools,” 176. 
236Disson, “Privileged Noble High Schools,” 180. 
 94 
only because Russian was its primary language of instruction, but also because the institution 
was located not in the imperial periphery but in Moscow. The Lazarevs sought social and 
political integration, not the fortification of insular national identities.  
By the early 1820s, the ALA’s status began to stabilize. In 1821, among the academy’s 
seventy Armenian, Russian, and foreign pupils, thirty paid no tuition or boarding fees.237 The 
majority of these subsidized pupils were promising orphans or the children of destitute Armenian 
families in the Caucasus. The institution’s trustee (popechitel’), usually in conjunction with the 
Uchilishchnoe pravlenie, made admissions decisions, without regard to the applicants’ 
subjecthood. The faculty, “certified and capable bureaucrats,” lived nearby in housing provided 
by Ekim Lazarev. Full-time boarders paid 700 rubles per year and part-time boarders paid half of 
that amount; however, by one estimate from the early 1820s, the academy’s annual tuition 
income amounted to just 8,000 rubles.238 Aside from this source of revenue the academy reaped 
the annual interest payments of Ivan Lazarev’s 200,000-ruble investment, and also benefited 
from the leasing of buildings that Ekim Lazarev purchased or commissioned specifically for the 
financial support of the ALA.239 Finally, students benefited from a 3,000-volume library. Thus, 
by 1823, the academy’s expanded curriculum, larger enrollment, and improved financial 
situation added punch to Ekim Lazarev’s appeals for elevating the status of his institution. 
The petitions succeeded. On 13 May 1823, Tsar Alexander I approved the first charter of 
the rebranded Armenian Lazarev Gymnasium of Advanced Studies and Oriental Languages 	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(Armianskaia Lazareva Gimnaziia Vysshikh nauk i Vostochnykh iazykov).240 The charter 
emphasized that the gimnaziia catered to all Armenians and non-Armenians, irrespective of 
subjecthood or financial status. Merit, not social status, determined admission. In theory, 
“anyone” demonstrating academic promise and interest in Oriental languages and cultures could 
seek admission. Into the ranks of subsidized students, the gimnaziia admitted “preferably 
children of the poorest families and orphans of the Armenian confession, not excluding children 
of other nations [as long as funds permit].”241 The charter envisioned up to 70 paying pupils and 
between 20 and 30 subsidized students. 
The Lazarevs emphasized the potential political and economic benefits to the tsarist state 
of such an institution—the first lyceum with a focus on Oriental studies. “The importance of 
these goals in terms of Russia’s commercial as well as political relations is so obvious, that it 
requires no explanation,” confidently declared the charter.242 The first institution of its kind in 
Russia, the Lazarev academy preceded the introduction of Arabic, Persian, and Turko-Tatar 
courses at the famed First Kazan Gymnasium in 1836.243  
The Lazarev gimnaziia focused on producing graduates for state (mainly civil) service 
and commerce. At its broadest level, it sought not only to provide “much-needed” teachers, 
translators, and bureaucrats versed in Oriental languages—limited to Armenian, Turkish, 
Persian, and Arabic—but also to educate the public about the culture and history of these 
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Oriental peoples.244 With Russia’s increasingly close political and economic ties to its southern 
imperial neighbors, the Lazarevs argued that their institution would fill an important void in the 
empire’s professional and academic spheres by producing dedicated cadres of well-educated and 
ambitious young men. Upon graduation, foreign-subject Armenians were promised “complete 
freedom” between becoming Russian subjects and returning to their original state of residence.245  
The confirmed charter delivered the prestige that Ekim Lazarev had long solicited but fell 
short of granting the rights and privileges the Armenian magnate sought. In addition to the 
economic exemptions granted to the empire’s elite lyceums, Ekim Lazarev hoped that a formal 
representative of the monarch would be assigned as a benefactor (pokrovitel’) of the institution, 
thus removing the need for the Education Ministry’s oversight by streamlining the decision-
making process at the top. The Lazarevs’ pursuit of eminent statesmen for this post showed their 
political sagacity in recruiting members of the tsar’s inner circle.  
Lazarev seized his chance in November 1823, when former War Minister Count Aleksei 
Arakcheev visited the school on the six-month anniversary of the charter’s confirmation.246 A 
vicious martinet despised by his colleagues and subordinates for his sternness and, later, for his 
draconian enforcement of the ill-fated military colonies project, Arakcheev enjoyed the tsar’s 
trust, making him attractive to the Lazarevs.247 Soon after Arakcheev’s visit, and with his 	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concern for the public good.” See Marc Raeff, Understanding Imperial Russia: State and Society in the 
Old Regime (New York: Columbia University Press, 1984), 128. 
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consent, a broad effort by prominent Armenians, including Ekim Lazarev and senior clergy of 
the Armenian Church, petitioned the tsar for Arakcheev to become “pokrovitel’” of the Lazarev 
Gimnaziia.248 Lazarev hoped that the appointment of a prominent political leader as patron 
would yield the institution additional privileges, such as those granted to the Demidov and 
Bezborodko gimnazii. In his appeal to the tsar, Ekim Lazarev emphasized that “the aim of this 
gimnaziia is to facilitate the education of youth toward state service and toward the classical 
study of Oriental languages, which are so necessary for the political relations of Russia, which 
still has no Oriental institute.”249 An explicit focus on oriental studies began to overshadow the 
earlier emphases on general education and commercial training. Within a year of the original 
charter’s confirmation, Ekim and his assistants drew up a revised charter that revealed this 
evolution of their institution.  
Reflecting the institution’s growing prominence, the tsar tasked the Council of Ministers 
with examining Lazarev’s new petition. Importantly, among the primary supporters of the 
Armenians’ appeal was Minister of Education and President of the Bible Society Alexander 
Golitsyn, who told his colleagues that the Lazarev Gimnaziia “without any violation of the 
general rules can be freed from the oversight of the education ministry, and, as a special kind of 
institution, which mainly educates Armenian children, be placed under a special Supreme 
Leadership.”250 The Council of Ministers agreed with this opinion on 8 November 1824, a 
decision that the tsar soon confirmed, approving the Lazarev Gimnaziia’s second charter.251 	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Count Arakcheev became the school’s principle (nachal’nik), making him the official 
representative of the government in all matters pertaining to the institution. After nearly a decade 
as a small private academy, the Lazarev Gimnaziia of Oriental Languages gained the formal 
backing of the Russian state. 
Several privileges accompanied this support. First, the gimnaziia was allowed to establish 
its own printing press and to use the state seal. Second, the school’s main building on Armenian 
lane in central Moscow, as well as “all” other structures owned by the Lazarev family for the 
explicit benefit of the gimnaziia, were “freed forever from all billeting and all rural and city 
duties.”252 Moreover, the gimnaziia’s professors and teachers were classified as “serving in 
active state service, enjoying all rights and privileges in the promotion of rank and eligibility for 
the receipt of [royal] graces for excellence in service.”253 Finally, LG faculty were permitted to 
wear the state-issued uniforms of the Moscow Educational District. 
Radical transformations in the Lazarev Gimnaziia’s mission and identity continued in the 
1820s. The tsar’s unexpected death in late 1825, the subsequent Decembrist uprising, the Second 
Russo-Persian War (1826-28), and the death of the institution’s founder, Ekim Lazarev, in 1826, 
contributed to the school’s reorientation. By 1827, Arakcheev had left his role as popechitel’ of 
the institution, a position that during his tenure had amounted to little more than a sinecure, 
according to one historian.254 Before another eminent statesman replaced Arakcheev in 1828, the 
tsarist state refocused its attention on the institution.  
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The Committee for the Establishment of Academic Institutions, an ancillary of the 
Education Ministry, tasked distinguished orientologist Christian Martin Frähn, economist G. F. 
Shtrokh, and linguist F. Adelung with composing a new charter for the institution. Frähn’s 
inclusion was particularly noteworthy owing to his role in the development of Russian 
orientology: after a frustrating stint as the first chair of Oriental letters at Kazan University, the 
German numismatist became the first director of the Asian Museum at the Academy of 
Sciences.255 As a result of these scholars’ proposals and the petitions of a new Lazarev, Ivan 
Ekimovich, the institution’s famous iteration was established. On 26 December 1827, the 
committee approved the newly reimagined Lazarev Institute of Oriental Languages.  
The state’s elevation of the Lazarev institution from a “gimnaziia” to an “institute” 
reflected two important developments. First, tsarist agents recognized the school’s success in 
producing cadres of professional clerks versed in Oriental languages and cultures. By the latter 
1820s, little doubt already existed that the lyceum “opened up broad prospects for staffing the 
Russian diplomatic agency.”256 As the Lazarev Institute’s reputation expanded beyond Russia’s 
Armenian diaspora, growing numbers of the institution’s early graduates joined the ranks of state 
translators, junior bureaucrats, and language teachers. Second, this promotion acknowledged the 
state’s need for such bureaucrats and diplomats. The institute’s establishment and the increased 
attention it received from the state coincided with the empire’s expansion into Persian domains 
in the South Caucasus. In the context of Russia’s annexation of new territory and peoples on its 
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southern periphery, the need for such an institution had never been more acute. The selection of a 
new patron confirmed these priorities.   
With Arakcheev’s departure, the Lazarevs and their allies in the Armenian Church 
launched a campaign for a new patron. The target of their efforts became diplomat and general 
Konstantin von Benkendorf.257 Another member of the tsar’s inner circle and former envoy in 
Baden and Stuttgart, Benkendorf had recently earned Armenians’ respect for his military 
prowess during the second Russo-Persian conflict, where his forces captured Echmiadzin and 
routed Persian troops near Yerevan. By March 1828, just weeks after the signing of the 
Turkmenchai Treaty that ended the Second Russo-Persian War and secured Yerevan and 
Echmiadzin for the tsar, Ivan Lazarev and Archbishop Hovannes appealed to Nicholas I for 
Benkendorf to become the institute’s pokrovitel’.  
Yet the post-Decembrist political climate resulted in distinctions between the successive 
tenures of Arakcheev and Benkendorf. Per the monarch’s decree of 19 August 1827, reflecting 
the new tsar’s conservatism and also the LI’s redefined identity, the institution’s royally 
appointed patron now fell under the jurisdiction and oversight of the Education Ministry. Under 
the leadership of the conservative Aleksandr Shishkov, who distrusted prominent academics and 
sought to replace them with bureaucrats, the ministry scrutinized the activities of the empire’s 
academies with reinvigorated zeal.258 To assuage the potential concerns of this “emblematic 
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figure of the emerging Russian nationalism,”259 Benkendorf assured Shishkov, in April 1828, 
that he was 
prepared to contribute to the prospering of this broadly beneficent [obshchepoleznogo] 
Oriental nest [rassadnik], especially because the institute’s overall aim is to provide that 
education to the youth, which is necessary for military and civil service. Moreover, the 
Armenian youth living under Russian protection, who have demonstrated zealous 
devotion to their new homeland . . . will unite [soedinitsia] with native Russians with 
greater ease.260   
 
Moreover, Benkendorf not only reassured Shishkov that the Lazarev Institute remained 
financially solvent, an ostensible early concern of the minister, but also that the institution 
derived financial profit from “the entire Armenian people,” whose “devoted cooperation” 
continued to grow.261 Finally, Benkendorf summarized his stance by arguing that the Lazarev 
Institute “deserves special attention because it was founded by private individuals, without any 
[state] encouragement and without any assistance from the treasury, to the substantive benefit of 
the government and to the benefit of an entire nation.”262 
 Despite a broad campaign that benefited from Benkendorf’s support, the Lazarevs 
struggled to secure for their private academy the privileges granted to state-owned institutions. 
Throughout 1828, Shishkov and his ministry rejected several drafts of a new charter that sought 
the granting to the Lazarev Institute of rights reserved for state-sponsored educational institutions 
(kazennye uchebnye zavedeniia).263 In rejecting the family’s appeals, the Education Ministry in 	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May 1828 called into doubt the institute’s financial situation. In particular, it argued that the 
Lazarevs failed to provide definitive proof of their academy’s annual profits.264 Even after Karl 
von Lieven replaced Shishkov at the helm of the Education Ministry in late 1828, the Lazarevs’ 
petitions encountered resistance from the state.  
By February 1829, the Lazarev brothers offered to place their personal properties, 
including large estates with many serfs and recently acquired stone buildings in Moscow, as 
collateral of their institute’s financial stability and solvency. Additionally, the brothers 
emphasized that leaving their academy strictly private, without attributing to it the privileges of 
kazennye uchebnye zavedeniia, would curb its contributions to state interests.265 Despite such 
assurances and arguments, Lieven for some time insisted on leaving the Lazarev institution “at 
its current good position, at the general rules for private institutions, [where it can] deliver 
benefits for public enlightenment commensurate with its resources.”266 The Education Ministry 
relented only in 1830, approving the institute’s new charter.      
 Beyond their institute’s mission, dialogue between the Lazarev family and the Education 
Ministry in 1829 focused on the broader growth of Armenian studies in the tsarist empire. By the 
fall of 1829, reports reached Lieven from the Moscow education officials that the Lazarevs 
sought to finance the establishment of a “department of Armenian language and literature” at the 
prestigious Moscow University.267 The Armenian philanthropists offered not only to finance the 
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initial efforts but also to assist in recruiting an experienced scholar of Armenian studies and, if 
need be, to provide “whatever academic assistance.”  
Lieven rejected this proposal in November 1829, assuring Ivan Lazarev that the 
Education Ministry “has already turned its attention to the necessity of studying in our country of 
Oriental languages, including Armenian,” but the resources of the imperial capital made St. 
Petersburg a more appropriate site for the initiation of these efforts than Moscow. Lieven argued 
that the Academy of Sciences and the Imperial Public Library, in conjunction with the city’s 
generally larger scholarly community from which instructors could be recruited, facilitated the 
study of various Oriental languages in St. Petersburg.268 Ivan Lazarev countered that Moscow’s 
Armenian population far exceeded that of St. Petersburg, providing the future center of 
Armenian studies with more support, demand, and objects of study. Although the first chair of 
Armenian studies was not established at Kazan University until 1842,269 the Lazarevs set the 
foundation on which Armenology came to be accepted in Russian academia. From 1844, 
Armenian became part of the curriculum at St. Petersburg University.270  
By the start of the 1830s, the Lazarev dynasty had not only established an increasingly 
esteemed center of Orientology, but also had taken the first steps toward the creation of 
Armenian studies departments in the empire’s premier universities. The institution’s reputation 
spread beyond Russia’s Armenian diaspora to attract Armenian and non-Armenian students from 
India and Western Europe, and facilitated its engagement with kindred foreign scholarly bodies, 
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such as the Royal Asiatic Society in London.271 From 1829 to 1831 alone, the institute’s 
enrollment grew from 73 to 93 pupils.272 Among the 73 pupils in 1829, 40 received full financial 
support from the academy and the total cohort’s national composition included 52 Armenians, 11 
Russians, and 2 Germans.273 The academy’s growing ranks of teachers ensured eight daily hours 
of class time; the institute’s faculty grew from 12-14 instructors in 1823 to 26 in 1829. 
Thanks to merit-based admissions, a rigorous curriculum, qualified faculty, and 
comfortable facilities, the Lazarev Institute began to produce young men who eventually 
advanced to senior positions in the tsarist political hierarchy. Even early disciplinary issues did 
not prevent former students from achieving success. To cite one example, when Mikhail, a 
young Armenian pupil, smothered his teacher’s chair with enough glue that the educator required 
his colleagues’ rescue after sitting down, the institute’s administration not only expelled the 
troublemaker but also sought to exile him to his parents in the South Caucasus. The future 
looked bleak for young Mikhail, and probably few could have imagined then that within four 
decades the mischievous Armenian teenager would become the second-most powerful man in the 
empire, Interior Minister Count Mikhail Loris-Melikov.274 
The Lazarev Institute of Oriental Languages played a key role in the evolution of Russo-
Armenian relations. From its inception, the academy and its patron family found allies among the 
tsarist political elite and broader Russian public. For example, on 28 February 1817, the 	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newspaper Moskovskie vedomosti (Moscow Herald) hailed the new institution as an affirmation 
of the “Christian brotherhood” between Russians and Armenians.275 The newspaper predicted 
that the Lazarev Academy would yield “a new holy union, tightly binding two people of the 
same faith.” In a particularly melodramatic rhapsody where Russia was likened to a “progeny-
loving mother” and Armenians to “her orphaned offspring,” the article highlighted Russia’s 
patronage of the stateless Armenians:  
Armenians, lacking a political existence [and] impoverished for so many centuries, find 
in Russia a compassionate mother who cares for them and stimulates their minds. [The 
Armenians] will utilize all their efforts to strengthen their position and will demonstrate 
new examples of gratitude and reverent filial dedication, [more] evidence of that 
unwavering loyalty and diligence toward the All-Russian throne with which they have 
been animated for a long time.276 
 
The article insisted that “an alliance forged on this solid foundation with a nation that is 
distinguished by its exemplary internal communication, a broad trade in a large part of the 
Orient, and especially [one that] maintains the closest and most direct relations with India and 
Persia, provides . . . a vast field of flattering [lestnye] benefits for Russia.”277 
 Among the tsarist political elite, too, Russian support for the Lazarev Institute, if not 
constant, assured the institution’s expansion. The tsar appointed two pokroviteli, eminent 
statesmen selected by the Lazarevs, demonstrating the status and implications that the Romanov 
state associated with this institution. Even when the Lazarevs encountered the resistance of 
senior officials, such as Shishkov and Lieven, their academy enjoyed the backing of other 
officials, such as Benkendorf, permitting the advancement of their vision.  
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The key to understanding the reasons for this shifting progress lies in the fact that the 
Lazarev academy was never intended to be, nor did it become, a center of Armenian education 
along national, or nationalist, ideologies. It focused primarily on the schooling of Armenian-
heritage pupils not to awaken or fortify their Armenianess, or to counteract perceived and real 
Russification of the tsar’s Armenian subjects, but to prepare Armenians and non-Armenians for 
membership in professional Russian society. The institute sought to train graduates for private 
and state careers that required knowledge of Oriental languages and cultures alongside general 
education. The state’s gradual patronage of this institution affirmed the Russian political elite’s 
acceptance of the Lazarevs’ stated mission toward the political and economic benefit of the 
tsarist empire. 
 The rise of the Lazarev Institute of Oriental Languages represented a response to the 
demands of Russian imperialism. The academy’s establishment and its gradual backing by the 
state corresponded with the lull between the two Russo-Persian clashes, when Russian ministers, 
generals, administrators, and the broader public turned their attention to the empire’s expansion 
into the South Caucasus. At the same time, as large numbers of Persian and Ottoman-subject 
Armenians immigrated into the Romanov empire, its population of Armenians grew suddenly, 
necessitating a closer understanding of their culture(s). To examine the processes through which 
foreign-subject Armenians came under St. Petersburg’s control, an analysis of the tsar’s clashes 
with the shah and the sultan in the late 1820s is necessary.  
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Figure 2. The original building of the Lazarev Institute of Oriental Languages. Today it houses the 
Armenian Embassy to Russia.  
Photo property of the author. 
Old Foes, New Friends 
 The Second Russo-Persian War of 1826-28 and the Russo-Ottoman War of 1828-29 
pitted Russia against its two imperial neighbors in the Caucasus. One of the key results of the 
former clash was Russia’s annexation of Yerevan and Echmiadzin in 1828. The tsars had 
pursued these historic Armenian centers since 1804, enticed by the strategic advantage of the 
Yerevan fortress and the political sway of the Echmiadzin monastery, to whose authority 
submitted the entire dispersed Armenian diaspora. While capture of Yerevan, the region’s second 
city after Tiflis, spelled full Russian dominion over the South Caucasus, control of Echmiadzin 
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promised extensive political and economic sway into those countries, such as Turkey, Persia, and 
even India, where Russian diplomats struggled for influence while local Armenian bishops 
enjoyed social prominence. Thus geopolitical incentives, more than economic goals, motivated 
Russia’s conflict with Persia and Ottoman Turkey in the Caucasus in the late 1820s.      
Persia’s political elite lamented the result of the First Russo-Persian War of 1804-13, 
when Russia wrested control of six khanates and hundreds of thousands of the shah’s subjects. In 
the words of historian Firoozeh Kashani-Sabet, “the danger of domination loomed large as 
imperial giants cast their sinister shadows over the Iranian lands and nibbled away at its 
fringes.”278 The terms of the Treaty of Giulistan in 1813 had confirmed the superiority of 
Russian weapons, but Fath-Ali Shah and Crown Prince Abbas Mirza remained convinced that 
good timing, more than good tactics, had brought victory to their northern neighbor. Persian 
leaders recognized the fact that, having both expelled Napoleon’s Grande Armée and defeated 
the Ottomans in 1812, Russia was free to devote a larger proportion of resources to the Caucasus 
campaign in 1813. Determined to regain lost territories and reestablish its imperial grip on the 
South Caucasus, the Persian political and spiritual elite vowed to wage jihad against the northern 
infidels, a fateful policy that would precipitate the decline of the entire Qajar monarchy.279 For 
the tsarist state, too, the Russo-Persian border redrawn at Giulistan fell short of its goals, 
because, after two failed Russian attempts at their conquest, Yerevan and Echmiadzin stayed 
within the shah’s domain. With the death of Tsar Alexander I in late 1825 and the subsequent 
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Decembrist revolt, Persia seized the chance to catch the tsarist bureaucracy and military off 
guard.  
 On 16 July 1826, the sardar, or military governor, of Yerevan attacked Russian outposts 
along the boundary of Russian-held Georgia and Persian-held Yerevan. Almost simultaneously, 
the main Persian army, led by Crown Prince Abbas Mirza, crossed the Arax River from Persia 
proper into the Russian-occupied khanates of Karabakh and Talysh. The Persian force advanced 
easily, driving back small Russian garrisons and welcoming the defections of local khans to the 
Persian side.280 Within days of the attack, the shah’s army had expelled or encircled all of the 
Russian troops stationed in Karabakh, a success that the supreme Russian commander, General 
Aleksei Petrovich Ermolov,281 attributed to the collusion of local Muslims. As one small Russian 
contingent became encircled in the Shusha fortress, Ermolov vented to the tsar that locals had 
blocked narrow mountain passages to prevent the retreat of Russian troops.282 
 Like many of the aristocratic officers in the tsar’s army, Ermolov was an intellectual as 
much as a soldier, belonging to a distant age of enlightened imperialists. He was a man of “wide 
culture and a fluent linguist, greatly influenced by the ideas of the Encyclopedistes; a writer of 
philosophical verse, a skilled Latinist who always kept his Livy close at hand, and who named 
his two sons Severus and Claudius.”283 Pushkin, who met Ermolov after his retirement, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
280RGVIA, f. 846, op. 16, d. 4290, l. 28. The Persian army numbered about 35,000 men.  
281A veteran of the Napoleonic War of 1812 who distinguished himself at Borodino and Paris, Ermolov 
assumed the command of tsarist forces in the Caucasus in 1816.  
282RGVIA, f. 846, op. 16, d. 4290, l. 39. 
283Michael Whittock, “Ermolov – Proconsul of the Caucasus,” in Russian Review 18, no. 1 (1959): 56. 
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immortalized him in his poetry.284 At the same time, the general was a “quintessential frontier 
conqueror,” who sought to subjugate the region through relentless violence and harsh policies.285 
His command of the Caucasus ensured that the highlanders feared, respected, and hated 
“Yarmul,” as they called him.286       
 From the first fusillade of the Second Russo-Persian War, the theme of a clash of 
religions informed the perspective of senior tsarist commanders in the Caucasus. Ermolov 
deflected blame for the debacle from himself to the supposed duplicitousness of the region’s 
Muslim residents. Shaken by the powerful incursion, the Russian general reported to the tsar 
within days of the Persian attack that “a war aroused by religion and fanaticism has mobilized 
against us all Muslims and we have nothing left but Georgia.”287 Warning of the perilous 
situation, Ermolov pleaded for heavy reinforcements, vowing to punish the Persians by “bringing 
the war into their own land!”288 In an appeal for assistance to the Imperial General Staff, 
Ermolov emphasized that “this war promises to be more severe than could have been expected, 
for it is aroused by religion.”289 
The tsar not only disagreed with Ermolov’s plans for a defensive war but also pressed 
him to conquer new territory. Soon after the Persian invasion, the chief of the General Staff, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
284Pushkin’s Prisoner of the Caucasus provides the best example of this. Pushkin also mentioned Ermolov 
in his Journey to Erzurum, but, written after the poet’s audience with the retired general, paints a less 
romanticized picture of Ermolov.  
285Charles King, The Ghost of Freedom: A History of the Caucasus (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2008), 45. 
286Whittock, “Ermolov – Proconsul of the Caucasus,” 55. 
287RGVIA, f. 846, op. 16, d. 4290, l. 28. 
288RGVIA, f. 846, op. 16, d. 4290, l. 4.  
289RGVIA, f. 846, op. 16, d. 4290, l. 38. 
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Hans Karl von Diebitsch, ordered Ermolov to take “decisive” action against the shah’s army 
using the Independent Caucasus Corps, a formidable force of 30,000 men. Diebitsch and Tsar 
Nicholas were so confident of this army’s superiority that they instructed Ermolov not only to 
repulse the Persian attack but also to capture the elusive Yerevan fortress, which had repelled 
Russian attacks in 1804 and 1808.290 By mid-August 1826, Tsar Nicholas’s terse messages 
revealed the monarch’s waning confidence in Ermolov.291 Although Nicholas relented by 
sending an additional division to the Caucasus, at the head of the reinforcements he sent General 
Ivan Paskevich, ostensibly to provide Ermolov with “a detailed explanation of my intentions.”292       
The complex interethnic climate of the region impacted the course of the conflict. 
Throughout the first months of the war, Ermolov continued to warn St. Petersburg of the local 
Muslims’ security risk, roused not simply by religious solidarity with the invading army but also 
by the financial “gifts” and incentives promised by Abbas Mirza in return for cooperation.293 
Ermolov also claimed that the sardar of Yerevan had sent propagandistic pamphlets to village 
elders in tsarist territory, urging their assistance in Persia’s struggle against the infidels. To 
“punish” the local Muslims for their collaboration with the enemy, Ermolov planned to billet his 
troops on their lands and in their villages until the start of a winter campaign against Karabakh. 
Some of Ermolov’s concerns were confirmed in September 1826, when local Muslims in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
290RGVIA, f. 846, op. 16, d. 4290, l. 24. Should the shah fail to sue for peace at that time, Ermolov was 
instructed to cross the Arax River into Persia proper to capture the major northern Persian city of Tavriz. 
291RGVIA, f. 846, op. 16, d. 4290, l. 43. 
292RGVIA, f. 846, op. 16, d. 4290, l. 43. 
293RGVIA, f. 846, op. 16, d. 4290, ll. 53-54. 
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Elisavetpol joined with the invading Persians to drive out the Russian garrison.294 Yet Ermolov 
again found himself on the wrong side of the predominant view. Despite the mass insurrection at 
Elisavetpol, the tsar instructed Ermolov to announce a blanket amnesty to local Muslims for their 
cooperation with the Persians. Ermolov and his commanders were to treat them with “mercy” 
and avoid any semblance of “vengeance.”295 According to Diebitsch, “His Majesty is convinced 
that mercy and justice sooner will instill in these people a sense of loyalty to Russia than 
persecution and harassment, which can fan the flames of a war birthed by religious 
fanaticism.”296  
If in the perception of some tsarist elites, such as General Ermolov, local Muslims posed 
security risks to Russian interests in the South Caucasus, then other groups offered advantages. 
Tsarist officials found indigenous, religious-based support primarily among two national groups: 
Armenians and Georgians. As soon as hostilities flared, Russian officials had no doubt about 
which side the Armenians supported. When Abbas Mirza’s army overran Elisavetpol in 
September 1826 and mobilized local Muslims against the Russian administration, the only good 
news Ermolov could report to the tsar was that “all Armenians living in the district are on our 
side.”297 When, a few weeks later, Paskevich’s forces entered Karabakh to break the siege of the 
Shusha fortress, the general reported to the tsar that local Armenians had facilitated his 
advancement by providing intelligence on the location of Persian troops.298  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
294RGVIA, f. 846, op. 16, d. 4290, l. 85.  
295RGVIA, f. 846, op. 16, d. 4290, ll. 96-97. 
296RGVIA, f. 846, op. 16, d. 4290, ll. 96-97.  
297RGVIA, f. 846, op. 16, d. 4290, l. 85.   
298RGVIA, f. 846, op. 16, d. 4290, l. 106. 
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Indeed, Armenian cooperation contributed to turning the tide of the war. The first major 
Russian victory of the conflict took place near Elisavetpol on 13 September 1826.299 Two 
Armenians in the Persian service, one of whom tsarist sources identified as the personal Russian 
interpreter of Abbas Mirza, snuck into Paskevich’s camp at night to warn the Russian general of 
an imminent attack by the Persian Crown Prince.300 This information, according to Paskevich’s 
report to Tsar Nicholas, permitted him to launch a preemptive assault that helped drive the 
Persians from Karabakh.301 Within days of this victory, Paskevich broke the Persian siege of 
Shusha and Abbas Mirza’s army withdrew from Karabakh into Persia proper, tracked along the 
route by Armenian informants.302  
If during the First Russo-Persian War Armenians were mainly tsarist spies and settlers, in 
the second clash they also assumed the role of soldiers. Upon entering the long-besieged Shusha 
fortress, Paskevich discovered that “up to 1,500 armed Armenians” had fought alongside Russian 
troops to withstand the Persian attack.303 The tsarist commander of the garrison, Colonel Reutt, 
confirmed to Paskevich that “brave Egerians and loyal Armenians” had played an active role in 
defending the citadel. Moreover, the colonel reported that, at the onset of hostilities, he had 
witnessed local “Tatars” slaughter “several” Armenians outside the fortress. The Russian officer 
interpreted this event as a sign of the Muslims’ resistance to the arrival of a Christian force and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
299A detailed summary of this battle can be found at RGVIA, f. 846, op. 16, d. 4302, ll. 1-3. 
300RGVIA, f. 846, op. 16, d. 4290, l. 109. 
301RGVIA, f. 846, op. 16, d. 4301, l. 1.   
302RGVIA, f. 846, op. 16, d. 4290, l. 139. 
303RGVIA, f. 846, op. 16, d. 4290, l. 145. Another source, less reliable for its unclear origin, gives the 
number of Armenian fighters inside the Shusha fortress at 3,000 men: RGVIA, f. 846, op. 16, d. 894, l. 3.  
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their displeasure with their Christian neighbors, whose sympathy for tsarist rule was no secret.304 
With the turning tide of the war and growing danger of a Russian invasion of the Yerevan 
khanate, tsarist authorities learned that the Yerevan sardar intended to relocate Armenians in his 
territory beyond the Arax River “in order to deprive us [Russians] of any benefits from them.”305  
Armenians mobilized both on their own and with Russian appeals. In some cases, 
Armenian ecclesiastical elders urged their followers to take up arms against the Persians. In late 
1826, at the behest of the Echmiadzin Catholicos (still within the Persian domain) and the 
Armenian archbishop of Tiflis, Armenians in and near Nakhichevan assembled a large militia, 
estimated by some Armenian sources to have numbered as many as 6,000 mounted men.306 
While this number is likely exaggerated, it is indicative of the role played by the Armenian 
Church in rallying its flock. During the Russian advance after Paskevich’s victory at Elisavetpol, 
several Armenian militias (opolchentsy), some numbering as few as 100 individuals, fought 
alongside the tsarist army.307 In some instances, junior tsarist commanders in the field issued 
certifications to individual Armenian militia leaders and other local supporters, acknowledging 
their assistance to the Russian army.308  
Other natives of the region, both Muslim and Christian, joined Armenians in the tsarist 
war effort. Armenian and Georgian militias fought under the command of their co-national 
commanders but coordinated their actions with Russian forces. Georgian militias, some of them 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
304RGVIA, f. 846, op. 16, d. 4290, ll. 147-51. 
305RGVIA, f. 846, op. 16, d. 4290, l. 284. 
306RGVIA, f. 846, op. 16, d. 894, l. 25. 
307RGVIA, f. 479, op. 1, d. 14, ll. 6, 8, and 10. More examples in RGVIA, f. 846, op. 16, d. 4290, l. 232.  
308National Archive of Armenia (NAA), f. 90, op. 1, d. 456, l. 1. 
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led by aristocratic young Georgians raised after the 1801 annexation of Kartli-Kakhetia, often 
battled alongside “Tatar” and Armenian units. The General Staff learned of these displays of 
loyalty early, directing Ermolov in the fall of 1826 to provide a report about local Armenians’ 
and Georgians’ cooperation with Russian war efforts.309 Moreover, always in search of 
additional reinforcements, in late August 1826 Ermolov recruited “up to 1,800” Georgian 
cavalrymen, “among whom are many princes and nobles of the best names.”310 Soon a formal 
declaration from Tsar Nicholas to the Georgian nobility acknowledged its contribution.311  
After Paskevich expelled Abbas Mirza from Karabakh, the Russian army targeted 
Yerevan. In preparation for the assault in the spring of 1827, Paskevich recruited local Muslims, 
Georgians, and especially Armenians. In May 1827, he boasted to Diebitsch that, within a couple 
days of his initial announcement, over one hundred Armenian men volunteered for service.312 
The terms of service for these mobilizing “Armenian battalions” were publicized widely. 
Armenian men aged eighteen to thirty were accepted on a temporary, voluntary basis for the 
duration of the war with Persia, at the conclusion of which they would be disbanded. During 
their service, together with their wives and children, the volunteers were excused from all taxes. 
They were armed and paid by the Russian army, to whose authority and command structure they 
submitted. However, efforts were made to assign tsarist officers of Armenian heritage to the 
Armenian battalions.313 Such commanders were permitted to issue orders in Armenian.314 The 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
309RGVIA, f. 846, op. 16, d. 894, l. 9. 
310RGVIA, f. 846, op. 16, d. 4309, l. 1.  
311RGVIA, f. 846, op. 16, d. 4309, ll. 2-3. 
312RGVIA, f. 846, op. 16, d. 4336, l. 1. 
313RGVIA, f. 846, op. 16, d. 4336, ll. 1-3. 
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supplies provided to the Armenian units, in theory, were to match the support given to ordinary 
Russian soldiers, and all Armenians wounded in battle were admitted into Russian field 
hospitals. The first of these units, a “druzhina” (squad) of 117 Armenians, was dispatched from 
Tiflis in mid-May 1827 to rendezvous with Russian forces near Echmiadzin. A few weeks later, 
another unit of 100 Armenians was sent from Tiflis to join the Russian siege of Yerevan, 
followed by a third, smaller unit of 67 men in August.315 Learning of these developments from 
Diebitsch, Tsar Nicholas proposed that permanent Armenian military units be organized after the 
war.316    
Persian authorities recognized their Armenians’ solidarity with Russians. In the encircled 
Yerevan khanate, according to Armenian reports to Russian officials, which must be interpreted 
with particular caution given the stakes involved,317 Persian officials took measures to check the 
potential collusion of local Armenians with the enemy. In one report from early October, 
Armenians in Tiflis, receiving information from their compatriots in Yerevan, reported to local 
Russian officials news from Yerevan. “As much as from its explicit suspicion of the Armenian 
people for its devotion to Russia,” summarized one Armenian report, “as much as from 
vengeance and evil, Yerevan authorities have begun the extreme harassment of the Armenian 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
314RGVIA, f. 846, op. 16, d. 4336, l. 5.  
315RGVIA, f. 846, op. 16, d. 4336, ll. 9-14. A unit of 100 Georgian volunteers was also dispatched from 
Tiflis to Yerevan in July 1827. 
316RGVIA, f. 846, op. 16, d. 4336, l. 7. 
317In theory, it was in Armenians’ interest to exaggerate to Russians the abuse they experienced at the 
hands of Persians in order to encourage Russian intervention.  
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Echmiadzin Monastery. By order of the Persian chiefs, some of the monks have already been 
killed, others [tortured], and moreover they have begun plundering and destroying.”318  
In another district, the local Persian commander returned from the front to confiscate the 
goods of local Armenian traders and to seize valuables from the local Armenian churches. The 
Yerevan sardar ordered all Armenians within the city suspected of cooperating with the enemy 
hanged, and those living outside the city to “evacuate” beyond the Arax River. Their abandoned 
homes were razed, as well as some bridges across the river.319 Beyond the Yerevan khanate, 
according to the complaints of Armenians in Tiflis to Russian authorities, tsarist-subject 
Armenian merchants travelling through Persia proper were detained, and their goods and money 
confiscated.320 However, other Armenians from Karabakh reported that Abbas Mirza had 
guaranteed the safe passage of Russian-subject Armenian merchants from Tavriz back to Tiflis, 
even providing them with an armed escort.321 
Back in the Russian camp, tensions between Ermolov and Paskevich came to a head, 
exasperated by Paskevich’s triumphs.322 In early 1827, Nicholas sent Diebitsch to resolve the 
matter and to end the war. Soon Paskevich refused to continue under Ermolov’s command. On 
28 March, following the tsar’s orders, Diebitsch relieved the veteran general from his duties, 
promoting Paskevich to lead the Independent Caucasus Corps.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
318RGVIA, f. 846, op. 16, d. 894, ll. 6-7. 
319RGVIA, f. 846, op. 16, d. 894, ll. 11-12 and also 31. 
320RGVIA, f. 846, op. 16, d. 894, l. 3. Ermolov retaliated by ordering the seizure of goods belonging to 
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322Based on the correspondence between Tsar Nicholas, Diebitsch, and Ermolov, it appears that the 
greatest sources of frustration for the court were Ermolov’s recurring pleas for heavy reinforcements, and 
his hesitation to engage the main Persian army until their arrival.  
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General Paskevich justified his promotion quickly. By mid-June 1827, the tsarist army 
had advanced within 25 kilometers of the Yerevan fortress.323 Russian troops under the 
command of General Benkendorf, meantime, captured Echmiadzin and drove the local Persian 
troops into Yerevan, taking care to “save Armenian villages from the expulsion of residents.”324 
Paskevich bragged in his journal that upon his army’s entrance into Armenian villages in Persian 
territory, they were met with “the most festive greeting, in all churches liturgies were read for the 
welfare of the Emperor and the entire august [royal] house.”325  
On 1 October 1827, Paskevich’s army stormed the Yerevan citadel, capturing the city and 
much of its Persian garrison, including Sardar Hassan Khan.326 Soon tsarist troops occupied 
Tavriz, well inside Persia proper, without a fight. Fearing the advancement of the tsar’s army 
deeper into his realm, the shah sued for peace. On 10 February 1828, General Paskevich and 
Abbas Mirza signed the Treaty of Turkmenchai in the eponymous Persian village.  
The terms of the treaty, much as they were at the end of the previous Russo-Persian war, 
were generous to the victor. The shah ceded to the tsar the Yerevan and Nakhichevan khanates, 
along with the remainder of Talysh khanate.327 Persia affirmed the previous concessions of the 
Treaty of Giulistan and forever surrendered claims to territory north of the Arax River, which 
became the formal boundary between the Russian and Persian states. Persia also agreed to pay 
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reparations of 20 million silver rubles, and to withdraw its naval fleet from the Caspian Sea.328 In 
return, Russian forces pledged to return occupied Tavriz and to support Abbaz Mirza as the heir 
to Fath Ali Shah. An important stipulation of the Treaty of Turkmenchai granted a yearlong 
window for all Persian subjects living along the new border to relocate into tsarist territory.  
 Even before the signing of the Treaty of Turkmenchai, Russian officials in the Caucasus 
turned their attention to the stirring of the Ottoman pashas across the other imperial border. 
Sparked in the Balkans by the Greek War of Independence and Turkey’s closing of the 
Dardanelles to Russian ships in retaliation for Russia’s participation in an anti-Ottoman 
coalition, the Russo-Ottoman War of 1828-29 reverberated in the Caucasus.329 By December 
1827, Paskevich reported that Ottoman officials in districts adjacent to the Russian border had 
begun preparations for war. As evidence of these developments, tsarist officials in the Caucasus 
notified St. Petersburg that Ottoman Armenians, “more committed to us than to their 
government,” were placed under surveillance and relocated away from the Russian border.330 
Paskevich received multiple reports about new restrictions affecting Ottoman Armenians in 
Anatolia, such as a prohibition on sending letters and the summons of two elders from each 
Armenian village to Constantinople for unclear purposes.331 This suggests that Ottoman officials, 	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like their Persian counterparts, recognized that their Armenian subjects sought Russian 
patronage.  
Tsarist agents sought to capitalize on these circumstances. The governor-general of Tiflis, 
Nikolai Sipiagin, proposed to Diebitsch in March 1828 that “with a quick foray into Turkish 
borders we will prevent them from relocating Armenians into internal provinces, and will take 
advantage of the grain stocks in Kars and Akhaltsykh districts; while our good treatment of the 
locals will compel them to remain in their villages and provide us with means for the successful 
execution of the war.”332 Another tsarist commander, General Afanasii Krasovskii, echoed this 
sentiment, arguing that Ottoman Armenians will support a Russian invasion of eastern Anatolia. 
Once the Armenians see that tsarist forces treat them well, pay for supplies received from the 
locals, and respect their properties, the Armenians, “having noticed such a dramatic contrast with 
the actions of their current overlords, will rush to join us; for the Turkish government has sowed 
so much hatred and loathing toward itself that they will eagerly facilitate a change that is 
beneficial to themselves.”333 Prior to Paskevich’s invasion of Ottoman territory on 14 June 1828, 
he sought to reassure the local Ottoman subjects, both Christian and Muslim, through pamphlets. 
The tsarist general vowed that his army “will not disturb your tranquility; no Russian soldier will 
touch your property, [and] will not hinder the security of Muslims.”334 Despite such assurances, 
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333RGVIA, f. 846, op. 16, d. 4334, l. 10.  
334RGVIA, f. 846, op. 16, d. 4643, l. 60. 
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the Russian army on its way to Kars found little more than abandoned plains: local Muslims had 
fled and the authorities had removed Christians, mostly Armenians, into the interior.335 
It would be an exaggeration to claim that, in the military or political sense, Armenians 
played a pivotal role in the Russian expansion into the South Caucasus. According to Russian 
sources, Armenian and Georgian volunteer units represented only a fraction of the total forces 
under tsarist command. Yet, in a conflict that was often portrayed in terms of an ethnocultural 
clash between Christendom and Islam, the real and potential cooperation of Armenians, and 
other native Caucasian Christians, allowed Russia to establish itself as a new master of the South 
Caucasus. The Romanov state not only relied on the aid of Armenians to facilitate its 
advancement, but also planned its future engagements around the likelihood of Armenian 
collaboration. When Armenians also colonized the tsarist South Caucasus en masse, their 
centrality to St. Petersburg’s imperial policy became solidified.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
335RGVIA, f. 846, op. 16, d. 4643, ll. 60-62. Paskevich targeted Kars because of its strategic location and 
political significance to the Porte, the ample provisions that could be bought and confiscated in the region, 
and to cut off Turkish forces at Erzurum.  
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Figure 3. Map of the South Caucasus after the Second Russo-Persian War.  
Source: Robert H. Hewsen, Armenia: A Historical Atlas (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000), 
173. 
Souls and Hearts: Russia Recruits Armenians from Abroad  
 The Treaty of Turkmenchai carried many political implications, but one of its most 
controversial stipulations reshaped the cultural, social, and economic climate of the South 
Caucasus. The Persian government allowed a yearlong period for its subjects living along the 
new Russo-Persian border to decide whether to stay within the shah’s domain or emigrate into 
the tsar’s empire. This accord resulted in the resettlement of thousands of the shah’s Armenian 
subjects into the tsar’s newly expanded realm. After the Russo-Ottoman war of 1828-29, more 
Armenians arrived from Anatolia. In what became state policy, Russia employed Armenians 
from abroad to fortify its hold on the South Caucasus.  
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 Several factors prompted the strategy of using Armenians to colonize newly annexed 
lands. First, the ecumenical bond between Orthodox Russians and Apostolic Armenians, invoked 
by senior tsarist officials and Armenian peasants, fed the mutual belief that Armenians 
“belonged” under the suzerainty of their coreligionist emperor, rather than his neighboring 
Muslim counterparts. Armenians’ religious identity, in turn, represented to tsarist authorities 
guarantees of political devotion and security, and this is why Russian officials chose Armenians 
to “increase the [regional] population by using Christians as much as possible.”336 Second, 
imperial agents sought to tap Armenians’ romanticized economic adeptness to stimulate the 
development of newly conquered and underdeveloped regions. Overall, Armenians looked for 
social and economic stability under the Russian aegis, convinced that relative religious freedom 
and improved trade opportunities would ensure prosperity. The tsarist state eagerly settled 
incoming Armenians in regions of the South Caucasus that had been depopulated by years of 
warfare. 
 When Russian troops occupied Azerbaijan, or the northern provinces of Persia in the last 
stages of the war, local Armenians signaled to Paskevich their desire to relocate into tsarist 
territory. Just weeks after the signing of the peace treaty in 1828, the Russian general welcomed 
this initiative. “Realizing the benefits that we can receive,” argued Paskevich to Diebitsch, “from 
the settlement of untended lands by a people who are hardworking, accustomed to obedience, 
and loyal to us through religion,” he had taken initial steps to facilitate the large-scale 
immigration of Persian-subject Armenians into the South Caucasus.337  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
336RGVIA, f. 846, op. 16, d. 978, l. 4. 
337RGVIA, f. 846, op. 16, d. 978, l. 1.  
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To oversee this formidable task, Paskevich assigned Colonel Lazar Ekimovich Lazarev, 
the youngest son of Ekim Lazarev. Paskevich had specifically requested Lazarev’s transfer from 
St. Petersburg to Tiflis, recognizing not only the young officer’s diligence, but also the fact that 
“his name alone served as a guarantee to Armenians of [Russia’s] sincere disposition toward 
them,” in the words of contemporaneous historian and writer Sergei Glinka.338 Paskevich, too, 
acknowledged that the colonel’s family name “enjoys the general respect of the Armenian 
nation.”339 To facilitate the mission, Paskevich appointed several officers and soldiers to serve 
under Lazarev and established in Tiflis the Committee for the Resettlement of Christians 
(Komitet pereseleniia Khristian, hereafter KPKh). Additionally, Paskevich set aside 50,000 
silver rubles for this undertaking from the shah’s reparations. 
 Lazarev received several specific instructions from Paskevich.340 Among the first of 
these, officers were to be dispatched to various Armenian villages to ascertain “the true 
intentions of the Christians and to confirm whether they really wish to cross into our regions.”341 
Paskevich impressed upon Lazarev that he ought to “use no coercion, especially violent means, 
but only suggestions, presenting to them all the benefits of entering into the subjecthood of the 
most powerful Christian emperor in Europe, and the peaceful and happy life which they will 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
338Sergei Glinka, Opisanie pereseleniia armiian adderbidzhanskikh v predely Rossii (Baku: Elm, 1990), 
36. (Originally published in 1831 in Moscow by the Lazarev Institute of Oriental Languages.)  
339RGVIA, f. 846, op. 16, d. 978, l. 13. 
340RGVIA, f. 846, op. 16, d. 978, ll. 1-2. 
341RGVIA, f. 846, op. 16, d. 978, l. 3. 
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enjoy under the auspices of benevolent Russian laws.”342 Lazarev also pledged to immigrating 
traders that they would receive “the same rights as local merchants” in their new homeland.  
Moreover, all resettling Christians were promised “adequate amounts” of farmland and 
freed from “taxes [podati] for six years and from rural assessments [zemskikie povinnosti] for 
three years.” During the immigrants’ journey, accompanied by tsarist troops to prevent potential 
outbursts by their Muslim neighbors, the most destitute families were to receive a one-time 
allowance of 10 silver rubles; Paskevich provided Lazarev with a total of 25,000 silver rubles for 
this task.343 Persian Armenians were led mainly into the newly demarcated Armenian and 
Nakhichevan oblasti, where the local administration, in conjunction with the KPKh, distributed 
land and determined other details. Only Armenians living along the new border were to be 
moved into Karabakh.344 
 By late May 1828, Paskevich could report to St. Petersburg about tangible progress made 
in this endeavor by Lazarev and his officers. Already 948 Armenian families had been resettled 
into Armianskaia oblast’, and 279 into Karabakh.345 Colonel Lazarev, moreover, had assured the 
general that the total number of immigrants will “exceed 5,000 families.” Paskevich emphasized 
to Diebitsch’s successor at the head of the General Staff, Count Chernyshev, the strictly 
voluntary nature of the Armenian relocation, carried out by the tsarist army not only out of 
Russia’s economic and political interests but also out of Christian benevolence. He highlighted 
this aspect by crediting the “oppressive Persian rule, which burdens Christians with taxes and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
342RGVIA, f. 846, op. 16, d. 978, l. 3. 
343RGVIA, f. 846, op. 16, d. 978, l. 5. 
344RGVIA, f. 846, op. 16, d. 978, l. 1 and 4. 
345RGVIA, f. 846, op. 16, d. 978, ll. 13-14. 
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injustices of all kinds,” for the smoothness of the population transfer,346 and also summarized the 
support he had received from Armenian ecclesiastical leaders, including Catholicos Nerses and 
the Armenian archbishop of Tiflis.347 Despite rising costs and diminishing grain supplies in the 
region, both Paskevich and Lazarev continued to stress the “obvious benefit that they can bring 
us” and that “any costs that the treasury will bear now for the support of the immigrating 
Armenians will always be reimbursed to it with excess; for in addition to their loyalty to 
Russians, which experience has shown, they are famous for their tireless work ethic.”348   
 Lazar Lazarev took advantage of his identity as an ethnic Armenian in the Russian 
service, declaring to his superiors, “to me, as a Russian officer, [this task] brings great honor, and 
as an Armenian, complete happiness.”349 Cognizant of his family’s position as an intermediary 
between the Armenian diaspora and the tsarist state, the young colonel advocated the benefits of 
the Armenian relocation to the two sides. When the Armenian immigrants’ financial problems 
impeded Lazarev’s mission, the colonel relied on the reputation of his family’s name to assuage 
their concerns. Indeed, when some Armenian communities hesitated to abandon their properties 
without financial compensation, it took little more than the promises of this Russified Armenian 
commander to sway them.350  
 According to Lazarev and other tsarist officials, such concerns among Persian Armenians 
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346RGVIA, f. 846, op. 16, d. 978, l. 14. 
347RGVIA, f. 846, op. 16, d. 978, l. 13. 
348RGVIA, f. 846, op. 16, d. 978, ll. 14-15. 
349Russian State Historical Archive (RGIA), f. 383, op. 29, d. 539, ll. 4-4ob. 
350RGIA, f. 383, op. 29, d. 539, l. 5. 
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Armenian subjects. Despite Armenians’ petitions to Paskevich, Lazarev found that many 
communities initially hesitated to part with their immovable properties, such as homes, gardens, 
and family cemeteries, that for centuries had formed the cornerstones of their lives in the Persian 
domain. Moreover, Lazarev accused Persian officials and “English agents” of spreading rumors 
among Armenians about the economic and political difficulties that awaited them in Russian 
territory, including enserfment, high taxes, and onerous military service.351  
In an effort to prevent the exodus of Armenians, whose economic contribution to the 
shah’s treasury Russian accountants estimated at 32 million assignation rubles,352 Persian tactics 
ranged from warnings to threats to promises. Most important, Lazarev claimed that Persian 
officials secretly prohibited Persian subjects from purchasing land and homes from departing 
Armenians, thus exacerbating their financial situation and ensuring that capital remained in 
Persia.353 These efforts bore limited fruit when some Armenians demanded to be reimbursed by 
Lazarev for at least one-third of their abandoned properties’ value.354 Moreover, according to 
Lazarev, Muslim Persian villagers hurled insults and rocks at the emigrating Armenians, 
demonstrating “tremendous hatred” and often necessitating the intervention of Russian and 
Cossack units to protect the refugees.355 Yet, despite such difficulties, Lazarev emphasized in his 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
351RGIA, f. 383, op. 29, d. 539, l. 4ob and 8. 
352RGIA, f. 383, op. 29, d. 539, l. 4. In the late 1830s, the exchange rate equaled 3.5 assignation rubles for 
1 silver ruble, but it appears that a decade earlier, in the 1820s, it was closer to 4:1. See B. P. Motrevich, 
“Ministr finansov E. F. Kankrin i denezhnaia reforma 1839-1843 g.g. v Rossiiskoi imperii.”   
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353RGIA, f. 383, op. 29, d. 539, l. 6. 
354Glinka, Opisanie pereseleniia armiian, 52-53.  
355RGIA, f. 383, op. 29, d. 539, l. 7ob. 
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reports to St. Petersburg that Armenians relocated on their own accord without financial support 
beyond the 10 silver rubles per family that had been authorized by Paskevich.356 
  Seeing that, despite their efforts, numerous Armenian communities continued to abandon 
their homes, Crown Prince Abbas Mirza accused tsarist agents of coercing the Armenians.357 In a 
case made famous by Glinka’s narrative,358 Persian officials in April 1828 alerted Lazarev that a 
group of 400 Armenian families had told the shah’s representatives that tsarist agents had 
coerced them into leaving. Confident of this account’s inaccuracy, Lazarev personally tracked 
down the Armenian party, accompanied by the son of a senior Persian minister, Asker Khan.359 
The immigrants, according to Lazarev’s report, “unanimously declared that they are relocating 
voluntarily. ‘We rather eat Russian grass than Persian bread,’ they said to the son of Asker Khan, 
from whom I took a written verification.”360 Neither the Armenian motivations behind such 
supposed statements, nor the accuracy of their Russian recordings, can be ascertained from the 
available sources; however, their prominence in Russian narratives, both official and popular, are 
indicative of the Russian perception and sentiments surrounding this population transfer.  
 The number of Armenian immigrants from Persia into Russian territory in the South 
Caucasus after the Second Russo-Persian War is difficult to determine. The archival record is 
incomplete (in the federal archives of both Russia and Armenia), because contemporary sources 
provided specific numbers for individual migrant groups, villages, or regions, but almost never 	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358Glinka, Opisanie pereseleniia armiian, 66-74. 
359RGIA, f. 383, op. 29, d. 539, l. 8ob. 
360RGIA, f. 383, op. 29, d. 539, l. 9.  
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for entire administrative territories.361 However, according to Lazar Lazarev, in the three and a 
half months between 26 February and 11 June 1828, he facilitated the relocation of 8,249 
families.362 It appears that at least 5,000 of these families, and perhaps as many as 6,000, were 
directed to the Armenian and Nakhichevan oblasti, with the rest of the refugees sent to Karabakh 
starting in May because of dwindling food supplies in the other regions of the South Caucasus.363 
Glinka provides the same total number of about 8,000 families, estimating the overall number of 
Armenian immigrants at approximately 40,000 individuals.364   
 Russia continued to rely on foreign-subject Christians to settle newly annexed territories 
in the South Caucasus after it transplanted 40,000 Persian Armenians. Satisfied with the 
accomplishments of General Paskevich and Colonel Lazarev, Tsar Nicholas sought to absorb 
more Armenians into the borders of his realm after the Russo-Ottoman War of 1828-29. In the 
wake of that conflict, tsarist agents justified this policy by emphasizing the collaboration of 
Ottoman Armenians with Russian forces during the war and the consequent abuse they did and 
would experience at the hands of their Muslims overlords and neighbors.  
Soon after the signing of the Treaty of Adrianople in September 1829, Paskevich wrote to 
the tsar that among the peoples living on either side of the Russo-Ottoman border, only Ottoman 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
361For example, the following file contains partial data about the population of 132 villages around 
Yerevan in the Armianskaia oblast’: National Archive of Armenia (NAA), f. 90, op. 1, d. 5, ll. 2-8ob.  
362RGIA, f. 383, op. 29, d. 539, ll. 12-13.  
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Armenians did not celebrate the armistice announcement, demonstrating instead “justified 
gloom” in anticipation of the “persecutions that threaten” them.365 Following the now well-
established practice of emphasizing the ecumenical solidarity between Russians and Armenians 
vis-à-vis regional imperial policy, Paskevich stressed that “in these remote countries, where for 
so many centuries Christianity has been oppressed by an unjust yoke, [the Russian] army could 
fear no hostility from the Armenian and Greek populations.”366 The real and alleged 
mistreatment of these Ottoman Christian minorities had ensured that invading tsarist forces 
found among the locals “zealous allies and partners.” Indeed, Paskevich enumerated the ways in 
which Ottoman Armenians had directly assisted Russian forces against their Turkish foes: in 
Bayazet, 2,000 Armenians fought alongside Russian troops; in Kars an Armenian battalion of 
800 mounted men protected the Russian flank; and in Erzurum “the majority” of the local 
Christians, mainly Armenians, welcomed the arriving Russian forces with open arms. “Do not let 
it happen,” the general implored the tsar, “that Ottoman despotism takes revenge on [Armenians] 
for the devotion they have demonstrated to Russia.”367    
 By mid-November 1829, Tsar Nicholas permitted Paskevich to resettle about 10,000 
Armenian families, mainly from the Ottoman pashalik of Bayazet, to tsarist Georgia and 
Armianskaia oblast’.368 Ottoman Armenians were so eager to emigrate, claimed Paskevich, that 
many of them did not request or wait for Russian financial assistance or military protection to 
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367RGVIA, f. 846, op. 16, d. 1019, l. 3.  
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begin their movement into Russian territory.369 To determine the details of their settlement, 
including land distribution, Paskevich established a separate administrative body in Tiflis.370 
Moreover, Paskevich was so confident of the political and economic advantages to Russia that 
Armenian relocation would bring, that he requested an unprecedented one million assignation 
rubles (over 250,000 silver rubles), about five times the amount he had expended on the 
relocation of Persian Armenians.371 The general assured St. Petersburg that “although the initial 
settlement of these people will require fairly significant costs, there is no doubt that they will be 
amply reimbursed by those advantages, which one can expect from this commercial and hard-
working” people.372 
 By late January 1830, about 2,500 Armenian families emigrated from Kars and its 
surrounding villages, settling in the vicinity of Mount Aragats.373 Based on Armenian requests, 
Russian officials anticipated the imminent arrival of an additional 2,100 families from Erzurum 
and 3,150 families from Bayazet pashalyk.374 Tsarist agents directed large groups—whose exact 
numbers remain unclear—to Armiianskaia oblast’, Georgia, and Karabakh. Yet by one Russian 
account from 1836, the number of Armenian immigrants from Turkey living in Armiianskaia 
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374It appears that these relocations did take place, but there is no confirmation of this in Russian sources.  
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oblast’ was just 5,755 individuals.375 Unlike the experience of Persian Armenians, Russian 
authorities used a portion of the sultan’s Armenian subjects to establish a buffer against the 
Ottoman empire, seeing that empire as a continued threat, whereas Persia’s expansionist 
ambitions had waned. As early as November 1829, Tsar Nicholas, noting Paskevich’s emphasis 
on Armenian cooperation with the Russian army, instructed the General Staff to settle some 
Ottoman Armenian immigrants in Akhaltsykh and other frontiers towns, where “in the form of a 
battalion or another military unit they can be used to defend our new border.”376 Soon, plans 
were drawn up to relocate over 2,000 Armenian families from Erzurum to Akhaltsykh.377 
 Tsarist officials strove to provide the immigrants with living conditions that would grant 
them “every opportunity to quickly reach a flourishing state and bring abundant benefits to 
Russia.”378 The immigration committee formed in Tiflis by Paskevich distributed state-owned 
land (kazennaia zemlia) and communicated with Armenian leaders to ascertain details of their 
settlement. Moreover, in mid-February 1830, when the numbers of Ottoman Armenian 
immigrants exceeded Russian estimates, Paskevich granted to them state-owned land in Georgia 
that had been allocated for Ukrainian Cossack settlers.379 When the number of refugees from 
Bayazet proved to be nearly twice as much as Russians had estimated, Paskevich not only 
permitted them to enter Russian territory but also provided emergency food provisions from his 
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army’s military depots.380 Within months, Russian commanders ensured that extra grain supplies 
had been delivered to the new immigrants from other regions of the Caucasus and beyond.381  
 The absorption of new Armenians into the social and economic fabric of the South 
Caucasus progressed slowly. To a degree, their economic assimilation matched Russian 
expectations, and within a couple of years of their relocation, transplanted Armenian merchants 
owned numerous buildings and vending stalls in Yerevan.382 Yet imperial agents struggled to 
prevent friction between the newcomers and the natives. Russian officials did not prevent the 
ethnic or national mixing of various communities, and the geographic coalescence of Persian 
Armenian, Ottoman Armenian, native Christian, and native Muslim groups was not uncommon. 
As some tsarist records demonstrate, the ostensible consent of all involved parties and the 
availability of land were the only prerequisites for the Russian facilitation of interethnic 
cohabitation.383 The Committee for the Resettlement of Christians (KPKh), headquartered in 
Tiflis and with affiliated offices in Yerevan, Nakhichevan, and Abaran, facilitated negotiations 
between neighbors in the South Caucasus, and worked with Russian military officials and 
Persian and Ottoman government representatives.384  
 The KPKh’s struggled to mediate between Muslim and Christian residents. As the 
Nakhichevan bureau of the KPKh grumbled in September 1828, “not a day goes by without . . . 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
380RGVIA, f. 846, op. 16, d. 1019, l. 17. 
381NAA, f. 90, op. 1, d. 437, ll. 46-92. 
382NAA, f. 90, op. 1, d. 443, ll. 1ob-2. In characteristically deficient record keeping, these sources provide 
the number of immigrant-owned buildings and stalls (14 and 11, respectively) in Yerevan in 1832, but do 
not specify the total numbers of such structures, which makes these statistics barely useful. 
383NAA, f. 90, op. 1, d. 436, l. 7. 
384NAA, f. 90, op. 1, d. 435, ll. 10-14.  
 134 
the complaints of the immigrants about Tatars, and the latter’s about the immigrants.”385 In their 
objections to the influx of Christians, native Muslim residents decried that they had been 
“deprived of all means of farming, and thus of feeding their families in the future.”386 In 
Nakhichevan and elsewhere, local Muslims protested at being pushed out—either through direct 
coercion or land redistribution—by the incoming Armenians.387 Russian officials intervened by 
reducing land allotment for Armenians and stipulating that only as much land could be granted to 
the immigrants as they could sow at the time of their arrival. In December 1828, housing 
restrictions were also implemented, with one home granted to every “three or four” refugee 
families.388 Overall, in theory if not in practice, senior tsarist officials in the Caucasus and St. 
Petersburg demanded that the KPKh “maintain the strictest supervision [to ensure that] the 
settlers do not inflict the slightest abuse upon the indigenous residents [and] that the property of 
each remains inviolable,” while the leaders of local native groups, “without exception,” were 
expected to ensure that no “injustice” or “harm” befell the newcomers.389   
 The changing South Caucasian society posed ethnic, cultural, and economic challenges 
for the tsarist bureaucracy. As a result, policy disagreements plagued much of the regional 
administration. Not only is it doubtful that St. Petersburg’s stability-seeking instructions to the 
KPKh were fully implemented, but internal discord among Russian officials in the South 
Caucasus revealed deeper schisms. One example should suffice here.  	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The influx of Christians into the tsar’s territory precipitated a concurrent exit of native 
Muslims into the domains of the shah and the sultan. Many departing Muslims, especially from 
the Nakhichevan and Ordubad regions, left behind their homes and fields.390 According to the 
provisions of the Treaty of Turkmenchai, these vacant properties could be leased by the Russian 
state for its benefit, but only their owners had the right to sell them. Yet their dilapidated 
conditions prevented the state from finding willing renters. Consequently, in late 1828, the KPKh 
petitioned the regional government of Armianskaia oblast’ (Armiianskoe Oblastnoe Pravlenie, 
AOP) for permission to transfer ownership of the vacant, untended homes to the “poorest” of the 
relocated Armenians. However, citing the Turkmenchai Treaty, the AOP rejected this request, 
arguing that absent Muslim owners retained rights to their abandoned properties. The KPKh 
repeated its appeal a year later, when no Muslims returned to claim their properties. Yet, again, 
officials refused to grant to immigrant Armenians properties abandoned by native Muslims.391  
 To be sure, Russian authorities faced a delicate balancing act. On the one hand, the 
absorption of foreign-subject Armenians had become a staple of tsarist policy in the South 
Caucasus. Eager to populate newly annexed lands with ecumenically kindred and politically 
reliable subjects, the state attracted Armenians through various incentives. On the other hand, St. 
Petersburg had to avoid the conflagration of ethnoreligious violence between the Christian 
immigrants and the Muslim natives. While they took no meaningful efforts to discourage Muslim 
emigration, Russian officials remained wary of antagonizing the indigenous population. The 
AOP’s rejection of the KPKh’s recurrent petitions is but one example of this point.     
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 In the first third of the nineteenth century, the Russian elite came to see foreign-subject 
Armenians as reliable colonizers. Not only significant resources were expended to consolidate 
Armenian communities in the South Caucasus, but also relations with domestic and foreign 
Muslims were jeopardized through the preferential treatment granted to the incoming Christians. 
Despite nominal attempts to blunt the harm this policy had on the region’s native Muslims, 
tsarist officials from the regional to the imperial capital prioritized the absorption of Armenians. 
Even land allotted to Russia’s traditional colonists, Cossacks, was reassigned to Armenians.  
To some Russian political and cultural leaders, this undertaking represented a singular 
development. In his embellished account, Sergei Glinka hailed the relocation of Persian 
Armenians into Russian territory as a “hitherto unique event in the annals of the world. It was not 
a simple resettlement of individual people, but a resettlement of souls and hearts.”392 Glinka’s 
exaggerated narrative underscored his and the state’s acceptance of Armenians as Rossiiskie—
Russia’s own subjects. In their private and official correspondence, Paskevich, Lazarev, and 
other tsarist statesmen agreed that they had “opened for the state a new source of wealth,” in 
more than the economic sense.393 Indeed, no evidence suggests that senior tsarist officials 
resisted these developments, and the influx of Armenians into the South Caucasus aroused 
resistance mainly from the region’s Muslim residents. However, the autocracy viewed another 
section of the Armenian diaspora, the long-settled Armenian merchants of southern Russia, not 
as a “new source of wealth” but as a liability that threatened the social and economic hierarchy 
of imperial society. The experiences of Armenians in Russia proper often challenged the 
expectations and hopes of the Christian refugees from Muslim empires. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
392Glinka, Opisanie pereseleniia armiian, 49. Italics in the original.  
393RGIA, f. 383, op. 29, d. 539, l. 11. 
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The Evolution of Armenian Tax Obligations 
A look at Armenian tax obligations in the Caucasus and other southern Russian territories 
reveals the internal disagreements among the tsarist political elite, and the inconsistent and 
ambiguous economic rules governing the commerce of Russian-subject Armenians. The 
ramifications of these debates influenced the highest levels of the imperial government, where 
Finance Minister Egor Kankrin cautioned in 1827: “The question will always remain: in Russia, 
do Armenians possess more rights than Russians?”394 
 Armenians in Russia had received exclusive economic rights since the early modern era. 
Frequent visitors to Russian bazaars and trade posts, foreign-subject Armenians’ actual and 
mythologized economic success, and the value of the rare goods they carried from the Orient, 
earned them special status already by the second half of the seventeenth century. In April 1667, 
Tsar Aleksei Mikhailovich, eager to take advantage of Persian Armenians’ silk imports, included 
Armenians among ethnic groups permitted to trade at advantageous rates, often duty-free, in 
major Russian commercial centers, such as Astrakhan and Moscow.395 Soon Armenian 
merchants received the right to sell silk and other raw materials in Novgorod and the northern 
port city of Archangelsk. From 1676, Armenian merchants sent their goods to foreign markets 
from Archangelsk, and from 1686 they began trading with Sweden through Novgorod.396 
 This pattern continued in the eighteenth century. In March 1711, the Governing Senate 
recommended that the empire “increase Persian trade and court (prilaskat’) Armenians as much 
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as possible and ease their lot, in order to encourage them to arrive [in Russia] in large 
numbers.”397 In December 1712 the Senate took another step in encouraging Armenian economic 
activity in Russia by removing restrictions and mandatory inspections from Armenian merchants 
traveling within the tsar’s domain.  
Peter the Great granted Armenians exemptions from military service and other exclusive 
rights in 1724, leading to the growth of an Armenian community in the southern Russian city of 
Kizliar. Armenian immigrants from Karabakh and Zangezur rushed to establish vineyards, 
orchards, and to engage in other agrarian commerce.398 Peter’s successors continued to grant 
economic privileges to Armenians in Russia. In 1746, Armenian merchants in Astrakhan were 
allowed to trade tax-free and to establish their own court; in 1769, Astrakhan Armenians 
received the exclusive right to build seagoing vessels for trade in the Caspian Sea.399 Moreover, 
Armenian immigrants from Crimea, whom Catherine the Great settled in the new city of 
Nakhichevan on the Don River, in 1779 received the right not to enlist in the merchant guild 
(kupecheskoe gildeiskoe sostoianie), which freed them from that estate’s taxes. Catherine’s 
decree became a source of much headache for both Armenians and Russian bureaucrats later: 
“[The Armenians] may enjoy free trade forever and hereditarily, inside and outside of the 
Russian state,” announced the empress.400  
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 Catherine’s successor, Paul, extended his mother’s 1779 exemptions for the Armenians 
of Nakhichevan-on-Don to three other southern cities. In October 1799, seeking to animate the 
commerce of southern provinces and to grow the populations of the strategically important 
Astrakhan, Kizliar, and Mozdok, Tsar Paul allowed tax-free trade for local Armenian merchants, 
excusing them from enrolling in merchant guilds and their attendant taxes.401 This fiat not only 
did not apply to non-Armenian merchants in those three cities, but also omitted all Armenian 
traders outside Astrakhan, Kizliar, and Mozdok. By the turn of the nineteenth century, over four 
thousand Armenian dealers in Astrakhan, Kizliar, and Mozdok paid no taxes (podati) 
whatsoever.402 Paul’s successor, Alexander, initially affirmed his father’s decision; however, in 
January 1807, Alexander cancelled the exclusive rights granted to the Armenian dealers of those 
three cities, requiring them to enlist in merchant guilds and pay corresponding taxes within six 
months.403 The tsar’s motivations are unclear, but likely he believed that, after nearly eight years, 
local Armenians had enjoyed sufficiently long privileges to ensure their prosperity, and the time 
had come to enforce uniform tax laws.   
The new regulations sent shockwaves through the Armenian merchant communities of 
southern Russia. According to tsarist summaries of Armenian complaints, their businesses ebbed 
and their foreign counterparts saw fewer financial advantages to trading with Russian-subject 
Armenians.404 An outbreak of the plague (chuma) in 1807 further diminished regional commerce 
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of southern Russia and, compounded by the growing chorus of Armenian objections to the 
January 1807 decree, forced Alexander I in November 1808 to “postpone the enrollment of 
Armenians into guilds until the command of the Finance Minister.”405 To the detriment of 
broader Russo-Armenian ties, however, no decision regarding the tax obligations of Armenian 
merchants in Astrakhan, Kizliar, and Mozdok came for nearly two decades. Thus, the tsarist 
leadership’s receptiveness to Armenian petitions undermined the state’s efforts to implement 
uniform tax regulations and bring Armenian traders into line with general rules, resulting in 
unclear and temporary directives.   
If the tsarist state demonstrated the first signs of rolling back the exclusive economic 
rights granted to various Armenian communities as early as 1807, the most salient manifestations 
of this trend appeared only in the 1820s. Yet conflicting initiatives from St. Petersburg and their 
partial implementation in the provinces yielded a multitude of ambiguous economic positions for 
Russia’s Armenian merchants.    
 Among the prominent opponents of the state’s policies vis-à-vis Armenian economic 
activity in the empire, General Aleksei Ermolov voiced concern about the government’s 
assignment of partial, temporary, and exclusive economic rights to separate Armenian 
communities. In a special report to the Senate in August 1820, Ermolov argued that no more 
“eternal” rights ought to be granted to new immigrants in the Caucasus, regardless of their 
national, ethnic, or religious ties to existing Russian-subject communities in the region.406 “It is 
[more] justified to give privileges,” contended the commander of the Caucasus, “not to an entire 
people, not to an entire society, but only to individuals whose immigration will bring benefits to 	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the government, whether though the introduction of some art or craft, or the circulation of large 
capital for the revitalization of trade and industry.”407 Referring to the partial exemptions of 
October 1799, the general asked, “What valid reason can there be for these exceptions, which are 
insulting to other Armenians living in Georgia and our Muslim provinces, and who are no less 
useful[?]”408 Ermolov accused Armenians of Astrakhan, Kizliar, and Mozdok of evading the 
decree of January 1807, which had canceled the rights granted to them in 1799. This 
disobedience of the tsar’s orders, according to Ermolov, had been made possible by the 
contradictory policies of former Interior Minister Alexei Kurakin, whom Ermolov accused of 
“shielding” Kizliar Armenians from the requirement of joining guilds and obtaining the 
necessary certifications for commerce.409 Soon, such dissension spread among other senior 
imperial agents and ministries.  
 Debates over the economic standing of Armenians in the Russian empire penetrated the 
highest levels of the government and elicited the involvement of Armenian lay and ecclesiastical 
leaders. By the summer of 1823, Ekim Lazarev—now the leading lay advocate of Russia’s 
Armenian diaspora—began to petition Finance Minister Egor Kankrin to continue Armenians’ 
exclusive economic privileges.410 Specifically, the tax obligations of Armenian merchants in 
Astrakhan, Kizliar, and Mozdok had remained in abeyance since the conflicting mandates of 
1807, with Armenians in Astrakhan and Mozdok no longer enjoying the exclusive tax breaks of 	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1799, but their counterparts in Kizliar continuing to engage in tax-free commerce. The situation, 
according to Lazarev, had “upset” those communities and harmed their economic activities.  
In justifying extended economic benefits for Armenian merchants, Lazarev argued that 
Russia traded with Persia and Turkey mainly through Armenians. At the local level, too, 
Armenians provided benefits to Russia’s provinces by paying all noncommercial taxes alongside 
their neighbors, billeting troops on their properties at their own expense, repairing roads and 
bridges without the financial support of local or regional authorities, and repeatedly 
demonstrated their “readiness to do everything in their powers for the general good.”411 To 
continue this trend, Lazarev asked Kankrin to excuse Armenian merchants in Astrakhan, Kizliar, 
and Mozdok from the requirement of enlisting in the merchant guild. He also requested that 
Armenians be excluded from rules governing the trade of “foreigners” in Russia, which, he 
argued, were intended for affluent western European merchants. 
In return, Lazarev expressed confidence that prolonged economic privileges for 
Armenian dealers would attract new generations of foreign-subject Armenians into the empire, 
where they will “establish new cities and villages [and] multiply various beneficial institutions, 
which are particularly customary to the Armenian people. Oriental wealth will flow in abundance 
into the core of their new fatherland.”412 In addition to Lazarev’s missives, senior Armenian 
ecclesiastical leaders petitioned St. Petersburg on behalf of Armenian merchants in southern 
Russia. Hovannes, the prelate of all Armenians in Russia and highest-ranking member of the 
Armenian Church in the empire, wrote to Kankrin in June and August 1823, requesting that the 
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privileges of 1799 be extended indefinitely.413 This dialogue continued even after the tsar 
addressed these issues with an empire-wide edict.  
 On 14 November 1824, Tsar Alexander I decreed that all merchants operating in his 
empire must join guilds and pay corresponding taxes.414 Yet the vaguely worded law created 
loopholes into which Armenian traders in Astrakhan, Kizliar, Mozdok and elsewhere could 
potentially fall. First, the penalties for tax evasion stipulated by the new law did not apply to 
“Orientals, until for them special rules are reconsidered.”415 Second, the fiat ordered that “All 
hitherto published laws concerning visiting foreign merchants and foreigners living in Russia 
remain active in all respects, unless affected by this regulation.” Third, the law applied to “all” 
merchants, “without exception,” not only in Russia, but also in Finland, the Polish Kingdom, 
Bessarabia, and Georgia; moreover, it explicitly identified Armenians (along with Tatars, Jews, 
Gypsies, Greeks, and other groups). However, most importantly, the law applied to “everyone in 
general, as long as they do not possess specific privileges, entitling them to an exclusion from 
general rules, or royally granted prerogatives.”416  
 The result was destabilizing. Authorities in the Astrakhan Treasury Chamber hesitated at 
first but then enforced the new statute with alacrity, forcing local Armenian dealers into guilds 
and assessing new taxes. When Armenians resisted, citing the rights granted to them in 1799 and 
extended in 1808, the provincial authorities sought St. Petersburg’s clarification of the new law’s 
applicability to the Armenian merchants of Astrakhan. The finance ministry in February 1825 	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sided with the Armenians and ordered Astrakhan authorities not to enforce the tsar’s recent 
edict.417 Nevertheless, provincial authorities in Astrakhan and other southern commercial centers 
applied the November 1824 law to local Armenian retailers, ignoring the decree’s third 
stipulation and the finance ministry’s orders. It appears that these Russian officials were either 
unaware of the preexisting regulations or believed them to be long expired. When Armenian 
businessmen in Astrakhan refused to enter into guilds and to pay new taxes, the police shut their 
stores and factories.418  
 Russia’s broader Armenian diaspora interpreted what it felt was the unjustified 
enforcement of the 1824 edict not as a problem limited to its merchant community, but as a 
threat to the status of the entire stateless nation. Lay individuals not affiliated with commerce, as 
well as senior members of the Armenian Church,419 backed the struggle of the Armenian 
merchantry in Astrakhan and elsewhere. An empire-wide campaign in 1825 sought to halt 
provincial authorities’ enforcement of the 1824 law, which Armenian representatives knew 
violated the directives of the finance ministry.420 The protests of Armenians from Astrakhan, 
Kizliar, and Mozdok were joined by their compatriots in several other southern regions, 
including the Ekaterinoslavskaia, Khersonskaia, Tavricheskaia, and Caucasus provinces.421  
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The Armenians argued that the privileges of the late eighteenth century had been granted 
to them “forever,”422 that Tsar Alexander’s proclamation implicitly excluded their communities 
because they enjoyed long-established exemptions, and that the 1824 edict had been aimed 
primarily at representatives of wealthy western European trade companies. These European 
dealers conducted wholesale trade that benefited international firms and enriched European 
banks, the Armenians claimed, while Russia’s Armenian retailers struggled to support their small 
communities and had no surplus capital for the new tax requirements.423 Armenian petitions 
emphasized that their communities never had and did not object to the city and rural taxes paid 
by all tsarist subjects, but rather resisted enlisting in merchant guilds with their separate dues.  
The Armenians of Nakhichevan-on-Don, for example, maintained that they had 
accomplished the tasks given to them by Catherine the Great in 1779, contributing to the region’s 
development by spreading factories, mills, stone and wooden buildings, and viniculture. These 
achievements justified the economic privileges granted to them, they asserted, by enriching the 
state treasury, whose coffers received over 120,000 rubles per year in taxes just from 
Nakhichevan Armenians’ viniculture and fruit-growing business.424 Moreover, individual 
Armenian traders ventured into countries and communities where few Russian dealers were 
willing or able to conduct business, especially in the backwaters of Persia and Turkey, and often 
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jeopardized their lives and finances in search of new trade networks and customers.425 Far from 
seeking an exclusive monopoly, only Armenians, they claimed, were willing to venture “with the 
smallest of capital into Oriental countries, to savage, obstinate, treacherous, independent peoples, 
subjected to all the difficulties and dangers, risked everything, and despite small profits, returned 
to their new peaceful fatherland contented.”426 At the same time, Nakhichevan Armenians, 
unlike their Russian counterparts in neighboring towns and provinces, maintained local roads, 
bridges, and postal horses at their own cost, provided their own police patrols, and paid all 
regular city and rural duties (povinnosti) to the provincial and state treasuries. As one petition 
from October 1825 stressed, road and bridge maintenance alone had cost Nakhichevan 
Armenians 37,360 rubles over the past four years.427      
 More than regional fiscal policy was at stake in these debates. The underlying question 
asked to what degree tsarist-subject Armenians had, or should, become socially, politically, and 
economically assimilated into Russia. From the perspective of some tsarist authorities, in St. 
Petersburg and the provinces, Armenian merchants by the 1820s had received ample economic 
privileges to compete on equal terms with their Russian counterparts. Officials in the Astrakhan 
Treasury Chamber and their colleagues in Nakhichevan-on-Don often interpreted local Armenian 
retailers’ refusal to enlist into guilds as a sign of Armenian resistance to social integration and 
reinforced stereotypes of cunning, parsimonious outsiders who looked for loopholes through 
which to escape collective responsibilities of all subjects. As the beginning of the “Jews of the 
Caucasus” trope, this essentialization would haunt Russia’s Armenians throughout the nineteenth 	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century, yet they escaped much of the Jewish plight, such as the Pale of Settlement, owing to 
their Christianity and relatively small, and thus ostensibly less threatening, population. After all, 
Jews loomed large in the Russian political and cultural imagination in part thanks to the fact that 
they comprised the empire’s largest non-Slavic and also non-Christian ethnic group.428  
Armenians saw efforts to enforce universal fiscal policies and taxes as removing justified 
economic protections for minority traders, whose cultural and national identity placed them at a 
disadvantage against their Russian and west European competitors. As Nakhichevan Armenians 
bemoaned in 1825,  
we are not able to stand on equal footing in commerce with native Russians: we are 
ignorant of the Russian language, laws, clerical rituals, customs of the people, of vast 
knowledge of European commercial practices . . . [we are] unknown to the capitalists 
who influence trade, we are more inclined toward Oriental trade based on simple rules; in 
this we are especially assisted by our knowledge of Oriental languages, customs, and 
rituals of these peoples, [as well as] our ties to our coreligionists, close relatives who 
inhabit Oriental countries.429  
 
 Whether or not these immigrants should or could have learned the Russian language and laws 
after over forty years of settlement on the Don River is not as important as their reliance on these 
ostensible reasons to justify their unique economic position in Russian society.  
Essentially, such arguments show that some long-established Armenian communities in 
Russia felt decisively alien to their adoptive country. Not a different sense of home perpetuated 
this sentiment, however, because the diaspora did not have a single location to pinpoint as its 
collective cradle. Rather, a sense of Armenian unpreparedness for the economic changes of the 
modern era sowed fear among the still-unassimilated immigrant communities of the imperial 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
428Benjamin Nathans, Beyond the Pale: The Jewish Encounter with Late Imperial Russia (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2004), 5.  
429RGIA, f. 571, op. 5, d. 740, l. 120. 
 148 
provinces, where they had fewer means and incentives for full integration than their compatriots 
in St. Petersburg and Moscow. Maintaining a culturally distinct life, the former Armenian 
refugees and their descendants engaged the world around them chiefly through the commercial 
enterprises that, in their view, became threatened by the state’s new fiscal policies.   
 Ironically, in the contemporaneous socioeconomic discourse, it was this partially self-
perpetuated image of Armenians as nonassimilated outsiders that buttressed some elite Russians’ 
distrust of tsarist-subject Armenians. Thus, while few state officials resisted the policy of 
colonizing newly annexed territories with foreign-subject Armenians, certain members of Tsar 
Alexander’s coterie opposed the state’s domestic economic policies toward Armenians. In 
particular, senior tsarist agents feared the social and economic implications of promoting 
Armenian commerce by extending their former exclusive privileges. At stake, in essence, was 
the domination of the Great Russian nation within the Russian empire, where Armenian 
merchants by the third decade of the nineteenth century joined Jews and other elements 
supposedly threatening to alter the social hierarchy of the polyethnic empire.  
In linking Armenians and Jews, Finance Minister Kankrin cited Ermolov’s assessment 
from 1820, when the Caucasus commander argued against partial and exclusive economic 
privileges for Armenians.430 The state’s “excessive patronage of these Orientals,” cautioned 
Kankrin in January 1826, “can have negative consequences. The spirit of Oriental commerce, 
akin to the haggling of Jews, certainly will lead to the expulsion of Russian merchants, as 
General Ermolov has also noted.”431 From Kankrin’s perspective, the incentives provided to 
Armenians in Russia’s internal provinces damaged the status of Russian merchants, who faced 	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being squeezed out by Armenians’ supposed Oriental business prowess, potentially yielding 
Armenian-dominated commercial centers in the Russian heartland. “In any case, one can hardly 
expect anything useful from cities inhabited by Armenians, Jews, Bukhartsy, Persians, and 
Persian [nomads],” insisted Kankrin, emphasizing the recent drop in tax revenue from 
Astrakhan, as well as the alleged decline of “some Lithuanian cities, where Jews more and more 
push out the Christian population.”432 This collective stereotype became well-entrenched in 
Russian popular thought, with the ethnographer and writer Vladimir Dal’ in 1861 lumping 
together Armenians, Greeks, Jews, and Indians as “predominantly trading peoples.”433  
 Despite Kankrin’s stance on this matter, the finance ministry issued no definitive 
directive in the 1820s. The tumultuous transition from Tsar Alexander to Nicholas in December 
1825, and the apparent belief that the new tsar might reverse his late brother’s economic policies, 
delayed Kankrin’s move. Meanwhile, frustrated provincial authorities inundated St. Petersburg 
with requests for clarification of Armenian tax obligations, complaining that local Armenian 
traders refused to obey the 1824 requirements under the protection of previous royal decrees.434 
Finally, in the spring of 1827, the Council of Ministers took up the issue. The diversity of senior 
tsarist officials’ opinions regarding this matter is important for understanding the economic and 
social role Armenians played in contemporaneous Russia. 
  Kankrin insisted to the Council of Ministers in March 1827 that the relevant decrees 
issued by Catherine, Paul, and Alexander had either long expired or no longer could be justified. 
Kankrin focused particularly on the supposedly detrimental impact of Armenian merchants in 	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Astrakhan on their Russian counterparts.435 “Cunning” Armenian dealers, the finance minister 
testified, feigned ignorance of the Russian language and laws to circumvent tax dues and thereby 
gained an unfair edge over their Russian competitors. The imminent consequence, he warned, 
will be that these “foreigners” will “crush” the Russians.436 Armenians already owned more 
property in the city than all of the local non-Russian groups combined: from a total real estate 
value of 2.5 million rubles owned by non-Russian residents, Armenians held over 1.8 million 
rubles worth of real estate.437 In a word, Kankrin argued that Armenian merchants in Astrakhan 
and other southern Russian regions, including the Caucasus, ought to be forced to enroll in guilds 
and pay corresponding taxes. 
 Kankrin’s colleagues in the Council of Ministers acknowledged the extensive and diverse 
prerogatives Armenians had enjoyed for decades. They also agreed with the finance minister and 
some provincial governors that these privileges had often allowed local Armenian merchants to 
marginalize other, including Russian, traders.438 However, the committee ruled that Alexander’s 
empire-wide fiscal laws excluded Armenians, citing the tsar’s 1808 exemption of Armenians 
from his 1807 requirements, and also the guilds law of 1824, which omitted those Orientals, such 
as Armenians, whose commerce was regulated by special guidelines. Consequently, the 
committee found that Armenian merchants of southern Russia must remain under the pre-1807 
laws governing their transactions, and that provincial authorities cannot force them into guilds. 
Finally, in acknowledging the confusion and contradiction that defined the state’s introduction of 	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the guilds law in 1824, the Council of Ministers emphasized that the new Tsar Nicholas I in 
November 1826 instructed Finance Minister Kankrin to undertake a revision of the previous 
tsar’s ill-fated guilds law.439 
 An irritated Kankrin countered the committee’s decision by arguing that the matter at 
hand had “not the slightest relation to the revision of the guilds regulation, for no matter what, 
the question will always remain: in Russia, do Armenians have more rights than Russians?”440 
He urged, thus, that the state enforce the requirements of 1807 and 1824 to prevent the 
“squeezing out” (vytesnenie) of Russian merchants from southern provinces.441 “If in former 
times it was necessary to provide privileges for Armenians to increase Oriental trade,” the 
finance minister stressed, “then now [such privileges] can only become burdensome for 
indigenous subjects, while time has already rooted many Orientals in Russia.”442 While 
Kankrin’s views on Armenians and Jews often smacked of racism, his economic vision held that 
Armenians had been overly privileged, leading to social inequalities that hurt regional dynamics. 
His colleagues disagreed. The Chairman of the Department of Economy of the State 
Council maintained that Armenian arguments were justified, that they had followed proper 
procedure in submitting their petitions (unlike other, unspecified groups), and cited the examples 
of other small groups, such as “Evangelical brotherly societies,” that enjoyed exclusive economic 
privileges in southern Russia without broader detrimental impacts.443 He also asserted that 	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renewing Armenian privileges would have “incomparably” more “calming” effects on southern 
Russia’s Armenians than the implementation of the requirements urged by Kankrin. With this 
view agreed the chairmen of the Council of Ministers, the Department of Civil and Religious 
Affairs, and the Department of Laws. Only the Director (Upravliaiushchii) of the Interior 
Ministry sided with Kankrin, who countered that the State Council alone, not the Council of 
Ministers, had the authority to determine whether and how a royal decree should be enforced.444 
Tsar Nicholas I concurred, ordering that the matter be forwarded to the State Council to 
determine, as the monarch jotted, “whether it is fair to give immigrants eternal advantages over 
native Russians.”445 The tone of the tsar’s note left little doubt as to his view on this issue.446 
After years of wrangling among senior tsarist officials and consecutive bureaucracies’ 
passing on the question of Armenian tax obligations, the matter was finally resolved in late 1833. 
In October 1833, a decade after Ekim Lazarev and other Armenians had begun to petition the 
state to extend Armenian merchants’ exemptions, the State Council formally rejected their 
appeals and ruled that all Armenian merchants in southern Russian provinces must abide by the 
general tax regulations governing the activities of all tsarist-subject traders.447 Kankrin 
triumphantly informed provincial governors that local Armenian businessmen were henceforth 
required to enroll in merchant guilds and pay corresponding taxes, for Tsar Nicholas had 
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concurred with the State Council’s proclamation that “[it is] inappropriate to provide advantages 
to Armenians over Russians.”448 
The tsarist political elite’s debate over the economic fate of the Armenian merchantry in 
Russia demonstrated competing visions of that small nation’s role in tsarist society. Influential 
officials presented cogent arguments for extending or cancelling economic privileges that 
decades earlier had been implemented to entice foreign-subject Armenians to arrive in Russia. 
By the 1820s, Armenians assumed two seemingly contradictory identities in the Russian political 
imagination. On the one hand, tsarist authorities actively recruited foreign-subject Armenians in 
Persia and Turkey to colonize the Caucasus. On the other hand, the economic success of long-
settled Armenians in southern Russia—an objective of Catherine the Great and her successor—
unnerved some tsarist officials, such as Ermolov and Kankrin, and threatened the social 
superiority of ethnic Russian elements in the provinces. Equally important, Armenian lay and 
ecclesiastical representatives ensured that Armenian voices reached the inner cabinets of the 
tsarist political establishment.  
Conclusion  
Russia’s political elite viewed Armenians as simultaneously advantageous to Russia’s 
imperial goals and also threatening to the social hierarchy of southern provinces. The state’s 
cancellation of exclusive commercial rights granted by previous tsars to Armenian merchant 
communities demonstrated the degree to which immigrant Armenians had succeeded in 
establishing deep roots in their new homeland, and the unnerving impact this had on some 
Russian statesmen. Yet Armenians were not simply a part of the imperial discourse; the nature of 
Russian political structures was in flux during this period. The tension between the old models—	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the cumbersome empires of eighteenth-century Spain and England—and the modern, post-
Napoleonic powers that strove to govern their multiethnic domains with the efficiency of a 
nation-state is palpable in the standardizing fiscal policies of Finance Minister Egor Kankrin. 
While the state transplanted foreign-subject Armenians into the South Caucasus and 
provided them with economic incentives, it confronted what it believed was a threat to Russian 
social dominance in other southern provinces from successful Armenian merchants. Ironically, 
Armenians’ economic privileges turned their proverbial mercantile prowess into reality, 
prompting fears that Armenian commerce was bound to “crush” its Russian competition. Thus 
St. Petersburg pursued two contradictory policies vis-à-vis Armenians in the empire: it supported 
fledgling Armenian communities in the Caucasus but cancelled tax exemptions for more-
established Armenian groups elsewhere in Russia.   
This fact evinces the complex process by which Russians came to “know” Armenians in 
the first third of the nineteenth century. Tsarist political elites essentialized Armenians into two 
broad, often complementary, categories: diligent but avaricious minorities, and politically loyal 
but culturally insular subjects. From the government’s efforts to convert the Lazarev Academy 
into a vocational school for merchants to Paskevich’s insistence on Armenians’ imminent 
economic rejuvenation of the South Caucasus, Russian statesmen constructed an image of a 
national group that could be used toward tsarist advantages. The state needed to portray the 
groups it recruited in a constructive manner to justify the human and financial resources 
expended upon their absorption. And essentializing a relatively small and still alien population 
permitted the state to govern and manipulate it more efficiently. The attendant stereotype of 
cunning businessmen was a product of Russian cultural tropes that relegated commerce to 
 155 
foreign—European, Jewish, “Oriental”—peoples and professed to disdain work for the sake of 
financial profit.  
In reality Armenian immigrants from Persia and Turkey were no more or less diligent or 
successful than their Russian, Georgian, and Muslim neighbors, but portraying them as such was 
in the government’s interest. The same objectives prompted the Russian characterization of 
Armenians as political and military allies who distinguished themselves by maintaining 
solidarity with Russians in the face of Muslim repression. A generation after their arrival in the 
tsar’s domain, however, Armenians in the strategically important southern Russian cities outside 
of the Caucasus gained a degree of economic and social prominence that concerned regional and 
imperial officials. But exclusive economic privileges, not inherent mercantile acumen, had 
granted Armenians advantage over their indigenous neighbors. Armenians of the southern cities 
resisted relinquishing this status not simply out of financial reasons but also because they were 
slow to integrate into Russia’s cultural fabric, employing motifs of Oriental distinction when it 
suited them to justify their refusal to comply with uniform fiscal policies. As the next chapter 
shows, the autocracy continued to struggle to incorporate different sections of its internal 
Armenian diaspora during the reign of Tsar Nicholas I (1825-55), when the state sought to 
standardize the tax and ecumenical laws governing its Armenian subjects. 
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CHAPTER 3: ARMENIAN ECCLESIASTICS AND ECONOMICS UNDER TSAR 
NICHOLAS I, 1831-1854 
“Privileges, at times given to foreigners settling in Russia, are necessarily reasoned with 
the needs and circumstances of the localities where they settle, which is why such benefits cannot 
and must not be the same for everyone.” 
   -State Council, 1848 
 
“Armenians undeniably occupy a very important place among the residents of the 
Transcaucasus, according to their abilities, enterprise, and pursuit of education. They have 
always been considered the most active toilers of the Orient.” 
     -Caucasus Calendar, 1846 
 
At mid-century, Russian statesmen proffered competing visions for the social and 
economic role that Armenians should play in the tsarist empire. By 1830, when Russia emerged 
from wars with Persia and Turkey as the new master of the Caucasus, the foundation of Russo-
Armenian relations rested on two core spheres: religious and economic. This chapter examines 
these dynamics in the context of the Russian state’s absorption of the Armenian nation into the 
empire. I argue that the autocracy relinquished some economic and cultural control over its 
Armenian subjects in expectation of reciprocal political benefit. Yet in the midst of governmental 
reform, St. Petersburg struggled to integrate Armenians. Contradictory fiscal statutes, arguments 
among senior statesmen, and competition, as well as cooperation, between the Orthodox and 
Armenian churches, marked the state’s search for effective Armenian policies. Overall, Tsar 
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Nicholas I (1825-55) sought standardized tax and ecumenical laws for his Armenian and other 
subjects as part of a broader pursuit of his own vision of a modern Rechtsstaat.  
As historian Marc Raeff has shown, “Nicholas was narrowly conservative and afraid of 
bringing any radically new elements into Russia’s political organization.”449 The tsar sought 
small adjustments to the “machinery of government,” and wished to lubricate its gears for 
smooth functioning but opposed fundamental changes. To this end, the emperor tasked Mikhail 
Speransky with codifying Russian law to clarify the legal relations and procedures for state 
bureaucrats. “It was as far as he was willing to go;” according to Raeff, “such a clarification 
would be sufficient in bringing to the imperial administration consistency, uniformity, and 
order—the supreme virtues to the military and technological mind of Nicholas I.” Raeff is 
correct to emphasize that the emperor and Speransky “obviously aimed at uniformity and 
simplicity of legal relationships and categories. . . . Minor exceptions and special cases had to be 
eliminated to bring about uniformity and a streamlining of legal relations that would pave the 
way for bureaucratic orderliness and military efficiency.”450 But in confronting the loopholes 
into which Armenian communities in Russia fell, the tsarist regime often prioritized not only 
legal and fiscal uniformity but also geopolitical aims beyond Russia’s frontiers.	  
Under Tsar Nicholas I, the state also codified the activities of Orthodox and non-
Orthodox groups in what historian Laura Engelstein has called a “project of administrative 
modernization.”451 The government included the Armenian Church in this endeavor, 	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guaranteeing, restricting, and defining the rights and obligations of tsarist-subject Armenians. 
Aimed at standardizing and legalizing the relationship between the tsarist state and Echmiadzin, 
the Polozhenie of 1836 and its attendant policies constituted part of an empire-wide reform 
initiative that affected most of Russia’s non-Orthodox faiths. Thus, under Nicholas, the Muslims 
of Crimea, Protestants, Jews, and Karaites received royal fiats that defined their ecumenical, 
social, and political position in imperial Russia.452    
But even during efforts to streamline the bureaucratic and legal systems of governance, 
state policy toward the non-Orthodox often reflected Nicholas’s conservatism. Indeed, new 
statutes and reformed administrative practices produced as many restrictions as opportunities. 
Historian John Klier has insisted that, under Nicholas I, the government targeted Jews for full-
scale conversion more than at any other time in the nineteenth century, subjecting them to the 
conscription system and the education policies of Sergei Uvarov, the architect of the Orthodoxy, 
Autocracy, Nationality doctrine.453  
Yet the Armenian experience, distinguished by the political implications of its 
transregional diaspora, suggests that Nicholas’s government at times pursued more important 
objectives than acculturation and political tranquility on the periphery. In seeking to reconcile the 
demands of a well-regulated country with the circumstances of such imperial minorities as 
Armenians, the autocracy’s foreign affairs imperatives often shaped its domestic policies. The 
Armenian Church represented a key factor in this equation. While in 1836 the state solidified the 	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legal status of Echmiadzin and its tsarist followers, it went no farther in exerting control over 
Armenian religious life. Unlike Nicholas’s Jewish, Georgian, and Muslim subjects, Armenians 
escaped the first half of the nineteenth century without experiencing the same level of 
government interference in their material and political culture.  
Imperial Policy and Context 
After the end of the Second Russo-Persian War in 1828, Russia consolidated its annexed 
lands by establishing new administrative spaces. Most of Eastern Armenia, comprising the 
former Persian khanates of Yerevan and Nakhichevan, became known as Armianskaia oblast 
(Armenian province), with its center at Yerevan. Ronald G. Suny has argued that Tsar Nicholas I 
rejected Armenian calls for the establishment of an autonomous Armenia, insisting instead on the 
designation of an oblast for Eastern Armenia.454 Yet, in a likely concession, the tsar appointed 
Armenian-heritage Major-General Vasilii Bebutov commander of the territory. The province was 
disbanded twelve years later and then resurrected in a more significant way in 1850 as 
Erivanskaia guberniia (Yerevan governorate). Pleased by his Caucasus commander’s 
accomplishments, Nicholas bestowed on General Ivan Paskevich the title Graf Erivanskii (Count 
of Yerevan) and reassigned him to Warsaw. 
In October 1831, Paskevich’s successor arrived in Tiflis. Of Estonian-German heritage, 
General Baron Grigorii Vladimirovich Rozen (Georg von Rosen) had distinguished himself 
during the Napoleonic Wars and the recent Polish campaigns. His six years at the head of the 
Caucasus administration (1831-37) focused on combating North Caucasian highlanders led by 
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the adroit Avar warlord Imam Shamil.455 Rozen also worked to integrate the economy and 
society of the South Caucasus with the rest of the country. In the mostly Muslim-populated 
North Caucasus, the spread of Muridism, a Sufist-political movement, challenged the tsarist hold 
on the region as soon as Russia emerged from wars with Persia and Turkey in 1829. 
Muridism “did not recognize any worldly laws other than those laid down by the prophet 
Muhammed in the Shari’ia.”456 Rejecting the Russian subjugation of their lands, the followers of 
Muridism waged a protracted jihad against the northern infidels. By the spring of 1832, Rozen 
stressed to War Minister Alexander Chernyshev that the “weak and unreliable condition of the 
[Caucasus] Line strikes everyone who visits it.”457 The Muridist movement’s most famous and 
deft leader, Shamil, rose to prominence in 1836, when Russian agents warily noted his success in 
preaching Shari’ia law to the residents of Dagestan and Chechnya.458 By the late 1830s, tsarist 
troops pursued Shamil throughout the region, leaving in their wake destruction and enraging 
previously docile Muslims. The warlord’s power reached its apex in 1842-43, when his joint 
Dagestani-Chechen force of 10,000 men scored a series of unprecedented victories against 
Russian outposts, killing in one skirmish in May 1842 nearly 500 tsarist soldiers.459 Between 
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August and December 1843 alone, Shamil’s guerillas killed or wounded 76 tsarist officers and 
over 2,300 soldiers.460  
Rozen’s initial policies relied on force to pacify the insurgency, but the unfamiliar terrain 
and hostile locals impeded tsarist military success. More generally, Rozen’s plan, vetted by the 
tsar and war minister, called for the construction of a network of fortified positions throughout 
the region, crisscrossing it with new roads and dotting it with redoubts.461 Rozen also sought to 
confiscate lands used by the gortsy (highlanders) for agriculture and cattle rearing and to provide 
it to Cossack colonists. Finally, he proposed using special border guards to cut off the 
highlanders’ “connections” [snoshenie] with Ottoman Turks along the Black Sea coast.462  
In a reflection of senior officials’ divergent perspectives on Russia’s mission in the 
Caucasus, Paskevich criticized Rozen’s proposal. In March 1834, Paskevich judged his 
successor’s program to be “difficult in its overall execution and insufficient in its particular 
details.”463 The Count of Yerevan rejected the idea of settling Cossacks in regions outside tsarist 
control, emphasizing both safety concerns and the myriad of potential economic difficulties. 
Paskevich also questioned whether the state treasury could bear the estimated three to four 
million rubles for Rozen’s new fortifications and roads, and whether the establishment of more 
isolated garrisons made tactical sense.464 Instead, Paskevich echoed Rozen’s calls for lines of 
fortified garrisons, but reduced their number and rearranged their positioning. He also 	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recommended settling Cossacks on the vast unoccupied lands of the North Caucasus, rather than 
wresting currently used land in punitive measures. Most importantly, Paskevich recommended 
that waves of “settlers from Russia” be used to “constrain the highlanders” in hopes of “forcing 
them to submit [smirit’sia], seeing from one side the terrifying punishment for insubordination, 
and from the other side the welfare enjoyed by peaceful and obedient tribes.”465 Owing to 
Paskevich’s accomplishments against Persia and in quelling the Polish rebellion, he received 
Tsar Nicholas’s full attention. At a time when two indigenous insurgencies—in Poland and the 
North Caucasus—challenged Russian imperial rule, the policies enacted in St. Petersburg often 
relied on heavy-handed tactics.  
The revolt of aristocratic Poles in 1830-31 threatened Russia’s grip on the western 
borderlands, which it had annexed in the late eighteenth century. In sending Paskevich and a 
large army to suppress the rebellion in Warsaw, Nicholas—who crowned himself King of Poland 
in May 1829—made clear that he intended to crush challenges to his authority. Yet Nicholas’s 
response to the Polish insurrection evinced the degree to which he fused personal emotions with 
the politics of governance, a circumstance described by historian Richard Wortman.466 
Distrustful of military elites after the Decembrist rebellion and suspicious that the republican 
cries of liberté, égalité, fraternité had infected his aristocratic subjects in the peripheries, 
Nicholas viewed Poland, the Caucasus, and other imperial territories as integral components of 
his empire, and saw any challenge to this arrangement as a personal affront. After his army 
suppressed the rebels, the tsar berated the defeated Poles:  
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You never knew how to be content with the benefits granted to you, and yourself 
destroyed your own welfare; you trampled on your laws—I speak the truth to you, in 
order to convince you once and for all of our mutual ties. . . . I will believe not your 
words but your actions; repentance must come from here [the tsar pointed to his heart], 
you see that I speak dispassionately [khladnokrovno], that I am calm, not angry at you, I 
have long forgotten your insults to me and my family.467 
 
The emperor threatened to annihilate Poland as a political entity if the nobility continued to seek 
independence: “If you stubbornly maintain your dreams of an imaginary utopia, of a separate 
nationality, of an independent Poland, of all these pipe dreams [nezbytochnye mechty], you can 
do nothing but incur grave disaster . . . for at the slightest disturbance, I will crush your city, 
destroy Warsaw, and of course I will not rebuild it.”468  
Nicholas took a similar approach to the Georgian elites of the South Caucasus, among 
whom the Russian administration uncovered a conspiracy in 1832.469 Chernyshev directed Rozen 
to arrest “several Georgian princes and noblemen,” citing evidence of a “quite serious . . . plot” 
that sought Georgian independence from St. Petersburg.470 Despite this development, Tsar 
Nicholas and Chernyshev remained confident that “there is no doubt that the sensible part of the 
[Georgian] nobility does not wish any changes in its political status and even is sincerely 
committed to Russia.”471 Nevertheless, in the summer of 1833, under the pretext that heirs of 
deposed Georgian royals continued to use their formal court titles in correspondence, Nicholas 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
467State Archive of the Russian Federation (GARF), f. 672, op. 1, d. 301, l. 1. 
468GARF, f. 672, op. 1, d. 301, l. 2.  
469AKAK, VIII (1881), ii.  
470AKAK, VIII (1881), 391-92. Even Georgian-heritage tsarist officials, such as Major-General 
Chavchavadze, and Prince Okropirom from Moscow were implicated in the investigation.  
471AKAK, VIII (1881), 393. 
 164 
instructed Rozen’s administration to intercept and burn their mail.472 At the same time, the tsar 
worked to smooth the government’s relationship with the Georgian aristocracy, sending a special 
envoy to Tiflis to avert a major schism. In a sanguine speech to the Georgian elite, the 
ambassador extraordinaire opined: “Having become acquainted with Georgians during the 
battles of the last Persian war, I have come to consider them as brothers, and believe that a 
Russian [Russkii] who is devoted to his Emperor must be a good Georgian, just as a loyal 
Georgian must be a good Russian [Rossiianin].”473 Yet the South Caucasus’s administrative and 
economic incorporation into the Russian empire posed as many challenges for Rozen as the 
political resistance of Georgian elites.  
Reflective of the regional and policy inconsistencies that characterized the entire imperial 
taxation system,474 the deficiencies of Russian fiscal policies in the South Caucasus frustrated the 
locals. In early 1833, a survey of the population of Armianskaia oblast revealed the residents’ 
discontent with the local administration.475 Armenians, Kurds, and “Tatars” alike complained of 
the slow bureaucratic processes and disparate regulations that delayed and complicated their 
daily lives. For example, in the first quarter-century of Russian rule in the South Caucasus, tsarist 
overlords, wary of rattling the locals, left Georgian provinces under former Persian tax rates and 
allowed the regional administration to use all of the tax revenue for the benefit of the region, a 
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deviation from standard policy in other region.476 In 1824 confusion ensued when officials in the 
South Caucasus, unlike their colleagues in neighboring districts, abandoned the household tax in 
favor of the poll tax. Another discrepancy had Muslim residents of the Caucasus, distrusted by 
the imperial authorities, pay a special military tax instead of taking part in conscription.477 
 Referring to the residents of Armianskaia oblast, one Russian report from 1833 
complained that, “most of them can be called semi-wild [poludikimi], who interpret the slowness 
of resolving their matters as oppression on the part of the Russian government.”478 Such tsarist 
sentiments, common among the administrators of the South Caucasus, consistently delineated a 
cultural separation between the ostensibly civilized, and European, Russians on the one hand, 
and the “semi-wild” Caucasian natives on the other. From the emperor to the rank-and-file 
soldier, Russians labeled the indigenous peoples of the Caucasus, both Christians and Muslims, 
as Aziatsy (Asiatics). At the same time that Russian imperial agents engaged in cultural 
“othering,” they remained aware of the region’s delicate political situation vis-à-vis the 
neighboring Muslim empires. Indeed, the same report cautioned that such circumstances “give 
our government no positive influence upon the residents of the neighboring powers, who 
consider [such bureaucratic deficiencies] to be measures that are oppressive for Muslims.”479 
 Economic concerns also plagued the administration of Armianskaia oblast. By early 
1834, Rozen turned his attention to the province’s “insignificant [tax] revenue” of 120,000 rubles 
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per year.480 He blamed the situation on the continuation of former Persian tax practices, 
including the collection of agricultural taxes by the hated sarkars. Inconsistent regional taxation 
policies also vexed the locals, who demanded a simplified system. Rozen collaborated with 
General Vasilii Bebutov, the commander of Armianskaia oblast, to abolished the sarkar system 
and compile more accurate data about local agriculture and trade. They also introduced taxes for 
the mostly Armenian farmers who had settled in the region four to seven years earlier and still 
enjoyed tax-free farming.481 The changes “exceeded expectations,” and by 1835 the province 
yielded 215,000 rubles in tax revenue, compared to the 120,000 collected the previous year.482 
Improved fiscal policies in the South Caucasus, however, did not relieve the deteriorating 
security situation in the North Caucasus and belied deeper problems with Rozen’s 
administration. 
 In mid-1837, responding to a crescendo of rumors, “Baron Gan arrived in Tiflis to 
uncover a network of vast corruption and abuse at the center of which was the emperor’s aide-
de-camp and Baron Rosen’s son-in-law, Colonel Prince Alexander Dadiani.”483 The crisis 
required the emperor’s personal attention. In the fall of 1837, Nicholas became the second tsar 
since Peter the Great to visit the Caucasus.484 Nicholas was eager to signal to Europe that 
Russia’s claims to the region remained firm, despite the native insurgency and the growing 	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commercial rivalry with British marine merchants, and to address the unresolved security 
situation and Gan’s reports of the local administration’s incompetence and corruption. 
 Nicholas visited Yerevan, Tiflis, Vladikavkaz, and several other important cities. In 
Tiflis, the regional administration’s headquarters, the tsar publicly dismissed several senior 
officials, including Dadiani. The emperor also replaced Rozen with General Evgenii Golovin, 
reprimanding the former for his failure to quell the North Caucasus uprising and his 
administration’s bureaucratic shortfalls. Nicholas instructed Golovin: “Do not start anything 
[hoping] for luck, it is better to delay until success is certain; in a word, carry out matters in such 
a way that, having taken a step forward, no steps are taken back.”485 However, the change of 
officials did not impact policy. Nicholas, his ministers, and Golovin continued to pursue a 
military solution to Shamil’s rebellion, and the region’s fiscal, criminal, and civil statutes 
remained inconsistent, partial, and often contradictory.  
 This climate reflected the government’s struggle to define its mission in the Caucasus. In 
December 1839 tsarist ministers convened to debate whether the South Caucasus “should be 
seen as a colony or a part of Russia.”486 Finance Minister Egor Kankrin (Georg von Cancrin) 
argued that the region’s social composition rendered it a colony, with only the Georgian nobility 
approaching the cultural pedigree of their Russian counterparts. Rozen disagreed with him, 
emphasizing instead the local population’s vast trade networks, something the government could 
not risk losing through the type of colonial marginalization that the British displayed in India. 
Minister of Foreign Affairs Karl Nesselrode also highlighted the delicate politics required to take 
full advantage of the region’s economic offerings, but believed that Armenians and Georgians 	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could be “civilized” through the expansion of modern regional commerce.487 Siding with Rozen 
and Nesselrode, the majority of statesmen concurred that the South Caucasus had to be 
incorporated into Russia’s social and political orbit. 
Reflecting these efforts to integrate the Caucasus into the country, in 1840 the regional 
administration underwent major reshuffling. Armianskaia oblast was abolished and its territory 
subsumed into the new Gruzino-Imeretinskaia guberniia (Georgian-Imeretian governorate); the 
eastern portion of the Caucasus became Kaspiiskaia oblast (Caspian province).488 The former 
was divided into eleven uezdy (districts), including the Yerevan and Tiflis districts, and the latter 
into seven uezdy. Initial steps were taken to replace adat and Shari’ia with Russian laws, but a 
backlash by some local communities prevented the full implementation of new statutes for some 
time.489 Criminal cases were tried in civil rather than military courts, and the jurisdiction of civil 
administrators grew at the expense of their military counterparts.490 Nevertheless, a St. 
Petersburg commission determined in 1842 that the state’s administrative reforms had failed. 
What prompted the changes of the 1840s? The location and symbolic nomenclature of 
Armianskaia oblast rendered it the de facto homeland of the Armenian people. Although little 
evidence survives to illustrate the reaction of contemporaneous Armenians to the 1840 
reorganization, some modern Armenian historians have interpreted the province’s dissolution as 
a Russian attack on Armenian nationalist dreams. Writing during the Soviet decline, V. G. 
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Tunian, for example, argued that the tsarist state’s “political decision was deliberately aimed at 
suppressing the autonomous aspirations of the Armenian people.”491 But economic concerns, not 
perceived national-political threats, guided the government’s administrative reshuffling.  
 Realizing that the reorganization of 1840 was insufficient, in late 1842 Tsar Nicholas 
recalled Rozen to St. Petersburg. His replacement, General Alexander Neidgardt, assumed 
command of the Independent Caucasus Corps at the time of Shamil’s zenith and Russian 
authority’s nadir. Neidgardt had one paramount task. “I want no conquests and [even] the 
thought of them consider criminal,” the tsar dictated when dispatching the general to the 
Caucasus.492 The pacification of the gortsy was the state’s primary objective, followed by the 
improvement of the region’s broader administration and bureaucracy. Contemporaries 
pronounced Neidgardt a “pedantic . . . drill-master.” Dr. Moritz Wagner, a German explorer and 
biologist who met Neidgardt in the 1840s, described the tsarist official as “a worthy, honest man, 
of unsophisticated character, just and severe; endowed with sound practical sense, but without 
superior talent, political penetration, or knowledge of mankind—no magnanimous character, 
such as Yermoloff, yet an improvement on his predecessors, Rosen and Golowin.”493 
Despite’s Neidgardt’s mission to suppress Shamil’s rebellion, the government began to 
express openness to “political,” nonmilitary solutions to the North Caucasus crisis. The region’s 
“conquest should not be achieved only through weapons, but instead [you] must act carefully, 
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patiently,” the tsar emphasized to Neidgardt.494 Indeed, months before Golovin’s demotion, a 
secret government report recommended offering rewards and agricultural assistance to the 
gortsy.495 The proposal argued that through economic incentives and improved relations with the 
natives, the government could achieve more lasting results than through perennial campaigns, 
stressing that Russian agents must not “offend” native sensibilities and customs.496 But the plan 
also called for a divide-and-conquer strategy, using money to fan discord among Shamil’s 
commanders, “and even to give rise to a bloody feud, forcing them to fight among each other and 
thus weakening them.”497 This scheme found support from such senior tsarist statesmen as War 
Minister Chernyshev, who argued that “the British were able to secure their sovereignty in India 
through political means. That way they conserved their troops and saved time in conquering the 
region. Should we not try this system?”498 
By the mid-1840s, Tsar Nicholas recognized that more than a new commander was 
needed. Less than two years after Neidgardt’s promotion, and disappointed in the general’s 
failure to check the spread of Shamil’s insurgency,499 Nicholas turned to Count General Mikhail 
Semenovich Vorontsov. Educated in London during his father’s tenure as Catherine the Great’s 
ambassador to England, the nobleman had served in his youth in the Caucasus under 
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Tsitsianov.500 The general’s credentials included military distinctions in wars against the French 
and Turks and an impressive record as the governor of New Russia and viceroy of Bessarabia. In 
late 1844, a frustrated Tsar Nicholas, expressing his “respect and dedication” to Vorontsov, 
asked the general to become the first viceroy of the Caucasus.501 
Vorontsov (1845-54) made a real difference, because he received “enormous and 
extraordinary” powers to make major decisions without consulting the ministers in St. 
Petersburg.502 Not since Grigorii Potemkin in Catherine’s era did a Russian imperial 
administrator receive such carte blanche from the monarch.503 Respected by his army and 
enjoying the support of War Minister Chernyshev, Vorontsov justified the tsar’s trust by turning 
the tide against Shamil (despite some notable early disasters) and reforming the regional 
bureaucracy.504 Vorontsov embraced diplomacy and economic incentives to win over 
disenchanted Dagestani villagers to his side, eroding Shamil’s influence to such degree that the 
rebels posed little practical threat to Russian interests in the Caucasus when the Crimean War 
erupted in 1853.  
To the south of the mountains, the viceroy divided the territory into new gubernii, 
including the Yerevan, Tiflis, and Baku governorates. Unlike his predecessors, Vorontsov co-	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opted local national elites into the political structure of the new administration, recruiting 
Georgian, Armenian, and other aristocrats and community leaders.505 He also invested in the 
development of the region’s cultural life, establishing schools, libraries, scholarly societies, and a 
theater in Tiflis.506 As a result, according to historian Ronald G. Suny, the “Georgian nobility, 
which fifteen years earlier had plotted to murder Russian officials and separate Georgia from the 
empire, made its peace with the tsarist autocracy during the viceroyalty of Vorontsov.”507 For 
middle-class Armenians of Tiflis and Yerevan, too, Vorontsov’s changes promised a brighter 
future, helped by the viceroy’s simplification of trade regulations, support for local students’ 
study in St. Petersburg and Moscow (including at the Lazarev Institute), and similar enlightened 
policies. The viceroy’s popularity among the natives of the South Caucasus, especially 
aristocratic Georgians, resulted in a statue erected to him in Tiflis, where, according to one 
scholar, locals “presented him as a father figure, placed him in an otherworldly environment, 
linked him to the forces of nature and the majesty of the highest mountains, and turned him into 
some kind of Übermensch.”508 In ill health, the viceroy resigned in 1854 and died in Odessa two 
years later.509 
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Vorontsov trusted Armenians. He facilitated the education of Armenian youths in the 
empire’s best academies and universities, supported the construction of new Armenian churches, 
and listened to the requests and suggestions of the Tiflis Armenian merchants.510 More than his 
predecessors, Vorontsov stressed that “throughout the region, the Armenians are entirely devoted 
to us.”511 At the end of his tenure, the viceroy lauded the “unquestionable loyalty and even 
affection toward us of all Armenians.”512 In particular, he praised tsarist-subject Armenians’ 
willingness to “serve against our enemies.” Among the Armenian elites who volunteered for 
Russian service, many had performed “excellent exploits . . . [and] acquired glory and general 
trust.” Among middle-class Armenians, too, the viceroy highlighted their mercantile successes. 
Unlike such predecessors as Tsitsianov and Ermolov, who faulted Armenian entrepreneurs for 
their perceived avarice, Vorontsov praised the broader social and economic benefits of their 
business acumen. “Armenians also are the government’s main instrument for leases and 
contracts here;” he summarized, “competition among them reduces prices to our advantage.”513  
Vorontsov’s perception of Armenians reflected the autocracy’s generally Janus-like view 
of these subjects. Positive assessments of Armenians accompanied concerns about the social 
marginalization produced by middle-class Armenians’ economic successes. For all his praise, 
Vorontsov noted that Tiflis Armenians “hold almost all [commerce] in their hands; for the 
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Georgians, based on an ancient militant spirit and general disposition, are not capable of it.”514 
Yet the Caucasus administration’s facilitation of social, economic, and cultural advancement of 
Armenians and other natives, in line with the broader reform effort that increasingly prioritized 
diplomacy and economic development, represented the government’s transition away from the 
punitive policies employed by previous regional commanders, including Ermolov and Paskevich. 
Armenians became core allies of the Russian administration, which relied on the local businesses 
of their middle class and the military service of their elites.  
In early 1855, General Nikolai Muravev arrived in Tiflis to replace Vorontsov, taking 
command during a particularly dangerous time for Russian imperial aims, when Turkey, Britain, 
and France allied against what they saw as St. Petersburg’s menacing foreign policy. While the 
majority of combat revolved around the Crimean peninsula, the war’s reverberations reached the 
Caucasus. As early as the summer of 1853, Shamil’s rebels and Ottoman officials discussed a 
coordinated campaign in the Caucasus.515 Soon Ottoman forces attacked Russia on sea and land, 
targeting the Black Sea coast and attempting to invade western Georgia. Shamil, meanwhile, set 
his sights on Tiflis. Despite these efforts, according to David Goldfrank, “Anglo-Turkish 
attempts to support Shamyl and some of the Caucasus peoples against Russia flopped.”516 Tsarist 
forces repelled both Ottoman and highlander threats and pursued the attackers beyond Russian 
lines. In November 1855, the tsar’s army captured Kars.  
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The Crimean War marked the first major Russian engagement in which well-educated 
and trained Russified Armenians became renowned members of the regular army. Not as much a 
product of state-engineered Russification as an organic result of select Armenians’ melding into 
elite Russian circles, this phenomenon affected small numbers of Armenians. Yet the fact that 
these individuals attained personal distinction within the tsarist hierarchy signaled the gradual 
Russian acceptance of Armenians. While thousands of Armenian peasants and middle-class 
laborers in Russia proper and the Caucasus continued to experience social marginalization, a 
select cadre of their compatriots gained prominence. For example, General Vasilii Bebutov, the 
former head of the disbanded Armianskaia oblast, earned the Order of St. George (second 
degree) in December 1853. Another Armenian-heritage commander, Guards Colonel Mikhail 
Loris-Melikov, led Armenian and Tatar cavalry units against Turkish troops,517 a small 
accomplishment in a career that would culminate in his promotion to interior minister in 1880.   
 In sum, for much of the 1830s and 1840s, imperial Russian policy in the Caucasus 
revolved around the reform of the regional bureaucracy and the suppression of the North 
Caucasus insurgency. The shuffling of generals in Tiflis yielded few results until the creation of 
the Caucasian viceroyalty and the arrival of Vorontsov, whose enlightened policies effected real 
change. In its relations with the restive Muslims of Dagestan and Chechnya, the tsarist state 
employed heavy-handed tactics, until the combination of Vorontsov’s diplomacy, his military 
persistence, and the Ottoman collapse in the Caucasus weakened Shamil’s power, resulting in his 
capture in 1859.  
Although Russia decisively lost the Crimean War, thanks mainly to the Franco-British 
alliance, it achieved important results in its southern domains. Tsarist troops captured the 	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sultan’s prized Kars fortress, a Pyrrhic victory quickly nullified by European diplomatic 
intervention. Moreover, after more than two decades of bloody resistance, Shamil surrendered, 
dying years later in comfortable exile in Medina.518 Finally, Russia maintained its claim as 
protector of Christians under Ottoman suzerainty, a position underscored by Tsar Nicholas 
during his declaration of war in April 1854: “We did not and do not search for conquests, nor for 
a dominating influence in Turkey,” but rather the “restoration of the violated rights of the 
Orthodox Christian subjects of the Ottoman Porte.”519 To be sure, throughout the reign of 
Nicholas I, the status of Christian confessions, Orthodox and heterodox, was simultaneously an 
opportunity and a liability for domestic and foreign policy. Few dynamics illustrate this as 
thoroughly as the government’s dialogue with the Armenian Church, whose links to a vast 
diaspora presented unique considerations for St. Petersburg.  
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Figure 4. Echmiadzin in 2014.  
Photo property of the author. 
Church-State Relations 
 In the 1830s, the encounter between the tsarist state and the Armenian Church underwent 
major transformations. In 1836, eight years after the annexation of Echmiadzin, the state codified 
the rights and obligations of the Armenian Church and its followers in Russia. While the 
Polozhenie (Statute) of 1836 simultaneously granted powers and placed restrictions on the 
Catholicos or patriarch, it also carried implications beyond the Armenian ecclesiastical sphere. In 
particular, the autocracy employed Echmiadzin to facilitate its foreign policy in Turkey and 
elsewhere. Moreover, in the interests of domestic stability and out of a sense of shared 
ecumenical culture, the Orthodox and Armenian churches cooperated against threats to the 
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integrity of the Armenian confession, as long as such collaboration did not encroach upon the 
authority of the Russian Orthodox Church.   
More than a monastic institution, Echmiadzin represented the epicenter of political 
initiatives for the stateless Armenians. Enjoying the recognition of the vast Armenian diaspora, 
albeit challenged by rivals in Jerusalem and Constantinople, the Echmiadzin Catholicos or 
patriarch exercised authority over Armenian communities from Western Europe to southern 
Asia. The political implications of this circumstance rendered control over Echmiadzin a key 
objective of the tsar, the shah, and the sultan. When Russia seized the complex from Persia in 
1828, it gained a new tool for projecting its foreign policy. While tsarist diplomats struggled for 
influence in Constantinople and Tehran, with the absorption of Echmiadzin Russia maneuvered 
to advance its interests through the leverage of local Armenian bishops, who, in contrast to their 
oft-mistreated lay compatriots, enjoyed social and political clout in Turkey and Persia. 
Nerses of Ashtarak, an ambitious and nimble Armenian clergyman, played a key role in 
the autocracy’s interaction with the Armenian Church in much of the Nicholaevan era. Nerses 
first gained prominence as the archbishop of the important diocese of Georgia, where he served 
between 1811 and 1830. Russian officials noted the prelate’s administrative efficiency during his 
tenure in Tiflis and often relied on his connections to Persian officials, especially during the 
Second Russo-Persian War.520 Harboring dreams of a self-governing Armenia, Nerses 
cooperated with Paskevich and Lazarev during the war, and at its conclusion facilitated the 
resettlement of Persian Armenians into Russian territory.521 Yet Nerses’s zealous advocacy for a 
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vaguely autonomous Armenia conflicted with the tsarist state’s decision to create Armianskaia 
oblast.522 As a result, in 1830 the state effectively exiled Nerses to Kishinev, where he became 
the first archbishop of the Bessarabian Armenian diocese.523 The “benign” Efrem, whom 
Persians had removed from Echmiadzin during the war, returned to lead the Armenian Church. 
 Despite Nerses’s clash with tsarist policy, he enjoyed the support of the most prominent 
Russian-Armenian family, the Lazarevs. Shortly after Nerses’s departure from Tiflis, Khristofor 
Ekimovich Lazarev, the family’s patriarch, corresponded with Count Alexander von Benkendorf, 
the architect and head of the Third Section of the Imperial Chancellery, the secret police 
established after the Decembrist revolt.524 A close confidant of the tsar, Alexander Benkendorf 
was the brother of tsarist general and Lazarev ally Konstantin von Benkendorf. 
 Lazarev lobbied Benkendorf to have Nerses transferred from Bessarabia to St. 
Petersburg, insisting that “it is necessary for the benefit of Russia—for the good of the Armenian 
people.”525 The Armenian magnate argued that “no one else is capable of successfully executing 
all-beneficial [obshchepoleznykh] intentions,” and wished to see Nerses play an active role in 
molding the state’s policy toward the newly annexed regions of the South Caucasus. In extoling 
Nerses, Lazarev claimed that “his personal influence, his talent, his trust, his knowledge, and 
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reasoning, dependent upon the cooperation of the local—and well-disposed—civilian leadership, 
can contribute quite a lot in all-beneficial matters.”526  
When the incumbent patriarch, Efrem, died in early 1830, Lazarev lobbied Benkendorf to 
facilitate Nerses’s ascension to the apex of the Armenian Church, claiming that the selection of 
Nerses as patriarch represented the “unified, general request of the Armenian people and the 
entire clergy.”527 The prelate even petitioned the tsar to return to the South Caucasus: “I have 
served Russia for 30 years,” Nerses insisted, “[I] have demonstrated in many ways and in 
important matters loyalty to the [Russian] emperors, to the benefit of the government and nation, 
have entirely justified trust, especially in wartime, [and I am] filled with the direct spirit of 
devotion to Russia, which is blissfully united with Armenia.”528  
Nerses thus signaled his acquiescence to Armenia’s political status and abandonment of 
his former dreams of autonomy. Yet, despite his appeals and Lazarev’s advocacy, Nerses spent 
thirteen years in Bessarabia waiting to become patriarch, ascending to the post only in 1843. In 
his stead, the tsarist state “insisted” on the election in 1831 of a candidate more suitable to its 
political goals, Hovannes.529 This episode confirmed the tsar’s influence on ecclesiastical 
developments of the Armenian Church. Even Lazarev’s intervention proved futile, suggesting 
that Nicholas and his advisors took Nerses’s earlier political aspirations seriously and responded 
by (temporarily) blocking his career. However, at the same time that it protected its domestic 
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interests by intervening in the affairs of the Armenian Church, the tsarist state also deployed 
Echmiadzin’s broad authority to advance its foreign policy. 
Russia utilized Echmiadzin to exert influence in the Ottoman empire and beyond. As 
historian Paul Werth has demonstrated, the autocracy’s considerations of the Armenian 
patriarch’s influence abroad necessitated a “policy of indulgence” that privileged Echmiadzin’s 
external prestige over its internal control.530 This policy had to be balanced between, on the one 
hand, amplifying the patriarch’s authority over non-Russian subject Armenians and, on the other 
hand, enforcing the domestic legal and administrative obligations of that tsarist subject. For 
much of the nineteenth century, the state chose to augment Echmiadzin’s standing abroad in 
expectation of reaping benefits within the Ottoman empire.  
St. Petersburg hastened to reestablish Echmiadzin’s influence among diaspora Armenians 
soon after absorbing the monastery in 1828. To be sure, some distant Armenian communities 
celebrated the change of Echmiadzin’s imperial master. From as far away as Madras, India, local 
Armenians declared to Khristofor Ekimovich Lazarev their readiness to financially support the 
church and even to emigrate to Armianskaia oblast.531 The wars with Persia and Turkey in 1826-
29, however, had weakened the links between the Echmiadzin Catholicos and his followers in 
the neighboring Muslim empires, who were wary of affirming the pro-Russian prelate’s 
authority. Ecclesiastical matters between Russian- and Ottoman-subject Armenians became 
further strained when Patriarch Hovannes was elected in 1831 without the participation of 
Ottoman Armenian delegates.532 Moreover, two rival Armenian patriarchs in Turkey, at 	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Constantinople and Sis, sought to assume more prominent roles in Armenian religious life and 
eclipse Echmiadzin’s perennial authority. In Jerusalem, too, an Armenian patriarch awaited an 
opportunity to outshine his rival in the South Caucasus.  
Hovannes supported the integration of the Armenian nation into Russian society. The 
limited evidence suggests that the Catholicos envisioned the social and political melding of 
Armenians into Russian everyday life, while maintaining the markers of cultural distinction, such 
as religious rites, that formed the cornerstones of Armenian national identity. Hovannes viewed 
Armenians learning Russian and observing Russian laws not as a threat to Armenian 
ethnocultural identity but as a means toward social, economic, and political prominence within 
the empire. In backing a proposed seminary at the Lazarev Institute, Hovannes asserted that “the 
young Armenian clergy, having been educated in the [Armenian] national Lazarev Institute of 
Moscow, quickly will connect morally with native Russians and consequently will adopt 
[srodnitsia] the customs and laws of their new fatherland.”533 Yet foreign policy matters often 
overshadowed the domestic dimensions of the Russo-Armenian ecclesiastical encounter.   
To boost Echmiadzin’s prestige abroad, Baron Rozen, the tsarist commander-in-chief of 
the Caucasus (1831-37), reported to Tsar Nicholas that Hovannes “deserves particular attention 
because the spread of Echmiadzin’s influence upon Armenians in Turkey is quite beneficial not 
only for him personally but also for our government politically.”534 From his election in 1831, 
Hovannes and Rozen cooperated to regain the prelate’s standing among Ottoman Armenians. To 
this end, Rozen corresponded with the tsarist foreign, internal, and war ministries to achieve such 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
533RGIA, f. 880, op. 5, d. 174, l. 1ob.    
534RGIA, f. 1268, op. 1, d. 55, l. 1. The date of this report is unknown, but it appears to be in 1837. 
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goals as the Ottoman acceptance of an Echmiadzin nuncio in Constantinople.535 The Russian 
government also tasked its ambassador in Constantinople, Apollinarii Butenev, with negotiating 
with the Armenian patriarchs of Sis and Jerusalem and urging them to endorse Hovannes’s 
spiritual superiority and pronounce his name during liturgy, requests that the rival patriarchs 
rejected.536 “This is a very important matter,” emphasized Rozen to the tsar, because the foreign 
patriarchs’ refusal to recognize Hovannes could precipitate a chain reaction among other, 
particularly Persian, Armenian communities. Hostile powers could co-opt such ostensibly 
ecclesiastical schisms for political purposes, Rozen warned.537  
To be sure, not just Persia and Turkey, but also Russia’s European rivals, cautiously 
watched the tsar’s growing influence over the Armenian Church in the 1830s and 1840s. Robert 
Curzon, the private secretary to the British ambassador to Turkey, stressed:  
[The tsar] will not fail to pull the strings which hang loosely in the hands of the Armenian 
Patriarch. If he pulls them evenly and well, he will advance his interests far and wide, 
even in the dominions of other princes, who may hardly be aware of the influence 
exercised in their states from a source so distant and unobtrusive. The danger in his case 
is, that he may use too great violence, and break the strings from too severe a tension, 
raising the storm against himself which he intended to direct against others.538 
 
Curzon echoed the sentiments of many European statesmen when he emphasized the potential 
political ramifications of Russia’s patronage of Echmiadzin: “the power of which he [the tsar] 
holds the reins is one which may be used for the advancement of the greatest or the most ignoble 
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536RGIA, f. 1268, op. 1, d. 55, ll. 1ob-2. 
537 RGIA, f. 1268, op. 1, d. 55, l. 2.  
538Robert Curzon, Armenia: A Year at Erzeroom, and on the Frontiers of Russia, Turkey, and Persia 
(London: John Murray, 1854), 209. 
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ends.” Given such far-reaching implications, by the mid-1830s the autocracy recognized the need 
for a clear state policy toward the Armenian Church. 
The state answered this need with the Polozhenie of 1836. The royal fiat codified 
Armenians’ freedom of worship, granted their church control over education, and acknowledged 
the institutional autonomy of the Armenian Church.539 The decree also formalized the church’s 
existing practice of owning land for income, and freed Armenian clergy from taxes.540 The new 
regulations took into consideration the teachings and traditions of Armenian ecumenical culture, 
seeking to reconcile them with the demands of the well-ordered Rechtsstaat. Indeed, Tsar 
Nicholas directed his aides to ensure that the law was based on the Armenian Church’s “own 
ancient ordinances” while also being “brought into conformity with the legal provisions of the 
Russian empire.”541 In another sign of the autocracy’s acceptance of the Apostolic confession, in 
April 1836 Armenian religious doctrine and language courses were introduced for Armenian-
heritage students at the elite Cadet Corps in St. Petersburg.542   
While the 1836 statute placed restrictions on the Armenian faith, it formalized the ties 
between St. Petersburg and Echmiadzin, producing little resistance from Armenians. True, 
Echmiadzin became formally subordinated to the Russian emperor, despite receiving more 
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University Press, 1993), 40. 
540Razmik Panossian, The Armenians: From Kings and Priests to Merchants and Commissars (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 2006), 123. And also Suny, “Eastern Armenia under Tsarist Rule,” 
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Imperial Russia (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), 62. 
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autonomy than other national churches, such as the Georgian Orthodox Church.543 Although 
ostensibly the state dropped its “insistence” on the election of a tsarist-subject patriarch,544 the 
Polozhenie required Armenian clergy and laymen from Russia and abroad to elect two final 
candidates, among whom the tsar would choose the patriarch.545 Moreover, the curriculum of 
church schools required the approval of the Holy Synod and the Interior Ministry. Finally, a state 
representative observed the Echmiadzin Synod to ensure the church’s compliance with these 
regulations.546 Despite such restrictions, most tsarist-subject Armenians reacted positively to the 
new regulations, and, as Suny has observed, “Rather than creating antagonism between church 
and state, the Polozhenie established a working relationship and cooperation.”547        
For Armenians the Polozhenie surpassed the ad hoc policies of the previous decades, 
when the autocracy affirmed the importance of Armenians to its political aims by granting 
economic incentives and transplanting foreign-subject Armenians to Russia. By the mid-1830s, 
little doubt remained that Armenians held the key to Russia’s foreign policy vis-à-vis Turkey and 
Persia, and also to its internal tranquility in the Caucasus.548 This represented a two-way 
dynamic. While the tsarist state utilized Echmiadzin to advance its interests abroad, the 
Armenian Church relied on the imperial government to defend its domestic interests. For 	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546With full Russian support, the Echmiadzin Synod was established in 1837 as part of the 
contemporaneous church reforms. See National Archive of Armenia (NAA), f. 90, op. 1, d. 353, ll. 1-4.  
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the rights and obligations of its non-Orthodox confessions in the 1830s. See Werth, “Imperial Russia and 
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example, when in 1839 a renegade Orthodox monk, Ioann Malinovskii, published in Moscow a 
book, An Addendum to the Proof of the Antiquity of the Tri-finger Service (Dopolnenie k 
dokazatel’stvu drevnosti trekh-perstnogo sluzheniia), Hovannes not only petitioned the tsar 
directly,549 but also convinced Interior Minister Lev Perovskii that the book contained “unfair 
and offensive expressions against the Armenian-Gregorian confession.”550 The patriarch sought 
the state’s help in preventing the publication of “books or articles related to [the Armenian faith] 
without first consulting the supreme ecclesiastical leadership of this confession and receiving 
from it precise information.”551  
The Orthodox Church supported Echmiadzin’s efforts to protect its interests. Reviewing 
Hovannes’s request, the Holy Synod agreed that Malinovskii’s book contained “unfair 
information” about the Armenian faith and directed the office of church censorship (dukhovnaia 
tsenzura) to ensure that similar items would not be published, and that reprints of Malinovskii’s 
book would be censored.552 Additionally, in a curious development, the Holy Synod “saw with 
comfort” that Armenian doctrine aligned with Orthodox teachings in condemning the “heresies” 
of Aria, Macedonia, Nestorius, Eutyches, Severian, and the Monophysites. As a result, the Holy 
Synod requested from Echmiadzin a thorough explanation of Armenian dogma, promising to use 
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it to enforce stricter censorship of religious publications that, like Malinovskii’s monograph, 
misrepresented Armenian canon.553 Tsar Nicholas approved these initiatives.          
 This episode evinced the state’s imperative of supporting the integrity of its foreign 
faiths.554 As Werth maintains, imperial Russia’s “multiconfessional establishment” provided “a 
series of significant collective rights to recognized religious groups and rendered the foreign 
confessions state religions entitled to certain forms of government patronage and protection.”555 
To be sure, as one official tsarist document summarized, “the dogmas and rites of the Armenian 
Church must be inviolable in all their fullness and purity—without deviation and without 
change.”556 To protect the orthodoxy of the Armenian faith and educate state censors, the 
Armenian Church and Russian government cooperated to compile a “simple, direct, clear, and 
convenient” catechism of the Armenian doctrine in Russian.557 Even more importantly, this 
initiative sought to highlight the kinship of the Armenian and Orthodox confessions. The 
government report optimistically contended that “every well-meaning and enlightened” person, 
having read the Armenian catechism in Russian, will 
understand and be convinced that the goal of Christianity is one and the same in all 
Christian denominations, . . . that the main tenets of the faith are the same, but the small 
and even trivial difference is only in a few words, in outward forms and in private 
ceremonies. [And] that the foundational stone of the Armenian Church agrees with the 
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Greco-Russian Church, for the dogmas are based on reason and the power of Holy 
Scripture.558 
 
In a word, in the reign of Nicholas I, the tsarist state and the Armenian Church not only derived 
mutual political benefit, but also coordinated efforts to emphasize publicly the dogmatic ties 
between the two national churches.559 Although serious discord arose in the next decades, this 
symbiosis lasted until the last quarter of the nineteenth century. 
 The Russian government maintained the integrity of Armenian religious culture to derive 
political advantage. While the Polozhenie of 1836 subordinated Echmiadzin to St. Petersburg, it 
privileged the Armenian Church and, by extension, the Armenian nation, at a time when few 
other groups in the Caucasus or elsewhere received similar concessions. For example, tsarist 
officials not only ended the long tradition of Georgian peasants “volunteering” for bondage and 
prohibited the sale of serfs without land, but in 1836 also required Georgian serf owners to 
provide documentary evidence of serf ownership, without which the bondsmen could legally 
seek freedom.560 Interpreted by many Georgian elites as a Russian attack on their historical 
prerogatives, such restrictions pitted aristocratic Georgians against an “alien bureaucracy” and 
reminded them that they remained “the servant[s] of a new master.”561 While almost no 
Armenians owned serfs, as a nation they avoided similar constraints on their everyday life. 
Although Suny has insisted that the tsarist regime “failed to Russify Georgian society,”562 it 	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absorbed the Georgian Orthodox Church into its own Orthodox Church’s administration as early 
as 1811, and hardly anyone could imagine the government bestowing upon Georgians such 
privileges as it granted to Armenians with the Polozhenie of 1836. The political implications of 
the Armenian diaspora explain this difference.  
 The tenure of Patriarch Nerses (1843-57), who succeeded Hovannes, represented the 
complex relationship between the government and the Armenian Church. Upon the death of 
Hovannes, Perovskii and Neidgardt agreed on the importance of “reinforcing the domination of 
the Echmiadzin patriarchal throne over the entire Armenian Church and delivering our 
government the moral influence over all Armenians, [including] those outside the empire.”563 To 
this end, the autocracy dispatched a “special bureaucrat” to Echmiadzin, tasked with “giving the 
election such a direction, that the lot falls on a person worthy of Imperial approval, disposed 
toward Russia, and enjoying equal respect among foreign and Russian Armenians, even if the 
patriarch elected on these bases is not a Russian subject.”564  
No sources survive to illustrate the results of this mission, but, with or without tsarist 
interference, the 1843 election boded well for the autocracy. Unanimously elected by twenty-six 
tsarist and foreign-subject Armenian delegates in April 1843, Nerses finally received the tsar’s 
approval after thirteen years of exile as the archbishop of the Bessarabian-Nakhichevan 
diocese.565 In a sign of the tsar’s efforts to woo the Armenian diaspora, Nicholas sent ornate gifts 
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to the candidates who lost the election, including the archbishop of Jerusalem and some Persian 
and Ottoman Armenian representatives.566 This development reflected the importance assigned 
by the government to maintaining its position as the patron of foreign-subject Christians, 
particularly of Armenians in the Ottoman empire. The state sought not only to nurture ties with 
Echmiadzin, but also to develop rapport with Echmiadzin’s rivals abroad. The new Catholicos, 
meanwhile, both engaged with and resisted the tsarist government.  
Nerses accomplished much in meeting Russian expectations. He reestablished the 
submission of the Constantinople patriarch to Echmiadzin and normalized relations with the 
Ottoman government in 1844.567 Nerses also cooperated with Vorontsov to found a new 
“commercial school” in the South Caucasus and to send Armenian and other native students to 
elite institutions in the two capitals, including St. Petersburg University and the Lazarev Institute 
of Oriental Languages in Moscow.568 The viceroy supported the patriarch’s plans for a new 
seminary in Echmiadzin, insisting to the tsar that this project would yield advantages “in the 
political sense, for there is no doubt that Armenians from Constantinople, India, and other parts 
of the Orient will send their children to Echmiadzin for education.”569 Vorontsov extoled Nerses 
to the tsar in 1846, praising the prelate as “always ready and always able to help in everything 
useful.”570 Before his retirement, too, Vorontsov lionized Nerses as the local administration’s 
“powerful and always prepared weapon,” and assured his replacement at the head of the 
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Caucasus, Viceroy Bariatinskii, that “I have always found in him full readiness to assist us in 
everything that is useful, . . . soon you will fully confirm this.”571  
Yet Nerses also “vigorously resisted the constraints imposed by the [Polozhenie of 1836], 
which he regarded as being inconsistent with the dignity of his position and the prerogatives of 
his predecessors.”572 Specifically, Nerses undermined the authority of the Echmiadzin Synod, 
seeing it as a threat to his clout, and also delayed the appointment of new bishops to amplify his 
influence. Such actions aroused the resentment of other senior Armenian clergy, including the 
archbishop of the Bessarabian-Nakhichevan diocese, who complained to St. Petersburg about 
Nerses’s excesses. The Interior Ministry, while overall deferential to the prelate, conceded that 
“the unlimited despotism of Patriarch Nerses is manifest in all of his actions.”573      
Despite such impediments, state-church relations within the Russo-Armenian encounter 
developed amicably at mid-century. Indeed, at times the autocracy made legal exceptions for the 
Armenian Church. For example, in 1851 Nerses complained to Vorontsov that Catholic 
proselytizers in the South Caucasus were converting individual Apostolic Armenians into the 
Catholic faith.574 Nerses accused Catholic missionaries of targeting young and uneducated 
Armenians.575 Although these efforts bore limited fruit, they compelled Echmiadzin to seek the 
state’s assistance.576 Vorontsov conveyed to Interior Minister Perovskii the Armenian patriarch’s 	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request “that the Armenian-Gregorian clergy have complete freedom in returning its progeny to 
the core of their church.”577 Nerses not only asked for the authority to take these actions without 
the preliminary approval of tsarist officials, but also urged the government to expel Catholic 
Armenian priests from the Caucasus to Poland. Apparently in a concession, he allowed for the 
possibility of transferring Catholic Polish clergy to Russia proper and the Caucasus, including 
regions populated by Armenians.578 Nerses likely believed that Armenians would be less inclined 
to accept Catholicism from ethnic Polish, rather than Armenian, priests. In effect, this 
demonstrated Echmiadzin’s implicit assumption of the interplay between ethnic and religious 
identities among tsarist-subject Armenians. While Nerses probably realized that the sudden 
influx of Catholic Armenian clergy in Poland would cause myriad logistical problems, he 
acquiesced to accepting Catholic Polish priests among Armenian communities, evidently 
confident that Polish proselytizers would prove unsuccessful among his compatriots. 
Tsarist officials endorsed Echmiadzin’s efforts to “shield Gregorian Armenians from 
Catholicism.”579 Vorontsov lobbied Perovskii to make a legal exception in this case, allowing the 
Armenian Church to convert Catholic Armenians to the Apostolic confession without the 
onerous participation of imperial ministers. Although state law580 required the bureaucratic 
approval of all conversions between non-Orthodox Christians, Vorontsov sided with Nerses in 	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arguing that the Armenians presented a unique case. The interior minister concurred with the 
viceroy and the patriarch, concluding that “with respect to the Armenian Gregorian church, 
Armenian Catholics occupy an exceptional position, because they are merely the lost progeny of 
that ancient church.”581 The emperor approved these measures.582 
While the autocracy supported Echmiadzin’s reconversion of wayward Catholic 
Armenians, it maintained a tight grip on the Armenian Church’s missionary activity. In 1853, 
Patriarch Nerses petitioned for allowing local tsarist officials in the Caucasus, rather than the tsar 
and his ministers in St. Petersburg, to permit voluntary Muslim baptism in the Armenian rite.583 
The autocracy rejected this request, pointing out that between 1843 and 1852 just 109 Caucasian 
Muslims converted to the Armenian creed.584  
Likewise, the state had no tolerance for Orthodox apostasy. When in 1854 news reached 
St. Petersburg that “several” residents of Shemakhinskaia guberniia (in modern Azerbaijan) had 
converted from “Greco-Georgian” and, reports implied, Russian, Orthodoxy to the Apostolic 
Armenian confession, Tsar Nicholas took up the case.585 Although zealous local authorities had 
convicted the defectors of apostasy, the tsar and the Interior Ministry relented, instructing 
regional officials in the Caucasus to continue their attempts to return the individuals to 
Orthodoxy but avoid “constraining their personality” (ne stesniaia ikh lichnosti).586 This episode 	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confirmed that the tsarist government protected the integrity of its predominant Orthodox 
confession against the encroachment of otherwise favored foreign faiths.  
To be sure, the state and the Orthodox Church did not always cooperate with the 
Armenian Church. In 1857, the Orthodox leadership foiled Echmiadzin’s attempts to expand its 
foothold in Moscow.587 The dispute traced to the fundraising of the city’s Armenian community, 
which collected money for the construction of a monastery on the grounds belonging to an 
Armenian cemetery. The Armenians of Moscow enlisted the support of Patriarch Nerses, who 
corresponded with state officials to secure the necessary approval for the new monastery. But 
Moscow Metropolitan Filaret opposed this initiative, alerting the Holy Synod to the Armenian 
plans and vociferously objecting to the perceived encroachment on his jurisdiction. He argued 
that the city’s Armenian population was too small to justify a new monastery, and maintained 
that the approval of the project would “make an unfavorable impression upon the Orthodox 
people of Moscow,” who “from ancient times have been especially strongly marked by the 
character of the dominant confession in Russia, and in the interests of general wellbeing [the 
Orthodox community of Moscow] demands the protection of its character now and in the 
future.”588 Even more worrisome to Filaret was the likelihood that the Roman Catholic Church, 
emboldened by the Armenian example, would establish monasteries in Moscow and thus 
threaten not only the Orthodox hold on Moscow but also entire Orthodox Russia.   
Thus the Armenian Church in the second quarter of the nineteenth century operated 
within a conditional framework. On the one hand, it enjoyed the exclusive right to convert non-
Orthodox Christians into the Armenian faith and benefitted from the government’s distrust of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
587RGIA, f. 821, op. 7, d. 39, ll. 1-5.  
588RGIA, f. 821, op. 7, d. 39, l. 4.  
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Catholic and Protestant proselytizing. On the other hand, the church had to observe its Orthodox 
counterpart’s prerogatives, maintaining a delicate balance between promoting its interests and 
avoiding antagonizing the venerable Russian institution.  
The complexity of the relationship between the Armenian Church and the tsarist state lay 
in the fact that not just domestic interests were at stake. Unique in that it exercised real influence 
over coreligionist communities in Persia, Turkey, Europe, India, and beyond, the Armenian 
Church at Echmiadzin brought the government of Nicholas I diverse geopolitical advantages. At 
the same time that officials in St. Petersburg relied on the Echmiadzin Catholicos to reestablish 
diplomatic ties with Constantinople, tsarist diplomats worked to secure foreign Armenian 
prelates’ submission to Echmiadzin. That is why the state kept no more than a loose hold on the 
Armenian clergy and laity. Yet this policy clashed with inherent Russian interests whenever the 
advances of the Armenian confession posed real or imagined threats to the Orthodox faith.  
Overall, any leeway the autocracy granted to its non-Orthodox subjects in hopes of 
structuring and regulating their existence, the state also extended to Armenian external activities. 
As Robert Crews has argued, “Confessional communities that subjected the followers to divine 
as well as monarchical judgment provided useful forms of social discipline to complement the 
will of the sovereign.”589 Elsewhere, Crews has shown that the empire coopted Muslim 
community leaders into its bureaucratic and cultural fabric in an effort to attain stability on its 
imperial periphery.590 If, however, the government employed religious toleration as a system of 
control over non-Russians, in the Armenian case the state sought more than docile subjects. The 	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Russia,” in The American Historical Review 108, no. 1 (February 2003): 59.  
590Robert Crews, For Prophet and Tsar: Islam and Empire in Russia and Central Asia (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 2009). 
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opportunity to project diplomatic influence into the capitals of Eastern empires through 
Armenian clerics outweighed the dangers of Armenian proselytizing or encroachment upon 
traditional Orthodox spheres of influence. Thus the encounter between the tsarist state and the 
Armenian Church in the second quarter of the nineteenth century represented a careful 
calculation on each side. The codification of Armenian rights and obligations with the 
Polozhenie of 1836 evinced Ann Stoler’s “active realignment and reformation” that was driven 
by geopolitical realities beyond tsarist frontiers.  
For the Armenian ecclesiastical leadership, especially Catholicos Nerses, the vision of an 
independent Armenia—articulated more clearly in the second half of the nineteenth century—
quickly yielded to a desire to secure the submission of the diaspora to Echmiadzin. 
Consequently, Nerses styled himself pope, not president. Unlike some of his quixotic lay 
compatriots, Nerses understood after his exile to Kishinev that the Russian government would 
tolerate no irredentist claims. Thus an aim of theological and, by extension, cultural and 
economic authority over distant Armenian communities drove the policies of the Catholicos, for 
which even his tsarist overlords faulted him. The ecumenical factor is imperative to 
understanding the evolution of Russo-Armenian ties under Nicholas I, but the economic 
dimension of that imperial encounter played an equally potent role.  
Economic Encounters  
 Armenians’ economic roles defined their rights and obligations within Russian society no 
less than ecumenical considerations. To examine Armenians’ economic and social position in 
Russia, I turn to the state’s taxation and other fiscal policies toward large Armenian communities 
in the Caucasus, in Crimea, and in Astrakhan province. The three distinct examples yield a more 
comprehensive understanding of the Russo-Armenian economic relationship under Tsar 
Nicholas I. The autocracy struggled to integrate Armenians economically into the country, 
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issuing contradictory statutes and demonstrating uncertainty about the social role of various 
Armenian communities. Indeed, no other Armenian-related matter elicited as much policy 
dissent among senior tsarist statesmen during Nicholas’s reign. Disagreements flared between 
both senior and provincial tsarist officials over the socioeconomic role, and its political 
implications, of Russia’s Armenian population. 
The disputes among government officials regarding economic policy toward the 
Caucasus reflected the state’s unease about the integration of that region into the Russian empire. 
As historian Ekaterina Pravilova tells us, St. Petersburg sought, but eventually failed, to fuse its 
imperial territories into a cohesive budgetary framework.591 Despite the vast cultural, political, 
and financial disparities between the various peripheries, including the Caucasus, Turkestan, 
Poland, and Finland, the government pursued a unifying economic strategy for much of the 
nineteenth century. Yet the tenure of Finance Minister Egor Kankrin (1823-44) represented an 
important deviation from this policy.      
In 1827 Kankrin became the first senior Russian official to articulate an economic policy 
of “colonialism” toward the South Caucasus.592 He insisted that “the government should not 
think about uniting [the South Caucasus] with the general state structure and should not hope to 
make it a part of Russia or of the Russian people [Rossiiskii narod] in the moral sense.”593 
Nudged by the influential finance minister, St. Petersburg began to view the region as a market 
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for Russian products and a source of revenue, discouraging the development of local 
manufacturing. Kankrin decried efforts to integrate the South Caucasus into the broader Russian 
economic system, promoting it instead as an “Asiatic province” that could be exploited for 
Russia’s economic benefit. By the early 1830s, Kankrin and Rozen openly argued about the 
financial independence of the South Caucasus. In 1832, under Kankrin’s pressure and responding 
to reports of local corruption and mismanagement, the Council of Ministers ordered that the 
Finance Ministry assume tighter control over the economy of the South Caucasus. Although 
Rozen succeeded in delaying the implementation of the new regulations by two years, soon the 
region was required to send all of its revenue to St. Petersburg, which would then distribute it 
back to the administration in Tiflis.594 Additional reforms in 1840 brought the territory under the 
Finance Ministry’s total control. Even after the establishment of the Caucasus viceroyalty in 
1845 and Vorontsov’s receipt of carte blanche powers, the economy and revenues of the South 
Caucasus remained in the hands of the Finance Ministry in St. Petersburg.595 
The Armenian community of Astrakhan offers a valuable example of the evolution of 
Russian economic policies toward Armenians. Astrakhan represented a strategically important 
and relatively large commercial center in southern Russia, and its Armenians, mostly immigrants 
from Persia, settled there well before the empire’s annexation of the Caucasus. The community 
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thrived, establishing its own academy in 1810 and newspaper in 1815.596 By the 1880s, more 
than 6,000 Armenians lived among the city’s 73,000 residents.  
 The experience of Astrakhan Armenians in the mid-1830s demonstrates that as late as 
that decade the autocracy had reason to maintain the exclusive economic privileges of long-
settled Armenian subjects.597 In October 1833, the State Council ruled that all Armenian 
merchants in southern Russian provinces must abide by the general tax regulations governing the 
activities of all tsarist-subject traders.598 Finance Minister Egor Kankrin, long opposed to the 
state’s privileged treatment of Armenians, informed provincial governors that local Armenian 
businessmen were henceforth required to enlist in merchant guilds and pay corresponding taxes, 
for Tsar Nicholas had concurred with the State Council’s proclamation that it was “inappropriate 
to provide advantages to Armenians over Russians.”599 
 This resolution proved as temporary as incomplete. In early 1835, some Armenian 
merchants from Astrakhan complained to the provincial governor that, in violation of the 
prerogatives they had enjoyed since 1799, the Astrakhan city authorities charged them new “city 
and local taxes” (gorodskie i zemskie povinnosti) of 40 rubles per person.600 This substantial 
amount was levied in addition to the standard urban tax of 2.76 rubles per person that all of the 	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city’s Armenian residents paid, irrespective of their vocation.601 Moreover, local Armenian 
merchants continued to pay between 25 and 100 rubles for each trade license. Consequently, in 
the first half of the 1830s, some Astrakhan Armenian businessmen paid as much as 142.76 rubles 
per year to the city government.  
 The provincial administration, Astrakhanskoe gubernskoe pravlenie, sided with the city’s 
Armenian merchants.602 It agreed that according to the relevant royal fiats of 1799 and 1825, 
Astrakhan Armenians were liable only for urban and merchant taxes, which they had been 
paying dutifully. The additional urban tax of 40 rubles was deemed unjustified because “it would 
not only involve the violations of the rights granted to them by the government, but also heavy 
burdens for them.”603 The provincial administration thus prohibited city officials from collecting 
the new gorodskie i zemskie povinnosti of 40 rubles. The fact that these taxes benefited only the 
city government and not the provincial administration cannot be overlooked.  
When city authorities in Astrakhan appealed the decision of the provincial administration 
to the imperial capital, the Finance Ministry, the Interior Ministry, and the Senate examined the 
matter.604 The review determined that, when emperors Catherine and Paul settled Armenians in 
Astrakhan in the eighteenth century, they had received temporary, not hereditary, economic 
privileges. In 1824 and 1825, the city’s untaxed Armenian traders were assessed new dues, but 
these taxes remained below standard rates. In early 1836, imperial authorities ruled that the 
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Astrakhan city government had the right to charge one-quarter percent from the city’s Armenian 
and non-Armenian merchants, in addition to the regular urban taxes paid by all residents, but it 
could not assess any additional taxes from local Armenian businessmen.605 Essentially, this 
episode demonstrated the complex economic considerations informing the Russian 
bureaucracy’s encounter with Armenians. By the mid-1830s, in Astrakhan and elsewhere, there 
arose a dissonance of policies between the local authorities and their provincial and imperial 
superiors. While local agents often opposed the economic advantages enjoyed by Armenians, the 
imperial government maintained their privileged economic conditions.  
Perhaps spurred by this debate, in May 1836 Tsar Nicholas I issued a decree that sought 
the “equalization of dues” (uravnenie podatei) paid by Armenians and non-Armenians in 
southern Russia.606 The fiat affected tsarist-subject Armenians not only in Astrakhan, but also the 
large Armenian communities of Crimea, including the Khersonskaia, Tavricheskaia, and 
Ekaterinoslavskaia gubernii.607 The new regulations required the “end of all hitherto collected 
from Armenians diverse individual, household [s dvorov], and land taxes,” replacing them with 
standardized rates applicable to all tsarist subjects.608 New, transitional tax rates applied to 
previously exempt communities: “Armenian burghers [Armian-meshchan], regardless of their 
[current] obligations for city and local taxes, are to be assessed a special collection for the 
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treasury.”609 Within ten years, though, these “special” rates would be phased out to match the 
dues of their Russian and other non-Armenian neighbors. The regulations also affected 
“Armenian settlers,” although it is unclear whether this applied to recent or long-established 
immigrants. While there were some important rate adjustments, the key change consisted in that 
poll taxes (s dush) were introduced, abandoning those assessed from households (s dvorov).610 
Some provincial authorities misapplied the 1836 regulations to the Armenians in their 
jurisdiction. The officials in Ekaterinoslavskaia guberniia, for example, assessed Armenian 
merchants and “settlers” taxes in excess of the prescribed rates.611 No sources survive to clarify 
the motivation of such local bureaucrats, but despite local Armenians’ complaints to the Finance 
Ministry, St. Petersburg took no action to rectify the situation. Yet the central government not 
always ignored the concerns of local Armenian communities, paying more attention to 
complaints originating in strategically or economically important regions. For instance, two 
Armenian communities in Crimea objected to the 1836 regulations, arguing that emperors 
Catherine and Paul had bestowed on them “eternal” exemptions.612 Mikhail Vorontsov, the 
governor of Novorossiia and Bessarabia (soon to become Caucasus viceroy), agreed with the 
Armenians in his province. With them also sided Interior Minister Dmitrii Bludov, but they faced 
the opposition of Finance Minister Kankrin.613 The State Council ruled that “no privileges can be 	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eternal,” and, apparently unaware of the discrepancies in Ekaterinoslavskaia guberniia and 
elsewhere, cited the edict of May 1836 in concluding that “the government’s intention to bring 
all Armenians under the same regulation is obvious.”614 
Part of the explanation for the dissonance among state and provincial officials about the 
Armenians’ tax obligations lay in the fact that Nicholas’s decrees were aimed at groups 
“excluded from the privileges of 1799.” Despite the State Council’s repeated declarations that 
“no privileges can be eternal,” Tsar Nicholas I implicitly reaffirmed his predecessors’ edicts 
from the late eighteenth century by ordering his bureaucracy to “levy taxes not on all Armenians 
living in Russia, but those who are excluded from the privileges of 1799.”615 This stipulation 
resulted in Russian and Armenian disagreements about which communities were and were not 
affected by the new laws. In a word, the tax reforms of the 1830s sought de jure fiscal 
standardization but yielded de facto irregularities. To be sure, under Nicholas, Armenian tax 
rates varied from Crimea to Astrakhan to the Caucasus.  
Aggrieved Armenians alerted the autocrat to this fact during his 1837 tour of the 
Caucasus. Representatives of the Nakhichevan Armenian community petitioned the tsar to 
remain under the prerogatives issued in 1779.616 While evidence suggests that Rozen, Vorontsov, 
and even Police Chief Benkendorf were sympathetic to the Armenian requests, again the most 
acute resistance came from Finance Minister Kankrin. He found the matter “entirely 
disrespectful and even inappropriate,” pointing out that Nakhichevan Armenians desired 
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exemptions “while native Russian subjects pay substantially higher tax quantities.”617 For much 
of the Nicholaevan era, Vorontsov and Kankrin voiced directly opposing views regarding the 
economic responsibilities and rights of tsarist-subject Armenians.618  
At the heart of the debate were conflicting notions of imperial goals and ethnonational 
integration. While Kankrin sought to enrich St. Petersburg’s coffers through “colonial” economic 
policies in the South Caucasus and held pejorative views of that region’s natives, Vorontsov 
resisted such methods and worked to promote Armenian and Georgian social mobility within 
Russian society. The finance minister needed Armenians to produce raw materials and wealth 
that would flow into central Russia, rebuking their supporters for seeking the “merger,” 
“integration,” and “cooperation” between those Aziatsy and ethnic Russians. In the Caucasus 
Kankrin pursued glory for the metropolis, not the growth of local culture and social integration. 
In contrast, as Robert Geraci has stressed, Vorontsov viewed Armenians as “necessary and 
desirable partners who could help the region flourish.”619 Yet despite these divergent tactics, 
both men sought to capitalize upon the empire’s non-Russian diversity. Vorontsov envisioned 
non-Russians contributing to the growth and vitality of Russia not through taxation and curtailed 
economic activity within a marginalized Caucasus, as did Kankrin, but rather by integrating into 
Russian social, cultural, and political life, which is why he dispatched Caucasian youths to 
universities in the two capitals and brought Russian cultural symbols to Tiflis.     
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When the debate over Armenian tax obligations reached the Senate in the spring of 1839, 
it sided with the Armenians and their tsarist allies, mainly Vorontsov and former Interior 
Minister Bludov, but it focused upon only some of the empire’s Armenian communities. The 
Senate recommended that the Armenians of Karasubazar and Staryi Krym, both in Crimea, as 
well as Grigoriopol in modern Moldova and Nakhichevan-on-Don, remain under their former 
privileges and be excused from the tsar’s 1836 regulations.620 In particular, these communities 
were to continue paying household, not individual, taxes. Kankrin refused to sign the proposal, 
insisting that the Senate’s decision countermanded the State Council’s emphasis on the 
impossibility of “eternal” economic prerogatives. Instead, the finance minister proposed leaving 
under privileges only those Armenians who had resided in the aforementioned cities at the time 
of the issuance of the original decrees, without extending those economic advantages to their 
descendants.621 The senators remained unconvinced by Kankrin’s counter-proposal.622  
The opposing camps soon compromised. In 1840, the autocracy granted a ten-year 
exemption from the 1836 law to the Armenians of Karasubazar, Staryi Krym, Grigoriopol, and 
Nakhichevan-on-Don.623 However, in a puzzling decision, the State Council ruled that the 
regime “should not mix [smeshivat’] Armenians in those regions that Russia conquered by force 
with those who came to us in response to the invitation of the government.”624 Evidently, the 
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Armenian community of Astrakhan fell into the former category, leaving them under the effects 
of the 1836 reforms and, effectively, creating yet another legal exception.  
Astrakhan Armenians protested, entreating the government to extend the same fiscal laws 
to them as to the Armenians of Crimea.625 In particular, Astrakhan Armenians argued that they 
too had voluntarily answered the state’s call for foreign settlers in the eighteenth century, 
colonizing Astrakhan and the northern coast of the Caspian Sea at the behest of the Russian 
empire. Notably, this Armenian community sought “eternal” tax prerogatives, rather than the 
ten-year exemptions granted to the Armenians in Crimea, Grigoriopol, and Nakhichevan-on-
Don. It also wished to continue paying taxes assessed on households rather than on individuals. 
The community cited its contributions to the regional economic development, mainly 
commercial agriculture and trade, to support its argument. The military governor of Astrakhan 
province agreed that the Armenians in his jurisdiction “are in the same circumstances and have 
the same rights” as their compatriots in other Russian provinces.626 The finance and interior 
ministries, however, rejected Astrakhan Armenians’ petition, finding that just 390 individuals, 
among that city’s nearly 2,600 Armenians, were eligible for the 1799 exemptions, and stressing 
that the extended privileges of non-Astrakhan Armenians were scheduled to expire by 1847.627 
Upon review, the Senate partially sided with Astrakhan Armenians. It concluded that they 
were correct in arguing that they had settled in that city voluntarily in the eighteenth century, at 
which point the government had promised them taxation based on households rather than 
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individuals.628 Consequently, the Senate affirmed the State Council’s recommendation to charge 
nineteenth-century Armenian immigrants in Astrakhan just two rubles per household, and those 
who had arrived in the eighteenth century were to be assessed even lesser rates. The Interior 
Ministry endorsed this decision, but Kankrin’s Finance Ministry refused to follow suit, arguing 
that insufficient evidence proved that Astrakhan Armenians had voluntarily arrived in the region 
at the invitation of the tsarist state.629  
Justice Minister Count Viktor Panin (1841-62), a longstanding member of Nicholas’s 
inner circle,630 reexamined the issue in the spring of 1848, concluding that “the difference 
between the decrees granted to the Armenians of Astrakhan and the other four cities further 
affirms the fairness of extending to the former the power of the royally approved State Council’s 
decision of 25 November 1840.”631 The justice minister insisted that “in all fairness, this right 
must now be accorded to the descendants of Astrakhan Armenians, [who were] awarded by a 
decree the complete freedom from taxes and who did not [benefit] from the 1840 [extension] 
only because they had not applied for it.”632 In a word, Panin backed Astrakhan Armenians and 
joined Vorontsov, Bludov, and the governor of Astrakhan against Kankrin. Among influential 
state institutions and actors, only the Department of the State Economy supported the finance 
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630For Panin’s political biography, see Richard Wortman, The Development of a Russian Legal 
Consciousness (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2010), 167-92. 
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minister’s views, concluding that it was “convinced neither of the basis nor the desirability of 
extending to Astrakhan Armenians the 1840 decision of the State Council.”633 
The Senate resolved the matter soon after Panin’s input. Astrakhan Armenians who had 
settled in the city before 1799, and their direct descendants, were “not brought into the general 
taxation system,” and assessed instead a flat household tax of two silver rubles per year, in 
addition to the standard city and local taxes paid by all locals.634 It appears that this regulation 
affected no more than 400 individuals. The city’s other Armenians, who had arrived after 1799, 
were to be charged the same tax rates as all other local residents, depending on their respective 
estates and guilds. The tsar soon approved this decision, bringing to an end one of the more 
divisive issues to affect the Russian political elite in the first half of the nineteenth century. 
This episode tells us much about contemporaneous nationalities policy and the role of 
Armenians in it. First, the state sought but failed to achieve a uniform economic approach toward 
the Armenian communities under its dominion, reluctantly recognizing the need for distinct 
policies that were dictated by historical precedents as much as regional realities. Second, senior 
tsarist statesmen conceived of Armenian rights and responsibilities in starkly different ways, 
undercutting the notion of political solidarity within Nicholas’s ruling circle. Third, this case 
demonstrates the empire’s difficult navigation of the process of ethnonational absorption. While 
some officials insisted that Armenians had received sufficient privileges to become rooted in 
their new homeland, other statesmen argued that continued prerogatives benefited the Russian 
state and their continuation yielded “justice” and “fairness.” 
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Overall, this protracted episode helped the autocracy to settle on a new understanding, if 
not an imperial strategy, of nationalities policy. As the State Council stressed in its ruling of 
1848, “privileges, at times given to foreigners settling in Russia, are necessarily reasoned with 
the needs and circumstances of the localities where they settle, which is why such benefits 
cannot and must not be the same for everyone.”635 Despite the government’s efforts to 
standardize the collection of taxes in accord with its pursuit of an efficiently managed empire, 
the state’s economic encounter with such non-Russian subjects as Armenians showed that no 
blanket policies proved practical or feasible. The final resolution of this episode, when the state 
reluctantly granted permanent exemptions to some but not all Armenian communities, clearly 
affirmed this reality. This circumstance echoes Pravilova’s argument that individual region’s 
political circumstances, rather than a pan-imperial economic program, drove the implementation 
of fiscal and financial policies on the empire’s peripheries.636    
This climate facilitated the seemingly contradictory status of Armenians in the Caucasus, 
where the tsarist state at once celebrated and obstructed their socioeconomic advancement. The 
reports of generals Rozen and Neidgardt, two of Nicholas’s commanders in the Caucasus, evince 
this Russian paradox. On the one hand, in 1834, Rozen resisted the attempts of three Armenian 
villages in the Caucasus to reclassify their estate categorization for economic purposes, arguing 
that the communities’ financial circumstances did not justify tax breaks.637 On the other hand, in 
1836, Rozen opposed the state’s plans to introduce new tariffs and other trade restrictions in the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
635RGIA, f. 1152, op. 3, d. 31, ll. 50ob-51. 
636Pravilova, Finansy imperii, 369.  
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region, arguing that such constraints harmed the “welfare of the Transcaucasus.”638 Fearing that 
new economic restrictions would drive local Armenians to seek their profits abroad, Rozen 
maintained that Armenians “live by the trade industry, and their very loyalty to Russia is based 
upon it. What can be expected if, because of the limitation of their trade deals, . . . they turn to 
resettlement in Turkey?”639 The consequences of such a scenario, warned Rozen, would 
transcend the regional interests of the Caucasus economy and affect the empire’s foreign affairs: 
“In that case, not only will the region become impoverished, [but] one cannot fail to foresee the 
harmful consequences in the political sense, and we will certainly lose the influence we have 
acquired over Armenians in Persia and Turkey, which is always needed and beneficial for us, 
especially in times of war with those powers.”640  
Several years later, Neidgardt both lauded and cautioned against the social and economic 
progress made by the Armenians of the South Caucasus.641 In a report to the tsar in July 1843, 
Neidgardt praised local Armenians for setting a “good example” for their Georgian neighbors, 
whom he accused of lethargy.642 The general emphasized that “the nature of the Armenian upper 
and middle classes has nothing in common with the nature of the Georgian nobility and 
merchantry.” But his praise also contained a warning: “They [Armenians] are more educated, 
care for the education of children, even making donations, but all of their intellectual abilities, 
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 211 
all their activity, is directed at [financial] acquisition.”643 Because, according to Neidgardt, 
Armenians “hold the trade in their hands,” they had marginalized Georgians and other natives in 
the region’s commerce. Among the prominent businessmen of Tiflis, “just one . . . notable 
Georgian trader” could be found.644 The city’s Armenian merchants “little by little ousted from 
trade all other nationalities and to eliminate all competition they support each other through 
guarantees and money.”645 To rectify this situation, which produced “disadvantages for the 
region as well as for the government,” Neidgardt proposed recruiting “merchants and capital 
from Russia” to Tiflis646 He was confident that “Russian capital would enter into . . . competition 
with Armenians that is beneficial to the government, and would reduce the presently very strong 
importance of Armenians in all affairs and enterprises.”647 Neidgardt’s proposal echoed the 
argument made a decade earlier by Russian economist P. Vysheslavtsov, who insisted in 1834 
that “Asiatic” enterprise had left the South Caucasus’s economy in a primitive state and urged 
Russian merchants to replace their Armenian counterparts.648 Although Neidgardt’s leadership of 
the Caucasus administration did not last long enough to enact these plans, his views showed the 
tsarist government’s simultaneous appreciation and apprehension about the economic, social, and 
political implications of ostensibly exclusive Armenian advancement in Tiflis and beyond.      	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
643RGIA, f. 1268, op. 1, d. 509, l. 13ob. Emphasis mine. Neidgardt also supported the founding of private 
Armenian schools in the Caucasus. See RGIA, f. 1268, op. 1, d. 623, ll. 1-8ob.  
644RGIA, f. 1268, op. 1, d. 509, l. 13ob. 
645RGIA, f. 1268, op. 1, d. 509, ll. 13ob-14. 
646RGIA, f. 1268, op. 1, d. 509, l. 14. 
647RGIA, f. 1268, op. 1, d. 509, l. 14. 
648P. Vysheslavtsov, “Vzgliad na Zakavkaz’e v khoziaistvennom i torgovom otnoshenii ego k Rossii,” in 
Syn otechestva 66 (1834): 39. 
 212 
Despite such concerns, at mid-century the Russian political establishment conceived of 
middle-class urban Armenians, in the Caucasus and Russia proper, in laudatory terms. While 
Kankrin’s orientalist wariness about Armenian entrepreneurship never faded from the Russian 
political imagination,649 within two decades of the empire’s annexation of the South Caucasus 
tsarist officialdom recognized the broadly beneficial effects of local Armenian commerce. In 
1846, the inaugural volume of the annual Caucasus Calendar, published by the viceroy’s 
administration under the auspices of the imperial military establishment, emphasized the distinct 
socioeconomic role of local Armenians.650 The publication contrasted them against their main 
Christian neighbors in the Caucasus, Georgians, who “are generally carefree [and] fun but no 
strangers to hard work,” although “their only occupation is agriculture.”651  
In contrast to Georgians, “Armenians undeniably occupy a very important place among 
the residents of the Transcaucasus, according to their abilities, enterprise, and pursuit of 
education. They have always been considered the most active toilers of the Orient [vsegda 
shchitalis’ deiatel’neishimi truzhenikami vostoka].”652 While Armenian peasants in the rural 
Caucasus hardly distinguished themselves from their non-Armenian neighbors, urban Armenians 
attained a standing where “there is no craft, no trade, in which they do not engage.” The 
Caucasus Calendar insisted that, thanks in part to Russia’s rescue of Armenians from their 	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“enslavement” at the hands of their former Muslim overlords and to the “beneficial fruits of 
Russian rule,” by mid-century Armenians had come to excel in the region’s social and economic 
life. “Highly gifted with the spirit of entrepreneurship and an aptitude for commerce, 
[Armenians] from time immemorial exclusively control the trade not only in Georgia, but also in 
almost all other Transcaucasian provinces. On their own they have established trade routes to 
Russia, which only through them traffics its goods to Georgia.”653 The publication particularly 
commended Armenians for securing the region’s trade with such European commercial centers 
as Leipzig, Hamburg, Trieste, and Marseille.  
The Russo-Armenian economic encounter during the reign of Nicholas I demonstrated 
the government’s complex encounters with non-Russian groups. While the state welcomed the 
broader impact of urban Armenians’ commercial success in Tiflis and elsewhere, it feared the 
social and, by extension, political implications of growing Armenians prosperity. Moreover, 
officials’ engagement with Armenians affected the empire’s perceptions of other subject nations, 
such as Georgians. In the Caucasus, tsarist officials applauded the broader benefits of Armenian 
business while hoping that the Armenian example would inspire their Georgian and other 
regional neighbors. Yet several administrators, such as Rozen and Neidgardt, implicitly 
promoted the Russian view of Armenian traders as motivated by individual and community 
interests that ostensibly seldom stretched to include non-Armenian elements. When in the 1830s 
and 1840s plans to attract Russian entrepreneurs to the South Caucasus were proposed, the 
underlying assumption was that ethnic Russian merchants, unlike their Armenian counterparts, 
engaged in morally acceptable practices that benefitted the common good. 
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Conclusion 
The autocracy under Tsar Nicholas I struggled to reconcile the demands of a well-
regulated empire with the circumstances of such imperial minorities as Armenians. The state 
wished to capitalize upon the Armenian Church’s authority in the diaspora to project influence 
beyond its borders, but took steps toward standardizing the economic life of its Armenian 
subjects, abandoning these efforts when competing visions of nationalities policy and 
ethnonational integration of non-Russians permeated the official discourse. In these endeavors, 
St. Petersburg sought streamlined policies to achieve “uniformity and simplicity of legal 
relationships and categories,”654 rather than social or political equality among its subjects.  
When, in 1838-40, the autocracy integrated the independent Armenian courts of 
Astrakhan, Kizliar, and Mozdok into the imperial judicial system,655 Nicholas professed a desire 
to see those Armenian communities “use the court and justice [system] on equal footing with 
Our native and all other subjects.”656 In practice, however, the empire’s ethnonational, cultural, 
and economic diversity made such goals impossible, as the autocracy’s return to previously 
abolished policies shows. For an emperor who, according to Richard Wortman, “viewed the 
improvement of the governmental system as his own personal concern,” the driving philosophy 
was not egalitarianism but efficiency.657 As a result, the Russian state essentialized its Armenian 
subjects as Christian allies and able traders. The disagreements of senior statesmen, such as 
Kankrin and Vorontsov, suggest that the government struggled to grasp the various 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
654Raeff, Michael Speransky, 337. 
655RGIA, f. 1268, op. 7, d. 485, ll. 1-91. 
656RGIA, f. 1268, op. 7, d. 485, l. 85. 
657Wortman, Scenarios of Power, 133. 
 215 
manifestations of “Armenian” identity. Classifying minorities—whether “diligent” Armenians, 
“lethargic” Georgians, or “dangerous” Muslim highlanders—gave the state an opportunity to 
mobilize them, or against them, to achieve its ultimate aims of vitality and stability. St. 
Petersburg consciously asserted these non-Russian groups’ inequality by essentializing them, 
maintaining the dominance of the Great Russian nation among the polyethnic empire’s 
population. Yet, under Nicholas’s distinctly personal approach to politics, the state equated 
juridical and fiscal standardization with modern governance at a time when the majority of ethnic 
Russians remained in bondage. Thus a patchwork of similarly inconsistent regulations 
characterized Nicholas’s nationalities policy. The tsar dreamed of reestablishing the political 
order of his empress grandmother’s world, one that rarely faced the challenges of post-1789 
republican aspirations and national agitations.  
But in the second quarter of the nineteenth century the Armenian diaspora, within and 
beyond the Romanov realm, sought security and prosperity, not a national state. Catholicos 
Nerses, politically the most influential Armenian in that era, yearned to become the pope of the 
diaspora, not the president of an Armenian republic. Before the rise of a concerted Armenian 
nationalist movement in the last decades of the century, Armenia’s diaspora looked to the 
Russian throne for the protection and recognition of its religious and cultural identities. To this 
end, it chose to cooperate with the tsarist government, albeit with periodic symptoms of discord. 
Few Armenians in Russia, especially among the nonelites, pursued social or administrative 
“equality” with other groups, including Russians, because they enjoyed special economic 
privileges. Ordinary Armenians in the Caucasus and Russia prioritized personal and community 
stability and growth, seeing few incentives for political agitation against their imperial overlord.  
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To be sure, in the first half of the nineteenth century a multitude of considerations 
informed the tsarist state’s encounter with Armenians. In his cogent overview of the evolution of 
Russian perceptions of Tiflis Armenian merchants in that era, Robert Geraci highlighted 
officialdom’s negative stereotyping of Armenian business practices and its desire for a greater 
Russian role in the Tiflis trade. But Geraci found it “somewhat odd” that Viceroy Vorontsov 
sided with Armenian businessmen against Russian industrialists in 1850, seeking the explanation 
for this development in the inconsistent behavior of the Muscovite merchants.658 However, as 
this chapter has demonstrated, Vorontsov and other senior tsarist statesmen weighed both 
economic and political factors in their interactions with Armenians. In that light, the viceroy’s 
decision to support Armenians in their dispute with ethnic Russian businessmen becomes less 
puzzling, because Vorontsov sought to benefit from the Armenian diaspora’s political 
connections as much as its economic networks. In that context, he chose to maintain constructive 
relations with Armenians even at the cost of ignoring the interests of ethnic Russian elements. In 
a word, imperial agents recognized and wished to capitalize upon not only Armenians’ real or 
exaggerated economic acumen, but also upon the political implications of the Armenian 
Church’s authority in the diaspora. As the next chapter shows, Nicholas’s successor, Alexander 
II, deployed the Armenian diaspora as Russia’s answer to Europe’s Eastern Question.  
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CHAPTER 4: RUSSIA’S RESPONSE TO THE EASTERN QUESTION AND THE 
ARMENIAN DIASPORA, 1855-1881 
“The Armenians, no matter in which country they live, always see in Russia a defender of 
their church and nationality—circumstances that have quite an important significance for our 
politics in the Orient.” 
  -Interior Minister Petr Valuev, 1861 
 
“The Eastern Question is not only a Russian question; it concerns the tranquility of 
Europe, of the world, and common prosperity, mankind, and Christian civilization.” 
                                                        -Foreign Minister and Chancellor Aleksandr Gorchakov, 1876  
 
Russia’s encounter with Armenians in the reign of Alexander II (1855-81) cannot be 
divorced from the implications of the Armenian diaspora’s transimperial existence and the 
broader challenges of the Eastern Question. Armenians were key to tsarist foreign policy in the 
East and to the Eastern Question in particular. In trying to balance its influence over Armenians 
outside Russia with maintaining control over Armenians within the empire, St. Petersburg often 
produced contradictory initiatives. Because Russia ruled over only a portion of the Armenian 
diaspora, another part of which resided in the Ottoman empire, it had to contend with a unique 
set of political circumstances. Recognizing that Armenians combined foreign with domestic 
advantages and liabilities for the Russian government, the state maneuvered to maintain its 
prominence in their lives.  
Armenians stood at the heart of the Russian response to the Eastern Question. St. 
Petersburg aspired to be recognized as the political benefactor and economic patron of the 
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Armenian diaspora, seeking to reorient all Armenians toward Russia’s orbit. Eager to capitalize 
on the deep social networks of Western Armenians within the sultan’s domain and cognizant of 
their discontent, tsarist officials relied on the Armenian nation and church to advance their 
foreign policy in the East. During the Russo-Ottoman War of 1877-78, Russia continued to 
promote itself as the defender of minority Christians in Turkey and resettled thousands of 
Ottoman Armenians into tsarist domains. Reflecting social and cultural advances spurred by the 
Great Reforms and the rise of a civil society, the Russo-Ottoman War played out on the front 
pages of St. Petersburg dailies, where the revival of the Eastern Question in a popular war pulled 
Armenians into a spotlight shone by Russian liberals. The periodical press in the imperial capital 
urged the Russian government to redouble its support for foreign-subject Armenians out of past 
and future political incentives, and even pushed the state to carve an Armenian homeland out of 
Ottoman territory. During the real and perceived encroachment of Western missionaries upon 
foreign and tsarist Armenians, Russian officials coordinated with the Echmiadzin leadership to 
counteract the proselytizing of foreign faiths, often without reciprocal strategic benefits.  
Yet the state worked to prevent Armenians from placing their national allegiances above 
their civil subjecthood to the tsarist empire. The authorities suppressed privately conceived 
national Armenian institutions, prohibited the unsanctioned collection of donations for foreign-
subject Armenians, and strove to prevent the Russian revolutionary movement from animating 
Armenian nationalism.  
Viceroys and Villains  
Viceroy Vorontsov’s retirement in 1854 came at an inopportune time for Russia’s affairs 
in the Caucasus. Taking place at the height of the Crimean War and leaving many of his goals 
unfinished, the statesman’s resignation placed added pressure on the regional administration. The 
emperor replaced Vorontsov with General Nikolai Nikolaevich Muravev, a protégé of Ermolov 
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and a decorated veteran of the 1828-29 imperial campaigns. Muravev arrived in Tiflis on 1 
March 1855, just hours after news had reached the city of the death of Tsar Nicholas I.659 
Muravev’s tenure at the head of the Caucasus administration lasted just nineteen months, first 
tarnished then vindicated by his army’s efforts to seize the Ottoman fortress of Kars in eastern 
Anatolia. Although his soldiers finally sacked the citadel in November 1855, in September 1856 
General Count Aleksandr Ivanovich Bariatinskii replaced Muravev, whom the new tsar, 
Alexander II (1855-81), promoted to membership in the State Council. 
With the Crimean War’s conclusion in the spring of 1856, Bariatinskii took advantage of 
the regional army’s swollen ranks to penetrate deep into Dagestan and end the North Caucasus 
insurgency. In late August 1859, the general scribbled to the tsar: “Shamil has been captured and 
sent to Petersburg.”660 In a separate missive, Bariatinskii boasted, “the fate of the eastern 
Caucasus has been resolved definitively. After fifty years of a bloody struggle, the day of peace 
has come to this country.”661 The North Caucasus fully capitulated in 1864, when new viceroy 
Grand Duke Mikhail Nikolaevich (1863-81), the tsar’s brother, forced the surrender of the last 
rebels in the Kuban region and along the Black Sea coast.662 
 For years after its defeat in the Crimean War, Russia’s relations with Turkey and Britain 
remained tense. In the wake of the Treaty of Paris, Bariatinskii alerted St. Petersburg to the 
shadowy visits of British and Turkish military and merchant vessels to the Black Sea coast 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
659AKAK XI (1888), ii. 
660AKAK XII (1904), i. 
661RGVIA, f. 846, op. 16, d. 6677, l. 28. 
662GARF, f. 678, op. 1, d. 687, ll. 1-1ob. Mikhail Nikolaevich employed particularly harsh methods, 
forcefully relocating about 90,000 Muslim residents along the Kuban River and pressuring 418,000 North 
Caucasians into emigrating to the Ottoman empire. See GARF, f. 652, op. 1, d. 236, l. 5.   
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populated by the North Caucasian highlanders. In August 1857, the viceroy emphasized to the 
war minister “how harmful it is for us that North Caucasus tribes along the Black Sea coast, who 
are hostile to us, receive openly and without hindrance assistance from abroad, in weapons and 
military supplies, and also from constantly arriving bands of European and Turkish 
[outsiders].”663 In St. Petersburg, too, members of the General Staff and other senior statesmen 
emphasized the growing political-economic competition between Russia and Britain in the 
Caucasus, on the Caspian, and in Central Asia.664 Acknowledging the lessons of the Crimean 
defeat, Russia launched administrative and economic modernization in the Caucasus and beyond.  
 Between 1855 and 1880, the jurisdiction of the Caucasus civilian administration 
expanded, at the expense of the military, by 80 percent to cover almost the entire Caucasus 
territory and 4,767,000 residents.665 At the same time, the regional bureaucracy was trimmed, 
some provinces and districts amalgamated, and the authority of provincial governors boosted to 
expedite their work.666 The viceroyalty’s hands were fully untied in 1858 when St. Petersburg 
allowed it to keep all of the revenues derived from the South, but not North, Caucasus.667 Thus 
Bariatinskii received the financial carte blanche that even his powerful predecessor, Vorontsov, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
663RGVIA, f. 846, op. 16, d. 6662, l. 46. 
664RGVIA, f. 446, op. 1, d. 37, ll. 1-3.  
665GARF, f. 678, op. 1, d. 687, l. 1. 
666GARF, f. 678, op. 1, d. 687, ll. 4-5. 
667GARF, f. 678, op. 1, d. 687, ll. 36ob-37. See also GARF, f. 652, op. 1, d. 236, l. 30. The Caucasus 
viceroyalty also received supplemental annual funding from St. Petersburg. In contrast to the finances of 
the South Caucasus, which came under the viceroy’s control in 1858, the imperial Finance Ministry 
administered the finances of the North Caucasus. 
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had not enjoyed.668 Other improvements included the spread of highways, railroads, and 
telegraph lines. Bariatinskii recognized the pressing need for such changes upon arriving in 
Tiflis: “At present time the Transcaucasian provinces are connected to the empire only on the 
geographical map; in reality they comprise a region in all respects separate from the rest of 
Russia.”669 The viceroy worked closely with his liberal, reform-minded chief of staff, Dmitrii 
Miliutin, who would serve as war minister from 1861 to 1881 and oversee major military 
changes. The two men accomplished much in pulling the Caucasus closer to modernity and 
closer to Russia.  
Whereas during the Crimean War the Georgian Military Highway was the only reliable 
link between the Caucasus and Russia proper, by the end of Alexander II’s reign in 1881, nearly 
600 miles of railroad tracks helped integrate the region with the imperial core.670 Almost 10,000 
miles of telegraph cable further added to the transformation of the region. Private steamship 
companies rushed to the Black and Caspian seas, and a new port, at Petrovsk on the Caspian, was 
built and another one soon opened at Poti on the Black Sea.671 Bariatinskii advocated these 
advancements out of both socioeconomic and strategic considerations, convinced that once 
modern transportation and communications were introduced in the region, “the Caucasus Army 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
668Ekaterina Pravilova, Finansy imperii: Den’gi i vlast’ v politike Rossii na natsional’nykh okrainakh, 
1801-1917 (Moscow: Novoe Izdatel’stvo, 2006), 116-17. 
669GARF, f. 722, op. 1, d. 475, l. 1. 
670GARF, f. 678, op. 1, d. 687, l. 19. Additionally, in 1879, Alexander II ordered the construction of five 
new railroad lines in the Caucasus, covering nearly 1,000 miles.   
671GARF, f. 678, op. 1, d. 687, l. 20. 
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will hang like an avalanche over Asiatic Turkey, over Persia, and over the Indian route. Russian 
power in Asia will turn from a ghost into reality.”672    
Even more impressive were the advancements in education. In 1856, within the territory 
of the Caucasus viceroyalty, there were 95 state-owned, public, and private schools.673 These 
schools accommodated approximately 5,500 pupils. By 1880, the number of schools had risen to 
2,157 with about 62,000 pupils.674 The regional pedagogical staff increased nearly tenfold, from 
375 teachers in 1856 to 3,735 in 1880. The imperial treasury, moreover, tripled the budget for 
education in the Caucasus from 193,000 rubles in 1856 to 600,000 in 1880.675 Other income, 
from private donations, benevolent societies, and student tuition payments, brought over 
1,200,000 rubles annually for local educational initiatives. The region’s industrial and 
commercial transformations were no less dramatic.  
An oil boom, mainly around Baku and the Caspian coast, erupted in the 1870s. In 1873, 
the temporary leasing of state-owned oil fields to private contractors was ended in favor of 
permanent sales of Caucasian oil wells to private companies.676 This initiative not only brought a 
one-time revenue of 3,000,000 rubles to the state treasury but also revolutionized the extraction 
of crude oil in the region: between 1872 and 1878 alone, the output increased from 54 million 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
672GARF, f. 722, op. 1, d. 475, l. 13. In 1881, the Caucasus Army contained 4,301 officers and about 
124,000 soldiers. These numbers were roughly doubled during wartime mobilization. See GARF, f. 652, 
op. 1, d. 236, l. 28. 
673GARF, f. 678, op. 1, d. 687, ll. 24-25. 
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676GARF, f. 678, op. 1, d. 687, l. 32. 
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pounds (1.5 million poods) to 722 million pounds (20 million poods).677 By the summer of 1878, 
the St. Petersburg newspaper Golos informed the imperial capital that in Baku “oil freely pours 
out of wells, forms streams and rivers, and floods the fields of strangers.”678   
The proliferation of refineries, factories, and rail lines accompanied this development, as 
did the attendant improvements in the socioeconomic conditions of the locals, who gained the 
ability to heat and light their homes at affordable rates. The price of photogen, an illuminant 
similar to kerosene that Russia imported from the United States prior to the Caucasus oil boom, 
fell from 45 to 3 kopecks per pound in the 1870s.679 These transformations gave reason for 
Viceroy Grand Duke Mikhail Nikolaevich to report optimistically to his brother, Tsar Alexander 
II, in February 1880: “Perhaps soon the future will see the Caucasus [become] . . . an integral 
part of the general state organism, will see it not as an object of difficulties and sacrifices for 
Russia, but as a source of new strength and of new rewards for those sacrifices, which were 
made to possess it.”680 Yet the modernization of the Caucasus and other regions gave rise to 
nationalisms, social discontent, and revolutionary political movements throughout the empire.  
Russia’s defeat in the Crimean War aroused popular unrest, nearly bankrupted the state 
treasury, and humiliated the tsar’s proud military. In part spurred by this crisis, the new tsar 
implemented the Great Reforms, transforming the country’s judicial, military, economic, and 
social spheres, including freeing the serfs in 1861. Terence Emmons has labeled the Great 
Reforms the “greatest single piece of state-directed social engineering in modern European 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
677GARF, f. 678, op. 1, d. 687, l. 32ob. 
678Golos, 15 July 1878, no. 194. 
679GARF, f. 678, op. 1, d. 687, l. 32ob. 
680GARF, f. 678, op. 1, d. 687, ll. 40ob-41. 
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history before the twentieth century.”681 But as historian Larisa Zakharova has argued, Alexander 
II introduced the reforms to strengthen the autocracy, not to appease liberals or relax the 
government’s grip on an inchoate civil society.682  
By the 1870s the rise of European socialism, peasant populism, Russian and non-Russian 
nationalism, nihilism, and student radicalism challenged the foundations of the autocracy. 
Between 1873 and 1877 alone, over 1,600 tsarist subjects were implicated in subversive political 
movements.683 In the spring of 1875, the Council of Ministers listened warily to the reports of the 
Third Section about the proliferation of antigovernment “revolutionary propaganda” throughout 
the empire.684 Whereas in 1866 the secret police had uncovered early signs of socialist agitation 
in only four provinces, by 1875 there was evidence of such subversive movements in over 30 
provinces, “indisputably proving the deficiency of the [state’s] measures” and demonstrating 
“the necessity of more systematic countermeasures against anarchist aspirations.”685 The 
ministers discussed with bewilderment the apparent apathy of ordinary Russians toward the 
threat to public order posed by the revolutionaries, “for the achievement of whose ideals are 
required streams, rivers, floods of blood.”686 Although non-Russians constituted less than 5 
percent of arrested revolutionaries, their presence, and their real and imagined ties to the “outside 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
681Quoted in Ben Eklof, John Bushnell, and Larissa Zakharova, eds., Russia’s Great Reforms, 1855-1881 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994), vii. 
682Larisa Zakharova, “Emperor Alexander II, 1855-1881,” in Donald J. Raleigh, ed., The Emperors and 
Empresses of Russia: Rediscovering the Romanovs (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1996), 294-333.  
683GARF, f. 109, 3rd exped., op. 162, 1877, d. 146, l. 13.  
684GARF, f. 109, 3rd exped., op. 162, 1877, d. 146, l. 2.  
685GARF, f. 109, 3rd exped., op. 162, 1877, d. 146, l. 2ob. 
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world,” elicited particular concern from St. Petersburg. Among those detained between 1873 and 
1877, the Third Section deemed a handful of non-Russians, including Jews and Caucasians (of 
unspecified national origins), to be especially guilty of subversive activity.687 The ministers 
feared that foreign ideologies could infect the tsarist youth, Russian and non-Russian, 
emphasizing that many subjects return from studying in “Zurich, Bern, and Geneva” infused 
with “the destructive influence of the Russian émigrés, who strive with all strength to spread 
anarchist principles in the state.”688 Whether attending the lectures of such anarchist émigré 
ideologues as Mikhail Bakunin in Switzerland or translating into Ukrainian illicit literature at St. 
Vladimir University in Kiev, scores of tsarist-subject youths challenged the political and social 
status quo.689 For the state, an acute threat came from the merger of youth agitation and 
nationalism in the imperial periphery. Few tsarist domains exemplified this dangerous synthesis 
more strikingly than the Caucasus.  
Although social, economic, and cultural circumstances in the South Caucasus 
distinguished it from the imperial core and the more developed western borderlands, the political 
situation in Tiflis in the late 1870s reflected the general unease that characterized Russia proper. 
While there were fewer students and well-educated elites in Tiflis than in Petersburg, Odessa, or 
Kiev, the local tsarist administration feared the “transfer of political agitation” to their 
territory.690 Specifically, regional officials linked anarchist and socialist ideologies with a 	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689The ministers noted warily: “However mad his teachings, Bakunin’s works and the sermons of his 
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particular group’s nationalism: “The agitators take advantage . . . and help spread all 
manifestations of antagonism in society, [thus we] cannot fully ignore the clearly demonstrated . 
. . nationalist aspirations toward separation [stremleniia k obosobleniiu] of intellectual 
Armenians in the Caucasus.”691 
Officials linked the revolutionary movement in Russia proper with the real and perceived 
rise of Armenian nationalism in the South Caucasus. In December 1879, the head of the Tiflis 
Provincial Gendarme Administration (gubernskoe zhandarmskoe upravlenie, hereafter GZhU) 
alerted St. Petersburg to what he interpreted as a connection between Russian socialism and 
Armenian nationalism.692 He warned that “the present emergence of Armenian nationalist 
tendencies in the Caucasus” will be compounded by the broader revolutionary movement if not 
checked through the “strict supervision over the spread of nationalist ideas among 
Armenians.”693 Tsarist agents in Tiflis worried that “Russian socialists . . . can easily establish 
here a nest not only with banned books, but also with a printing house and an armory . . . of 
course in order to act against the government.”694 The authorities identified only Armenians as a 
potential threat, suggesting that officials began to associate political subversion with Armenians.  
How can this be explained? Among the dozens of distinct ethnonational groups 
populating the South Caucasus,695 from the Russian perspective, Armenians alone possessed the 	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distinct factors necessary for a potential political challenge to the status quo. Their economic 
standing and attendant social influence in the Caucasus and elsewhere, the domestic and foreign 
authority of their national church, and the diasporic distribution of Armenians throughout 
Eurasia, all affected tsarist officials’ perception of Armenian political aims and abilities. Even in 
the absence of hard evidence of secessionist nationalist ambitions, Russian authorities in the 
1870s began to envision links between still-benign Armenian nationalism (which focused on 
Western Armenia) and the diverse subversive youth campaign in the imperial core, fearing the 
synthesis of the revolutionary movement and nationalism in the Caucasus.  
By 1880, Tiflis became a hub for Russian and non-Russian political dissidents, attracting 
revolutionaries from St. Petersburg, Moscow, and universities throughout the empire.696 The 
South Caucasian capital’s remoteness from the centers of imperial power, its proximity to the 
porous borders of the Ottoman and Persian empires, and the city’s lively cultural ambiance drew 
diverse dissidents. The provincial GZhU grumbled that the Third Section “constantly” inundated 
Tiflis with arrest and surveillance orders for fugitives from Russia. The problem compelled local 
authorities to track daily the arrival of each outsider, especially of intellectuals. Officials also 
sought to double the number of police stations in the region to combat the proliferation of 
socialist and other illicit publications, underground presses, and clandestine groups.697  
In addition to socialist circles, provincial authorities pursued ill-defined “political-
national” tendencies among Caucasian natives. In one example, tsarist agents in Tiflis arrested a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Christian peoples comprised about 3,070,000, with the rest (about 2,480,000) Muslim. See GARF f. 652, 
op. 1, d. 236, l. 23.    
696GARF, f. 109, 3rd exped., op. 165, 1880, d. 81, ll. 4-4ob. 
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young Armenian for distributing portraits of the writer Mikael Nalbandian,698 an exiled socialist 
with ties to some of the era’s leading dissidents, including Alexander Herzen, Mikhail Bakunin, 
and Nikolai Ogarev. Soon the viceroy personally followed all Third Section investigations of 
political revolutionaries in the Caucasus.699 Thus the hallmarks of modernity introduced during 
Alexander II’s reign in Russia and the Caucasus spurred reciprocal social resistance, 
characterized by unique variations in the imperial regions.  
The Great Reforms in the Caucasus      
The Russian empire’s reforms and modernization followed situational patterns that 
accounted for the regional diversity of ethnicities, confessions, and social groups.700 Because in 
the Caucasus few uniform categories existed, the implementation of the Great Reforms there 
exposed the logistical problems inherent in modernizing a polyethnic and multiconfessional 
empire. Armenians illustrate this point, but their experience was hardly unique during 
Alexander’s reign. Although the policies enacted in St. Petersburg reverberated in the Caucasus, 
they did so with distinct iterations. 
At the onset of Tsar Alexander II’s reign in 1855, vast incongruities characterized the 
judicial system of the Caucasus. While the provinces under the jurisdiction of the civilian 
administration largely followed the general legal codes and bureaucratic procedures found in 
Russia,701 the Caucasian territories under the control of the military administration maintained 
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various traditional national and tribal legal systems from the pre-Russian era.702 The legal affairs 
of some groups—Armenians, Georgians, and others—were standardized in 1838-40, including 
the integration of independent Armenian courts in Astrakhan, Kizliar, Mozdok, and elsewhere 
into the imperial judicial system.703 But the jurisprudence of such groups as Cossacks and 
Muslim highlanders remained significantly distinct from Russian legal statutes. Often separate 
legal codes governed the lives of different minorities in the same territory, frustrating local 
residents and sowing bureaucratic confusion.704 
 The legal transformations of the Great Reforms provided a catalyst for righting the 
inconsistent jurisprudence of the Caucasus. In early 1868, some of the legal provisions were 
extended to the civilian-administered regions of the Caucasus.705 In 1871 almost the entire 
territory was brought under a single judicial system, which still lagged behind its Russian 
counterpart.706 New courts throughout the viceroyalty accompanied the revision of legal codes. 
But while Armenian witnesses gained the right to swear to an Armenian priest in court, a key 
aspect of the Russian judicial reform, trial by jury, did not extend to the Caucasus. By the 
viceroy’s own admission in 1880, the changes “cannot be deemed fully satisfactory of the needs 
and desires of the local populations.”707 Yet the standardization and expansion of courts signaled 
advancement from the prereform era in that St. Petersburg continued the administrative 	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704Viceroy Mikhail Nikolaevich summarized years later some of these discrepancies to his brother. See 
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modernization of the Caucasus. The introduction of some legal provisions to the Caucasus 
opened the possibility for previously excluded groups to take part in the execution of universal 
justice,708 gradually abandoning anachronistic national and tribal legal systems in the Caucasus.  
 Peasant reform in the Caucasus made a more immediate and indelible mark upon the 
region’s social and economic structure. Prior to the 1860s, multiple forms of personal bondage 
existed in the Caucasus. In the Georgian regions, serfdom represented a deeply ingrained and 
diverse social norm, in which not only royals and nobles but also clergy, merchants, and even 
peasant serfs owned serfs.709 (In 1832, tsarist officials in Georgia restricted the ownership of 
serfs to nobles.710) Russian rule curbed the powers of Georgian serfowners, but until the 1860s 
the practice continued on largely the same proportional scale as in Russia.711 In contrast to the 
Georgian provinces, in the Dagestan, Kuban, Sukhum and other Muslim North Caucasian 
districts, personal bondage, according to viceroy Mikhail Nikolaevich, “was characterized by 
total lack of rights,” and resembled “slavery.”712 Conversely, in the Muslim territories of the 
South Caucasus (mainly modern Azerbaijan), no de jure serfdom existed. Local farmers working 
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theatricality of the adversarial courtroom made it a place where modernity could be performed by all 
involved in the pursuit of justice.” See Louise McReynolds, Murder Most Russian: True Crime and 
Punishment in Late Imperial Russia (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2013), 3. 
709Ronald G. Suny, The Making of the Georgian Nation (London: I. B. Tauris & Co., 1989), 67. 
710According to Suny, “Those serfs owned by non-nobles had either to be sold or allowed to buy their 
freedom; otherwise they reverted to state peasants. At the same time nobles were given the right to exile 
offending peasants to the North Caucasus.” 
711For example, tsarist officials required Georgian nobles to provide documentary proof of serf ownership 
and allowed serfs to buy their freedom. See Suny, The Making of the Georgian Nation, 67. 
712GARF, f. 678, op. 1, d. 687, ll. 9-9ob.  
 231 
the lands of wealthy lords were classified as “state peasants” with ostensibly some rights, but de 
facto their conditions paralleled serfdom.713 
 Viceroy Mikhail Nikolaevich, after succeeding Bariatinskii in March 1863, wasted no 
time in coordinating with Alexander II and the Caucasus Committee to extend similar 
regulations to his jurisdiction.714 As early as October 1863, the Grand Duke discussed with his 
brother tentative strategies for this complex endeavor.715 Initial plans called for freeing the serfs 
without land—a proposal to which Georgian nobles acquiesced—but was later revised to 
emancipating the serfs with land, for which they had to reimburse the landowners.716 As Suny 
summarized: “This proposal was a radical break with the nobles' position, but the government 
was determined not to create a mass of landless peasants that would ‘introduce into the state 
organism a constant element of disorder.’”717          
 By the time the phased emancipation ended in 1870, approximately 297,500 newly freed 
peasants joined the region’s growing force of mobile free labor.718 First to gain liberty were the 
bondsmen of Tiflis guberniia in 1864, followed by their counterparts in Kutais and two nearby 
districts in 1865, Mingreliia in 1866, Dagestan and Kuban in 1868, and the Sukhum military 
district in 1870. In Yerevan guberniia, where fewer serfs existed than in Georgian provinces 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
713GARF, f. 678, op. 1, d. 687, ll. 9ob-10. 
714For an overview of this process, see GARF, f. 678, op. 1, d. 615, ll. 1-132. For a more succinct 
description of the emancipation in Georgia, see Suny, The Making of the Georgian Nation, 96-112. 
715GARF, f. 678, op. 1, d. 615, l. 2. The likely reason for the emancipation’s start in Tiflis guberniia is 
that it was the center of the tsarist administration.  
716Suny, The Making of the Georgian Nation, 102. 
717Suny, The Making of the Georgian Nation, 102. 
718GARF, f. 678, op. 1, d. 687, l. 10. 
 232 
because of a comparatively smaller Armenian noble estate, emancipation was enacted in 1870. 
Thus the emancipation did not affect Armenians as much as it altered the everyday lives of 
Georgian elites. While new competitors and neighbors entered the socioeconomic spheres 
previously dominated by Armenians, the freeing of the serfs in the Caucasus impacted the 
economies and social relationships of other native groups more acutely. 
The autocracy’s administrative reforms in the Caucasus in the 1860s indicate its 
continued efforts to integrate the region into Russia. While the Georgian nobility—the largest 
native elite estate in the Caucasus—initially resisted the terms of the emancipation, the tsarist 
state remained determined to implement the 19 February 1861 proclamation to its fullest extent. 
Recognizing the Georgian lords’ uniquely weak financial conditions, Russian authorities 
nevertheless pushed forward to bring the territory in line with the rest of the empire. The risks of 
alienating native elites were serious, but they did not outweigh the risks of allowing modernity to 
sidestep the Caucasus.  
External Influence and Internal Control 
This encounter of political and socioeconomic modernity with Caucasian natives posed 
unique challenges for the Russian empire. In an era of reconsideration of political and social 
bonds, the autocracy embarked on a multifaceted endeavor to (re)define its dialogue with 
Armenians. As late as the third quarter of the nineteenth century, the tsarist government 
struggled to balance its policies between expanding its influence upon Armenians abroad and 
maintaining control over its own Armenians in the Caucasus and elsewhere. While some tsarist 
elites backed the promotion of national Armenian institutions, other Russian officials advocated 
the cultural assimilation of Armenians. No master plan directed the government’s approach 
because individual ministers resisted relinquishing their jurisdictions, and also because senior 
statesmen espoused divergent visions of empire.     
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 In July 1865, Tsar Alexander II initiated the most important recalibration of Russo-
Armenian political ties since the Polozhenie of 1836. Under the emperor’s orders, Caucasus 
Viceroy Mikhail Nikolaevich, Interior Minister Petr Valuev, and Foreign Minister Aleksandr 
Gorchakov—among the empire’s most senior statesmen—convened to “coordinate the activities 
of their departments regarding the question of our government’s relations with the Armenian 
church and nation.”719 Two topics in particular dominated the men’s agenda. First, they sought to 
synchronize their efforts at reconciling St. Petersburg-Echmiadzin ties with the state policy of 
exerting political influence over Armenians living abroad. Second, they emphasized the 
importance of checking the work of foreign missionaries among Caucasian Armenians.720 
 At the heart of the debate were several interrelated questions: To which degree did the 
Armenian faith, a close dogmatic and liturgical cousin of Russian Orthodoxy, qualify as a 
“foreign faith”? How far should the government go in shielding Echmiadzin from the 
encroachment of Protestant and Catholic agents? How best to utilize the foreign sway of the 
Armenian Church, especially in Turkey, to achieve tsarist political objectives? Which policies in 
the Caucasus ought to be introduced or revised to achieve a balance between internal stability 
and external influence? How, and how far, should Armenians be incorporated into the Russian 
political and social life? The ministers proposed different answers to these questions. 
 Gorchakov’s warnings about the recent successes of “secret” Protestant proselytizing 
among Caucasian Armenians drew the attention of the viceroy and the interior minister.721 The 
three men agreed on the need to cooperate with the Armenian Church to eradicate such alien 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
719RGIA, f. 1268, op. 10, d. 103, l. 1.  
720RGIA, f. 1268, op. 10, d. 103, ll. 2-3. 
721RGIA, f. 1268, op. 10, d. 103, ll. 6-7ob. 
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doctrines among tsarist subjects. To this end, Gorchakov wished to increase his ministry’s 
coordination with Echmiadzin’s leadership, who “by its very nature is connected to our foreign 
policy.” In justifying a closer political partnership between the autocracy and Echmiadzin, the 
foreign minister stressed the kinship of the Russian and Armenian faiths: “Although our laws 
place the Gregorian church among the heterodox, it is not, strictly speaking, a heterodox church, 
in terms of its main dogmas and the similarity of its rites with the Orthodox Church, and 
deserves [our] support and protection against [foreign] propaganda.”722    
 While Mikhail Nikolaevich and Valuev expressed “complete agreement” with 
Gorchakov’s need for more thorough links to the Echmiadzin leadership, they resisted his 
implication that the Armenian faith deserved legal declassification as a heterodox creed.723 The 
viceroy and interior minister posited that the empire’s existing laws for heterodox faiths 
protected the Armenian Church from external threats. Although they acknowledged parallel 
Russo-Armenian interests in combating Protestantism and Catholicism, Mikhail Nikolaevich and 
Valuev refused to consider the possibility of introducing a separate legal status for the Armenian 
faith.724 At the same time, all three statesmen agreed about the imperative of continuing to nudge 
Echmiadzin along a path most favorable to tsarist foreign policy.  
 To gain greater control of this process, the political elite considered introducing a special 
government “advisor” to the Echmiadzin patriarch.725 An ethnic Armenian bureaucrat, this tsarist 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
722RGIA, f. 1268, op. 10, d. 103, ll. 6-7ob. 
723RGIA, f. 1268, op. 10, d. 103, l. 8. 
724Mikhail Nikolaevich and Valuev also objected to Gorchakov’s proposal to invite the patriarch to St. 
Petersburg and present him with a special royal commendation. See RGIA, f. 1268, op. 10, d. 103, ll. 
10ob-11.   
725RGIA, f. 1268, op. 10, d. 103, ll. 9ob-10. It is unclear who proposed this scheme. 
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agent would be tasked with “convincing the Catholicos [to undertake] measures and courses of 
action that aim to dispose the [Russian] government and [Armenian] nation toward him, and 
strengthen his influence abroad.”726 The advisor would lobby the Catholicos to execute policies 
that were in line with Russian interests, focusing on Armenians both within and outside the 
tsarist empire. Mikhail Nikolaevich, Valuev, and Gorchakov rejected this scheme, not only 
doubting its efficacy but also fearing broader repercussions. The interior minister argued that the 
plan would “more likely elicit suspicion than sympathy from the patriarch and the Armenians 
themselves, which is enough reason to fear that [a tsarist advisor to Echmiadzin], in order to 
acquire influence, in many cases would sacrifice the perspectives and interests of our 
government.”727 This scenario could precipitate “the establishment of Armenian national 
autonomy.” Such concerns suggest that, as late as the mid-1860s, the autocracy—still negotiating 
between domestic control over Echmiadzin and its foreign influence—privileged the latter over 
the former.728 The government desired a tighter grip on the affairs of the Armenian Church but 
recognized the potential dangers, foreign and domestic, of alienating clerical and lay Armenians. 
 Gorchakov understood this dilemma well. According to an official summary of the July 
1865 meeting, the foreign minister stressed to his colleagues that “in light of the tremendous 
importance for our political interests of maintaining foreign Armenians’ trust and devotion to our 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
726RGIA, f. 1268, op. 10, d. 103, ll. 9ob-10. 
727RGIA, f. 1268, op. 10, d. 103, ll. 10-10ob. This appears to be an official summary of his statement, 
rather than his own words. 
728See chapter 3. For a broader overview, see Paul Werth, “Imperial Russia and the Armenian Catholicos 
at Home and Abroad," in Reconstruction and Interaction of Slavic Eurasia and Its Neighboring Worlds, 
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government,” the state had to reassess its policies.729 In particular, Gorchakov argued that in “all 
matters pertaining to Armenians and the Armenian Church,” domestic considerations must be 
“subordinated” to foreign policy imperatives. Consequently, he insisted on elevating the external 
prestige and political cachet of the Echmiadzin patriarchy.730 
 Valuev disagreed with Gorchakov’s stance, likely fearing the erosion of his ministry’s 
oversight of tsarist-subject Armenians. The interior minister acknowledged the necessity of 
maintaining foreign Armenians’ favorable disposition toward Russia, but resisted what he 
interpreted as Gorchakov’s attempt to assign special status to the Armenian nation.731 Valuev 
argued that tsarist laws governing all groups within the empire, including Russians and the 
Orthodox Church, could not be ignored out of “more or less conjectural” goals pursued by 
Gorchakov. More potently, the interior minister opposed the establishment of “an exceptional 
position for a quite insignificant portion of the population, which the Armenians of the empire 
constitute.”732 Valuev feared foreign and tsarist Armenians’ pursuit of the “reestablishment of its 
national autonomy,” and thus wished to “avoid all that which directly or indirectly could 
contribute to the maintenance or spread of such aspirations.”733 Viceroy Mikhail Nikolaevich 
sided with Valuev, even arguing that the elevation of Echmiadzin’s external influence could 
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730RGIA, f. 1268, op. 10, d. 103, l. 12. 
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732RGIA, f. 1268, op. 10, d. 103, ll. 12-12ob. 
733RGIA, f. 1268, op. 10, d. 103, l. 12ob. 
 237 
backfire by promoting the notion of Armenian exceptionality and giving the impression of 
preferential treatment within a nationally kaleidoscopic imperial domain.734       
 In sum, in the 1860s the tsarist political elite struggled to reconcile the unique challenges 
and opportunities of Armenian diasporic, transimperial existence. Although the ministers 
recognized that a combination of external and internal considerations regarding Armenian 
political affairs had to be weighed at all times, they disagreed about whether the government 
should amplify Echmiadzin’s foreign influence or prevent the realization of some Armenians’ 
“political dreams.” The case of the Armenian scholar-cleric Gavril Aivazovskii illustrates this 
interplay of religion, diaspora, and diplomacy at the heart of the autocracy’s political encounter 
with Armenians.  
A Domestic Diaspora: Gavril Aivazovskii   
Born in Russia, Gavril Aivazovskii was taken as a child by mechitarist monks to be 
raised and educated in Vienna.735 Aivazovskii was the elder brother of Hovannes Aivazian, 
better known by his Russified name of Ivan Aivazovskii, a renowned marine artist. While his 
brother stayed in their native Crimea, Gavril became a life-long scholar and priest in Europe, 
where he educated Armenian youths in Venice and Paris. Aivazovskii spent eight years in the 
latter city, where he established an academy that attracted Armenians from throughout Europe 
and also Turkey, Baghdad, and India. He also published a literary Armenian journal that gained 
equal prominence among lay and clerical diaspora Armenians. Aivazovskii’s promotion of 
Armenian “national questions” and resistance to Catholicism's influence on European Armenians 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
734RGIA, f. 1268, op. 10, d. 103, ll. 12ob-13. 
735RGIA, f. 1268, op. 10, d. 103, ll. 15-16. The mechitarists are Benedictine monks of the Armenian 
Catholic Church, established in 1717 and based in Vienna and Venice. 
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eventually elicited the ire of the Catholic Church, which drove him out of Paris and the 
mechitarist order. Expelled from Europe, Aivazovskii returned under the authority and aegis of 
the Echmiadzin and Constantinople patriarchs, who lauded him for his scholarship and 
promotion of Armenian national interests. 
 Back in the tsar’s domain, Aivazovskii sought to recreate his Paris academy in Odessa, 
on the Black Sea.736 He argued that Russia’s 1.5 million Armenian subjects required a national 
educational center no less than their compatriots in Europe. Aivazovskii maintained that Russia’s 
political interests demanded a national Armenian academy that would counteract the growing 
sway of Western dogmas with Armenians. Russia’s defeat in the Crimean War, Aivazovskii 
stressed, eroded some of its influence among Ottoman Armenians, while at the same time the 
stature of British Protestantism and French Catholicism had grown to unprecedented levels 
among Ottoman and Russian Armenians. 
 In 1856, Alexander approved the plan, thanks in part to the endorsement of such tsarist 
officials as Russian ambassador to France Pavel Kiselev.737 Aivazovskii’s request to establish the 
academy in the Crimean city of Feodosia, rather than in Odessa, also met with approval.738 In a 
sign of the emperor’s backing of Aivazovskii’s academy, the tsar held an audience with the cleric 
in November 1857, lauding his work and tasking the Interior Ministry with facilitating its 
execution.739 More consequentially, Alexander appointed Aivazovskii the archbishop of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
736RGIA, f. 1268, op. 10, d. 103, l. 17. 
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738Aivazovskii argued that Feodosia was a more suitable location because of a recently started steamship 
route between Feodosia and Constantinople and a promised plan to link Crimea with St. Petersburg and 
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Nakhichevan-Bessarabian Armenian eparchy (which included Crimea), one of the largest and 
most profitable in the Russian empire. According to state records, the tsar took this decision not 
only to expedite Aivazovskii’s project but also to allow him to use the eparchy’s finances for his 
academy.740 But Aivazovskii’s promotion came during an interregnum in Echmiadzin’s 
patriarchy, thereby letting the tsar to sidestep the Armenian Church leadership. Although many 
tsarist and foreign Armenians supported Aivazovskii,741 his elevation to the head of the 
Nakhichevan-Bessarabian eparchy without Echmiadzin’s consent aroused popular discontent.742 
 Russian sources paint a picture of a mismanaged and corrupt Nakhichevan-Bessarabian 
eparchy administration prior to Aivazovskii’s arrival, characterized by lost or embezzled church 
funds and poor organization.743 Indeed, Interior Minister Sergei Lanskoi asked Aivazovskii to 
address these issues upon his promotion to the head of the eparchy. The new archbishop made 
important strides in this direction, initially supported by local Armenian elders and also the 
Echmiadzin Synod. But Aivazovskii soon discovered that his eparchy’s poor monetary situation 
prevented him from opening his academy using local church funds. To his rescue came wealthy 
Armenian businessman Arutiun Khalibov, who donated 50,000 silver rubles to fund an 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
740Russian synopses of this case claim that many local Armenians from Crimea petitioned the government 
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741Armenians in Constantinople celebrated Aivazovskii’s plans, vowing to send their children for 
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 240 
Armenian academy in Feodosia.744 By mid-1858, Aivazovskii had secured the final permissions 
of the Russian political elite, including the tsar, the ministers of the interior, foreign affairs, and 
education, and the governor general of the Novorossiisk and Bessarabian governorate.745 
 On 12 October 1858, the Khalibov Armenian Academy of Feodosia, named for its 
primary benefactor, opened its doors to its first 50 students.746 By the following academic year, 
the six-year school enrolled about 130 pupils, mainly from the Ottoman and Russian Armenian 
communities. A press opened at the academy soon after its founding, and between 1860 and 
1863 a journal was published in Armenian, Russian, and French, after which it came out only in 
Armenian.747 The aims of the journal, according to one Russian account, reflected the broader 
purpose of the Khalibov academy: “the propagation of the light of science and knowledge among 
the Armenian people, [and] the development in it of civil virtues and dedication to that 
government that patronizes it.”748 In a word, the gestation of pro-Russian attitudes among 
Armenian youths—foreign and tsarist—constituted a key political aim of the new academy, 
alongside its more generic aspirations toward enlightenment. The Romanov state embraced these 
goals, underscored by Tsar Alexander II’s visit to the academy in September 1861, where he met 
with Aivazovskii and Khalibov and commended their work.749        
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 In contrast to the Russian government, the Echmiadzin leadership soon withdrew its 
backing of Aivazovskii. Not only was his promotion to archbishop conducted without the 
patriarchy’s preliminary approval, but he also demonstrated more initiative than the heavily 
hierarchical and intransigent church could tolerate. When a new Catholicos, Mateos, was elected 
in 1858, he wasted no time in summoning Aivazovskii to Echmiadzin. Although the nature of 
their audience is unknown, the fact that Mateos delayed his affirmation of Aivazovskii as the 
archbishop of the Nakhichevan-Bessarabian eparchy points to tension between the two clerics.750 
Soon, despite the Russian government’s and Armenian laity’s support for Aivazovskii, Mateos 
set out on a multifaceted campaign against the ambitious priest.751  
 By the early 1860s, Mateos and his allies in Crimea publicly renounced Aivazovskii’s 
initiatives. A common rumor charged Aivazovskii and Khalibov with stealing church funds to 
finance their academy.752 More likely, however, the secularism of such Armenian intellectuals as 
Aivazovskii threatened the church’s preeminence in Armenian culture. Mateos condemned 
Aivazovskii for his emphasis on secular education and publishing, and accused him of neglecting 
his duties toward the spiritual and administrative management of his eparchy.753 In his campaign 
against Aivazovskii, Mateos ordered snap audits of the Nakhichevan-Bessarabian eparchy, 
intimidated priests who edited the Khalibov academy journal, and pressured Tiflis booksellers 
not to sell publications from Aivazovskii’s press.754 The academy withstood such adversity for a 
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decade but succumbed in 1871, closing its doors and converting the facilities into a church-
administered Armenian seminary. 
Largely unbeknown to the government, the animosity between Aivazovskii and 
Echmiadzin paralleled the conflicting visions of Armenian identity that pitted traditional church-
centered culture against the growing secularism of Armenian intellectuals.755 The strife within 
Russia’s Armenian community at mid-century surfaced in the competition between publications 
that used the vernacular Armenian (ashkharhabar) and those that preferred the classical 
Armenian of the church (grabar). Aivazovskii joined such Armenian intellectuals as writer 
Khachatur Abovian, jurist Grigor Otian, and editor and novelist Hovannes Hisarian in 
modernizing Armenian culture and urging the secularization of education. The Russian 
government stayed out of these debates as long as it perceived them as apolitical.     
 Yet, in a risky rebuke of Echmiadzin, the autocracy embraced the mission and role of the 
Khalibov academy. While cognizant of the potential political dangers associated with alienating 
the Armenian Church and its senior leadership, the tsarist government backed Aivazovskii’s 
plans throughout the 1860s, even propping it up with an annual subsidy of 11,000 rubles.756 But 
the creation of national Armenian academies in Russia remained a politically controversial 
prospect that aroused policy disagreement among senior statesmen. 
 Valuev and Gorchakov, the interior and foreign ministers, respectively, supported the 
establishment not only of Aivazovskii’s academy but also of a similar institution in Astrakhan.757 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
755See Ronald G. Suny, Looking toward Ararat: Armenia in Modern History (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1993), 23 and 59. 
756RGIA, f. 880, op. 5, d. 278, ll. 13-15ob. 
757RGIA, f. 880, op. 5, d. 278, ll. 1-1ob. 
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The men emphasized the mutual interests of the Russian government and the Armenian Church, 
entirely overlooking, intentionally or inadvertently, the serious rift between Aivazovskii and 
Mateos. The statesmen advocated “counteracting the Western powers’ religious-political 
propaganda among foreign Armenians, which is as harmful to Russia as it is to the Armenian-
Gregorian Church.”758 Moreover, “in order to spread and consolidate Russia’s influence” upon 
foreign-subject Armenians, and to “strengthen the moral and religious bonds” between 
Armenians outside and inside the Russian empire, the ministers supported the founding of such 
exclusively Armenian educational centers as the Khalibov academy in Crimea.759 Unlike the 
Lazarev Institute, which sought to integrate Armenians into Russian society and the state by 
producing professional cadres for the tsarist service and private commerce, the institutions 
supported by Valuev and Gorchakov aimed to attract Armenians from abroad, reorienting them 
toward Russia’s orbit not through a Russian-focused curriculum but simply through the offering 
of subsidized education.  
 Several unique features characterized the Khalibov academy and another proposed 
institution in Astrakhan.760 First, they were intended “primarily” for foreign-subject Armenians, 
who received financial assistance from the Russian government. Second, to appeal to foreign 
Armenians, all instruction was to be conducted in Armenian, and no Russian-language courses 
were part of the mandatory curriculum (at least for non-tsarist Armenians). Third, the schools’ 
jurisdictional oversight would be divided between the Interior Ministry and the Echmiadzin 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
758RGIA, f. 880, op. 5, d. 278, l. 1. 
759RGIA, f. 880, op. 5, d. 278, ll. 1-1ob. However, by 1868 MVD Valuev lost confidence in the Khalibov 
academy’s ability to attract Armenians from abroad. See RGIA, f. 880, op. 5, d. 278, ll. 13-15ob. 
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patriarchy, shutting out the Education Ministry. Finally, all tsarist-subject graduates of these 
academies were admitted into the lowest, fourteenth rung of the Russian table of ranks, while 
their foreign classmates entered the “personal honorary citizen” estate with hereditary rights.        
  The Education Ministry opposed this proposal. Minister Ivan Delianov (1882-97) 
conceded the need for “the most decisive rebuff” of Western religious and political ideas, and 
agreed with the importance of elevating Echmiadzin’s external prestige as part of “strengthening 
Russia’s influence on Turkish and Persian Armenians.”761 However, the ministry resisted calls 
for the establishment in Russia of exclusively Armenian national academies that catered to 
foreign-subject Armenians. It argued that Western powers targeted Russia’s Armenians as much 
as their foreign compatriots, thus requiring a greater domestic focus on the political, cultural, and 
social integration of Armenians into the empire. Essentially, the Education Ministry advocated 
the cultural assimilation of tsarist-subject Armenians. In a statement that undoubtedly reflected 
the views of many tsarist statesmen, Delianov insisted that the government 
must be solely focused on that [the Armenian] youth receives a common education with 
all of its Russian countrymen, that it is raised on the Russian language in educational 
facilities common for all, [raised] on Russian literature and Russian history, in the spirit 
of unwavering devotion to its Russian fatherland and Emperor, [and thus] completely 
melds [srodnilos’] with all of the intellectual and moral interests of Russia and from 
childhood becomes tempered against all intrigues and agitations, as incongruous with its 
own wellbeing as with the tranquility of Russia on her southeastern periphery.762 
 
In a word, the Education Ministry argued that the expansion of such institutions as the Khalibov 
academy would drive a wedge between Russia’s Armenian subjects and the tsarist government, 
and also emphasized the need for absorbing the Armenian youth into the Russian social and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
761RGIA, f. 880, op. 5, d. 278, l. 2. 
762RGIA, f. 880, op. 5, d. 278, ll. 2ob-3. In a specific grievance against the Khalibov academy, the 
Education Ministry wrote that Aivazovskii’s original petition had stated that Armenian would be a major, 
not the only, language of instruction. See RGIA, f. 880, op. 5, d. 278, ll. 8-8ob.  
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cultural fabric. The failure to implement these policies, Delianov warned, would result in the 
growth of “national” ideas among tsarist-subject Armenians.  
 Indeed, the Education Ministry and other government agencies feared that certain state 
policies, such as the establishment of national academies, could arouse Armenian nationalism. 
The ministry cautioned that exclusive regulations that deviated from standard laws governing all 
inorodtsy (aliens) would “inevitably be interpreted as backing the national-political aspirations 
that are artificially excited among Armenians by hostile [foreign] policies.”763 Delianov also 
warned that Ottoman Armenian pupils at the proposed academies would infect their tsarist-
subject classmates with anti-Russian sentiments. The result would be an atmosphere where “a 
young generation of Russian Armenians, it is safe to say, would take away from the schools . . . a 
love not for Russia, but for a fantastical future Armenia, and would represent ardent supporters 
of Armenian autonomy, [which is] preached by Russia’s adversaries.”764 
 Russia’s unique sociopolitical and ethnonational circumstances made the implementation 
of national academies impossible, the Education Ministry held. Delianov argued that, unlike in 
“Austria, France, or England,” with their comparably smaller Armenian populations, in Russia 
distinctive factors rendered the establishment of the Khalibov academy politically 
counterproductive.765 Because Russia’s Armenians lived closer to their historical homeland, and 
also closer to the headquarters of their church, they were more likely to develop nationalist 
tendencies as a result of school-induced cultural consciousness. Consequently, the minister 
insisted, Russia had an “obligation” to shield its Armenians from “all the political and religious 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
763RGIA, f. 880, op. 5, d. 278, l. 3. 
764RGIA, f. 880, op. 5, d. 278, l. 3ob. 
765RGIA, f. 880, op. 5, d. 278, ll. 3ob-4ob and also 9ob. 
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machinations of its adversaries.”766 In contrast, Delianov claimed that Western countries could 
afford to promote Armenian national education “without the slightest fears” precisely because of 
the small Armenian populations residing in those states.  
 In reorienting Armenians abroad toward Russia’s orbit, the tsarist Education Ministry 
proposed a different model for reconciling Russo-Armenian domestic and foreign goals. Instead 
of national academies in Russia that recruited Armenians from abroad, Delianov suggested that 
the government provide “material and moral” sponsorship for “schools for the secular education 
of Armenians” in Turkey and Persia.767 Such institutions would strive to counteract the work of 
Western missionaries among non-Russian Armenians. They would promote the political interests 
of the tsarist state and the ecumenical interests of Echmiadzin by maintaining a pro-Russian 
curriculum. Staffed by Russian-Armenian graduates of the empire’s top universities, these 
schools would advertise the benefits of Russian subjecthood among foreign Armenians. 
Moreover, the Education Ministry insisted that Armenians from abroad should be recruited into 
the general-purpose academies and universities of the Russian empire, where they could learn 
alongside their tsarist-subject Armenian compatriots and Russian classmates.768 At such 
institutions, where no distinctions were made along ethnic or national lines, foreign Armenians 
would be inculcated with a spirit of political and cultural devotion toward Russia and toward 
Echmiadzin, spreading it among their compatriots upon returning to their home countries.769 The 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
766RGIA, f. 880, op. 5, d. 278, l. 9ob. 
767RGIA, f. 880, op. 5, d. 278, ll. 5-6. The ministry also proposed establishing “a considerable number” of 
Armenian seminaries throughout Russia.  
768RGIA, f. 880, op. 5, d. 278, ll. 6-7ob. 
769The Education Ministry was confident that Turkish and Persian Armenian communities would send 
their children to be educated in Russia, producing new generations of “zealous devotees and agents of 	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Russian government’s vacillation between the promotion of national, quasi-secular Armenian 
institutions and the cultural assimilation of Armenians reflected the complexity of the state’s 
political encounter with the Armenian diaspora.  
Seesaw Politics  
Driven not by a master plan but by the realities of fluid geopolitics, Alexander II’s 
government simultaneously confronted, co-opted, and cooperated with Armenians. At the same 
time as the state worked with the Armenian Church to stave off the influence of British, French, 
and American missionaries in the Caucasus, it resisted attempts by secular Armenians to form 
benevolent organizations. Tsarist authorities cooperated with Echmiadzin because they feared 
the political consequences of the diffusion of Western faiths among their non-Russian subjects. 
Yet St. Petersburg did not tolerate Armenian social initiatives that could yield political, cultural, 
and economic autonomy.  
 The Armenian Church looked to the government to silence its Russian and Armenian 
critics. In 1856, Professor Stepanos Nazarian of the Lazarev Institute founded in Moscow an 
Armenian-language journal, Hyusisapayl (Aurora Borealis).770 Caucasus Viceroy Bariatinskii 
and Count Alexei Orlov, the head of the Lazarev Institute, backed the journal’s establishment, 
clearing the way for its approval by the Education Ministry.771 But Nazarian, an advocate of 
secularism in Armenian literature and culture, turned his publication into a platform for 
Armenians unhappy with their clergy to voice their grievances. By 1858, prominent senior 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Russia in the Orient, the more they melded with the intellectual life of Russia.” See RGIA, f. 880, op. 5, 
d. 278, l. 10. 
770RGIA, f. 821, op. 7, d. 46, ll. 5-6ob. 
771RGIA, f. 821, op. 7, d. 46, l. 7.   
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clergymen protested to the government about the journal’s “malicious articles, aimed against the 
Armenian-Gregorian clergy in general . . . and sharp, entirely false attacks on some of the 
members of our senior clergy.”772 The tsarist state took these complaints seriously, prompting 
investigations of Hyusisapayl by the Education Ministry and the St. Petersburg censorship 
committee. The government even questioned the individual censors who had cleared the 
questionable articles, forcing them to provide a defense against each accusation.773 Although the 
state finally ruled in Nazarian’s favor and refused to ban his journal, its pursuit of the claims 
made by the Armenian clergy suggests a desire to appease the Armenian Church. 
 More acute examples of cooperation between the Russian state and the Armenian Church 
can be gleaned from the two sides’ partnership against the encroachment of Western religions in 
the early 1860s. In 1861, eighty-one Armenians from Shemakhinskaia province, 
excommunicated by the Echmiadzin patriarch from the Armenian Church for unspecified 
offenses and consequently socially ostracized, sought to convert to Lutheranism.774 While 
Interior Minister Petr Valuev agreed that it was not in the autocracy’s interests to permit their 
conversion, he also criticized the role of Patriarch Mateos in this affair. First, in a letter to 
Viceroy Bariatinskii, Valuev stressed not only the dogmatic kinship of Russian Orthodoxy and 
the Armenian Apostolic Church, but also highlighted the latter’s role in Russian foreign 
policy.775 “The Armenians,” insisted the interior minister, “no matter in which country they live, 	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always see in Russia a defender of their church and nationality—circumstances that have quite 
an important significance for our politics in the Orient.”776 Valuev asserted that Russia had 
always “shielded” Armenians, inside and outside Russia, from the efforts of Western 
missionaries, “who seek, with the strong assistance of Western powers, to spread Catholicism 
and Protestantism among Armenians, the natural result of which will be the strengthening of 
French and English influence at the expense of our standing in the Orient.”777  
Thus what worried tsarist authorities more than the conversion of Armenians to Western 
faiths was the potential subsequent advancements of Western powers into Russia’s imperial 
domains. Valuev believed that, should Armenians embrace Protestantism, “then likely the 
English government will deem it necessary to set up its consuls in several cities of the 
Transcaucasus, and thus will strengthen England’s influence upon the natives of the 
Caucasus.”778 Another consideration played an important role here.  
Valuev insisted that Patriarch Mateos’s intolerant policies had brought this crisis upon his 
church and the Russian government. The interior minister blamed the prelate for driving small 
groups of his own countrymen toward Protestantism. Valuev maintained that Mateos, in a 
zealous effort to combat the encroachment of Western faiths, excommunicated and ostracized 
many Armenians for such transgressions as group scripture reading and prayer, which the 
patriarch interpreted as sympathy toward Protestantism.779 Prior to his election to Echmiadzin, 
Mateos, then the patriarch of Constantinople, drove “thousands” of Armenians to secede from 	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their national church and join Protestantism, which led to English agents pressuring Ottoman 
authorities to establish separate legal protections for non-Apostolic Armenians in Turkey. Now 
at the helm of Echmiadzin, Mateos engaged in “the same spirit of intolerance and religious 
persecution, so contrary to the spirit of Christian teachings and our laws, which permit wide 
tolerance in matters of conscience.”780 Consequently, Valuev believed that the petition of eighty-
one Armenians to convert to Lutheranism was driven less by personal conviction than their 
persecution by Mateos. The minister suggested that the government reject their request but 
“urge” the patriarch to exercise more tolerance toward his flock, including permitting the eighty-
one apostates to return to the church and to congregate for private worship.781 Thus even when 
the state grew frustrated with Echmiadzin’s internal policies, it collaborated with the Armenian 
Church against Western creeds. 
 To be sure, few matters evoked as much cooperation between Echmiadzin and St. 
Petersburg as their opposition to Western proselytizing. Throughout the reign of Alexander II, 
Russian officials and Armenian clerics worked together to prevent Protestant and Catholic 
missionaries from making inroads among Armenians living within and outside the Russian 
empire. Whatever their national origin—Britain, France, Austria, Switzerland, or the United 
States—foreign religious agents represented a simultaneous threat to the autocracy and 
Echmiadzin. Especially after the Polish uprising of 1863, the Russian government viewed the 
conversion of its heterodox subjects to Western faiths as facilitating the growth of foreign 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
780RGIA, f. 1268, op. 10, d. 111, ll. 5ob-6.  
781RGIA, f. 1268, op. 10, d. 111, ll. 7ob-8. As late as September 1864 Armenians from Shemakhinskaia 
guberniia continued to seek permission to convert to Lutheranism, suggesting that this proposal failed. 
 251 
political influence in the tsarist empire’s periphery and beyond.782 Given the close economic 
links and common national consciousness of Russian and non-Russian Armenians, the autocracy 
took note whenever foreign missionaries targeted non-tsarist subject Armenians for proselytism. 
For example, in October 1873, the Russian consul general in the northern Persian city of 
Tabriz alerted St. Petersburg to the arrival of American missionaries.783 Flush with funds and 
apparently enjoying the approval of Persian authorities, the American proselytizers had the 
potential to make significant inroads among the shah’s Armenian subjects. The Russian diplomat 
warned his superiors that local Armenian youths were particularly susceptible to the American 
efforts, insisting that “many young Armenians will easily go over to Protestantism, partly out of 
the precariousness of their religious convictions and partly out of selfish [korystnykh] 
reasons.”784 Russian officials noted that among the recent Armenian converts, three young 
people were tsarist subjects.785 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs alerted Echmiadzin to this 
information, urging Patriarch Kevork to “counter Protestant propaganda among Armenians.”786 
The Catholicos had already replaced the infirm Armenian bishop of Tabriz with a younger and 
better-educated cleric and ordered the renovation of local Armenian schools.787 	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785The Russian consul general was also concerned that local Muslims’ “fanaticism” would not simply 
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The presence of American missionaries riled the Russian government throughout the 
1870s and 1880s. Two organizations in particular equally unnerved tsarist statesmen and 
Armenian clergymen: the American Bible Society (ABS) and the American Missionary Society 
(AMS). Enjoying Washington’s diplomatic backing, these entities targeted Armenians in Russia 
through the distribution of Armenian-language publications. As early as May 1872, the US 
ambassador to Turkey, George H. Boker, asked his Russian counterpart in Constantinople, 
Nikolai Ignatev, to secure the tsarist government’s permission for the ABS to import New 
Testament Bibles into Russia.788 Although the ABS published Bibles in twenty-three languages, 
it sought the right to import only Armenian-language publications into Russia, suggesting that 
the organization focused specifically on this national group. These Bibles were printed in modern 
Armenian vernacular (ashkarabar), accessible to countless non-elites, rather than the classical 
Armenian used by Echmiadzin (grabar).789 Boker arranged for Ignatev to receive a 
representative of the ABS, Isaac Bliss, who provided the Russian envoy with copies of the 
American Bibles.790 In a departure from diplomatic protocol, Boker intimated to Ignatev that the 
ABS possessed “secret methods” for smuggling its publications into Russia, but preferred to 
have official permission.791    
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St. Petersburg rebuffed the American request but corresponded with Echmiadzin to 
ascertain the position of the Armenian Church. Interior Minister Aleksandr Timashev, who 
judged the American appeal to be “inappropriate,” sent copies of the American Bibles to 
Patriarch Kevork and Baron Nikolai, the head of the Caucasus viceroy’s administration.792 
Kevork informed the authorities that the American texts contained “significant differences in the 
content and style” from Apostolic doctrine and found in the American Bibles “omissions of 
entire sentences, resulting in the distortion of teachings of not only the Armenian, but also the 
entire Eastern, church.”793 Baron Nikolai and the ministers in St. Petersburg concurred with 
Kevork’s assessment. By late 1873, the tsarist government had coordinated with the Armenian 
Church to forbid the importation of Armenian-language ABS publications into the Caucasus.      
Concerted Russo-Armenian efforts to stem the work of Western missionaries hardly 
discouraged the US government, which continued to lobby on behalf of American groups. In the 
spring of 1882, the State Department, through its embassy, formally asked the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs to permit the work of the American Bible Society.794 Washington wanted St. 
Petersburg to allow the ABS to distribute its publications in the Caucasus, and also sought the 
tsarist government’s protection of ABS missionaries in Estland province from Lutheran clergy. 
As part of this request, the American chargé d’affaires Wickman Hoffman submitted to 
Russian officials the appeal of the ABS.795 The organization argued that “dispensing with all 
thought of pecuniary gain and desiring to promote good morals and the well-being of mankind,” 	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it engaged in no direct proselytizing.796 It sought to “secure from the Russian government equal 
privileges with those accorded to other citizens of the United States and the subjects of other 
nations in carrying [out] its legitimate business of importing into the empire and offering for sale 
[its publications].” Importantly, the organization identified specifically tsarist-subject Armenians 
as its primary focus, insisting that the Russian government “forbids the Society to do for the 
Armenians of Russia what their brethren in Turkey are very willing to have done for them.”797 
The group and, by extension, the US government, implied that the Christian tsar’s policies 
toward his heterodox Christians fell short of the Muslim sultan’s rule over his own Christian 
minorities. Such accusations were particularly acerbic in the context of Russo-Ottoman 
antagonisms in the wake of the war of 1877-78 and the attendant anti-Armenian climate in the 
Ottoman empire.   
In rejecting the American requests, the Russian state cited the wishes of the Armenian 
Church. Count Dmitrii Tolstoi, the interior minister and chief of the gendarmes, wrote to US 
Ambassador William Hunt in March 1883, that, “under Russian law, Armenian-language works 
of spiritual content, which are imported from abroad, are circulated in the Caucasus only with the 
approval of the Echmiadzin Patriarch Catholicos or the Armenian-Gregorian Synod.”798 
Consequently, Russia’s “prohibition on the distribution in the empire of publications of the 
American Bible Society followed according to the conclusion of the [Echmiadzin] leadership.”799  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
796RGIA, f. 821, op. 5, d. 999, l. 31. 
797RGIA, f. 821, op. 5, d. 999, ll. 31ob-32. 
798RGIA, f. 821, op. 5, d. 999, ll. 57-57ob. 
799RGIA, f. 821, op. 5, d. 999, l. 57ob. 
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Thus the autocracy signaled its recognition of Echmiadzin’s prerogatives within the 
Russian empire. This case stands out from the Russo-Armenian cooperation against British and 
French missionaries because the Russian government had fewer geopolitical reasons to fear the 
encroachment of American influence in the Caucasus. Unlike the Western European powers, the 
United States posed no immediate challenge to Russian hegemony in its southern periphery. 
Until the last two decades of the nineteenth century, Russo-American relations progressed 
amicably, underscored by the sale of Alaska in 1867 and St. Petersburg’s support for the Union 
during the Civil War.800 As the influential newspaper Golos highlighted during the Congress of 
Berlin in 1878, with the possible exception of Germany, “there is no country in the Old or New 
World that elicits as much sympathy from Russia as America.”801 Ties between the two countries 
worsened only toward the latter decades of the century with the rise of anti-Jewish political 
sentiment in Russia and broader ideological differences during the conservatism of Alexander 
III. Thus, with Russia having little to fear from potential American political influence on 
Armenians, its opposition to the Washington-backed efforts of the ABS was informed by its 
desire to appease Echmiadzin and to maintain symbiotic ties with Armenians.  
Yet strife was as much a characteristic of the Russo-Armenian dynamic as partnership. 
The autocracy especially resisted Armenian social initiatives that it feared could yield political or 
economic implications for nominal Armenian autonomy. For example, in 1865 the government 
barred the formation of a private, secular Armenian benevolent society that promoted 
commercial training. A wealthy tsarist-subject Armenian businessman, Nikita Sanasarov, 
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(Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1991). 
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envisioned a philanthropic organization that would “improve the intellectual and material 
wellbeing of Armenians” in the Russian empire.802   
Sanasarov emphasized the political benefits to Russia of ensuring that its Armenian 
subjects flourish, echoing the arguments made decades earlier by the Lazarevs. The businessman 
insisted that the organization he proposed was necessary in order to maintain the superiority of 
tsarist-subject Armenians over their external compatriots, and thus to ensure Russia’s supremacy 
over its imperial rivals in the Orient. He argued that Armenians in Europe and the Near East, 
“from time immemorial have viewed Russia as a patron of the Armenian people and [also view] 
their compatriots living in Russia as those who enjoy the fruits of European civilization the 
most.”803 Yet now Turkey and the Western powers were working to depose Russia as the 
benefactor of the pan-Armenian nation, threatening the tsarist empire’s geopolitical interests. Not 
only had the Porte recently granted new legal protections to its Armenian subjects, but “at the 
same time England endeavors to master the Oriental trade, which Russia from long ago has 
maintained with Asia through Armenians.”804  
To prevent such developments, Sanasarov argued that Russia had to ensure that its 
Armenians remain intellectually and economically more advanced than their compatriots abroad. 
Toward this goal, the benevolent society he proposed would spread among Russian Armenians 
basic knowledge of commerce and business, seeking to maintain the competitive edge of former 
generations of Armenian merchants, which Sanasarov believed had faded among his compatriots 
in Russia. To achieve these aims, his group would fund vocational schools, pay students' tuitions, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
802RGIA, f. 821, op. 7, d. 72, ll. 1-2ob. Citation on l. 2.  
803RGIA, f. 821, op. 7, d. 72, l. 1. 
804RGIA, f. 821, op. 7, d. 72, l. 1ob.  
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and publish business-related booklets.805 The Interior Ministry’s Department of Foreign Faiths 
supported Sanasarov’s petition, agreeing that its implementation was likely to carry political 
advantages for the empire.806 However, Interior Minister Valuev and the minister of education 
disagreed. They questioned the project’s feasibility, doubted the financial stability of the 
program, and criticized the proposal’s vagueness.807 The notion of a privately initiated, secular 
benevolent society that promoted Armenian commercial training proved too radical for the 
autocracy. Because neither the government nor Echmiadzin would control such an enterprise, 
officials feared that it would animate a self-reliant, secular Armenian identity that had fewer 
incentives to work within the tsarist political and social system. 
This became a recurring tension. Seven years later, in 1872, two Armenian businessmen 
from Astrakhan sought to establish an “Astrakhan Armenian Benevolent Society.” The proposed 
organization would “spread moral and intellectual education as well as crafts [training] among 
the poor Armenian children of both sexes in Astrakhan.”808 The two philanthropists had already 
invested over 6,000 rubles into the project, and turned to the regional tsarist authorities to secure 
the final permissions. But the governor of Astrakhan criticized not only the plan but also its 
broader implications. In his assessment of the request for the Interior Ministry, the governor 
argued that the Russian government had historically erred in creating an insular Armenian 
community in Astrakhan that failed to integrate into its social, cultural, and economic 
surroundings. The governor insisted that the imperial state “artificially created in Astrakhan a 	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807RGIA, f. 821, op. 7, d. 72, ll. 12-14. 
808RGIA, f. 1287, op. 43, d. 502, l. 1. 
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privileged Armenian society, the isolation [zamknutost’] and orientation of which, given its legal 
rights, is now an anomaly in our time, which has drawn the attention of the Interior Ministry.”809 
Consequently, the governor opposed the establishment of a new Armenian academy, which 
would “only complicate the relationship between the [local] administration and the Armenian 
society.” St. Petersburg concurred with this assessment, rejecting the proposed organization for 
the penurious children of Astrakhan Armenians.   
The government’s wariness of the solidification of a political Armenian identity within 
and beyond Russia influenced its policies toward tsarist Armenians sending remittances to their 
compatriots abroad. Only with the tsar’s explicit approval were Armenians permitted to send 
financial assistance to their neighboring compatriots. For example, when in early 1871 a large 
fire in Constantinople damaged an Armenian church and several schools and homes, local 
Armenians turned to the Russian ambassador for help.810 Through him, Ottoman Armenians 
petitioned the tsarist government to permit the collection of donations among the Armenians of 
the South Caucasus. The state conferred with the Echmiadzin patriarchy, whose consent led to 
Tsar Alexander II’s approval of the petition. In a different example, in 1874 the Armenian 
patriarch of Constantinople requested the help of his Echmiadzin counterpart for the “starving” 
Armenians of Anatolia.811 The autocracy again permitted Echmiadzin to collect donations among 
tsarist-subject Armenians for the benefit of their compatriots in Turkey.  
Yet when Armenians failed to seek the government’s preliminary permission for such 
activity, the autocracy interpreted it as a sign of something sinister. When, in the spring of 1872, 	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an earthquake in northern Persia damaged several local Armenian communities, they turned to 
Echmiadzin for help.812 Apparently without the precursory nod of the tsarist government, the 
patriarch began collecting donations among Russia’s Armenians for their compatriots in 
Persia.813 Soon Russian officials in Astrakhan alerted the Interior Ministry to this unsanctioned 
campaign. Astrakhan governor N. N. Bippen saw in this development another symptom of 
nascent Armenian nationalism, emphasizing to St. Petersburg that “it will be hardly convenient 
in the future to permit such exclusive donations, [which] artificially buttress claims to the 
existence of an ‘Armenian nation.’”814 The state soon halted the campaign, finding that it 
deviated from the law (Ustav ob upravlenii delami Armiano-Gregorianskoi tserkvi) by failing to 
secure the tsar’s permission for the collection of donations for the benefit of foreign subjects.815    
Such incidents remind us that, throughout the nineteenth century, the tsarist empire 
adapted its methods of rule to govern one part of the Armenian diaspora. The government strove 
to delineate a sphere of influence and affiliation for Russian-subject Armenians, seeking to 
prevent the maturation of a consciousness of a cohesive, multistate nation that transcended 
imperial boundaries. Such a scenario would jeopardize Russia’s borders in the South Caucasus 
and beyond, because Armenians could not be allowed to place their national allegiances above 
their civil subjecthood to the tsarist empire. Neither the domestic secularization of Armenians 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
812RGIA, f. 821, op. 7, d. 143, ll. 2-4ob. 
813The Armenian bishop of Astrakhan claimed that he believed that the state had sanctioned the donation 
campaign. It is unclear whether this is something that the patriarch told his subordinates. The Astrakhan 
bishop argued that he “always considered it my Christian duty to help the needy, inviting my 
congregation to do so [as well], seeing nothing illegal in this good deed.” (Emphasis in the original – 
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 260 
nor their church-supported interimperial bonds could be tolerated if St. Petersburg was to 
continue deploying the Armenian Church for its foreign policy. The dispersed Armenian nation’s 
cultural kinship remained a liability even when the autocracy managed to harness it for its needs. 
To be sure, Russian statesmen recognized these dangers well, emphasizing that self-initiated 
Armenian donation campaigns were against tsarist interests because “they can have an inter-
national significance” (mezhdu narodnoe znachenie).816 With the conflagration of interimperial 
war between Russia and Turkey in 1877-78, such considerations vis-à-vis Armenians intensified.  
Armenians and the Russo-Ottoman War of 1877-78, or “Intentional Misunderstandings 
and Political Prejudices” 
During the pan-European political crisis of 1878, when the West clamored against 
Russia’s gains in the wake of its thrashing of Turkey, the influential St. Petersburg periodical 
Golos voiced the Russian public’s frustrations when it lamented, “The future historian of Europe 
will be stunned by this period’s entanglement of understandings and contradictions. He will find 
nothing similar in the annals of the world, and perhaps will entitle that portion of his work 
‘intentional misunderstandings and political prejudices.’”817 Indeed, complex interimperial, 
interethnic, and intercultural dynamics characterized both the immediate results and the broader 
reverberations of the Russo-Ottoman War of 1877-78.          
Several coalescing factors triggered that war. First, Russia’s defeat two decades earlier in 
the Crimean War rendered revenge an important if implicit aspect of tsarist foreign policy. 
Second, rising nationalism in the Balkans, especially among the southern Slavic subjects of the 
sultan, grew in intensity while their imperial overlord declined in strength. Third, the Serb 
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insurrection against Ottoman rule in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1875-77 aroused as much 
sympathy in St. Petersburg as concern in Western European capitals. While historiographical 
attention often accents the experience of the Balkan Slavs, the role played by Armenians on 
either side of the Russo-Ottoman imperial frontier in the Caucasus deserves examination because 
of its impact upon public opinion and state policy in Russia.   
 Prince Aleksandr Gorchakov orchestrated Russia’s international resurgence after its 
Crimean shaming. Few tsarist officials played as decisive a role in reversing Russia’s diplomatic 
and territorial losses in the 1850s as that statesman did under the reign of Tsar Alexander II. In 
April 1856, the new reformist emperor appointed Gorchakov to succeed Carl Nesselrode as 
foreign minister, ending the latter’s four-decade command of Russian foreign policy. Gorchakov 
took up his task with alacrity, announcing that “the emperor wishes to live in good harmony with 
all governments,” and also issuing his famous declaration: “They say that Russia sulks. Russia 
does not sulk. Russia is collecting herself.”818 As foreign minister (1856-82) and chancellor 
(1867-83), Gorchakov exercised more control over Russian relations with its neighbors than any 
official in the empire. An adroit diplomat and strategist, his policies ensured not only that Russia 
“collected” itself after defeat but also regained its stature as a perennial power in the 
international arena. He faced many challenges.  
 In 1875, rebellions by Ottoman-subject Bulgarians, Bosnians, Herzegovinians, Serbs, and 
Montenegrins challenged the Porte’s hold on the Balkans, leading to Muslim-Christian atrocities 
and raising international concerns about a new clash between the West and Russia over the fate 
of the declining Turkish state. In response to Western fears of Russian advancement, Gorchakov 	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denied that St. Petersburg sought to conquer Ottoman territories. In an October 1876 letter to 
tsarist ambassador in London Petr Andreevich Shuvalov, the chancellor asked rhetorically, 
“What evidence must be provided to English ministers of [our] disinterest, [which is] based not 
on political advantages, but on rationality and common sense?”819  
Yet Gorchakov reiterated Russia’s self-promotion as the patron of Muslim-ruled 
Christians. The chancellor emphasized the “popular and Christian sentiment in Russia, which is 
too close to these countries and associated with them by [too] many ties [to be] limited to 
academic sympathies.”820 The statesman argued that these unique considerations placed upon the 
tsar responsibilities “which His Majesty cannot evade.” But Gorchakov insisted that all of 
Europe had a collective obligation to prevent the bloodshed of innocent Christians, for “the 
Eastern Question is not only a Russian question; it concerns the tranquility of Europe, of the 
world, and common prosperity, mankind, and Christian civilization.”821 The plight of Ottoman 
Christians was more than a token geopolitical tool wielded by a zealous, resurgent empire. 
Throughout the war, tsarist agents not just protected Ottoman Christians but also cooperated with 
them against Turks. These circumstances manifested clearly in the Caucasus theater of war.   
While the majority of the Russo-Ottoman War of 1877-78 took place in the Balkans, 
events in the Caucasus and Anatolia proved no less consequential to the postwar era. The tsar 
placed his brother, Caucasus Viceroy Grand Duke Mikhail Nikolaevich, in command of the war 
effort in the Caucasus. By the end of 1877, over 113,000 tsarist officers and conscripts served in 
the Caucasus Army, outnumbered by the nearly 642,000 men mobilized for service in the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
819RGVIA, f. 485, op. 1, d. 594, l. 1.  
820RGVIA, f. 485, op. 1, d. 594, l. 2. 
821RGVIA, f. 485, op. 1, d. 594, l. 2. 
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European theater.822 The viceroy’s immediate subordinate, who wielded the real authority over 
the military campaign in the Caucasus and Anatolia, was General Count Mikhail Loris-Melikov. 
An Armenian-heritage aristocrat born in Tiflis, Loris-Melikov completed his education in St. 
Petersburg after his expulsion from Moscow’s Lazarev Institute for minor mischief. Decorated 
for his exploits against the highlanders in the North Caucasus and against the Turks during the 
Crimean War, the general also earned the tsarist political elites’ respect for his managerial 
acumen. The viceroy trusted his general, handpicking him to spearhead Russia’s campaign 
against Turkey in the Caucasus and granting him freedom of action. In December 1876, the 
Grand Duke bestowed on Loris-Melikov “complete independence” by excusing him from 
reporting to the War Ministry and the general staff in St. Petersburg.823 Essentially, Loris-
Melikov had only two superiors: the Caucasus viceroy and the tsar. Such carte blanche was 
necessary because the general confronted enemies outside and inside the tsar’s southern domain.  
Some tsarist officials conceived of the Russo-Ottoman conflict as a clash between Islam 
and Christianity, fretting over the allegiance of tsarist-subject Muslims in the Caucasus. Loris-
Melikov warned Viceroy Mikhail Nikolaevich in July 1877 that the Porte “prepares for a 
desperate struggle, seeing it as a battle for the life and death of Islam, and recognizing that in the 
Asia Minor [Malo-Aziiskom] theater of war [it] seeks more important results than a successful 
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defense.”824 The general remained convinced that Turkish forces aimed to invade tsarist territory 
in the South Caucasus, possibly Yerevan guberniia, and to rally local Muslims to their aid, 
igniting a major anti-Russian insurrection.825 Loris-Melikov cautioned Mikhail Nikolaevich that 
“the Turks indeed base their upcoming offensive actions upon the cooperation of the Muslims of 
the Transcaucasus.”826 The general warned the viceroy that Ottoman authorities viewed their 
army in eastern Anatolia as “a lever for raising among their coreligionists [in tsarist territory] a 
tidal wave of Islam.”827 Loris-Melikov was convinced that “the Turks recognize well that their 
success in the Transcaucasus will deliver a blow not only to our dominion [there], but also to all 
our influence in the rest of Asia.”828  
Concerns about a Turkish invasion did not prevent the tsarist army from launching its 
own incursions into Ottoman territory. The most successful of these attacks captured the 
strategically important fortress-city of Kars in November 1877. Two Armenian-heritage tsarist 
commanders played decisive roles in the city’s conquest: Loris-Melikov and General Ivan 
Davidovich Lazarev. The victors took 10,000 Turkish soldiers prisoner and seized large armories 
and supplies.829 With Russian forces in Anatolia and the Balkans advancing rapidly, the Porte 
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sued for peace in the spring of 1878. In early March, the combatants signed an armistice in San 
Stefano, a small village near Constantinople.830  
San Stefano galvanized nationalism among many ethnic groups. The treaty guaranteed an 
autonomous Principality of Bulgaria, allowing it to shed nearly 500 years of Ottoman suzerainty. 
Romania gained its independence while Serbia and Montenegro nearly doubled in size at the 
expense of Ottoman territories. The accord also carried important implications for Armenians, 
because Russia annexed much of the territory historically labeled Western Armenia, including 
the Ottoman provinces of Kars, Batum, Alashkert, Beyazit, Artvin, and Olti. While in most of 
these districts Armenians comprised a national minority, thousands of Ottoman Armenians 
suddenly gained the prospect of tsarist subjecthood. Such dramatic Russian gains unsettled the 
Western powers, which had remained on the sidelines of that imperial clash.  
Politicians and the public from London to Paris to Vienna clamored against what they 
saw as Russia’s unilateral recalibration of the European balance of power. Andrei Kraevskii, an 
influential pioneer of the independent periodical press in imperial Russia,831 noted with 
annoyance that the London newspapers met news of the San Stefano Treaty “quite coolly 
[ves’ma kholodno].”832 The Standard suggested blockading the Dardanelles and occupying 
Egypt, while the Daily Telegraph went as far as urging the government to make “energetic” 
preparations for war. The Daily Telegraph and the Morning Post, Kraevskii alerted St. 
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Petersburg officials, printed “bellicose articles” calling for England to seek “vengeance” for 
Russia’s transgressions.833 Kraevskii also summarized the fears of the Austrian cabinet, which 
objected to the independence and expansion of Bulgaria, predicting that it would “threaten 
Europe with constant disturbances.”834 With the Western European capitals seemingly united in 
their opposition to the Russian gains vis-à-vis the Ottoman empire, German Chancellor Otto von 
Bismarck hosted a conference of the European powers in the summer of 1878. 
The Congress of Berlin, held from mid-June to mid-July 1878, sought to reconcile 
Russia’s defeat of Turkey with the geopolitical realities of the entire European continent. At the 
core of the debate were the implications of the Eastern Questions, yet again threatening to pit the 
West against Russia because of the Porte’s weakened hold on its vast domains. Britain, France, 
Germany, and Austria-Hungary aimed to truncate the tsar’s gains at San Stefano, fearing the 
geopolitical reverberations of Russia’s westward expansion. The added natural resources, 
territorial annexations, and population absorptions stipulated at San Stefano rendered Russia an 
indelible leviathan, upending the post-Crimean European balance of power. 
To the Russian public and statesmen, San Stefano was the rightful rejoinder to the 
injustices of the Crimean War, when the Western powers backed Turkey against Russia and 
imposed costly concessions upon St. Petersburg. When, in March 1878, news broke that the 
Europeans planned to debate the provisions of San Stefano, Golos exclaimed, “for Russian 
nature, the prolonged paroxysm of this crisis, incessantly revived in the form of various 
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conferences and protocols, is considerably more unbearable than the horrors of war.”835 The 
periodical echoed the sentiments of many officials when it insisted confidently: 
No European power, not even England, will dare to reduce that which we gained on the 
path toward the liberation of the Christian tribes and acquired in the historical process of 
declining Turkish authority on the Balkan Peninsula. No one has the right to reduce the 
terms of our compensation that we have obtained from Turkey for war casualties.836 
 
Golos charged Europe with apathy toward the plight of Ottoman Christians, including 
Armenians. The newspaper underscored this factor as one justification for tsarist actions against 
the sultan’s empire, reminding its readers that “Russia alone has shouldered the whole gigantic 
struggle against the enemies of the Christian religion and European civilization; the Russian 
people alone have paid with floods of blood for the liberation of the Christian population on the 
Balkan Peninsula, and only through a new war against Russia can she be forced to relinquish her 
achievements!”837 Private readers’ letters to the periodical also expressed dismay at Europe’s 
perceived preoccupation with the actions of Russia rather than Turkey, accusing Western 
diplomats of overlooking the Porte’s abuse of its Christians.838 
To be sure, the Russian public echoed the government’s focus on the conditions of the 
sultan’s minorities, and the affairs of Ottoman Armenians prompted no less outcry than the 
plight of the Balkan Slavs. Golos, among the most vociferous unofficial Russian advocates for 
the Armenian cause, reached over 22,000 subscribers on the eve of the war in 1877, securing its 	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position among the imperial capital’s esteemed dailies.839 Throughout the spring and summer of 
1878, the newspaper not only covered European diplomatic negotiations but also rallied the 
tsarist government and public in support of the Ottoman Armenians.  
Golos voiced Russia’s insistence on the protection of non-Slavic Christians within the 
Ottoman domain. St. Petersburg sought not “conquests at the expense of its vanquished enemy,” 
not the “destruction of the Ottoman empire,” and not the “total annihilation of every follower of 
the Prophet.”840 Instead, Russia demanded the “complete, definitive liberation of Christians, but 
not only Slavs, as they think in Western Europe.”841 This clear reference to Armenians and 
Greeks was intended to reaffirm Russia’s support for the Ottoman Armenian population and 
intended as much for domestic consumption as external declaration. Indeed, as the Congress of 
Berlin approached, Golos grew increasingly vocal in its support of the Armenian cause. When, in 
April 1878, Circassian and Kurdish irregular cavalry raided several Armenian villages in eastern 
Anatolia, the Constantinople-based correspondent of Golos reported that “the Porte has paid no 
attention” to these abuses and that Ottoman Armenians “remain in the most critical position.”842 
Citing the legal provisions of the San Stefano Treaty, the journalist urged the tsarist government 
to “take upon itself the protection of these unfortunate Armenians.” 
Russian officials—in occupied Ottoman territories, in the Caucasus, and in St. 
Petersburg—remained cognizant of the humanitarian, political, and logistical challenges posed 
by the Armenian dimension of the Eastern Question. As self-declared protectors of the sultan’s 	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Christians, Russians had assumed a responsibility to ensure the welfare of Armenians, who, in 
turn, had eagerly accepted the promises of tsarist patronage. But no clear policy dictated the 
resettlement of threatened Ottoman Armenian communities to Russian territory, and the post-San 
Stefano political uncertainty yielded an ambiguous climate in the Caucasus and occupied 
Anatolia. As early as March 1878, tsarist officers in occupied Ottoman territories reported that 
San Stefano “was greeted especially joyfully by the local Christian population, in hopes that the 
territory we have occupied will enter into the domain of our empire and that thus they will be 
forever liberated from Turkish rule.”843 But with growing rumors of the Russian army’s 
imminent withdrawal from occupied territories, local Christians, mainly Armenians, were 
“convinced that the Turks will not forgive them the sympathy they have demonstrated toward us 
since our entry” into Ottoman lands. This fear of retribution compelled a “significant portion of 
Christians to wish to resettle into our domains, with the adoption of Russian subjecthood.”844 
Over 2,000 families had already expressed this intention to Russian officers, and were “only 
waiting for our instructions.”    
When no Russian permission for relocation came, Ottoman Armenians prepared for 
unsanctioned immigration. Tsarist agents in Erzurum reported in April 1878 that local Christians 
intended to follow the withdrawing Russian army, without formal approval.845 Although officers 
took “all measures to prevent” the relocation, desperate petitioners arrived at the Russian camp 
“daily,” declaring their intention to move eastward with or without authorization. Tsarist agents 
warned their superiors that many families and “perhaps entire communities” of Ottoman 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
843RGVIA, f. 15322, op. 1, d. 18, l. 11. 
844RGVIA, f. 15322, op. 1, d. 18, l. 11ob. 
845RGVIA, f. 15322, op. 1, d. 18, l. 40-40ob.   
 270 
Christians wished to become Russian subjects. These Armenians and other Christians had “most 
compromised themselves against the Turkish government through their complete hospitality 
[polnoe radushie] toward Russian troops during the war,” and were “convinced that no articles 
of peace treaties . . . will protect them from the abuse of Muslims.”846 Russian officers 
emphasized that the refugees were prepared to settle in tsarist domains under any conditions, 
waiting for neither logistical nor financial preparations to be made, because they insisted that 
even a life of penury would surpass the “oppression” they were certain to experience after the 
departure of tsarist forces. As a sign of their determination, some Ottoman Armenian farmers 
refused to sow their fields, confident of their imminent relocation.847   
Russian officials in the captured Ottoman territories struggled to prevent an unauthorized 
exodus of local Armenians into the tsarist South Caucasus. The tsar’s officers insisted to 
Armenians that their immigration to Russia could be sanctioned not by local military agents but 
by the highest levels of the government in St. Petersburg.848 Because signs indicated that 
thousands of would-be refugees were ready to flood the valleys and plains of the South 
Caucasus, Russian authorities searched for ways to delay the resettlement until proper diplomatic 
negotiations and logistical preparations could be carried out. One exasperated junior officer 
reported to his superiors that he was “constantly riding around, persuading and reassuring 
[Armenians], but nothing works, they all repeat the same thing: that they will be lost without 
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[Russian] troops.”849 While the tsarist officialdom delayed its permission for Armenians to 
relocate from Turkey to Russia, the Petersburg press voiced its support for Western Armenians.  
No major periodical advocated as much for the Armenian cause during the 1878 crisis as 
the newspaper Golos. It rallied Russian society and the state to rescue the sultan’s hapless 
Christians and to fulfill its promises to Armenians. On the eve of the Congress of Berlin, the 
paper emphasized the antiquity and ecumenical identity of Armenians, labeling that nation “one 
of the civilized nations of antiquity, part of the Greek sphere of ancient civilization.”850 The 
Armenian nation’s early adoption of Christianity “distinguished it from the orbit of Asiatic 
peoples, placed it in contradiction to their worldview, and aroused [their] hatred.” Branding 
Armenians “an outpost of Christianity in Asia,” Golos portrayed them as the first redoubt against 
the attacks of “the enemies of Christianity,” implying that Armenians had earned special 
gratitude from the “Christian world.” The paper also insisted that the Armenians of Anatolia 
“reside upon their native soil, within the confines of ancient Armenia.” Supposedly 
outnumbering Turks 2,000,000 to 900,000 in Anatolia, Armenians enjoyed no advantages of 
numerical majority, instead falling victim to a lethargic regime and marauding neighbors:  
The living conditions of Armenians under Turkish rule present an outrageous 
[vopishchuiu] picture: Armenians live among a predatory, armed population of Kurds, 
and not only do not receive Turkish authorities’ protection from Kurdish raids, which are 
usually condoned by those authorities, but also are deprived of the ability to defend the 
honor and dignity of their family [and] the sanctity of their temples, because they are 
forbidden from carrying weapons.851   
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Golos also stressed that Armenians found no relief in the Ottoman judicial system, where no 
Christian could hope for a favorable result without the corroborating testimony of a Muslim 
witness, a rare occurrence because the Koran prohibits Muslims from testifying against 
coreligionists. The newspaper also enumerated the ways in which Ottoman Armenians enjoyed 
no hereditary property rights, unlike their Muslim neighbors. The Russian empire, the periodical 
insisted, had a moral responsibility to act.  
 Golos argued that Armenians had been loyal Russian allies for generations, assembling 
militias and serving as senior officers in charge of Russian armies in past wars. While the tsar’s 
Armenians served in his military, the sultan’s Armenians demonstrated overt “sympathy” toward 
Russia, for which they repeatedly paid with blood. “But never has Turkish rage against 
Armenians reached the stage that it did in this war,” insisted Golos, “the systematic 
extermination of Armenians now constitutes the state doctrine of the Porte, hekmeti khiukiumet 
(state secret), as Turkish rulers say.” The periodical dismissed the nominal reforms in Anatolia 
promised at San Stefano, arguing that they were too vague and insufficient to provide tangible 
security to local Christians. Golos echoed the fears of Ottoman Armenians when it argued that 
Muslim massacres of Christians were certain to take place upon the tsarist army’s withdrawal.  
To prevent such tragedies, Golos urged Russian diplomats at the Congress of Berlin to 
secure from the Porte concrete guarantees of protection for Ottoman Armenians. Most 
importantly, the periodical demanded the establishment of an “autonomous” Western Armenia 
within the Ottoman empire, analogous to the concessions granted to Bulgaria and other Ottoman 
subjects in the Balkans. “Armenia has the right,” declared Golos, “to receive the same autonomy 
and the same reforms as will be introduced in Bosnia, Herzegovina and other Christian provinces 
of European Turkey.” The paper emphasized both past and future Russo-Armenian cooperation: 
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Thus, Armenians would receive from us a just reward for that assistance, which they have 
provided to us in all of our wars with Turkey and Persia from the times of Peter the 
Great, and for those hardships and persecutions, which they have consequently endured at 
the hands of their Muslim rulers. Their sympathy toward us would gain a real foundation, 
and there is no doubt that the sympathy of such an intelligent, diligent, and large 
population of Asia Minor [Maloi Azii] can prove in time to be quite important.852      
 
Thus the St. Petersburg press announced its unequivocal support for the Armenians of Turkey, 
urging the tsarist state to make the Armenian cause a key demand of its negotiations in Berlin. 
Despite the fact that Western European pressure at the Congress of Berlin greatly reduced 
Russia’s gains at San Stefano, dashing any dreams of an autonomous Western Armenia, the 
vociferous pleas of Golos underscore the Russian public’s support for the plight of Ottoman 
Armenians. Golos would not have printed such articles if its editors did not believe that their 
readers would be receptive to them. The newspaper took a liberal stance on the Eastern Question, 
urging a diplomatic solution that would yield a national home for Armenians. At a time when 
Bulgaria and other Slavic nations attained the contours of statehood, such as constitutions, the 
Russian liberal public included the non-Slavic Armenians in its polemics. Rather than the 
solidarity of ethnic kinship that drove pan-Slavism, liberal Russians’ support for Western 
Armenians was grounded in notions of religious kinship and political synergy. Although this 
agenda did not match tsarist policy, it vocalized liberals’ support for the Armenian cause. 
Ottoman Armenians learned of Golos’s efforts and expressed their gratitude in August 1878. 
 Several weeks after the disappointing results of the Berlin Congress became known, 285 
Armenians from Erzurum signed a letter to the editors of Golos. The representatives thanked the 
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newspaper and, by extension, the Russian public for its support of Ottoman Armenians.853 They 
conveyed their broader community’s “feelings of immeasurable gratitude for those words of 
truth and defense, which you express on the pages of Golos.” In a clear reciprocity toward the 
paeans of the Russian periodical, Ottoman Armenians underscored that a “people oppressed for 
centuries sheds tears of gratitude to the tsar-liberator, whose all-imperial will breaks the chains 
of slavery, which barbarism has placed upon the humble followers of Christ’s teachings.”854  
 Thus the sultan’s Armenian subjects signaled their acceptance of the themes—
ecumenical identity and minority oppression—that Golos and other Russian sympathizers 
promoted as justifications of tsarist support for the Armenian cause. Ottoman Armenians 
embraced the often-sensationalized and melodramatic Russian characterizations of their plight, 
which mixed facts and apocryphal accounts. In juxtaposing their “slavery” and Christianity 
against the “barbarism” and ostensibly Muslim oppression committed by their imperial rulers 
and neighbors, Ottoman Armenians adroitly evoked the very themes that galvanized the Russian 
public and statesmen. Such efforts bore tangible fruit.  
Ottoman Armenian immigration into Russian territory started before the end of the war 
and the finalization of the new Russo-Ottoman boundary at the Congress of Berlin. Although 
Russian officers in Anatolia were often confused about their orders, the state’s decision to 
abstain from forcefully preventing the immigration of Ottoman Armenians evinces St. 
Petersburg’s decision. The exodus started as early as June 1877, when almost 2,000 Armenian 
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families accompanied the first withdrawing units of the tsarist army.855 Other groups of refugees 
snuck into the South Caucasus without Russian permission, prompting the governor of Yerevan 
to complain in July 1877 that “whole crowds” of Ottoman subjects had infiltrated his district. 
Soon Armenians from Erzurum, Alashkert, and other provinces moved en masse to newly 
annexed Kars and other former Ottoman districts.856  
By the fall of 1878, the Russian empire formally opened the gates for Ottoman 
Armenians to settle in the South Caucasus. Several semi-official organizations sprang up in the 
region to facilitate the newcomers’ settlement. The refugees received 20 rubles per family as 
well as food and lumber for construction.857 The authorities granted supplemental financial 
support, usually an additional 15 rubles, to the most destitute families. The governor of Yerevan 
guberniia estimated that 50,000 rubles would be required to support the incoming refugees over 
the winter of 1878-79, suggesting that up to 2,500 families were expected.858 While most of the 
funding came from the imperial treasury, the refugees also received financial support from 
private donors. The Yerevan Committee for the Relief of the Immigrants from Turkey, for 
example, collected money from local residents, and its benefactors included the governor of 
Yerevan guberniia, M. I. Roslavlev, who donated a modest 50 rubles to the cause.859 Other 
sources of donation included newspapers and individuals in other parts of the Russian empire 	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and beyond, including Moscow, Kiev, Simferopol, Novorossiisk, and even Bulgaria. From mid-
August 1877 to early January 1878, the Yerevan Committee for the Relief of the Immigrants 
from Turkey collected 4,213 rubles, and also distributed to the refugees the 3,835 rubles 
collected by its counterpart, the Tiflis Committee, bringing the total amount of private donations 
in that four and half month period to over 8,000 rubles.860   
The immigrants settled in existing towns and also established new communities, such as 
Novobaiazet in Yerevan guberniia. The partial archival record can be useful for gaining a 
general understanding of the immigration scale. By January 1878, early in the Ottoman 
Armenian immigration process but one of the few dates for which collective population data is 
available, there were 2,511 individual refugees (298 families) in Echmiadzin uezd,861 2,509 
individuals (307 families) in Novobaiazet uezd,862 582 individuals (74 families) in Yerevan 
uezd,863 and 300 individuals (43 families) in Surmalinskii uezd.864 These statistics are incomplete 
not only for January 1878, because Ottoman Armenians settled in other districts too, but also 
exclude the subsequent waves of immigrants that arrived throughout 1878. By July 1878, 7,018 
Ottoman subjects, mostly Armenians, lived in Yerevan guberniia, receiving state assistance.865   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
860NAA, f. 94, op. 1, d. 208, ll. 10-3. Data on ll. 13ob-16ob suggests that the Yerevan Committee 
distributed over 7,000 rubles between August and January, but it is not clear whether this amount 
included the money collected in Tiflis.  
861NAA, f. 94, op. 1, d. 207, ll. 671-78. 
862NAA, f. 94, op. 1, d. 207, ll. 683-690ob. 
863NAA, f. 94, op. 1, d. 207, ll. 667-669ob. 
864NAA, f. 94, op. 1, d. 207, ll. 680-81. 
865NAA, f. 94, op. 1, d. 208, ll. 373-92. 
 277 
In facilitating the immigration of Ottoman Armenians into its domain, Russia sought to 
fulfill the promises of protection that it had issued to Armenians for over a century. The state 
took advantage of this resettlement by bolstering its image as the defender of oppressed Christian 
minorities, thus continuing to exert political influence beyond its borders. Unlike the first half of 
the nineteenth century, when Armenians from Persia and Turkey were recruited as colonizers of 
newly annexed and under-populated lands, in the 1870s new motives drove the Russian 
absorption of foreign-subject Armenians. The immigrants became less frontier colonizers than 
kindred allies returning under the aegis of their patron.  
Conclusion 
 Russia’s encounter with the Armenian diaspora presented both opportunities and threats 
to St. Petersburg’s political and diplomatic ambitions. Through governing one part of the vast 
diaspora, the tsarist state exercised leverage in the internal affairs of its rivals. Ottoman 
Armenians’ sympathy toward Russia also allowed the autocracy further to weaken Turkey by 
cooperating with the sultan’s Armenians and by transplanting that important element of the 
regional economy from eastern Anatolia.  
In the Russo-Armenian encounter under Alexander II, Armenians had as many reasons to 
cooperate with Russia and to seek its patronage as they had to fear its imperial grip. The 
Armenian Church recognized that without the state’s help Western missionaries threatened its 
flock and its prosperity. Even the attacks of Orthodox Russians upon the Armenian faith often 
ended in the state’s backing of Echmiadzin. In this period, as throughout much of the nineteenth 
century, Armenians gained advantages from their association with the Russian empire. The 
security and economic opportunities provided by tsarist patronage outweighed the absence of an 
independent Armenian homeland for many tsarist, and even foreign, Armenians.  
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Yet the autocracy remained unprepared to provide the liberal concessions (to Russians or 
to foreigners) that Golos and some Armenians demanded. It was not in the government’s 
interests to precipitate consciousness of a cohesive, multistate nation that transcended imperial 
boundaries. Such a scenario would jeopardize Russia’s borders in the South Caucasus and 
beyond, because Armenians could not be allowed to place their national allegiances above their 
civil subjecthood to the tsarist empire. Consequently, the authorities suppressed private, secular 
Armenian institutions, prohibited the unsanctioned collection of donations for foreign subjects, 
and suspected ties between the Russian revolutionary movement and inchoate Armenian 
nationalism. As the next chapter demonstrates, in the last two decades of the nineteenth century, 
Russo-Armenian relations became more acrimonious in response to the combined impact of the 
rise of Armenian nationalism and Russian political conservatism under Alexander III.  
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CHAPTER 5: TSARIST PERCEPTIONS OF ARMENIANS IN LATE IMPERIAL 
RUSSIA 
“The tsar of a giant state declares war on a tiny nation. But why are we surprised.” 
 
   -Armenian pamphlets, 1885 
 
“Permission for Turkish Armenians to resettle in our territory can be justified only by a 
sense of humanitarianism. But in state matters, such considerations can have but a secondary 
influence.” 
         -Minister of Foreign Affairs Girs, 1888 
 
A bloodied monarch emerged, dazed and disoriented, from his crippled carriage. A bomb 
blast had wounded him, killed his driver, and created confusion. Moments later, before the tsar’s 
retinue had time to react, a well-aimed bomb landed at the monarch’s feet, mortally wounding 
him. The assassination of Tsar Alexander II on 1 March 1881 ended the reign of an enigmatic 
ruler both lauded as a liberator and derided as an autocrat. His successor, Alexander III, inherited 
a Russia dangerously fragmented along social, political, and ethnic lines. Two decades after 
Alexander II had freed the serfs, created a modern judiciary, instituted a draft army, and 
reformed provincial administration, Russian society remained at odds with the forces shaping 
and reshaping the modern world.  
Alexander III (1881-94) saw in his father’s assassination proof of what he had felt for 
years: the liberalization of imperial Russia over the past two decades had weakened the 
institution of the autocracy to dangerous levels. The young monarch vowed not to repeat his 
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father’s mistakes and to reassert the tsar’s ultimate control over the state.866 Looking beyond his 
father’s example to the reign of his grandfather, Tsar Nicholas I (1825-55), Alexander III and his 
camarilla renounced the Great Reforms as an unjustifiable and dangerous deviation from the 
“Orthodoxy, Autocracy, Nationality” trajectory of the prereform era. The new tsar maintained 
that Russia’s western tilt since the Petrine era had squandered the glory of Muscovy and had bred 
the westernized society that produced regicidal radicals. Alexander’s remedy for these ills relied 
on coerced Russification, a zealous Orthodox Church, a centralized bureaucracy, and an 
empowered tsar.867    
The autocratic counter-reform camp clashed not only with the motley revolutionaries and 
radicals of the era, including the Narodnaia Volia (People’s Will) terrorists who had carried out 
Alexander II’s assassination, but also with liberal members of the state bureaucracy. The 
resulting atmosphere revealed that different layers of Russian society adjusted to the pace of 
modernization at different rates. This circumstance emerged clearly during the crisis of the late 
imperial government, when several prominent officials resigned to protest the new policies. This 
event marked “the direct outcome of the failure of old and new loci of power to move in 
synchrony with each other and with the forces of modernization.”868  
 Alexander III distrusted the liberal, westernized aristocracy and the professionalized 
bureaucracy, charging the latter with attempting to establish a “sovereign bureaucracy” that 
transformed the position of the tsar into little more than a sinecure. But his opposition to the 	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Great to the Abdication of Nicholas II (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006), 237. 
868Whelan, Alexander III and the State Council, 10. 
 281 
legacy of the Great Reforms went beyond egotistical anxiety. According to historian Heide 
Whelan, Alexander believed that the progress of the state and the nation could best be guaranteed 
under the watchful eye of a powerful autocrat, unrestricted in his authority by law or 
cumbersome legislatures. At the same time, the tsar recognized that his domain had grown too 
unwieldy to be run by an individual, acknowledging the necessity of a large bureaucracy.  
 Although promptly dismissed by the new tsar in 1881, few state officials exemplified the 
opposition to Alexander’s conservatism as closely as Interior Minister Mikhail Loris-Melikov. 
After his exploits during the Russo-Ottoman War of 1877-78, he rose to political prominence in 
the imperial capital, joining the State Council and, in February 1880, heading the Supreme 
Administrative Commission. Tasked with responding to the rising tide of social discontent 
among Russian intellectuals, Loris-Melikov received a jarring reminder of the political 
situation’s volatility during an attempt on his life just eight days after his promotion.869  
A reformist monarchist, if not a liberal, Loris-Melikov eschewed repressive tactics in 
remedying the political and social ills facing the state. In April 1880, he called for the 
reevaluation of tax obligations; the reorganization of local administration; the expansion of civil 
rights for such groups as the Old Believers; changes to registration requirements, education, and 
even the abolition of the notorious Third Section.870 He also collaborated with other reform-
minded officials, such as Minister of Finance Aleksandr Abaza, to repeal the unpopular salt tax, 
relax press censorship, and tighten exile regulations. Alexander II approved these measures 
and—based at least in part on Loris-Melikov’s recommendation—removed the conservative 
Education Minister, D. A. Tolstoi. By August 1880, Loris-Melikov rose to Interior Minister and 	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Chief of the Gendarmes, becoming the second-most powerful man in the empire. On the morning 
of 1 March 1881, Loris-Melikov met with the tsar to discuss the formation of a commission 
modeled on the one that two decades earlier had engineered the Great Reforms. Hours later, 
Alexander II was mortally wounded. His successor proved less open to the Armenian 
statesman’s projects, compelling him and other like-minded officials, including Abaza and War 
Minister Miliutin, to resign within months. 
For many of the tsarist empire’s millions of non-Russian subjects, Alexander III’s reign 
brought hardship. Alexander’s pursuit of the Muscovy model, with its ostensibly unified ethnic 
and religious groups ruled by a strong Orthodox tsar, clashed with the modern reality of a 
multinational empire. The hitherto tolerated expressions of ethnic and national identity—
language, religion, education, and institutions—were increasingly deemed a threat to the unity 
and vitality of the rejuvenated heir to the Muscovy throne. Informed by the example of his 
grandfather’s Russification policies in the Western borderlands, Alexander III presented the 
renewed effort as a “defense of the national character and sovereign rights of the monarchy and 
the Russian people.”871 Within months of Alexander’s ascension, anti-Jewish pogroms rocked 
parts of Ukraine and Russia’s two capitals.872 Although the government did not instigate or 
promote these riots, new Interior Minister Nikolai Ignat’ev made clear that Jews—the 
“conquered foe”—had received too much liberty from the previous tsar.873  
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 This domestic political climate soon affected the state’s foreign relations. As early as the 
summer of 1881, Russia’s secret police turned their attention to the Russian émigré dissidents 
residing in Western Europe. Although Russia’s own radicals had become well entrenched in St. 
Petersburg and Moscow by this time, some of the most active social revolutionaries engaged in 
recruitment, publishing, and fundraising from the relative safety of western capitals. Replacing 
the Third Section, the new Department of Police of the Interior Ministry (also known as 
Okhranka), emphasized in 1881 that “the secret and systematic surveillance of Russian émigrés 
abroad constitutes the main task of the Russian state police.”874 Russia’s primary partner in these 
endeavors was Austria-Hungary, and the two empires negotiated new agreements that tightened 
customs and border monitoring as early as August 1881.875 Six months later, Russian police 
established links with local law enforcement officials in Galicia, Bukovina, and Krakow.876 
 Russia’s foreign policy in the Near East also evolved under Alexander III. Having 
defeated the sultan’s army in the war of 1877-78, the tsar controlled Kars and Ardahan 
provinces, adding over 100,000 new Armenian subjects to his realm.877 Despite the limits 
imposed at the Congress of Berlin, Russia continued to promote itself as the protector of 
Ottoman Christians. The plight of Western Armenians elicited the attention of the Russian state, 
public, and Eastern Armenians. As historian Janet Klein has shown, Ottoman officials mobilized 
Kurdish militias in the late nineteenth century to maintain control over Armenian-populated 
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regions and to provide a redoubt against Russia. Klein has contended that “Kurdish chiefs who 
signed on as militia members . . . appropriated the land and resources of their neighbors, many of 
whom were Armenian.”878 By the 1890s, “as the movement spread and as armed activities 
became more prevalent in the years following the initial recruitment for the Hamidiye, the anti-
Armenian component of the Hamidiye’s raison d’etre was further confirmed in the eyes of its 
creators.”879  
The Rise of Armenian Nationalism 
The manifestations of what Russians lumped under the label “Armenian nationalism” 
took on multiple forms that were not always distinct to tsarist imperial agents who often 
bemoaned the ambiguity of various Armenian political agendas.880 At their broadest level, the 
Armenian political movements of the Russian empire in the last quarter of the nineteenth century 
espoused one of three objectives. The most prominent force, because of its size and vitality, 
included elements in Eastern Armenia who expressed outrage at the real and imagined 
mistreatment of the Western Armenian population of neighboring Anatolia and sought to redress 
this through violence directed at Turks and Kurds. Another group of Armenians, a distinct 
minority of nationalists, called for the establishment of an autonomous Armenian republic within 
the Russian empire, one that would enjoy the contours of statehood but also benefit from 
Russia’s protection. The most radical faction of Armenian irredentists strove to unite Western 
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and Eastern Armenia to establish a sovereign nation-state. This internal diversity of Armenian 
nationalism challenged Russian authorities, who remained especially unclear about the goals and 
strategies of the groups crossing into Turkey from the South Caucasus. 
The most visible expression of Armenian “nationalism” in this era, the cross-border raids 
of Eastern Armenians into Ottoman territory, eludes neat categorization into conventional 
definitions of nationalism. On the one hand, the tsar’s Armenians evinced cultural camaraderie 
with the sultan’s Armenians. The two groups spoke the same language, albeit with distinct 
regional dialects, worshiped according to the same dogma, and traced their origins to a once-
unified political state. Thus, they fulfilled Ernest Gellner’s requirements for a “consciousness of 
a shared cultural, religious or territorial identity.”881 However, they satisfied only two of the 
three components proposed by John Breuilly: they demonstrated “an explicit and peculiar 
character” and a primacy of self-interests and values, but did not enjoy “political sovereignty.”882  
On the other hand, the majority of Russia’s Armenians did not seek to fuse Western and 
Eastern Armenia into an independent nation-state. Thus, although Michael Hechter’s definition 
of “unification nationalism” is probably the closest conceptual framework for understanding 
Armenians’ actions, this lack of a large-scale independence discourse poses serious challenges to 
the traditional conviction that each nationalism seeks an independent homeland.883 Indeed, even 
the most prominent Armenian revolutionary party of the era, the Armenian Revolutionary 
Federation, or Dashnaktsutiun, conspicuously eschewed calls for the formation of an Armenian 
state. While some of their contemporary counterparts, such as the Hunchakian Revolutionary 	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Party, sought the establishment of an independent Armenia under the umbrella of international 
socialism, the Dashnaks sought the implementation of long-promised political, social, and 
economic reforms in Ottoman Armenia.  
As a result, my use of the term “nationalism” to refer to the actions of Russian Armenians 
in the late nineteenth century looks to the definition proposed by theorist Azar Gat.884 His 
challenge of the modernist thesis of nationhood emphasizes the deep role of ethnicity, which he 
defines as the congruence of shared kinship and culture, in the formation of nationalism. The role 
of a shared religion among non-elites from Egypt to China, evinced in the mobilization of 
preindustrial and illiterate masses to rebuke external threats, demonstrates to Gat the examples of 
premodern “imagined communities” that Benedict Anderson overlooked. Gat rejects the 
modernist Eurocentric arguments of Gellner, Kohn, Hayes, Deutsch, Hobsbawm, and other 
theorists, who find the roots of nationalism in the social and political reverberations of the 
French and Industrial revolutions. Gat disputes Gellner’s argument that a congruence of state and 
ethnicity—his definition of nation—hardly existed before the modern era, and maintains instead 
that “sweeping processes of modernization, rather than inaugurating nationalism, simultaneously 
released, transformed, and enhanced it, while greatly increasing its legitimacy.”885 
Gat’s emphasis on the role of a shared religious (and more broadly cultural) identity and 
the recognition of a collective kinship matches Eastern Armenians’ actions in the last quarter of 
the nineteenth century. Armenians defied tsarist laws and attacked Turks and Kurds not in hopes 
of wresting an independent Armenia from its two imperial overlords but rather out of a shared 
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cultural bond and ethnonational solidarity that sought to protect Ottoman Armenians from real 
and imagined abuses. Indeed, some Armenian nationalist hardliners claimed to have been so 
moved by the calls of the Russian press to support the oppressed Christians of eastern Anatolia, 
that they interpreted this as a sign of the tsarist state’s tacit endorsement of its Armenian 
subjects’ cross-border raids. The gestation of Armenian nationalism, analogous to the examples 
elucidated by Gat, did not simply emerge or awaken at the end of the nineteenth century in 
response to mass media advancements or repressive state policies. Rather, a collective sense of 
shared culture and common identity had always existed within that nation’s divided communities 
of the Russian, Ottoman, and Persian empires, but became more pronounced only in the late 
nineteenth century as external threats decreased and the Russo-Armenian bond began to fade.    
Yet, before the rise of radical Armenian political parties in the late 1880s and early 
1890s, a liberal and nationalist Armenian intelligentsia defined the search for national liberation 
in the late 1870s. While some discontented Russian youths turned toward the peasant socialism 
of the narodovol’tsy, their Armenian counterparts remained more enticed by the moderate, 
reform-oriented proposals exemplified by the influential Tiflis newspaper Mshak (Tiller) and its 
long-time editor, Grigor Artsruni (1872-92). Mshak “promoted a pro-Russian attitude among 
Armenians, advocated economic development along capitalist lines, and polemicized against the 
newly fashionable doctrines of socialism. Reform rather than revolution was the preferred way to 
improve Armenian life in Russia.”886 At the same time, Artsruni rallied his compatriots across 
the imperial border against the injustices of the Ottoman government, urging the sultan’s 
Armenians in July 1876 to follow the example of the rebellious Balkan Slavs: “It will be a 
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disgrace for Armenians if they do not raise their voice in defense of their rights, at a time when 
other Ottoman subject nations sacrifice themselves, spilling their blood for freedom.”887  
Fissures in the Russo-Armenian relationship began to form even before Alexander III 
took the throne. Some of the earliest reports from Russian officials in the South Caucasus 
investigating illicit Armenian organizations trickled into St. Petersburg ministries already in the 
mid-1870s. Among the first of these, on 8 April 1875, the head of the Yerevan Provincial 
Gendarme Administration (gubernskoe zhandarmskoe upravlenie, hereafter GZhU) alerted the 
Third Section that in Aleksandrapol’ uezd (district), police had uncovered a shadowy circle run 
by young Armenians.888 Intercepted missives revealed that the group had begun to “contemplate 
matters beneficial for the [Armenian] nation, excluding government matters, which are 
prohibited.”889 The circle’s members perceived its explicitly nonrevolutionary ethos to be so 
innocuous that they announced its establishment in regional Armenian newspapers. Yet at least 
one official report from May 1875 charged that the group was “established by Armenians with 
the aim of raising among their coreligionists a patriotic spirit and achieving independence.”890 A 
search of the apartment belonging to the group’s leader, Ambartsum Balasaniants, revealed 
literature published abroad and smuggled into the Russian empire, as well as patriotic Armenian 
poetry, some of which was written by his brother, a student at the Aleksandrapol’ seminary. 
Although Russian investigators devoted little space to elucidating the contents of such 
publications, it appears that they were more Armenophilic—in the sense of celebrating Armenian 
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antiquity and supposed national singularity—than Russophobic, and thus not as politically 
subversive as some of the texts that would be discovered in the next decade. 
Almost concurrently with the discovery of Balasaniants’s group, local police in 
Aleksandrapol’ uncovered a more politically focused secret organization. With the ostensibly 
altruistic but hopelessly ambiguous name “Society of the Noble Aim” (Obshchestvo s blagoiu 
tseliiu), the group had been founded in 1869 by a local teacher, Arsenik Krit’iants.891 Although 
detected and disbanded before it could boast of any tangible accomplishments, the group has 
earned its place in history as the “the first circle dedicated to Armenian liberation in the Russian 
Empire.”892 Meeting every Sunday in their furtive headquarters, which housed a library of 
banned Armenian publications, its members expressed a conspicuously political tone, if yet 
unfocused and unclear to tsarist authorities. With a notably more aggressive stance than anything 
heretofore seen by Russian officials, Krit’iants’s writings called on the Armenian people to 
rediscover the fighting spirit of their ancestors and to shed the domination of the “crafty and 
treacherous Russians, the demented Tatars [Turks and Azeris], and the hateful Persians.”893 The 
group’s forty-three members contributed a small weekly fee used to purchase histories of 
Armenia published abroad, which were then distributed (often sold) to local Armenian students. 
Among Krit’iants’s belongings the police discovered Armenian-language texts and newspapers 
from abroad, including material banned by the censors, such as literature printed in 1866 in 
Constantinople claiming that tsarist agents engaged in the Russification of Armenians.  
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In a new twist, confiscated documents showed that unidentified members of the group 
had given nationalistic orations in Armenian churches. The audiences reacted to these appeals 
with “delight,” receptive to making sacrifices for the sake of establishing poorly defined 
“independence.”894 Krit’iants’s correspondence with other members vented that “the disgusting 
and hateful conduct of the Russians elicits [our] ire and indignation.”895 The police noted that a 
portrait of Hayk, the etiological patriarch of the Armenian people, hung “in a conspicuous spot” 
in his school office.896 The Tiflis court sentenced Krit’iants to six months of incarceration 
followed by two years of police surveillance. Balasaniants and his associates received only a 
“strong suggestion hereafter not to allow themselves to form any organizations without the 
government’s permission.”897 The trickle of isolated reports in the spring of 1875 of possible 
political dissatisfaction among Armenians belied the torrent of investigations, surveillance, 
reports, and flurry of Russian activity that would take place in the following decade in response 
to Armenian incursions into Ottoman territory. 
Frontier Raiders 
Eastern Armenians maintained strong cultural and economic ties with Western 
Armenians, and the plight of the sultan’s minority Christians became a cause célèbre among 
various groups in Russian Armenian society, just as it attracted attention in Europe.898 Whether 	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based on legitimate or sensationalized claims of abuse, the fervor of Armenians and many 
Russians gathered strength in the early 1880s. Responding to the promised yet undelivered 
protections of the Congress of Berlin, Eastern Armenians sought to take matters into their own 
hands. While the Western powers granted autonomy and political self-determination to several 
Balkan Slav nations, such as Bulgarians, the fate of Western Armenians remained uncertain. In 
that age of nationalism, political sovereignty and security became the markers of modernity.899 
The Congress of Berlin, according to historian Jerzy Jedlicki, “opened the epoch of the 
disintegration of empires and the multiplication of nations. The Bulgarians, Serbs, Montenegrins, 
Romanians, Ukrainians, Lithuanians, Jews, and others all began to claim their rights to a separate 
existence, justifying such rights by the unique nature of their cultures.”900 One of the key 
provisions of the accord called for the Ottoman government to ensure the protection of its 
minority Christians, including Armenians. The clause, article 61, in subsequent decades acquired 
gravity for Armenians of the Ottoman and Russian empires. The attention of purportedly 
“justice-loving” Europeans to the Armenian cause, mainly in Turkey but also in Russia, 
remained of paramount importance to Armenian nationalists, who were keenly aware of the 
primacy of the Eastern Question in European capitals.901 One confiscated Armenian publication 
from 1890 chastised Armenians for their inaction, warning that “the nineteenth century calls all 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
later example, published after large-scale massacres of Ottoman Armenians in the mid-1890s, Malcolm 
MacColl, England's Responsibility towards Armenia (London: Longmans, Green, & Co., 1896). 
899Michael Reynolds, Shattering Empires: The Clash and Collapse of the Ottoman and Russian Empires, 
1908-1918 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 17. 
900Jerzy Jedlicki, A Suburb of Europe: Nineteenth-Century Polish Approaches to Western Civilization 
(Budapest: Central European University Press, 1999), 260. 
901The authoritative treatment of this issue in the pan-European context remains M. S. Anderson, The 
Eastern Question, 1774-1923: A Study in International Relations (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1966). 
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peoples to a free life, yet Armenians extend their hands even farther to be chained. In antiquity, 
the voice of the dissenters did not reverberate beyond the horizon, but now, thanks to the 
telegraph and post, the protestations of Armenians can be heard by peoples who love justice.”902  
In this atmosphere arose the faction of Eastern Armenian nationalists determined to aid 
Western Armenians. One of the earliest Russian alerts came in October 1880 from the Governor 
General of the Caucasus (and the tsar’s brother), Grand Duke Mikhail Nikolaevich, who notified 
St. Petersburg about young Armenians’ illegal crossing of the border from the South Caucasus 
into Turkey.903 Half a year later, in April 1881, Yerevan police detained three Armenian students 
who had recently run away from a private Tiflis gymnasium. Under interrogation, the youths 
admitted that they had intended to cross into Turkey to join a band of so-called Van Volunteers 
(Vanskie dobrovol’tsy) in their struggle for the protection of Armenians against Kurds.904 The 
students had collected 300 rubles for the weapons and the journey through private donations in 
Tiflis, and the police report concluded that their appearance in Yerevan had “caused a strong 
reaction in all layers of the local Armenian population.”905 Rumors of similar incidents spread in 
Tiflis, Yerevan, and Aleksandropol’, with Russian imperial agents reporting that donations had 
been solicited for the funding and arming of volunteer units headed to Turkey.    
The delay in the implementation of the protections for Ottoman Armenians stipulated by 
the Congress of Berlin continued to feed the nationalistic fervor among Russian Armenians. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
902GARF, f. 102, 3rd d-vo, 1895, op. 93, d. 1130, l. 23. 
903GARF, f. 109, 3rd exped, 1880, op. 165, d. 707, l. 1. Mikhail Nikolaevich reported that he had taken 
steps to stop their actions. 
904Van is a city in an eponymous province in eastern Turkey. 
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From illicit pamphlets to covert meetings and through the use of the Armenian-language press, 
Russian Armenians’ frustrations at the perceived inaction of the European powers gathered 
momentum. Not uncommon, for example, was an anonymous letter received in March 1883 by 
the editor of the Armenian-language Yerevan newspaper Psak (Wreath). Postmarked in Moscow, 
the letter decried the plight of the sultan’s Armenian subjects and lamented that, in the five years 
since the Congress of Berlin, no tangible steps had been taken to enforce Article 61:  
We see that all articles of the Berlin treaty have been carried out, yet the promised and 
tiny reforms in Armenia, according to Article 61, have been left unattended. We see that 
Europe does not find the time to get involved in our affairs, since it already has too much 
work and issues that must be solved, after all it has its own pressing interests. We notice 
all of this very clearly, yet we wait as if for a miracle from the sky.906  
 
The author equated waiting for Ottoman reforms to waiting for divine intervention, reminding 
the reader that no nation had ever achieved “freedom” (svoboda) without blood and sacrifice. 
“Will Europe really abandon its interests,” asked the author sardonically, “and for our sake make 
sacrifices, when we do not wish to make them for our own benefit? Do not forget that hitherto 
we have done nothing to attract Europe’s attention to the fact that we are capable of independent 
self-determination (upravliat’ soboi nezavisimo), which is one of our main weaknesses that 
Europe points out each time.”907  
 The author’s message was clear: How can Armenians—whether subjects of the sultan or 
the tsar—expect the position of Ottoman Armenians to be improved, which this particular writer 
vaguely presented as independence, when Armenians have not yet demonstrated to the world 
both the dedication and the facility for self-determination? To wait and beg for foreign 
intervention and eventual providence was both fruitless and unbecoming of an ancient nation, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
906GARF, f. 102, 3 d-vo, op. 79, 1883, d. 172, l. 1a. 
907GARF, f. 102, 3 d-vo, op. 79, 1883, d. 172, l. 1a. 
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many believed, and it was Armenians who must make Europe understand that the time had come 
to extend the same privileges to Armenians that had been earned by Greeks. The only solution, 
then, lay in “proving to the enlightened world that the inhabitants of Armenia have been 
penetrated by ideas of freedom, that they too are capable and ready to sacrifice the lives of their 
dear, beloved sons for the sake of freedom. Who can forget those incredible self-sacrifices 
through which tiny Greece returned its former independence?”908 Russian Armenian nationalists 
who focused on aiding their Ottoman compatriots often invoked such examples of the sultan’s 
other minorities. Whether inspired by the struggles of the Greeks, Bulgarians, Albanians, or 
Egyptians,909 Armenians argued that the time had come to follow the actions of those nations and 
break away from Constantinople’s “barbaric” grip. To achieve these aims, Russian Armenians in 
the South Caucasus were called upon to provide “material and moral support” for the cause.  
 Tsarist authorities sought to prevent the crossing of their Armenian subjects into Ottoman 
lands. Wary of renewed hostilities with a traditional foe and seeing little to gain from Armenian 
political initiative, St. Petersburg dispatched Cossacks and Russian border guards to plug the 
porous frontier. But the mountainous terrain aided the undetected passage of small groups of 
Armenians, who often terrorized local Ottoman villagers on their way to attacking Turkish 
garrisons or Kurdish civilians whom they accused of maltreating the local Armenians. Yet, 
despite the Russian imperial regime’s clear disapproval of the Russian-Armenian raids into 
Ottoman lands, St. Petersburg breathed a sigh of relief whenever the Porte, not Russia, found 
itself in the crosshairs of Armenian nationalists.  
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909GARF, f. 102, 3 d-vo, op. 79, 1883, d. 172, l. 2b. 
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The appeals of various nationalists—whether in the form of anonymous letters to 
newspapers or in speeches in churches—gave rise to several small Armenian circles in Yerevan, 
Tiflis, and other regional cities. Attracting the attention of local authorities, these “benevolent” 
societies were deemed to be potentially subversive yet without specific political danger to the 
state. Reporting the results of an investigation into these groups to the ministers of justice and the 
interior in September 1883, the commander-in-chief in the Caucasus, Prince Alexander 
Mikhailovich Dondukov-Korsakov, concluded that the threat of Armenian nationalism to 
Russian interests remained low, because the groups aimed their energies at inducing action 
among Western Armenians against Ottoman authorities.910 No clear evidence yet existed, he 
wrote, of similar goals on the part of Russian Armenians, although the discovery of maps of the 
ancient Armenian kingdom hinted at the presence “among some South Caucasian Armenians of 
vague (neiasnykh) dreams regarding the future reestablishment of unity and political 
independence of both Turkish and Russian Armenia.”911 Nonetheless, Dondukov-Korsakov 
found no evidence of a “serious political organization” threatening Russian interests. Indeed, he 
stressed that “the most limited number” of Armenian youths, including some teachers and 
publishers, could be accused of harboring unclear “dreams,” and that Armenian merchants and 
peasants “are utterly alien to these ideas.” Thus the attempts of Armenian agitators among those 
groups, concluded the head of the Caucasus, currently presented “nothing dangerous and are 
devoid of any significance.”912  
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For the remainder of this decade, Russian officials noted few instances of cross-border 
activities on the part of Russian Armenians, a lull that would be broken in the following decade. 
Fueled by ethnoreligious conflict between Armenians and their Turkish and Kurdish neighbors in 
Turkey, the steady stream of Easter Armenians crossing into Ottoman territory or sending 
material help would pose major challenges for the tsarist regime. Armenian-Muslim strife within 
the sultan’s domain had simmered long before the 1890s, with numerous Western travelers 
emphasizing the interethnic and interreligious conflicts they witnessed. For example, decades 
earlier, William Francis Ainsworth, a member of the Royal Geographical Society, highlighted 
Kurdish raids of Armenian villages near Erzurum. His travelogue pointed out that local 
Armenians had “not only been subject to an authorized vexation and spoliation entailed by 
Kurdish supremacy, but also to frequent incursions of the same predatory tribes; on which 
occasions they drive away all their cattle, sheep, and goats, and treat the inhabitants according as 
they submit quietly to be left destitute, or resist this cruel system of plunder.”913  
Tsarist officials took note of these abuses. In the summer of 1890, Russian diplomats in 
Constantinople and Erzurum alerted St. Petersburg to the rise of Armenian-Muslim violence. In 
one incident that June, an anonymous tip to local police in Erzurum prompted a destructive 
search of the city’s main Armenian church for stockpiled weapons. After some damage to the 
walls and floors failed to produce the weapons, two mobs of Armenians and Turks clashed, 
leaving 15 Armenians dead, including one Russian subject, and over 200 injured.914 The mob’s 	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belief that the British and French consulates sheltered Armenians aggravated the situation, 
resulting in armed attacks on both diplomatic missions. Consul-General Clifford Lloyd 
barricaded himself into the British consulate, armed to the teeth. Although the Russian consulate 
escaped the mob’s wrath that day, it was only a matter of time before these interethnic tensions 
in Turkey directly affected Russian interests.  
In the wake of the skirmishes in Erzurum in the summer of 1890, Ottoman Armenians 
disseminated in parts of the Russian South Caucasus “exaggerated” accounts of these clashes.915 
Roused by the rumors, many Eastern Armenians became convinced that both Turkish officials 
and civilians engaged in the abuse of their Christian Armenian minority. Small parties of 
Armenians, often numbering between ten to fifty men, began to cross into Turkey from Russian 
territory to “avenge” the abuse of their compatriots. They exceeded their ostensible missions by 
attacking, plundering, and often murdering unsuspecting Kurdish villagers along the frontier.916 
Armenians captured by Russian border guards often freely admitted to crossing into Ottoman 
territory with the intention of “avenging the Muslims for their abuse of Turkish Armenians.”917  
Russian responses to Armenian incursions into Ottoman lands in the 1890s demonstrate a 
heightened sense of urgency compared to the previous decade. Despite increased Cossack and 
Russian border patrols, many Armenian units continued to slip through. On 2 September 1890, 
Cossack border guards clashed with a unit of 100 Armenian volunteers attempting to cross into 
Turkey with the intention of “avenging” (mstit’) the local Kurds for their abuse of Ottoman 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
915GARF, f. 102, 3rd d-vo, 1895, op. 93, d. 1130, l. 2. 
916GARF, f. 102, 3rd d-vo, 1895, op. 93, d. 1130, l. 2. 
917GARF, f. 102, 3rd d-vo, 1895, op. 93, d. 1130, l. 6ob. 
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Armenians.918 The fray left a Cossack and two Armenians dead, with the timely arrival of a 
Russian infantry unit resulting in the capture of twenty-seven Armenians and a cache of arms. 
Composed of men from throughout the region and beyond, including St. Petersburg, Yerevan, 
Tiflis, Elisavetopol’, Kars, and Batumi, as well as the subjects of all three neighboring empires—
Russia, Turkey, and Persia—the group’s composition signaled deep cohesion among the region’s 
Armenians. Yet not all members of this unit understood the position of the Russian authorities 
regarding their mission. Confusion and disagreement about Russian approval had slowed the 
group’s advance, until several men deserted when they ostensibly realized that imperial officials 
had not sanctioned their task and that their outfit was hiding from Russian border patrols.919 
Later, some of these men claimed that reading pleas to help Ottoman Armenians printed in 
Russian newspapers convinced them that officials would “look the other way” at their actions.920      
Tsarist officials confiscated from these fighters red epaulettes stamped with the Armenian 
letters “M. H.” Under interrogation, at least one of the captured men admitted that the 
abbreviation denoted “Miiutiun Hayastani,” or United Armenia.921 This discovery pointed to the 
existence of a more organized, and militant, group of Armenian nationalists than Russian 
authorities had heretofore encountered. The missives of the group’s leader, Sarkis Kukunian, 
who was captured during the abortive incursion against Kurds, suggested that his band of 100 
men constituted part of a broader Armenian movement rather than an isolated outburst of 
vengeful chauvinists. Kukunian informed tsarist officials that Russian Armenians armed 	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920GARF, f. 102, 3rd d-vo, 1895, op. 93, d. 1130, l. 12. 
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Ottoman Armenian communities not to encourage an insurrection against the sultan but rather to 
force the Porte, with European pressure, to honor its obligations under the Berlin Treaty. The 
attention of the European community to the plight of the Ottoman Armenians was vital, 
Kukunian contended, for the improvement of their condition. Only the saber rattling of local 
Christians could solicit such attention.922 Not uncommon among Armenians on both sides of the 
imperial border, such views were expressed to Russian interrogators by other captured rebels. 
After traveling from St. Petersburg to Tiflis, for example, Kukunian met Akop Vartapet, the 
leader of an Ottoman Armenian group who had come to the South Caucasus to solicit help from 
Russian Armenians.923 An Interior Ministry (MVD) investigative report concluded that 
Vartapet’s mission had been to gather material assistance to achieve reforms prescribed by the 
Berlin Treaty through terroristic action inside Turkey:  
The entire Armenian population of Turkey, said Akop, is ready to rebel, but they have no 
leaders, no weapons, no material resources, which is why it is necessary to arm Turkish 
Armenians and to organize independent bands, spreading them throughout the Turkish 
empire, for a struggle against Muslims. Without a doubt through this the attention of 
European powers will be attracted and with their help Turkey will be forced to comply 
with Article 61 of the Berlin Treaty.924 
 
Although Kukunian disagreed with some of Vartapet’s strategies and suspected him of 
mismanaging donations, Kukunian shared his fellow rebel’s conviction that Armenian violence 
against Muslims in Turkey must be employed to exact tangible reforms through the application 
of European pressure on Constantinople. Both men travelled from village to village, in the South 
Caucasus as well as in Kars oblast, soliciting donations and making fiery harangues.  
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The ramifications of these actions for the political status of Russian Armenians and 
Yerevan province remained ambiguous to St. Petersburg. The MVD stressed that the captured 
Armenians “categorically deny” any intention “to establish an independent Armenian kingdom, 
although . . . during their first interrogation, some [of the accused] declared their dream for this 
organization of an independent Armenia, but one that excluded those provinces, which comprise 
parts of Russia.”925 Moreover, other captured Armenians argued that their incursion into Turkey 
had been carried out as part of “a kind Christian goal” and intended to attract the attention of the 
tsar, who, in turn, would either secure the “freedom” of the Ottoman Armenians himself or 
would allow his Armenian subjects to rescue their neighboring brethren.926 Having for centuries 
steadfastly served as loyal subjects of the Romanovs, some Armenians claimed, they wished to 
see all of the sultan’s Christians relocated into the tsar’s aegis.  
 Suspicious Armenian initiatives, and the Russian scrutiny of them, transcended the 
political sphere and penetrated the region’s cultural life. Tsarist officials pursued every reported 
instance of questionable nationalistic expression with zeal, from tracking down the teachers of 
schoolchildren accused of singing nationalistic songs to students charged with producing 
subversive poetry. In one example from Kars, Russian officials learned of a children’s song 
whose lyrics invited “Armenians to raise arms for the emancipation of Turkish Armenia” and 
described an imaginary war of independence that would result in “total Armenian victory.”927 
When in 1892 several Armenian schoolchildren in Kars were discovered reciting poetry with 
similar calls to arms, their teacher was arrested and charged with “membership in a secret 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
925GARF, f. 102, 3rd d-vo, 1895, op. 93, d. 1130, l. 13. 
926GARF, f. 102, 3rd d-vo, 1895, op. 93, d. 1130, l. 14ob. 
927GARF, f. 102, 3rd d-vo, 1895, op. 93, d. 1130, l. 22. 
 301 
Armenian organization.”928 In another incident, Russian authorities accused a Kars teacher, Ter 
Akop, of encouraging his students to steal gold from their parents and either use it to travel to 
Turkey themselves or to donate it to volunteer units.929  
 In November 1890, Russian officials discovered pamphlets, written in Armenian, 
distributed throughout Tiflis and surrounding villages.930 Declaring that “the Armenian question 
now enters a new phase; long-enslaved Turkish Armenia demands freedom,” the proclamations 
targeted Russian Armenians. Warning that the time for seeking independence through “cultured 
ways” had ended and that “yesterday’s slaves have become revolutionaries,” the pamphlets 
announced that an “Armenian Revolutionary League” was prepared to shed blood for the 
“political and economic liberation of Turkish Armenia.” Each group within the Armenian 
community was exhorted to contribute: young men were urged to “take up arms,” women to 
“breathe soul into the holy task,” the elderly to “assist with advice,” the wealthy to “give material 
help,” and the clergy to “bless the freedom fighters.”  
 The scope of the Russian investigation into such activities reveals the tsarist regime’s 
wariness regarding the still-unclear political aspirations of its Armenian subjects. Investigations 
into Kukunian’s and Vartapet’s groups, for example, involved not only regional Russian 
resources in the Caucasus but also elicited the active participation of the ministries of the 
interior, justice, and war in St. Petersburg. To track down suspected members of Armenian 
organizations, officials pursued them into “every province of the empire” and monitored 
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suspected Armenian nationalists in such major cities as Warsaw.931 Punishments ranged from 
warnings to months of solitary confinement or even exile. Most members of Kukunian’s band, 
for example, received a month of solitary confinement followed by a year of police surveillance; 
the leader himself was sentenced to two months of isolation.932 The quantity of state 
investigations of Eastern Armenians assisting Western Armenians overshadowed its pursuit of 
other Armenian nationalist subgroups in the last two decades of the nineteenth century, making 
this the largest Armenian threat perceived by the tsarist order. Loosely organized Armenian 
circles seeking a different aim, however, also posed a formidable challenge.  
Unification and Independence  
The most radical strain of Armenian nationalism in the South Caucasus advocated the 
creation of an independent nation-state that fused Western and Eastern Armenia. Although these 
irredentists could boast a less numerous membership than the groups determined to aid Ottoman 
Armenians, they earned their share of attention from tsarist officials in the wake of the closing of 
Armenian parish schools in 1885. Even before then, notifications of Russian Armenians’ 
growing “national awareness” and its attendant threats to tsarist interests rattled St. Petersburg. 
Coupled with the rise of socialism’s popularity among the Armenian youth of the South 
Caucasus, the state monitored their activities with particular attention. The basic question for 
Russian officials remained: which government did Armenian nationalists target? 
In August 1883, the Interior Minister reported to Tsar Alexander III that investigations of 
Caucasian socialist circles had revealed several nefarious Armenian nationalist tendencies.933 	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Among these, the MVD outlined a revitalized effort on the part of the region’s Armenian 
intellectuals to inculcate in their youth “aspirations toward the political revival of the Armenian 
people.” The head of the Yerevan gymnasium, for instance, took measures to check the “harmful 
influence” of Armenian propaganda aimed at promoting “political” thinking among the school’s 
students. Provincial police connected this agitation to an organization of “lovers of the Armenian 
nationality and patriots” (“Haya-ser” and “Azga-ser”).934 Several prominent local Armenians 
were implicated in the investigation, such as the assistant to the Secretary of the Yerevan Circuit 
Court, Ter-Zakharov, the head of Yerevan women’s schools, Hovannesiants, and the editor of 
the Tiflis Armenian newspaper Mshak, Grigor Artsruni. A search of Ter-Zakharov’s home 
uncovered “appeals to the Armenian youth and nation, inviting it to spill blood for the freedom 
of Armenia by taking part in the movement that ought to develop in the near future.”935 These 
writings urged Armenians of the neighboring empires to set aside any differences and to focus on 
the “simultaneous uprising” in both western and eastern Armenia. In the homes of other suspects, 
the police discovered evidence of cooperation between Armenian nationalists of the Russian, 
Ottoman, and Persian empires, suggesting a new degree of political and national cohesion. 
Investigators insisted that evidence pointed to a “total solidarity between Turkish and Russian 
Armenians, equally seeking the reestablishment of their political unity and independence.”936   
Further scrutiny of this case uncovered the genesis of the “Haya-ser” and “Azga-ser” 
groups. In the wake of the Berlin Congress, Armenians in Constantinople and other major 
Ottoman cities had formed organizations to prepare the empire’s Armenians for increased 	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autonomy and self-administration. Once it became clear that the provisions of article 61 were not 
forthcoming, these Armenian groups turned to more subversive measures, such as underground 
printing and calls for rebellion.937 Discovered by Ottoman authorities, these revolutionary 
Armenian circles made their way into the perceived haven of the tsarist South Caucasus. But if 
Western Armenians had been receptive to the bellicose appeals of the rebels, Eastern Armenians 
proved more reluctant, to the chagrin of the recently relocated agitators. From calling for the 
Echmiadzin monastery to be moved out from under Russian control, to demanding a greater role 
for the Armenian language, these groups initiated a rejuvenated effort to promote among South 
Caucasian Armenians what Russian officials labeled “patriotic aspirations” (patriotichekie 
stremleniia). The tracing of the link between Ottoman Armenian rebels and their new activities 
within Russian territory posed new challenges for tsarist officials. If hitherto they had been more 
familiar with their Armenian subjects crossing into Turkey, now Russian authorities had to 
confront the threat of Armenian self-determination movements aimed at altering the status quo in 
the South Caucasus.  
What were the aims of these groups? Russian officials often bemoaned the perceived 
ambiguity of Armenian goals, peppering their reports with such charges as “anti-government,” 
“patriotic,” and “undesired wandering of minds.” However, with the growing quantity of 
intercepted correspondence, particularly among Armenian students, the contours of specific 
objectives began to come into focus for state officials. In August 1883, Interior Minister 
Orzhevskii reported to the tsar that “the existence in the higher schools of St. Petersburg, 
Moscow, and Kharkov of Armenian circles with social-democratic programs aimed at the 
achievement of federal rule (federal’nogo pravleniia) in Russia, through which the dreams of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
937GARF, f. 102, 3rd d-vo, 1883, op. 79, d. 700, ll. 4ob-5. 
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Armenian patriots about the political independence of Armenia will come true, has been 
proven.”938 Evidence suggested, moreover, that similar circles were developing in the schools of 
the Caucasus. But what makes Orzhevskii’s report noteworthy is that it is one of the few pieces 
of evidence of an Armenian pursuit of political autonomy (in this case defined as federal rule) 
from Russian, state-produced sources.   
Indeed, local tsarist authorities in the Caucasus often had to reassure St. Petersburg that 
Armenian nationalists’ efforts were directed against the Ottoman, rather than Russian, 
government. This reflected the fact that the links between ostensibly distinct Armenian 
objectives remained unclear to state officials. Although still convinced that “no serious political 
organization” of Armenians threatened Russian interests, Prince Dondukov-Korsakov, the 
commander-in-chief in the Caucasus, reported to the minister of justice in September 1883 that 
illicit, quasi-political Armenian circles, masquerading as benevolent or philanthropic societies 
but containing a “lining of a political nature,” had popped up in Yerevan.939 Nearly contradicting 
his earlier dismissal of these groups’ potential dangers to tsarist interests, Dondukov-Korsakov 
summarized their main goals as “the instigation of Asia Minor Armenians against Turkish 
overlordship and in providing them assistance . . . as well as moral support in the form of various 
articles of Armenian-patriotic focus in the local press, [and] the compilation of Armenian 
revolutionary instructions and propaganda about the unification and independence of the 
Armenian people.”940 The report comforted the MVD that such groups yet represented “nothing 
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939GARF, f. 102, 3rd d-vo, 1883, op. 79, d. 700, l. 10ob.  
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serious, due to the extremely limited number of their sympathizers as well as because their 
objective is aimed at inciting . . . [Ottoman] Armenians against Ottoman rule. At present there is 
no reason to fear the spread of similar attitudes among Russian-subject Armenians,” although he 
concluded by proposing several preemptive measures to check the further growth of the 
embryonic and “murky ideas about the reestablishment of the political independence of the 
Armenian people.”941 
Tsarist ministries faced not only nationalism imported from across the border by the 
sultan’s Armenian subjects but also its locally developed strains. By 1883, the interior minister 
had reason to alert the royal court to the threat of “antigovernment aims of the Armenian 
intelligentsia.”942 Armenian students in the South Caucasus used various means to propagate 
subversive material, often employing the Tiflis Armenian daily Mshak and the Yerevan 
newspaper Psak. The use of Mshak for Armenian nationalism particularly worried Russian 
officials given the newspaper’s reach: by 1886, it boasted 1,400 subscribers, more than any of 
the other four Armenian newspapers in Tiflis.943 In the imperial capital, too, young Armenians 
were accused of printing “anti-government” material. Students from universities in the Caucasus, 
St. Petersburg, and Moscow were implicated in the investigations. Intercepted correspondence 
between one Moscow University student and his counterpart in Yerevan revealed the existence 
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of a shadowy student group “Unity of Patriots” (edinstvo patriotov). In June 1887, Moscow 
police investigated a group of Armenian students from the Imperial Technical Institute for 
collecting donations for an indeterminate cause.944 In July 1888, the Department of Police 
ordered the Moscow police to monitor the activities of local Armenian students known to hold 
secret meetings with their counterparts from St. Petersburg.945 A student group at the St. 
Petersburg Forestry Institute engaged in “national questions, for which it subscribes to Armenian 
journals and acquires photographs of Armenian poets, ‘singers of the homeland,’” although no 
evidence suggested that members took part in any “revolutionary activity.”946  
There was also indication of less benign student circles in other cities. Two separate 
groups in Moscow, including one at prestigious Moscow University, were accused in the fall of 
1888 of following a “revolutionary program.” Unlike the St. Petersburg groups, which discussed 
Armenian poets and collected money for individual struggling friends, the Moscow groups 
hosted gatherings that lauded exiled political prisoners and read banned publications.947 
Surveillance of one of these groups revealed that it sought donations, mainly from Armenian 
merchants of Moscow, up to ten times per year and could gather as much as 3,900 rubles per 
campaign. Although students comprised the core of similar circles discovered by Russian 
officials, there were also instances of faculty involvement. In March 1895, police intercepted 
letters from an Armenian in Odessa to Iurii Veselovskii, a professor at Moscow University.948 	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This discovery led to the uncovering of a large organization, “Progress,” with affiliated circles 
located in several imperial cities, including Odessa, Kharkov, and Tiflis. Members of “Progress” 
sought to “help Armenian schools through the shipment of libraries, teaching guides, etc.,” and 
strove to “encompass, as far as possible, all of Armenian society.”949 
From the perspective of the tsarist state, Eastern Armenian nationalists in the last decades 
of the nineteenth century sought not so much the establishment of an autonomous Armenia 
within the tsarist empire, but rather the liberation, however defined, of Ottoman Armenians from 
Turkish mistreatment. How can this be explained? On the surface, the contrast between the two 
groups’ existence explains their divergent satisfactions with the status quo: the sultan’s 
Armenians received no security from the imperial order and often fell victim to their more 
powerful neighbors, while the tsar’s Armenians not only enjoyed economic and social 
prominence in the South Caucasus but also earned political clout within the tsarist bureaucracy. 
On a less quantifiable level, however, Russia’s Armenians focused on the plight of Ottoman 
Armenians out of fraternal investment in the betterment of their compatriots. Aiding the sultan’s 
Armenians without the permission of the tsarist state jeopardized Russian Armenians’ position 
within the imperial hierarchy, especially vis-à-vis their Georgian and Muslim neighbors in the 
South Caucasus. Yet a multifaceted and diverse Armenian effort risked their privileged position 
to achieve “national salvation.” With the rise of professional revolutionary groups, these efforts 
took on a more cohesive form.   
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Professional Revolutionaries   
Professional Armenian revolutionary parties, like their predecessors, often aimed their 
energies at the sultan’s domains and avoided confrontation with Russia. In fact, until the late 
1880s, and in many cases beyond, liberal and nationalist Russian Armenians sought reform, not 
revolution.950 Although sympathetic and supportive of Western Armenians’ revolutionary 
actions, Eastern Armenians had no reason to seek secession from Russia. Their successful 
economic situation and social position had earned them resentment from non-Russian neighbors 
and some Russian officials, but these factors had also secured for them an enviable 
socioeconomic niche in the South Caucasus. In an 1890 report to Tsar Alexander III, Dondukov-
Korsakov opined:  
Distinguished by undeniable aptitude, a penchant for education, and the persistent pursuit 
of wealth through all means, Armenians over the past thirty years have acquired a 
dominant economic position in the region. Having understood that whoever holds the 
capital and land acquires significance and strength even in the eyes of the government, 
Armenians have captured in the South Caucasus almost all trade, manufacturing, the 
majority of property in cities and part of land properties.951   
 
To challenge this status quo and strive for an independent nation-state would not be proposed in 
earnest until the formation of the socialist Hunchak party in 1887.952 But the social revolutionary 
zeitgeist of Russia’s multiethnic society in the latter part of the nineteenth century made the 
divorce of Armenian “liberation” movements from other disenchanted groups nearly impossible. 
Young Russian Armenians joined Georgian and Russian-led socialist circles from Yerevan to St. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
950Suny, in Hovannisian, 130-31.  
951GARF, f. 1099, op. 1, d. 587, l. 7. 
952The authoritative Anglophone treatment of the Hunchak and Dashnak movements remains Louise 
Nalbandian, The Armenian Revolutionary Movement: The Development of Armenian Political Parties 
through the Nineteenth Century (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1963). 
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Petersburg. In 1883, when an imperial army deserter surrendered to Tiflis authorities in return for 
leniency, he exposed a large multinational socialist group operating in the South Caucasus.953 A 
Russian investigation found that young Armenians had taken a prominent role in the group’s 
activities, joining their Georgian socialist comrades in establishing underground networks.  
Although their actions often fell beyond the purview of the tsar’s agents, the development 
of professional Armenian revolutionary movements affected the changing Russo-Armenian 
dynamic in the last two decades of the nineteenth century. The conservatism of Alexander III’s 
politics and the international community’s continued inaction over Ottoman abuses galvanized 
previously docile Armenians and gave rise to professional revolutionary parties. These 
organizations boasted well-ordered internal hierarchies and more proactive strategies, although 
their objectives often were no less opaque than those of the South Caucasian student circles. The 
first such group, the Armenakan Party, arose in Van in 1885. While this Ottoman Armenian 
group “did not favor open agitation or demonstrations and did not include Armenian 
independence even as a long-range objective,” it served as an important precursor to the two 
parties that Eastern Armenians soon established.954 The first of these more prolific parties 
appeared in 1887. Formed in Geneva by Russian Armenian émigrés, mainly Maro Vardanian and 
her fiancé Avetis Nazarbekian, the Hunchakian Revolutionary Party looked both to Russian 
populism and Marxism for achieving Armenian liberation. With a nod to Alexander Herzen’s 
periodical Kolokol (Bell), the Armenian party took its name from the Armenian newspaper 
Hunchak (Bell).955 The Hunchaks, as they came to be known, combined two of many Russian 	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955Hovannisian, Armenian People from Ancient to Modern Times, 214. 
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Armenians’ aims: the immediate freeing of Ottoman Armenians and the eventual establishment 
of an independent Armenian socialist state. Unlike the staunchly antisocialist Armenakan Party, 
the Hunchaks envisioned the cohabitation of the sultan’s, the tsar’s, and the shah’s Armenians 
under the umbrella of international socialism.956 Given this inclusive outlook, the Hunchaks 
worked with Eastern and Western Armenians equally, seeking the cooperation of all Armenians 
in attaining an independent homeland. The Hunchaks gained support among various layers of 
regional Armenian communities, but a new party would challenge their domination.  
Established in 1890 in Tiflis by Eastern Armenians, the Armenian Revolutionary 
Federation, or Dashnaktsutiun, contested the Hunchaks’ goals. The Dashnaks relegated the 
question of an independent nation-state to a secondary position behind the urgency of alleviating 
the plight of Ottoman Armenians. Focused on this task, the Dashnak manifesto of 1892, the 
Program, “did not even mention the word independence. It affirmed the need for reforms in 
Asiatic Turkey, but said nothing of complete separation from the Ottoman Empire.”957 As 
opposed to the autonomy and independence pursued by the Hunchaks, the Dashnaks sought the 
type of political, social, and economic reforms in Ottoman Armenia that a dozen years earlier 
had been promised by the Congress of Berlin. Consequently, matters pertaining to Russian and 
Persian Armenians fell outside the purview of the Dashnaks. An important element, however, 
bound the two Armenian parties: terrorism was their preferred tactic for achieving their 
contrasting objectives.958 The Dashnaks, in particular, attacked Turkish officials, soldiers, and 
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even civilians, took hostages, and collaborated with other anti-Ottoman groups, such as the 
Bulgarian-controlled Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization.959 Unlike their less-
organized and less-capable sympathizers in the South Caucasus, the Dashnaks launched attacks 
either from Anatolian hideouts or from within Persian territory; as a rule, they did not operate 
from the tsar’s domain, which explains their relative absence from tsarist police records.960 
Nevertheless, both the Hunchak and Dashnaktsutiun parties were founded by the tsar’s Armenian 
subjects who “had never lived in Turkish Armenia for any length of time,”961 illustrating not only 
this community’s perennial concern for the plight of the sultan’s Armenians but also the diverse 
political development of Eastern Armenians.   
The Closing of the Parish Schools 
  With each discovery of an Armenian student circle with questionable aims and 
potentially subversive intentions, the tsarist state homed in on the perceived origin of this threat. 
Coupled with Alexander III’s Russian nationalism, the closing of the parish schools followed a 
broader pattern of reactionary conservatism, eroding many Eastern Armenians’ dedication to the 
tsar. Convinced that “nationalism and a revolutionary spirit, 'patriotism and populism,' were 
rampant among Armenian students and had to be eradicated,”962 Russian officials targeted 
Armenian parish schools as one of the foci of Armenian cultural and political initiative. St. 	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Muslim residents slaughtered 6,000 of their Armenian neighbors. 
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Petersburg viewed these schools as the epicenter of several coalescing forces: the promotion of 
notions of Armenian political, cultural, and religious antiquity; historical and geographical unity; 
and the inculcation of an inchoate but radical dissident Armenian youth. Priests and even secular 
teachers, imperial authorities charged, reinforced ideas of Armenian singularity—driven by 
Armenia’s status as the first Christian nation—to promote greater cohesion and “patriotism” 
among the students.  
Aside from theological accents, Armenian schools also focused on the well-trodden 
myths of the nation’s metahistory, highlighting the exploits and triumphs of distant kings and 
military commanders, and reminding students of Armenia’s past territorial glory, when the 
nation “stretched from sea to sea.” Former governor of Yerevan province, A. A. Freze, 
summarized Caucasus officials’ stance, warning that Armenian “parish schools inculcate in the 
youth a spirit of intolerance, inflated understandings of the Armenian nation and its future, a 
spirit of resistance to all that, which is not directed at the unification and strengthening of 
Armenians; these schools are the disseminators of counteraction against the government’s 
integration efforts.”963    
 Armenian youths enjoyed a variety of educational options until the mid-1880s. Divided 
between the jurisdictions of the Education Ministry and the Armenian Church, as well as a few 
privately sponsored institutions, a growing number of schools provided scholastic opportunities 
for students from both wealthy and poor families. Growing literacy was a key component in 
Russia’s modernization of the South Caucasus, and imperial agents assigned particular 
importance to education’s role in maintaining a loyal populace. In February 1880, the Caucasus 
viceroy reiterated to Alexander II the political aims of local pedagogy: “[Teaching] must be 	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directed in such a way that education serves not only the advancement of the spiritual 
development of the national masses, but also as an instrument (orudie) of political unification of 
this region with the [Russian] government.”964 It is hardly surprising, then, that the autocracy’s 
strategy to curb Armenian nationalism targeted Armenian parish schools.  
 On 16 February 1884, Tsar Alexander III issued several demands of the Armenian parish 
schools of the Caucasus. Parish schools were defined as “One and two-course institutions of 
general elementary learning, which are attached to churches and monasteries, and maintained 
either exclusively with church funds or with the assistance of the laity.”965 Effectively 
transferring the control of these schools to the Education Ministry, the fiat stipulated that 
henceforth Armenian schools must offer Russian language instruction, relinquish control over 
the curriculum, report data to the ministry, and seek official approval of all decisions regarding 
the hiring and termination of teachers.966 Russian authorities, moreover, now reserved the right to 
remove “unreliable” teachers. The new law prohibited, among other suspect pedagogical tools, 
the use of maps of ancient Armenia or hagiographies of ancient kings.967 Maps, in particular, had 
become common items seized from suspected radicals in the mid-1880s, suggesting that at least 
some Armenian nationalists linked their national identity to the territorial vastness and antiquity 
of the Armenian land.968 When used in conjunction with foreign-published textbooks, these 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
964GARF, f. 678, op. 1, d. 687, l. 27. 
965RGIA, f. 821, op. 7, d. 222, l. 6ob. 
966RGIA, f. 821, op. 7, d. 222, l. 45. 
967GARF, f. 102, 3rd d-vo, 1895, op. 93, d. 1130, l. 23. 
968Christopher Ely has made a similar argument for the role of land and imperial geography in the 
formation of a national identity in the Russian case. See Christopher Ely, The Meager Nature: Landscape 
and National Identity in Imperial Russia (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 2002). Miroslav 	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suspect pedagogical tools were found to be “clearly and quite strongly aimed at the education of 
the pupils in a sense of national separatism and hostile attitudes toward the existing order of 
administration,” as Caucasus head Dondukov-Korsakov reported to Interior Minister Tolstoi.969    
 When in 1885 the Echmiadzin Synod failed to comply promptly with these demands, 
citing the recent death of the patriarch and the temporary absence of leadership before the 
election of a new Catholicos, Caucasian officials shut down 500 schools, where 900 teachers had 
taught 20,000 pupils.970 Tsarist agents justified their actions by arguing that Armenian 
ecclesiastical authorities had resisted state educational policies since the previous decade. In 
November 1873, a law covering the entire Russian empire had required every school to teach the 
Russian language, and, if it offered history and geography, to teach Russian history and 
geography (in Russian). In 1885, Russian authorities contended that Armenian clerics’ protests 
against the 1873 policies had resulted in the introduction in July 1874 of new regulations 
requiring the Armenian Church to submit periodic reports about its educational activities, such as 
the opening and closing of schools, and the hiring and backgrounds of all teachers.971 Russian 
officials charged that, despite an eventual compromise whereby the Catholicos retained most of 
the authority over the schools, Armenian ecclesiastical leaders refused to cooperate and did not 
provide the required information. Thus, with the real and perceived proliferation of Armenian 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Hroch has highlighted the role of geographical divisions in the formation of nationalism. See Miroslav 
Hroch, Social Preconditions of National Revival in Europe: A Comparative Analysis of the Social 
Composition of Patriotic Groups Among the Smaller European Nations (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 2000).    
969RGIA, f. 821, op. 7, d. 196, l. 16ob. 
970Ronald G. Suny, in Hovannisian, 129-30; and also Ovanesov and Sudavtsov, Voenno-administrativnaia 
deiatel’nost’ armian, 183.  
971Novoe obozrenie, 2 March, 1885. 
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nationalism, compounded by a history of Armenian resistance to Russian interference in 
education, the state took its most radical step yet by closing the parish schools in 1885. 
 Despite the “total resistance” of the Armenian Church to state interference in its 
schooling practices, the parish schools reopened in 1886 following the royal petitions of 
Patriarch Makarii.972 Yet tightened surveillance over teachers, curriculum, and even students 
ended Armenian hopes for a return to the relative liberty of the pre-Alexander III order. For the 
rest of the decade and part of the 1890s, several additional steps brought to bear the full weight 
of the government’s authority. In March 1889, a new law required all teachers of the Russian 
language, history, and geography in Armenian parish schools to hold a special license, 
uchitel’skii tsenz.973 Any teacher found working without such certification after five years would 
be removed from his or her position. In March 1891, Tsar Alexander III issued a special warning 
to the Armenian Church to obey this and other laws or face new restrictions. To drive home his 
message, the tsar granted the local Caucasus education curator (popechitel’ uchebnogo okruga) 
and the head of the Caucasus civilian administration authority to close any schools that deviated 
from prescribed regulations, without the preliminary consent of ministers in St. Petersburg.  
Such wrangling over the control of the Armenian parish schools would spill into the final 
decade of the nineteenth century, when in 1894 and 1895 Patriarch Mkrtych petitioned for an 
extension to the 1889 regulations regarding teaching licenses. The ministers of education and the 
interior, in conjunction with the Caucasian administration, used this example of what they 
interpreted as Armenian Church’s dawdling to expand the state’s grip on the Armenian schools. 
In November 1895, the tsar’s ministries ordered that only schools directly supported by the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
972RGIA, f. 821, op. 7, d. 222, l. 45. 
973RGIA, f. 821, op. 7, d. 222, ll. 45ob-46. 
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Armenian Church and the donations of its members were subject to the rules of 1884, with all 
other Armenian schools falling under the same general regulations as all schools in the 
Caucasus.974 Education Minister Ivan Delianov determined that, according to this calculation, the 
number of schools subject to the 1884 law dropped significantly, making it easier to staff them 
with state-approved, licensed teachers. Before his death in November 1894, Alexander III 
supported these measures, underlining in one report, “make no concessions to the Patriarch in the 
schools matter,” and scribbling “approve” near a passage that proposed placing all Armenian 
schools under the authority of the Caucasus education administration.975 By March 1896, as a 
result of the new requirements, 160 previously approved schools shut down.976  
 Although cooperation and adaptation were not uncommon Armenian reactions to the 
closing of the parish schools, the community mainly responded with both overt and furtive 
resistance. Patent opposition came from the new Catholicos of Echmiadzin, Makarii, who in 
1885 argued that the education of Russian Armenians corresponded to broader geopolitical 
interests of the Romanov empire.977 Erudite Russian Armenians promoted the tsar’s political 
interests not only within Russia, contended the patriarch, but also in Turkey, India, and beyond. 
At the same time, covert resistance took diverse forms. Within months of the first closings in 
1885, privately funded underground schools popped up throughout the region.978 As Russian 
authorities took to the pages of regional newspapers to announce and explain their actions, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
974RGIA, f. 821, op. 7, d. 222, ll. 47-48. 
975RGIA, f. 821, op. 7, d. 222, l. 48. 
976RGIA, f. 821, op. 7, d. 222, ll. 57-57ob. 
977RGIA, f. 821, op. 7, d. 196, ll. 17ob-18. 
978Suny, in Hovannisian, 129-30. 
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alongside the official notices appeared advertisements offering private lessons in Armenian 
history, literature, and geography.979  
More irksome for Caucasus authorities were the pamphlets discovered in Tiflis in April 
1885, denouncing the closing of the Armenian schools as “shameful abuse” (pozornoe 
nasilie).980 “The Russian autocracy with its customary despotism closes our schools,” lamented 
the pamphlets, warning that the parish schools have formed an unalienable component of the 
Armenian Church since its inception.981 Likening the parish schools to the sacred altar of the 
church, the letters reminded readers that “from our past we have two sacred things left: the 
national church and the national schools.” The pamphlets accused the tsarist regime of declaring 
war on the Armenian nation: “Alexander III the Despot destroys to its foundation the Armenian 
school; the tsar of a giant state declares war on a tiny nation. But why are we surprised [?]” The 
author charged the government with wooing small nations into Russian subjecthood, only to 
retract gradually these concessions and take away their rights: “What the Russian despots did to 
the Georgians, they are now doing to us, Armenians.” By comparing the plight of Armenians to 
that of other tsarist subjects, the pamphlets connected the current crisis to the suppression not 
only of the Georgian church and language, but also to the attempted Russification of Ukrainians 
and Poles. “With bayonets and spurs, you, Russian despots, were unable to force the Poles to 
forget their language, your campaigns against the Little Russian [Ukrainian] tongue likewise had 
completely counterproductive results,” charged the Armenian letters.982 The authors urged 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
979See, for example, Novoe obozrenie, 2 March 1885. 
980GARF, f. 102, 3rd d-vo, 1885, op. 81, d. 25, ch. 13, l. 1. 
981GARF, f. 102, 3rd d-vo, 1885, op. 81, d. 25, ch. 13, ll. 3-3ob. 
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greater self-reliance: “Let every Armenian family represent a special Armenian school. . . . From 
now on, we ourselves will be our own only hope, from now on we will not trust other, especially 
Russian, governments, and when we, as true Armenians, carry out our holy duty, then, believe, 
Armenians, victory will be on the side of the righteous. Victory will be ours.”983 
Menacing Faith 
The conflict over the parish schools was but the most prominent manifestation of tensions 
between St. Petersburg and Echmiadzin in the last two decades of the nineteenth century. In 
contrast to the preceding decades, the late imperial era marked the deterioration of the Russo-
Armenian political bond based on religious kinship. From the imperial to the regional capital, 
fissures appeared. In December 1883, for example, Yerevan authorities alerted St. Petersburg to 
a change in local Armenian churches’ practice of worship: priests no longer removed their miter 
or kneeled as a sign of deference for the royal Romanov family, as they had done since 1833.984 
This change, the police emphasized, could have come about only with the sanction of the 
Echmiadzin leadership, apparently demonstrating the existence of “solidarity between the leaders 
of the Armenian agitation and senior Armenian clergy.”985 The Yerevan GZhU’s annual report to 
the Department of Police in January 1884 echoed these accusation, charging senior Armenian 
clergy with engaging in “antigovernment” machinations. Yerevan Bishop Sureniants was 
accused of being a “notable member of Armenian patriots (Azga-ser), but the main center of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
983GARF, f. 102, 3rd d-vo, 1885, op. 81, d. 25, ch. 13, ll. 7ob-8. A twenty-three year old Armenian from 
Elizavetpol’ was arrested for distributing these pamphlets, but the source of their printing was never 
discovered. The Tiflis police tracked other anti-government challenges in 1885, such as pamphlets found 
on local barracks declaring that “We don’t need the emperor who does evil to us, we don’t need the army 
that kills us, we don’t need the government that robs us – we need not a monarchy but order.” See GARF, 
f. 102, 3rd d-vo, 1885, op. 81, d. 25, ch. 13, l. 15.      
984GARF, f. 102, 3rd d-vo, 1883, op. 79, d. 700, ll. 53-55. 
985GARF, f. 102, 3rd d-vo, 1883, op. 79, d. 700, l. 55. 
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separatist aims [is the] Echmiadzin monastery, where Bishops Manguni and Nerses are 
distinguished [and] active members.”986 Armenian priests’ publications also attracted the state’s 
scrutiny in the mid-1880s, with numerous bans and investigations launched both by local 
Caucasus officials and their superiors in St. Petersburg.987         
 Yet the geopolitical need to maintain influence over Ottoman Armenians often 
outweighed these domestic concerns. In the early 1880s, the autocracy focused on accruing the 
goodwill of the sultan’s Armenians by affirming the ecclesiastical bond between the Russian and 
Armenian peoples. In the spring of 1883, for instance, the Russian consul in Erzurum, A. Denet, 
urged St. Petersburg to assist the venerable Armenian monastery Surp Karapet.988 The tsarist 
diplomat asked his superiors to donate an ornate chandelier as a sign of Russia’s goodwill. In 
stressing Surp Karapet’s importance to Western Armenians, Denet compared it to the Russian 
reverence for similar monasteries, which “for the people are not just holy sites that serve as a 
source of divine benevolence, but also the embodiment of the idea of its national identity 
(samobytnost’).” Such a prominent position in Ottoman Armenians’ national lore made this 
sacred abbey a unique tool for advancing Russian political interests, Denet insisted, emphasizing 
that “any attention we pay to such a valuable place for the Armenian people cannot but arouse in 
them a burning [sense of] sympathy and gratefulness.”989 The Foreign Ministry agreed that such 
a sign of friendship would “in the greatest sense contribute to the revival of sympathy toward us 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
986GARF, f. 102, 3rd d-vo, 1884, op. 80, d. 88, ch. 2, l. 24ob.  
987RGIA, f. 821, op. 7, d. 182, ll. 10-48. 
988RGIA, f. 821, op. 7, d. 131, ll. 13-16ob. The Surp Karapet monastery, reportedly founded by Gregory 
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among the majority of the Armenian people,” and determined that “a sign of the [tsar’s] attention 
to a holy Armenian place will produce among them quite positive impressions.”990  
 When foreign missionaries made inroads among Western Armenians, Alexander III’s 
bureaucracy shelved its grievances against Echmiadzin to join forces. In September 1887, the 
Constantinople patriarch alerted his Echmiadzin counterpart to the plight of Armenians in several 
Anatolian regions, whose condition had been exacerbated by famine and large-scale fires that 
had swept through parts of Zeitun province.991 The Constantinople patriarch stressed that 
Catholic and Protestant missionaries had increased their activity—with notable success—taking 
advantage of local Armenians’ economic predicament. The Echmiadzin patriarch turned to the 
Russian governor of the Caucasus, Prince Dondukov-Korsakov, who shared the two Armenian 
prelates’ concerns, writing to the Interior Ministry that he wished to “maintain warm relations 
with the senior ecclesiastical leadership of the [Armenian] Church.”992 Interior Minister Tolstoi 
likewise confirmed to Alexander III that this action “completely corresponds with our interests in 
the east.”993 However, on the whole, Alexander’s reign curtailed Armenian religious autonomy.  
 In the spring of 1883, the autocracy reformulated its policy toward the election of the 
Echmiadzin Catholicos, explicitly prioritizing Russian state interests above all other 
considerations.994 To ensure the “direct oversight and influence of the government” over future 
patriarchs, the new regulations called for the number of votes from Ottoman Armenian 	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991RGIA, f. 821, op. 7, d. 131, ll. 23-32. 
992RGIA, f. 821, op. 7, d. 131, ll. 27-27ob. 
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representatives to be reduced, fearing the leverage of “the Constantinople Armenian national 
council.”995 In April 1885, Makarii, the Nakhichevan-Bessarabian archbishop, was elected 
Echmiadzin Catholicos by a margin of one vote.996 Despite official notices that, if elected 
patriarch, Makarii had promised not to “hesitate to sacrifice [his] life to save his nation from the 
Russian yoke, for the time has come to reestablish the Armenian Kingdom,”997 the new prelate 
initially pleased his Russian benefactors with harangues against the impact of nationalism on the 
Armenian communities of the South Caucasus and admonitions against independence.  
Yet tensions soon arose between Makarii and Dondukov-Korsakov over the closing of 
the parish schools. The Russian governor later complained to the tsar that “despite Makarii’s 
undoubted personal reliability (blagonadezhnost’) and his friendliest and heartfelt relations 
toward me, I nevertheless was unable to turn him onto a strictly legal course.”998 The closing of 
the parish schools aroused recurring petitions, complaints, and resistance from Echmiadzin, 
“disappointing” local Russian officials. Makarii’s “remarkable intransigence” (udivitel’noe 
uporstvo) in the parish schools matter eroded what remained of the tsarist state’s constructive 
modus operandi toward the Armenian Church and, by extension, much of the laity.999 In fact, the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
995GARF, f. 1099, op. 1, d. 587, ll. 8-9. 
996GARF, f. 1099, op. 1, d. 587, l. 9. 
997GARF, f. 102, 3rd d-vo, 1883, op. 79, d. 700, l. 68. 
998GARF, f. 1099, op. 1, d. 587, l. 9. 
999Dondukov-Korsakov wrote that with his open opposition to the closing of the parish schools, Makarii 
adopted the antigovernment position of the Armenian nationalists. Specifically, Makarii was accused of 
resisting government orders by formulating his own regulations for the Armenian parish schools, which 
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combination of Makarii’s resistance and the continued subversive actions of lay Armenians 
opened a new chapter for Russo-Armenian ties. The imperial subjecthood and personal 
characteristics of the Catholicos became secondary considerations for Russian policy, 
overshadowed by the activities of the secular nationalists and fear of foreign interference. An 
irritated Dondukov-Korsakov concluded in one report: 
Apparently, the cause of such strange behavior must be discovered not in the subjecthood 
of the elected person to our or another government, nor in the patriarch’s personal traits, 
but rather exclusively in that difficult situation . . . in which the patriarch finds himself 
surrounded by the intrigues of the Armenian intelligentsia that is hostile toward us, as 
well as in the persistent pressure of foreign powers.1000    
 
This acknowledgment hardly implied a change of policy, and the state continued to use 
Echmiadzin to recalibrate the political orientation of the Armenian diaspora.  
The Armenian patriarch of Constantinople occupied an equally important role in Russian 
considerations. When Ariutin Vekhabedian, archbishop of Erzurum, was elected patriarch in 
early 1885, a Russian diplomat from the Constantinople embassy reported to Minister of Foreign 
Affairs Nikolai Girs that Vekhabedian’s selection “can be considered fortunate for us,” given 
that from his days in Erzurum the Armenian priest had corresponded actively with the Russian 
government, declaring himself to be a “zealous guardian of Armenian interests in the East, who 
at the same time values good relations with Russian agents.”1001 The autocracy sought to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1000GARF, f. 1099, op. 1, d. 587, ll. 9-9ob. 
1001RGIA, f. 821, op. 7, d. 164, ll. 4-4ob. Vekhabedian’s election encountered problems when the sultan 
delayed his confirmation of the new Constantinople patriarch. Although the Porte was aware of 
Vekhaedian’s rapport with the tsarist government, the delay was ostensibly caused by rumors that 
Vekhabedian was a Muslim apostate who had been born into a Muslim family and even circumcised 
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patriarch, Vekhabedian resigned in October 1887, citing the Ottoman government’s interference and 
resistance to his authority. The Russian embassy in Constantinople kept a close watch over this “crisis,” 
warning the MID of the potential repercussions for the Ottoman Armenian community.    
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capitalize on the rivalry between the prelates of Constantinople and Echmiadzin. As Dondukov-
Korsakov advised the tsar in 1890, “in time it will be beneficial for us to take advantage of the 
aspirations of the Constantinople and Sis patriarchs to secede from Echmiadzin, in order to turn 
the Catholicos into a blind instrument of our goals (slepoe orudie nashikh tselei).”1002    
To be sure, the 1890s witnessed a new, more acrimonious dynamic between St. 
Petersburg and Echmiadzin. No government edict contributed more to this circumstance than the 
16 March 1891 regulations for the punishment of Armenian clergy.1003 Aiming to target low-
ranking Armenian priests who “avoid carrying out the demands of the government,” or who are 
“harmful to the state and civil order,” Alexander III granted authority to Caucasus officials and 
the Interior Ministry to exile and imprison Armenian clergymen without the consent of the 
Echmiadzin Synod or the Catholicos. Russian imperial agents could use Armenian monasteries 
and “other places,” within and outside the Caucasus, as penitentiaries for this purpose.1004 
Outside the Caucasus, the Interior Ministry determined the length of sentence and location of 
imprisonment, whereas inside the region the head of the Caucasus civilian administration made 
those decisions. Exiled priests were placed under local police supervision, prohibited from 
carrying out public worship or private religious services, and banned from meeting with 
outsiders without the consent of the police. In explaining the new law to one governor, Interior 
Minister Durnovo wrote that it was made necessary “as a result of the Armenian clergy’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1002GARF, f. 1099, op. 1, d. 587, l. 10. 
1003RGIA, f. 821, op. 7, d. 206, ll. 15-15ob. 
1004When Caucasus governor Sheremet’ev sought Echmiadzin’s assistance in compiling a list of regional 
monasteries to be used to house convicted priests, he encountered resistance from Patriarch Makarii, who 
argued that such steps could not be taken without his consent. Sheremet’ev responded by threatening to 
lock up priests not in monasteries but in ordinary prisons. See RGIA, f. 821, op. 7, d. 206, ll. 51-53.  
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observed evasion of fulfilling the laws and orders of the government,” and that it “has been 
deemed desirable especially at this time, when among our Armenians a straying (brozhenie) is 
noticed, which is aroused by the political movements of their compatriots in Turkey.”1005 
Regional Russian officials enforced the new law with alacrity. One of its earliest casualties was 
Yerevan province priest Ter Vartan Vartanov, whom police accused of collecting among local 
villagers large sums of money (4,500 rubles from one village) to support young men crossing the 
border to join “units of Armenian volunteers rebelling against Turkish authority.”1006  
Imperial officials imprisoned or banished other Armenian clergymen in the 1890s 
throughout the Caucasus, Kars province, and in internal Russian provinces. One Armenian priest 
from Kars, Ter Petrosiants, was arrested for receiving from known Armenian revolutionaries 
books banned by the censors, an offense for which he was exiled to Lenkoran for a year.1007 In 
Yerevan, the priest Krikor Ter Nersesiants was charged in April 1891 with recruiting young 
Armenians to fight in Turkey, not only supplying them with horses and clothing but also paying 
each man 20 to 25 rubles.1008 In Zakaspiiskaia province, an Armenian priest named Ter 
Vaskanov was “removed” after declaring during liturgy, “His Majesty the Emperor is not our 
tsar, but the Russian tsar.”1009 Such cases continued for the duration of Tsar Alexander III’s reign 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1005RGIA, f. 821, op. 7, d. 206, ll. 17-17ob. 
1006RGIA, f. 821, op. 7, d. 206, ll. 27-27ob.  
1007RGIA, f. 821, op. 7, d. 206, ll. 30-30ob and 54. Ter Petrosiants aroused particular indignation on the 
part of Russian police, who not only charged him with harboring Armenian nationalistic aspirations, but 
also vented that his home contained “no portrait of the Tsar Emperor and in general had nothing that 
would suggest that this Armenian priest is a Russian subject,” while maps of ancient Armenia and past 
kings decorated his home.   
1008RGIA, f. 821, op. 7, d. 206, ll. 36-37.  
1009RGIA, f. 821, op. 7, d. 206, ll. 58 and 72.  
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and into the rule of imperial Russia’s last tsar. In one example from 1896, Yerevan priest Grigor 
Ter-Avakov was banished to Kutais province for “political agitation among Armenians.”1010  
Related developments in the Armenian diaspora again compelled the autocracy to 
reshape its policies. Unlike the ostensibly subversive activities of low-ranking priests, a new 
challenge for the state emerged from the Echmiadzin patriarch’s seeking to work within the 
imperial system. In February 1894, Patriarch Mkrtych informed Interior Minister Durnovo about 
the recurring pleas for aid reaching Echmiadzin from Ottoman Armenians.1011 Driven from their 
homes by famine and receiving no assistance from Turkish authorities, Armenians of Van and 
Erzurum vilayets (Ottoman provinces) dispatched representatives to Echmiadzin to beg the 
Armenian patriarch for assistance. Arguing that “when people starve to death, even political 
considerations give way to Christian benevolence,” Mkrtych cited the comparably liberal 
policies of Alexander II—“the emancipator of Eastern Christians”—who permitted Eastern 
Armenians in 1880 to collect donations for their Ottoman compatriots. 
Several senior tsarist officials debated this request, weighing the potential benefits and 
consequences of permitting Eastern Armenians, under Echmiadzin’s leadership, to collect 
donations for Western Armenians. When Durnovo sought Caucasus military commander Sergei 
Sheremet’ev’s opinion, a new iteration of state policy emerged. A stern administrator who even 
forbade Armenians to collect alms for the poor without his approval,1012 Sheremet’ev did not 
rush to reject Mkrtych’s request but made clear that Armenian political and social initiative 
would not be tolerated. Sheremet’ev argued that the donation campaigns “can hardly be 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1010RGIA, f. 821, op. 7, d. 206, l. 205. 
1011RGIA, f. 821, op. 7, d. 131, ll. 34-35ob.  
1012RGIA, f. 821, op. 7, d. 206, l. 137. 
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considered appropriate in the political sense, given that the Armenian clergy, as well as the 
secular intelligentsia and especially the teachers of Armenian parish schools, most likely, will 
not fail to take advantage of this campaign as a convenient opportunity for tendentious agitation 
among the Armenian population of national-patriotic feelings.”1013 Moreover, Sheremet’ev 
warned that consenting to this proposal would be detrimental to tsarist interests because it would 
place the initiative with the “quite popular among Armenians current leader of their clergy.”  
But Sheremet’ev suggested not rejecting the patriarch’s request unconditionally. Because 
Russian officials had previously allowed such collections for Ottoman Armenians, their total 
prohibition could galvanize the population and incite renewed tension with senior Armenian 
clergy. Instead, the Caucasus governor proposed acquiescing to the request with the stipulation 
that donations be collected only in Armenian churches and, crucially, that the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, rather than the Echmiadzin monastery and its representatives, be charged with 
distributing the alms to Western Armenians. The tsarist government would appear altruistic in its 
assistance to the starving Armenians, while simultaneously stripping the initiative of the Eastern 
Armenian clergy by taking charge of the donations’ distribution. Sheremet’ev’s proposal met 
with approval from Durnovo and Minister of Foreign Affairs Girs, who forwarded their plan to 
the tsar, securing royal permission for it in April 1894.1014  
 The level of acrimony between the Armenian Church in Echmiadzin and Russian 
officials reached unprecedented levels in the last two decades of the nineteenth century. What 
had previously been a symbiotic partnership firmly grounded in ecumenical solidarity and 
parallel aims had turned into a political conflict. Russian officials linked the rise of nationalism 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1013RGIA, f. 821, op. 7, d. 131, ll. 38ob-39. 
1014RGIA, f. 821, op. 7, d. 131, ll. 43-44.  
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both to the Armenian Church’s senior leadership and to its low-ranking clergy. Former governor 
of Yerevan province, A. A. Freze, was unequivocal in 1892: “There is no doubt that the 
Armenian clergy took, and continues to take, the most lively and active part in the Armenian 
national-political movement.”1015 Given the Armenian faith’s primacy to the nation’s identity 
and Echmiadzin’s centrality in Armenian secular affairs, the empire’s pursuit of the Armenian 
Church marked the nadir in Russo-Armenian ties of the pre-Soviet era.  
Evolved Perceptions and Responses   
The real and imagined rise of Armenian political self-initiative and nationalism altered a 
centuries-old Russian understanding of who Armenians were, what their close association with 
Russia provided to the empire, and what this meant for tsarist policy in the South Caucasus and 
beyond. From Caucasus officials to the tsar and to the periodical press, Russian reactions to the 
deterioration of Russo-Armenian relations shed light on the final iteration of imperial Russia’s 
evolved perception of its Armenian subjects.  
 At the start of Alexander III’s reign in 1881, nearly 730,000 Armenians populated the 
Caucasus.1016 By 1890, through natural growth and immigration the number had risen to 
890,000,1017 reaching nearly one million by the end of the century.1018 Among the South 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1015RGIA, f. 821, op. 7, d. 222, l. 55.   
1016GARF, f. 652, op. 1, d. 236, l. 24. All but 26,000 of these Armenians lived in the South Caucasus, 
primarily in Yerevan province. Just 17,000 Armenians remained in Kars province by 1881.    
1017GARF, f. 1099, op. 1, d. 587, l. 7.  
1018Bratskaia pomoshch’ postradavshim v Turtsii Armianam (Moscow: I. N. Kushnerev & Co., 1898), 
254. The Armenian population in the Caucasus by 1898 is cited here at 985,460.  
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Caucasus administrative region’s (Zakavkazskii krai) population of nearly 4,700,000 people,1019 
Armenians had made conspicuous advancements in various social, economic, and even political 
spheres. Indeed, by the 1890s, Dondukov-Korsakov warned the tsar that Armenian economic 
progress threatened to marginalize Georgians and other national groups. Armenians’ “pursuit [of 
land] is so strong, that into their hands will fall all estates of the impoverished Georgian nobility 
if the government does not come to the [Georgians’] rescue,” cautioned the Caucasus 
governor.1020 Dondukov-Korsakov also pointed out that “there is no doubt that Armenians have 
done much for the revitalization of the province’s economic life and industrial expansion, and in 
this regard we ought to use them (imi nuzhno pol’zovat’sia), but we should not leave out of sight 
their simultaneous pursuit of other aims, [nor should we] forget that for their personal gain 
Armenians do not stop at far from irreproachable (bezuprechnymi) measures.”  
This manifestation of the hackneyed “Jews of the Caucasus” aphorism for Armenians had 
been a staple of the Caucasian social milieu for generations,1021 but its increased use by the 
tsarist political elite signaled a shift not only in the Russian social perception of Armenians but 
also in their political situation vis-à-vis the tsarist nationalities policy. Fellow senior officials 
mimicked Dondukov-Korsakov’s sentiments. The head of the Holy Synod, for example, advised 
the Interior Ministry that “the Armenian nation possesses, like the Jews, a special ability to 
control the market, to take into its hands industry and trade, removing all others, and to act 	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Christian national minority, at 1,170,000. The majority of the rest were various Muslim peoples.    
1020GARF, f. 1099, op. 1, d. 587, l. 7. 
1021A local Caucasian proverb warned: “A Greek will cheat three Jews, but an Armenian will cheat three 
Greeks.” See Charles King, The Ghost of Freedom: A History of the Caucasus (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2008), 148.  
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through deft intrigue in an environment that has insufficient strength to combat or resist it.”1022 
The Yerevan GZhU echoed this sentiment, reporting to Petersburg that Armenians, “possessing 
the natural tendencies of their Semitic race, are engaged exclusively in acquiring profit.”1023      
The Russian political elite’s growing use of this conception of Armenians, analogous to 
the one employed to marginalize Jews, evinced tsarist officials’ new perception of the Armenian 
diaspora. Whereas in the early decades of the century Russian imperial agents, seeking to expand 
the tsarist empire through direct Armenian cooperation, had lauded Armenians’ economic 
success and celebrated it as a mark of Christian resilience in hostile environments, now the 
official understanding of Armenians had changed dramatically. Although Armenian peasants 
maintained loyalty to the tsarist state, the intelligentsia and merchantry were deemed to “present 
no satisfactory guarantees of political reliability.”1024 Armenians’ political prominence in 
regional affairs compounded their potential threat. Authorities were vexed, for example, by the 
fact that of the Tiflis Duma’s 70 vote-wielding members, 54 were Armenian, rendering the South 
Caucasus’s premier city essentially “an Armenian center.”1025  
 Tsarist officials took the first steps to curb the consequences of Armenian political 
“straying” in September 1883. Authored by Dondukov-Korsakov, they were a response to 
Interior Minister Orzhevskii’s warning about the “undesired straying of the Caucasus’s 
Armenian population, which . . . can later become harmful for the state order, having inculcated 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1022GARF, f. 102, 3rd d-vo, 1883, op. 79, d. 700, l. 50. 
1023GARF, f. 102, 3rd d-vo, 1884, op. 80, d. 88, ch. 2, ll. 18-18ob. 
1024GARF, f. 1099, op. 1, d. 587, l. 7. 
1025GARF, f. 1099, op. 1, d. 587, l. 8. 
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in the maturing generation a sense of separation from the general interests of the state.”1026 To 
combat the rise of subversive Armenian movements, the Caucasus governor called for several 
interrelated policy changes. First, in a foreshadowing of the parish school demands to be issued 
by the tsar in a few months, Dondukov-Korsakov urged placing Armenian schools under the 
jurisdiction of the Education Ministry.1027 Second, he suggested instituting “strict supervision” 
over private Armenian societies, including benevolent and philanthropic organizations. Not only 
would local authorities be able to shut down such groups, but they also were to receive monthly 
financial reports from the groups. No new Armenian organizations in the Caucasus were to be 
permitted. Third, Dondukov-Korsakov demanded that Armenian civil servants henceforth not be 
assigned to regions with large Armenian communities and that Armenian bureaucrats in sensitive 
locales be gradually transferred away.1028 Finally, tighter press censorship was necessary to 
ensure the political reliability not only of internally printed Armenian publications but also of 
those imported from abroad.  
 Upon the tsar’s orders, thirteen ministers and senior officials examined Dondukov-
Korsakov’s proposal. Their responses illustrate not only the diversity of the Russian political 
elite’s opinions on this subject but also the degree to which Armenians had become 
indispensable to the bureaucracy of the Romanov empire. The Minister of State Properties, for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1026GARF, f. 102, 3rd d-vo, 1883, op. 79, d. 700, l. 8. 
1027GARF, f. 102, 3rd d-vo, 1883, op. 79, d. 700, ll. 15ob-16. In a separate letter to the MVD, Dondukov-
Korsakov stressed that it was imperative to take advantage of the current absence of an Echmiadzin 
patriarch to carry out the transfer of the Armenian schools’ oversight to the tsarist government.  
1028GARF, f. 102, 3rd d-vo, 1883, op. 79, d. 700, ll. 16-16ob. Dondukov-Korsakov intended to extend this 
measure to other non-Russian bureaucrats of the region, due to his conviction of the “harmful 
consequences bred by the execution of official duties by natives (tuzemtsy) in places of their personal and 
property interests.” See GARF, f. 102, 3rd d-vo, 1883, op. 79, d. 700, ll. 18ob-19.   
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example, hesitated to endorse the proposal and questioned its reasoning, asking for further 
evidence and clarification.1029 The Holy Synod’s Chief Procurator cautioned that “Armenians are 
distinguished by their ability (sposobnost’) and cleverness (bystrota v sobrazhenii), which is why 
it is not surprising that those looking for competent bureaucrats end their search with 
Armenians.”1030 Rather than expelling all Armenian bureaucrats, he recommended reassigning 
them to secondary positions within the regional administration, ensuring their continued function 
but taking away much of their influence.1031 The State Comptroller unequivocally declared that 
its eleven Armenian-heritage employees in the South Caucasus posed no political risk and would 
not be removed.1032 The Finance Minister advised against a rushed removal of current Armenian 
officials in the Caucasus.1033        
 Despite such dissent, the formidable Interior Ministry supported the proposed restrictions. 
In response to questions from surprised officials about the newly suspect Armenians, the MVD 
issued a spirited defense of the measures. “That such aims indeed exist,” insisted the ministry, 
“that the number of believers in the Caucasus in the idea of Armenians’ national independence 
constantly increases, and that this movement interacts with the . . . movement of Asia Minor 
Armenians—none of this is subject to doubt.”1034 The ministry maintained that, given the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1029GARF, f. 102, 3rd d-vo, 1883, op. 79, d. 700, l. 41.  
1030GARF, f. 102, 3rd d-vo, 1883, op. 79, d. 700, l. 48ob. 
1031However, the Holy Synod’s head, who made frequent comparisons between the supposedly subversive 
activities of Armenians and Jews, also suggested that the “currently unlimited rights of Armenians” be 
reduced through a tighter control of their press, which fans harmful ideas.  
1032GARF, f. 102, 3rd d-vo, 1883, op. 79, d. 700, l. 51. 
1033GARF, f. 102, 3rd d-vo, 1883, op. 79, d. 700, l. 45. 
1034GARF, f. 102, 3rd d-vo, 1883, op. 79, d. 700, l. 43ob. 
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“constantly fortifying” and “prominent” position Armenians had attained in the Caucasus, the 
government could not afford to overlook their political self-initiative. The growing economic 
advancement—“which was the main stimulus of the notion of Armenians’ independent 
existence”—gave them unparalleled influence over regional society, and it was the government’s 
duty to prevent this influence from penetrating into the administrative and official spheres 
through Armenian-heritage civil servants, argued the Interior Ministry.1035  
 Yet the very backlash against Armenians signaled their important social, economic, and 
political position in late imperial Russia. Despite the souring of the top-level dynamic, Eastern 
Armenians experienced no large-scale violence, unlike their compatriots in Turkey or such tsarist 
subjects as Jews.1036 In fact, the collective Russian perception—more among the public than state 
officials—continued to see Armenians as Rossiiskie, that is, Russia’s own subjects.1037 The rise 
of Armenian nationalism and professional revolutionaries had blighted the constructive 
atmosphere of the earlier decades, but Russian society by and large continued to coexist with 
their Armenian neighbors and also to sympathize with the plight of Ottoman Armenians.  
From increased scholarship on Armenian antiquity to private Russian campaigns for the 
support of the sultan’s Armenians, Russian society embraced Armenians as Rossiiskie. After 
large-scale massacres of Ottoman Armenians in the mid-1890s, a Moscow-published book, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1035GARF, f. 102, 3rd d-vo, 1883, op. 79, d. 700, l. 44. 
1036For contemporary anti-Jewish pogroms, see John Klier, Russians, Jews, and the Pogroms of 1881-
1882 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011); and Michael Aronson, Troubled Waters: Origins 
of the 1881 Anti-Jewish Pogroms in Russia (Pittsburgh: Pittsburgh University Press, 1990). 
1037Who qualified as “Russian” in the pre-Soviet era was a notoriously fluid understanding, in which 
Armenians experienced the full spectrum of identities ascribed to them by state officials. For an overview 
of the category of “aliens,” see John Slocum, “Who, and When, Were the Inorodtsy? The Evolution of the 
Category of ‘Aliens’ in Imperial Russia,” in Russian Review 2, vol. 57 (1998): 173-90. For a broader 
analysis, see Eric Lohr, Russian Citizenship: From Empire to Soviet Union (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 2012).   
 334 
entitled Brotherly Help for the Armenian Victims in Turkey, rallied tsarist society for aid.1038 It 
not only condemned the “inhumane slaughter by Turks in 1894 of 10,000 peaceful Armenians in 
Sasun” but also celebrated Armenians’ antiquity and cultural contributions. In a subsequent 
volume, about 120 Russian, Armenian, German, French, and English contributors presented a 
wide range of support for the Armenian cause. The famed Russian archeologist Nikolai Marr 
summarized his excavations at Ani, the ancient Armenian capital, emphasizing its rich cultural 
heritage.1039 An obituary of Prime Minister William Gladstone repeated the late statesman’s 
proclamation that “to serve Armenia is to serve civilization,” while Lord Byron’s assertion that 
“Armenian is the language to speak with God” underscored the contributors’ accent on 
Armenia’s Christian identity.1040 Other Russian publications in the 1880s echoed such 
sentiments, highlighting the mutual benefits of the Russo-Armenian encounter. Historian Victor 
Abaza declared that “In the moral sense, Armenians in the East rendered one of the greatest 
services to the Christian world, having remained the steadfast bearers of Christian light, under 
the most unequal multi-century struggle with pagans and Muslims.”1041 Another author lionized 
Armenians as Russia’s “true sons, [who] dedicated themselves to her benefits and interests.”1042  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1038Bratskaia pomoshch’ postradavshim v Turtsii Armianam (Moscow: K. O. Aleksandrov, 1897). A 
second edition was released the following year: Bratskaia pomoshch’ postradavshim v Turtsii Armianam 
(Moscow: I. N. Kushnerev & Co., 1898).  
1039Nikolai Marr, “Ani, stolitsa drevnei Armenii,” in Bratskaia pomoshch’ postradavshim v Turtsii 
Armianam (Moscow: I. N. Kushnerev & Co., 1898), 197-222.  
1040There were also analogous West European English-language publications, such as Malcolm MacColl, 
England's Responsibility towards Armenia (London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1896). 
1041Viktor Abaza, Istoriia Armenii (St. Petersburg: Tip. I. N. Skorokhodova, 1888), v.  
1042I. Ia. Aleksanov, Kratkaia istoriia Armenii s pribavleniem ocherka “Armiane v Rossii” (Rostov: Tip. 
A. I. Adamkovicha, 1884), 107.  
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 Nevertheless, the contemporary political climate left little room for such romanticizing. If 
Russo-Armenian religious kinship had ipso facto cemented the tiny nation’s ties with the Russian 
empire in the first decades of the nineteenth century, Armenians no longer presented the same 
guarantees of political reliability and social benefits that had once made them essential 
colonizers. When disaffected Ottoman Armenians sought shelter in Russia in the late 1880s, the 
state’s responses made clear that such sentiments no longer impacted imperial policy, evincing 
the final evolution of the tsarist state’s perception of Armenians.  
 In April 1888, Minister of Foreign Affairs Girs brought to the tsar’s attention Erzurum 
Armenians’ “indignation, entirely justified by the Porte’s complete disregard of the 
responsibilities regarding Armenians that it has assumed as a result of the Berlin Treaty’s article 
61.”1043 Girs enumerated the myriad ways in which Turkish authorities and locals neglected and 
abused Armenians in Erzurum vilayet, citing the reports of the Russian consulate. When 
Ottoman officials adjudicated cases in favor of Kurdish villagers who had raided and destroyed 
several Armenian villages, desperate local Armenians contemplated emigrating from Anatolia to 
Russia. In light of the prohibitive financial and political obstacles to such a drastic move, the 
besieged community chose to stay put but to convert to Orthodoxy.1044 Seeking the establishment 
of Russian schools and the arrival of Russian priests, the community saw salvation only in direct 
Russian involvement, analogous to the English protection of Turkey’s small Protestant Armenian 
communities. This initiative spread beyond Erzurum to neighboring Armenian settlements in 
Anatolia, including regions bordering Kars province.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1043RGIA, f. 821, op. 7, d. 164, l. 28. Girs’s entire report is on ll. 28-33.  
1044RGIA, f. 821, op. 7, d. 164, ll. 22ob-23.  
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 A suspected leader of the disaffected Erzurum Armenians, a man called Tatos, denied 
both to Ottoman authorities and to the local Armenian eparchy any intention to convert to 
Orthodoxy, but soon he appeared at the Russian consulate to ascertain the position of the tsarist 
government.1045 The Consul General, T. Preobrazhenskii, discouraged Armenian resettlement 
into Russia, warning Tatos of the obligations they would face in their new homeland, including 
taxes and military service. Instead, the Russian diplomat urged Erzurum Armenians to form a 
more cohesive front through which, using legal means, to present their concerns to the Ottoman 
government.1046 Undeterred, Tatos insisted that “the condition of the 10,000-Armenian 
population of Erzurum vilayet is so dire, that only in resettlement in Russia does it see salvation, 
and should the imperial government consent, Armenians will eagerly accept all demands of 
Russian law.”1047 Preobrazhenskii reported to St. Petersburg that nine Armenian villages from 
Erzurum alone, representing approximately 1,800 people, had joined in this request to relocate 
into the South Caucasus, although Tatos had omitted any mention of a conversion to Orthodoxy. 
 The spectrum of the tsarist political elite’s responses to this challenge is also valuable for 
what it tells us about the broader Russian understanding of Armenian theological identity. Girs 
rejected Erzurum Armenians’ plans, not only pointing out the unacceptability of religious 
conversion driven by political motivations, but also arguing that such conversion would do little 
to alleviate their situation vis-à-vis their Muslim overlords and neighbors, potentially causing a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1045RGIA, f. 821, op. 7, d. 164, ll. 23ob and 30.  
1046This reflected the stance taken by Girs, who argued that the main reason behind the Porte's continued 
failure to implement the reforms required by the Berlin Congress stemmed from the divided nature of the 
Ottoman Armenian population. Armenian elites, especially those who lived in Constantinople and had 
connections to the Turkish government, were engaged in internal intrigues and focused on “selfish” goals, 
largely ignoring the plight of their compatriots beyond Constantinople.  
1047RGIA, f. 821, op. 7, d. 164, l. 30ob. 
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dangerous backlash by the Armenians.1048 Moreover, Girs demonstrated greater concern for 
potential repercussions coming from the Echmiadzin Synod rather than the Ottoman government, 
which clearly would not be pleased by Russia’s real or perceived patronage of newly converted 
Ottoman Armenians. The tsarist minister feared the “problems, which will inevitably arise 
among our Armenian population and the Echmiadzin clergy if we give the slightest reason to see 
in us a readiness to support the conversion of Turkish Armenians into Orthodoxy.”1049 Yet a 
different consideration played the decisive role in this debate.  
 Girs emphasized that the relocation of Ottoman Armenians into Russian territory 
contradicted broader imperial policy. The settlement, he wrote,  
of the Caucasus by foreigners (inozemtsami) is undesired, while, on the other hand, the 
Christian, especially agrarian, population of the Turkish provinces bordering Russia . . . 
has always served as a redoubt during our wars with Turkey, and to weaken this 
population [by allowing them to move into the South Caucasus] would be especially 
dangerous because in the event of their departure the Turkish government will not fail to 
ensure the settlement in the abandoned places of Muslims who are hostile to us.1050   
 
Geopolitical state priorities had always eclipsed the desires of Armenians and other imperial 
subject groups, but the new emphasis on the “undesirability” of “foreign” elements, however 
defined, colonizing the Caucasus signaled a departure from earlier policies. True, the region’s 
population had grown significantly since the days of the Persian wars in the first decades of the 
nineteenth century, and little supposedly “untended” land remained, but Russia’s claims of 
concern for the plight of Muslim-ruled Armenians had dissipated with the tsarist state’s claims to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1048RGIA, f. 821, op. 7, d. 164, ll. 30ob-31. Girs feared that Erzurum Armenians, disenchanted by their 
futile conversion to Orthodoxy, would next seek Protestantism or Catholicism in a desperate search for 
foreign protection.  
1049RGIA, f. 821, op. 7, d. 164, l. 31ob. 
1050RGIA, f. 821, op. 7, d. 164, ll. 31ob-32. 
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moral supremacy over its imperial rivals.1051 Girs realized this well, acknowledging that 
“permission for Turkish Armenians to resettle in our territory can be justified only by a sense of 
humanitarianism (chuvstvo chelovekoliubiia). But in state matters, such considerations can have 
but a secondary influence.”1052    
 This incident reflected a broader policy adaptation of Russian imperialism in the 
Caucasus and Anatolia. Since 1882, corresponding to the general breakdown in Russo-Armenian 
ties, tsarist agents had reduced their reliance on Armenians to settle the recently conquered Kars 
province, preferring in their stead Russian colonizers.1053 Russian sectarians had long fortified 
the tsar’s dominion in the Caucasus,1054 but their small numbers were eagerly and successfully 
augmented by transplanted Persian and Ottoman Armenians after each Russo-Persian and Russo-
Ottoman clash in the first half of the century. However, as early as 1872, tsarist officials began to 
question the hitherto condoned relocation of Ottoman Christians—mainly Armenians and 
Greeks—to the Black Sea coast of the Caucasus.1055 By the next decade, Dondukov-Korsakov 
and other imperial agents charged these settlers with “maintaining a predatory and nomadic 
economy, exhausting the land, and moving from place to place.”1056 Soon after the Russo-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1051For early notions of Russian moral superiority against its imperial competitors, see Dominic Lieven, 
Empire: The Russian Empire and Its Rivals (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002).  
1052RGIA, f. 821, op. 7, d. 164, l. 32. Girs’s stance found support from Dondukov-Korsakov and Interior 
Minister Tolstoi, who instructed the Russian consulate in Erzurum to deliver the tsarist government’s 
decision to the local Armenians. 
1053RGIA, f. 821, op. 7, d. 164, ll. 34-35ob.  
1054For Russian sectarians as trustworthy colonizers of the South Caucasus, see Nicholas Breyfogle, 
Heretics and Colonizers: Forging Russia’s Empire in the South Caucasus (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 2005).   
1055RGIA, f. 821, op. 7, d. 164, ll. 34-34ob. 
1056RGIA, f. 821, op. 7, d. 164, l. 34ob. 
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Ottoman War of 1877-78, when small bands of Armenian refugees fled from Anatolia to Russian 
territory, including traversing the eastern Black Sea to settle on the Russian shores of the sea, 
they were forcefully deported back to Turkey.1057 The Russian government instructed its 
diplomats in Erzurum and Trebizond (Trabzon) to make clear to Ottoman Christians in March 
1880 that unsanctioned immigration into Russia would result in their immediate repatriation. 
When this warning had little effect, Dondukov-Korsakov asked the Russian ambassador in 
Constantinople, in November 1883 and again in June 1884, to impress upon the Ottoman 
government the need to prevent the unauthorized crossing of the border by all of the sultan’s 
subjects, whether Muslim or Christian. Fearing that forced deportations of Ottoman refugees 
would have “adverse effects on our politics in the East,” Dondukov-Korsakov petitioned Foreign 
Minister Girs to use his ministry’s resources to check the tide of migrants.1058  
 There is no clear evidence to dispute Dondukov-Korsakov’s justification for the 
transition from Armenian to Russian colonizers of the western Caucasus and Kars, but the 
contemporaneous rise of Armenian nationalism and the breakdown of the state’s partnership with 
the Armenian diaspora cannot be discounted. This is especially true when the ostensible reasons 
cited by Russian officials are lack of proper domestic economy and poor agricultural practices 
among newly transplanted Armenians. The state’s waning preference for foreign Armenian 
settlers of recently annexed domains corresponded to its newfound mistrust of the tsar’s own 
Armenian subjects. Russian officials’ understanding of who Armenians were, and what their 
engagement (or lack thereof) with the state’s imperial ambitions meant, had solidified by the end 
of the nineteenth century into opposition between a metropole and its subject nation.   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1057RGIA, f. 821, op. 7, d. 164, ll. 34-35ob.  
1058RGIA, f. 821, op. 7, d. 164, l. 35ob. 
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Conclusion   
Several interrelated forces in the last decades of the 1800s unraveled the mutually 
advantageous Russo-Armenian affiliation. The rule of Alexander III, with its attendant political 
and social ramifications, merged with Armenians’ growing cultural self-awareness and political 
self-initiative to sour the complex ties between the two sides. In that age of nationalism, the rise 
of a secular Armenian political movement and the autocracy’s distrust of Echmiadzin led to an 
outright indictment of Armenian antigovernment subversion. Armenian students, teachers, 
priests, merchants, farmers, and refugees all found themselves on the receiving end of the state’s 
redoubled effort to maintain the cohesion and vitality of the empire, which it saw as threatened 
by Armenian “straying” from once parallel interests. Even references to the “Armenian nation” 
(Armianskaia natsiia) and the “Armenian people” (Armianskii narod) were crossed out by state 
censors and replaced with “Armenian society” (Armianskoe obshchestvo),1059 further eroding the 
once-symbiotic partnership. St. Petersburg, and then Moscow, would maintain its grip on 
Armenia well past the death throes of imperial Russia, until almost a century later, when an 
independent Republic of Armenia would emerge from the defunct Soviet Union in 1991. 
 The nadir in nineteenth-century Russo-Armenian relations shows that even when the 
autocracy confronted the cultural and political hallmarks of its subjects’ identities, some groups 
continued to derive benefit from their associations with St. Petersburg. Even with their priests 
imprisoned and schools shut, Eastern Armenians collectively enjoy the type of economic and 
social prosperity, as well as physical security, that decades earlier had enticed their forbearers to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1059Ovanesov and Sudavtsov, Voenno-administrativnaia deiatel’nost’ armian, 184. It is likely that the 
semiotic logic behind labeling Armenians a “society” rather than a “nation” or “people” lies in the 
perception of a society as part of a greater whole. An “Armenian society” implied that it was a component 
of a larger, multinational tsarist state, as opposed to a separate entity with unique political and cultural 
characteristics.   
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relocate from neighboring lands. Indeed, foreign Armenians continued to seek a new life in the 
South Caucasus despite Russia’s resistance to their immigration. Even during crises of 
nationalities policy, the state continued to work with disaffected national minorities, presenting 
sufficient incentive to prevent them from splintering from St. Petersburg’s patronage. At the 
same time, however, a new bitterness permeated the Russo-Armenian encounter in the late 
nineteenth century. A sense of distrust and danger on the part of tsarist officials and a fear of 
coerced acculturation and deeper political subjugation on the part of Russian Armenians became 
the norm in the South Caucasus and beyond.
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CONCLUSION  
What does this case study tell us about the nature of Russian imperialism? Historian 
Geoffrey Hosking famously quipped: “Britain had an empire, but Russia was an empire – and 
perhaps still is.”1060 The interplay between national and imperial identities remains an important 
lens for understanding modern Russian history. Unlike the sea-based empires of Western Europe, 
Russia’s contiguous structure clouded the divisions between metropole and colony, producing 
spaces of hybrid identity and unclear power hierarchies.1061 Even, or perhaps especially, when 
Russia flaunted its ostensibly European identity vis-à-vis the inorodtsy (aliens) of its peripheries, 
the lines between “European” and “Oriental” elements remained obscured by shifting priorities, 
shared cultures, and evolving politics.  
Historians disagree about how the Russian government and nation conceptualized its 
imperial domains. Alexei Miller insisted that, by the late nineteenth century, a clear 
understanding arose of “national Russian spaces,” including the western provinces, Siberia, and 
the Volga region, which contrasted with colonial holdings, such as the Caucasus and Central 
Asia.1062 Ekaterina Pravilova likewise maintained that Russian economists viewed the South 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1060Geoffrey Hosking, “The Freudian Frontier,” Times Literary Supplement, 10 March 1995, p. 27. 
1061For some overviews, see Willard Sunderland, “The 'Colonization Question': Visions of Colonization in 
Late Imperial Russia,” in Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas 48, no. 2 (2000): 210-32; Paul Werth, 
“From Resistance to Subversion: Imperial Power, Indigenous Opposition, and their Entanglement,” in 
Kritika 1, no. 1 (2000): 21-43; and Alexander Morrison, “Metropole, Colony, and Imperial Citizenship in 
the Russian Empire,” in Kritika 13, no. 2 (2012): 327-64. 
1062Alexei Miller, "The Empire and Nation in the Imagination of Russian Nationalism," in Alexei Miller 
and Alfred J. Rieber, eds., Imperial Rule (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2004). 
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Caucasus and other peripheries as colonies.1063 Michael Khodarkovsky has contested the 
applicability of such frameworks to the Caucasus, arguing that Russia “failed” in its policies 
toward the North Caucasus because it saw the territory not as a separate colony distinct from the 
metropole but rather as an integral part of the Russian empire.1064  
As this dissertation shows, St. Petersburg conceptualized the South Caucasus as a space 
distinct from Russia but welcomed some of its natives, such as Armenians, into its political 
project. Thus the state’s experience in the South Caucasus merged the Orientalist distancing 
between Russians and the natives with the strategic integration of Armenians into the imperial 
system. Owing to distinct geographical, cultural, and political factors in the South Caucasus, the 
autocracy recruited native allies and viewed them as (a) key to maintaining its regional 
hegemony. This dissertation challenges traditional dichotomies of power and resistance by 
illustrating how Russia relied on foreign-subject Armenian peasants and elites to colonize parts 
of the South Caucasus, thus rendering Armenians concurrently the agents and the recipients of 
European imperialism. Some of this story’s key protagonists, ethnic Armenians in the tsarist 
service, such as Interior Minister Loris-Melikov, served in the Romanov bureaucracy and 
commanded Russian troops, often against their own compatriots. The encounter between Russia 
and the non-Slavic Armenians demonstrates that for Russia “to be” an empire meant to expand 
the categories of Russkie and Rossiane, equally mistrusting and capitalizing upon its ethnic 
diversity. This fluidity of identities can be traced in the evolution of Russo-Armenian relations in 
the nineteenth century.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1063Ekaterina Pravilova, Finansy imperii: Den’gi i vlast’ v politike Rossii na natsional’nykh okrainakh, 
1801-1917 (Moscow: Novoe Izdatel’stvo, 2006). 
1064Michael Khodarkovsky, Bitter Choices: Loyalty and Betrayal in the Russian Conquest of the North 
Caucasus (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2011). 
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Despite religious kinship and parallel political designs, tensions often characterized 
Russo-Armenian ties throughout the nineteenth century. Tsarist agents lauded Armenian traders’ 
contributions to the economic development of the imperial periphery but suspected their 
affiliations with British and French merchants in Asia Minor. The government supported the 
establishment of the Lazarev Institute of Oriental Languages in Moscow but prohibited the 
formation of privately conceived, secular Armenian organizations elsewhere. Tsarist diplomats 
amplified the clout of the Armenian Church in European capitals and Russian statesmen, such as 
Viceroy Vorontsov, befriended Echmiadzin patriarchs, but the government closed Armenian 
parish schools and imprisoned clergy when it detected links between the church and a rising 
nationalist movement in the late nineteenth century.  
Yet Armenians cooperated with Russian goals through much of the nineteenth century 
because Russia represented a real and idealized guarantor of Armenian security and prosperity. 
Whether subjects of the sultan and the shah, or townspeople in Russian cities far from the 
Caucasus, Armenians worked with, and within, the tsarist system to attain a better life. Their 
dreams occasionally turned into nightmares, some of their hopes were misplaced, and zealous 
tsarist agents inhibited sacrosanct aspects of their material and spiritual culture. But as the 
twentieth and early twenty-first centuries have demonstrated, imperial Russia succeeded in 
recalibrating the Armenian nation toward its orbit.  
Of course, gradations of geopolitical “success” depend upon our understandings of 
imperial aims. If the tsarist officialdom sought to construct loyal and docile subjects out of 
ethnically other groups, then the Russo-Armenian encounter ended in failure. After a promising 
start marked by decades of deep cooperation, the dynamic deteriorated into a nationalist 
opposition that worsened over the next half-century. But if the primary goal of Russian imperial 
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expansion was to absorb new groups into the empire and through them increase the economic 
and political vitality of the state, then Russia’s incorporation of Armenians delivered tangible 
results. Indeed, the tsarist patronage of Armenians through most of the nineteenth century 
brought much advantage to these subjects.  
This study demonstrates that, through partnership with such subject groups as Armenians, 
the Romanov empire could merge foreign policy imperatives with domestic growth. Pravilova 
has traced the Russian dilemma between external expansion and internal development, finding 
that throughout the nineteenth century St. Petersburg prioritized the former at the expense of the 
latter.1065 But in the Armenian diaspora Russia gained a versatile tool that required only periodic 
concessions for growth. Russia’s encounter with Armenians shows that the “imperial factor” 
represented not a constraint but a catalyst for progress.  
Although the cooling of Cold War animosities and the opening of the archives have 
deepened our understandings of St. Petersburg’s methods of imperialism, certain key concepts 
remain controversial, reflecting as much the diversity of historical experiences as 
historiographical choices. While recent scholarship accents the constructive and symbiotic bonds 
between Russians and non-Russians, there remains a temptation to echo the accusations of early 
Soviet and Cold War-era scholars, who charged the tsarist empire with “imprisoning” its non-
Russian national groups.1066 The notion that non-Russian, and especially non-Slavic, minorities 
drew advantages from their absorption into the Romanov state remains disputed by some 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1065Pravilova, Finansy imperii.  
1066This was the first, official Soviet position articulated by historian Mikhail Pokrovskii in the 1920s. 
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authors, who emphasize the forced acculturation and political subjugation of various groups.1067 
Such circumstances represented everyday reality for many tsarist subjects, but for other groups 
Russian imperialism brought concrete opportunities, resources, and even liberties, as Nicholas 
Breyfogle, Jane Burbank, and others have highlighted.1068  
While Russians throughout the century branded Armenians as distinctly non-European 
“Orientals,” the government saw few incentives for their coerced assimilation or total 
subjugation. Instead, St. Petersburg recognized its need for the use of Armenians in its 
governance of the Caucasus and in foreign policy. Administration, not civilization, guided the 
tsarist approach toward Armenians.1069 As Alexei Miller has argued, the state’s nationalities 
policy often prioritized political stability and imperial vitality over acculturation, especially in 
the first half of the nineteenth century.1070 While the autocracy pursued a quintessential 
“civilizing mission” in the Far East and elsewhere,1071 and displayed intolerance toward such 
integrated groups as Jews, it tolerated muted displays of Armenian cultural identity because more 
important priorities vis-à-vis Armenians informed its agenda. Even during the conservatism of 
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Tsar Nicholas I (1825-55), the government granted Echmiadzin exclusive rights, such as the 
conversion of non-Orthodox Christians into the Armenian faith. John Klier has insisted that 
under Nicholas I, the autocracy targeted Jews for full-scale conversion more than at any other 
time in the nineteenth century.1072 In contrast, Armenians in the first half of the century 
experienced few analogous persecutions from the Russian state. The combination of religious 
kinship and parallel political interests explains this circumstance.   
   Thus situational circumstances informed the political encounter between the Russian 
state and its Armenian subjects, illustrating the Russian manifestations of the “tensions of 
empire” identified by Ann Laura Stoler and Frederick Cooper.1073 This framework helps us 
understand the ostensibly contradictory statutes and policies that the tsarist empire employed 
toward Armenians in the nineteenth century. Far from a cumbersome yet omnipotent “prisoner of 
nations,” imperial Russia adapted its strategies of rule in response to evolving political 
realities.1074 When the government combined restrictive control with exclusive privileges for the 
Armenian Church, it was responding to the more pressing needs of its foreign policy in the 
neighboring Eastern empires of Turkey and Persia. Despite periodic confrontations, the 
government skillfully adjusted its grip on Echmiadzin in return for political benefits, such as 
diplomatic dialogue and economic access, in countries where few Russian officials or merchants 
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ventured. Yet the adaptability of regulations toward individual non-Russian groups represented a 
hallmark of Russian imperial governance that was not unique to the Armenian case. Eastern 
Armenians lived within the “imperial rights regime” identified by Jane Burbank, where various 
ethnic, national, and religious groups received legal rights and obligations that accounted for 
their historical developments and cultural customs. “Russian imperial law accommodated 
particular social institutions extant in the population. It did not homogenize them but legalized 
them selectively within the whole opus of imperial legislation,” Burbank has stressed.1075 No 
extant social institution played a bigger role in Armenian life than the national church.  
More than a monastic institution, Echmiadzin represented the epicenter of political 
initiatives for the stateless Armenians. Unique in that it exercised real influence over 
coreligionist communities in Persia, Turkey, Europe, India, and beyond, the Armenian Church at 
Echmiadzin became a willing tool of tsarist foreign policy. Within Romanov borders, too, the 
government relied on the Armenian Church to foil the spread of Western faiths in the Caucasus, 
a scenario whose political implications vexed the Winter Palace no less than its dogmatic and 
national ramifications antagonized Echmiadzin. These circumstances place Russo-Armenian 
relations into the “multiconfessional establishment” framework identified by Paul Werth, where 
the government “granted a series of significant collective rights to recognized religious groups 
and rendered the foreign confessions state religions entitled to certain forms of government 
patronage and protection.”1076 In exchange for his cooperation, the Catholicos relied on the tsar’s 
support to secure his institution’s control over the dispersed diaspora. Challenged by Armenian 
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rivals in Jerusalem and Constantinople, the Echmiadzin Catholicos sought not to rule an 
independent Armenia but to submit the vast diaspora to his authority. Consequently, successive 
patriarchs styled themselves pope, not president. Only with the rise of a secular Armenian 
identity and an articulated nationalist vision in the last quarter of the nineteenth century did 
Armenian national interests begin to confront the prerogatives of their imperial master.  
The Armenian encounter with modernity in the nineteenth century, much as it played out 
in other parts of Europe in that age of nationalism, yielded a complex interplay of national and 
imperial identities. In the 1870s among Eastern Armenians emerged a diverse Armenian 
nationalist movement, the most visible faction of which strove to aid the Armenians of the 
neighboring Ottoman empire. The Armenian incursions into Ottoman territory represented 
changing Armenian self-perceptions. No longer content with a passive political framework that 
subsumed Armenian political identity under the domestic and foreign interests of Russia, Eastern 
Armenians took it upon themselves to protect Western Armenians from abuse. Seeing that the 
promises of reform issued at the Congress of Berlin were not forthcoming, and that the sultan’s 
Armenian subjects in eastern Anatolia continued to fall prey to irregular Kurdish militias, tsarist-
subject Armenian vigilantes and activists defied Russian laws to cross into Ottoman lands.   
The concept of “Armenian nationalism” in the late nineteenth century has become almost 
fused to the names of its most prominent representatives, the professional revolutionaries of the 
Dashnaktsutiun, Hunchak, and Armenakan organizations.1077 Yet the history of less organized 
but equally zealous Armenian groups, especially within the tsarist empire, often eludes the 
historian’s attention. This dissertation highlighted a particular subset of the more dilettante 	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California Press, 1963). 
 350 
predecessors and contemporaries of the well-established Armenian nationalist parties in the last 
quarter of the nineteenth century. They too constituted a nationalist movement.  
 Studying Armenian nationalism in the Russian empire challenges those modernist 
interpretations of imperialism that prioritize the pursuit of an independent national home. With 
some notable exceptions, most Eastern Armenians did not seek to secede from the tsarist empire 
that continued to provide a guarantee of security against the neighboring Muslim states. Instead, 
Armenians defied tsarist laws and attacked Turks and Kurds not in hopes of wresting an 
independent Armenia from its two imperial overlords but rather out of a shared cultural bond and 
ethnonational solidarity that sought to protect Ottoman Armenians from real and imagined 
abuses. Theorist Azar Gat’s emphasis on the role of a shared religious identity and the 
recognition of a collective kinship matches Eastern Armenians’ actions in the 1880s and 1890s 
more closely than the modernist definitions of nationalism that require a congruence of state and 
ethnicity—Ernest Gellner’s definition of nationalism—to qualify as a full-fledged movement.1078  
Tsarist officials struggled to define and defeat Armenian political and cultural self-
determination, resulting in a patchwork of policies that rarely yielded the political and interethnic 
stability that the state sought in the South Caucasus. Internal disagreements and uncertainty 
among senior officials produced contradictory assessments of tsarist Armenians’ political goals. 
This hazy perception of imperial subjects’ actions parallels the contradictory initiatives among 
tsarist authorities that historians Theodore Weeks and Alexei Miller, among others, have 
identified in Russia’s western borderlands.1079  	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Indeed, one of this dissertation’s contributions to the study of nineteenth-century Russian 
imperialism is its emphasis on the lack of a master plan emanating from St. Petersburg. 
Throughout the century, senior statesmen as well as regional bureaucrats disagreed, contradicted, 
resisted, and misunderstood how the autocracy should approach Armenians. While ministers and 
administrators often displayed deft flexibility in adjusting their policies according to regional and 
imperial sociopolitical realities, no single vision drove Russia’s encounter with Armenians. 
Across time and regions, the government sought stability and growth—whether the growth of its 
peripheral economy or external political influence—but the strategies for achieving these goals 
frequently remained contested and disparate. To speak of a Russian imperial project is to speak 
of a fluid dialogue that drew as much direction from the agency of non-Russian subjects as any 
state-designed blueprints.  
Beyond the study of imperial Russia, the inclusion of the Armenian diaspora in narratives 
of empire highlights the hazard of multistate nations. At the same time as some ethnic and 
national minorities contributed to imperial growth, the collective identities of large diasporas 
competed with their political allegiances and civic obligations. Bound by cultural kinship, 
economic networks, and even parallel political interests, dispersed nations balanced collective 
interests with individual imperial demands. Every European empire that ruled a portion of a 
diaspora contended with these circumstances, cognizant of the concurrent opportunities and 
threats posed by such formations. Politically fragmented nations that claimed collective identities 
present important avenues for understanding the evolution of imperial methods of rule. 
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Armenians may have been a pawn in an imperial game, but through adroit maneuvering 
Eastern Armenians survived the brutal age of imperialism at the threshold of three expansionist 
empires to emerge as an independent state in 1991. Over the course of the nineteenth century, 
Eastern Armenians sought out Russia’s security, profited from domestic and foreign trade 
beyond the Caucasus, gained access to European education and culture, and despite some 
Russian resistance maintained the inviolable features of their national culture, such as religion, 
that often mitigated the lack of political independence. In sharp contrast to the long hardship of 
Western Armenians, which culminated in the genocide of 1915, Eastern Armenians found the 
better life that their ancestors had sought. Thus the pawn remained standing after the checkmate. 
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